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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §78A-3-102(3)0).

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Under Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a party opposing

a summary judgment motion must controvert the moving party's statement of
material undisputed facts, or else the facts are deemed admitted. USA Power
egregiously and repeatedly violated Rule 7 by arguing about the implication of
PacifiCorp's material facts rather than controverting them. Should this court
sustain the district court's ruling that PacifiCorp's material facts were deemed
admitted because USA Power failed to actually controvert them as Utah R. Civ.
P. 7(c)(3)(A) requires?
2.

As the summary judgment movant, PacifiCorp had the initial burden

of presenting evidence demonstrating that no genuine issue of material fact
existed and that it was entitled to judgment on USA Power's misappropriation of
trade secrets and breach of contract claims. PacifiCorp presented three core
groups of material undisputed facts in its opening memorandum demonstrating
that: (1) another power plant developer (Panda Energy) selected and developed
the Currant Creek power plant site near Mona, Utah, and later sold its project
assets to PacifiCorp; (2) the precise location and technical details of USA

1

Power's power plant, to be located % mile north of the Panda Energy site, were
publicly disclosed in an application for an air permit; and (3) the Currant Creek
power plant was a typical air-cooled combined cycle power plant that was
designed, engineered and constructed for PacifiCorp by Shaw/Stone & Webster
and a replica of the Apex 1 power plant in Las Vegas, Nevada, also designed by
Shaw/Stone & Webster that was under construction well before USA Power
provided any information to PacifiCorp. Should this court sustain the district
court's ruling that based on these undisputed facts, PacifiCorp met its burden?
3.

After PacifiCorp met its initial burden, the burden shifted to USA

Power to present evidence that under the Utah Uniform Trade Secrets Act there
was a genuine issue for trial as to whether USA Power had a trade secret that
PacifiCorp misappropriated. USA Power failed to present evidence that any of its
information was a secret; that the information was not known within the industry,
general public, or readily ascertainable by PacifiCorp by independent means
based upon PacifiCorp's knowledge and experience in the industry. Should this
court sustain the district court's ruling that USA Power failed to meet its burden?
4.

Similarly, USA Power had the burden to present by affidavits or

discovery material evidence that there was a genuine issue for trial as to whether
PacifiCorp misappropriated USA Power's information in violation of the Uniform
Trade Secrets Act or the confidentiality agreement. Unable to present any direct

?

evidence of a misappropriation, USA urged that it be allowed to present a web of
circumstantial evidence that relied primarily on the similarities between USA
Power's proposed power plant and PacifiCorp's Currant Creek power plant,
which was a near replica of an existing power plant in Las Vegas, Nevada. USA
Power offered no evidence showing anything novel in its plans and no evidence
of similarity between its calculations and financial projections and those actually
developed by PacifiCorp and its engineering and construction contractor. Should
this court sustain the district court's ruling that USA Power failed to meet its
burden?

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Supreme Court reviews the district court's summary judgment ruling
for correctness, and views all facts and reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Western Water, LLC v. Olds, 2008 UT 18, U 14, 184 P. 3d 578.
The district court's determination to grant summary judgment on the basis
that the non-moving party failed to comply with Utah R. Civ. P. 7(c)(3)(A) is
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Anderson Development Company, LC. v.
Tobias, 2005 UT 36, U 21, fn 3, 116 P. 3d 323.

3

CITATION TO THE RECORD SHOWING THAT THE ISSUES WERE
PRESERVED IN THE TRIAL COURT
USA Power correctly stated where the issues raised in this appeal were
preserved in the trial court. (USA Power Principal Brief at pp. 1-5.)

STATUTES
The Uniform Trade Secrets Act, Utah Code Ann. § 13-24-1, et. seq. is
included in the addendum at Tab 2. Utah R. Civ. P. 7 is included in the
addendum at Tab 3.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This lawsuit comprises the claims of three related companies, USA Power,
LLC, USA Power Partners, LLC, and Spring Canyon Energy, LLC (hereafter
collectively "USA Power") owned and managed by three individuals who asserted
that their publicly expressed "vision" or "concept" to build a power plant near
PacifiCorp's1 electrical switching station just outside the Town of Mona in Juab
County, Utah, was somehow a trade secret that PacifiCorp misappropriated. On
summary judgment, they were unable to demonstrate that their project was a
trade secret, either as a "concept" or as individual components.

1

In Utah, PacifiCorp operates under the assumed name Rocky Mountain Power in
conducting its retail electricity business.
A

The claims in the case revolve around one of PacifiCorp's many power
plants - Currant Creek - which was completed in 2005-2006 primarily to meet the
growing demands of PacifiCorp's customers along the Wasatch Front. The initial
development work for Currant Creek was actually performed by Panda Energy,
an experienced power plant developer. Panda had intended to construct its own
combined cycle power plant next to PacifiCorp's 345 kV Mona switching station,
but when its economic fortunes turned, Panda sold its project assets to
PacifiCorp which used them to build Currant Creek on the same 240 acre Panda
site.
Currant Creek is a typical 525 MW natural gas fired air-cooled combined
cycle power plant. It was constructed by one of the world's leaders in power
plant engineering and construction - Shaw/Stone & Webster - based on its
standard plant design. In fact, Currant Creek is a virtual replica of the Apex 1
power plant that Shaw/Stone & Webster designed and built in Las Vegas,
Nevada. Significantly, the Apex 1 power plant was already designed and well
under construction before the USA Power entities ever contacted PacifiCorp, let
alone supplied any information to PacifiCorp. An article about Currant Creek that
ran in Power magazine (R. 1852-1855) is included in the addendum at Tab 4.
The USA Power entities were formed by Ted Banasiewicz (deceased), his
wife Lois, and their associate David Graeber, who held themselves out as

5

developers of their proposed, but never designed, engineered or built, combined
cycle power plant on a 40 acre site about % mile north of the Currant Creek
power plant.
USA Power claims that PacifiCorp "stole" their "vision" to build a power
plant near Mona and that their water lawyer, Jody L. Williams, breached her
duties of loyalty and confidentiality when she assisted PacifiCorp, her client of
more than 20 years, in obtaining water for Currant Creek.
In addition to their misappropriation of trade secrets claim against
PacifiCorp, USA Power asserted that PacifiCorp used their confidential
information in breach of a confidentiality agreement; that PacifiCorp breached the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; and, that PacifiCorp was unjustly
enriched. Not one of USA Power's claims against PacifiCorp survived summary
judgment.
On appeal of the claims against PacifiCorp, USA Power only challenges
the summary judgment rulings on the misappropriation of trade secrets and
breach of contract claims.

The Course of Proceedings
USA Power has accurately stated the course of proceedings. (USA Power
Principal Brief at pp. 5-6).

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
PacifiCorp sets out below the same three core groups of material
undisputed facts (with the same numbering) that were presented to the district
court in the Memorandum in Support of PacifiCorp's Motion For Summary
Judgment. (R. 8555-8598).
Panda Energy
1.

In late 2000 and early 2001 a successful power plant developer from

Texas, known as Panda Energy,2 began its development of a combined cycle
power plant site immediately adjacent to PacifiCorp's switching station near the
town of Mona, in Juab County, Utah. The Deseret News reported Panda's plans
in an article published July 19, 2001. Panda Energy's David Barlow Deposition
taken September 6, 2006, at pp. 28-35, 40-41, 51, 83-86, 92-102 (R. 8600-8716).
See, newspaper article about Panda produced by USA Power from their files,
Bates Nos. USA 7341-7342 (R. 8718-8719); see also, Panda Monthly Report,
dated October 2001, deposition exhibit 292 (R. 8721-8733).
2.

By the end of April 2001, Panda had secured options to purchase

240 acres of land next to PacifiCorp's Mona switching station. The site was ideal
for a combined cycle plant because of its immediate proximity to PacifiCorp's

2

For a listing of Panda Energy's successful projects, see http://www.pandaenergy.com.
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transmission system and high pressure natural gas transmission pipelines owned
by Questar Pipeline Company ("Questar") and Kern River Gas Transmission
Company ("Kern River"). See, id.; Barlow Depo. at pp. 35 (R. 8609), 135-138 (R.
8694-8697).
3.

In addition to acquiring land, Panda took the following steps to

develop its power plant, among others:
a.

hired a market consultant (R.W. Beck) to prepare a report

assessing the electric power market within the state of Utah;
b.

hired environmental and air quality firms to prepare an

Environmental Site Evaluation and Planning Report and erect an on-site
meteorological/monitoring station to gather meteorological data to support
Panda's application to the Utah Division of Air Quality for an air permit;
c.

met with PacifiCorp's transmission group in Portland, Oregon,

to arrange for an Interconnection Study at Panda's cost to provide an
analysis of the cost of interconnecting Panda's power plant to PacifiCorp's
transmission system at the Mona switching station;
d.

hired a lobbyist to lobby state and local officials;

e.

visited the Mona switching station with its engineers to design

a transmission path from the power plant site to the switching station;

f.

located the nearby Questar Mainline 104 and Kern River

natural gas transmission pipelines using available maps and visible
markers;
g.

mapped out two alternate routes to place lateral gas lines to

transport natural gas from Questar's and Kern River's gas transmission
pipelines; and,
h.

hired a water lawyer to pursue the acquisition of water from at

least three sources.
Barlow Depo. at pp., 36-39 (R. 8610-8613), 42-67 (R. 8616-8640), 70-72 (R.
8642-8644), 74-77 (R. 8645-8648), 81-82 (R. 8652-8653), 90-91 (R. 8658-8659),
94-99 (R. 8662-8667), 118-119 (R. 8685-8688), 123-125 (R. 8689-8691), and
133-138 (R. 8692-8697); see also, deposition exhibits 284 (R. 8735-8736), 287
(R. 8739), 292 (R. 8721-8733), 290 (R. 8741-8744), 291 (R. 8746-8747), 294 (R.
8749-8813), 295 (R. 8815-9022), 296 (R. 9024-9050).
4.

After all of these pieces of its power plant development were in

place, Panda contacted PacifiCorp's Managing Director of Resource
Development, Rand Thurgood, Ph.D.3, and set up a meeting in Salt Lake City,

3

Rand Thurgood holds a doctorate in chemical engineering from Brigham Young
University. His dissertation addressed power plant combustion. Thurgood depo. at
page 8 (R. 9054). Mr. Thurgood was formerly the director of power plant engineering
for the whole PacifiCorp system. Id. at page 12 (R. 9055). In June, 2004 he was
promoted to Vice President of Resource Development and Construction. Id. at page
482 (R. 9124).

9

Utah. Barlow Depo. at pp. 102-116 (R. 8670-8684). Panda's hope at the time
was that PacifiCorp would be interested in purchasing the power generated from
Panda's power plant under a long term power purchase contract. See, Id.
5.

The meeting between Panda and Rand Thurgood took place June

19, 2001, at PacifiCorp's offices at One Utah Center in Salt Lake City. Panda,
with its maps and engineering design drawings in hand, made a full blown,
detailed presentation to Mr. Thurgood, explaining the size, location and design of
Panda's power plant. Barlow Depo. at pp. 69-70 (R. 8641-8642), 102-115 (R.
8670-8683).
6.

Panda explained the intended combustion technology of its

combined cycle plant based on Panda's standard plant design using General
Electric 7FA gas turbines in a "2 on 1" (also referred to as 2x1) configuration.
Panda explained how it was gathering a year's worth of meteorological data to
support its application for an air permit. It explained how the electricity from the
power plant would flow over PacifiCorp's transmission system from an
interconnect at the Mona switching station. It explained how and where the
natural gas would be transported to the plant from a new lateral pipeline
connected to Questar's and Kern River's transmission pipelines along one of two
routes that Panda had mapped out. It explained how water could be acquired
from Kennecott and piped to the plant. And, it touted the positive attitude of local
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zoning officials to a proposed zoning change and the enthusiastic response tnat
Panda had received from legislative and community leaders. Barlow Depo. at
pp. 102-115 (R. 8670-8683); Rand Thurgood Deposition, taken January 19-20,
2006 (hereafter "Thurgood Depo."), at pp. 115-135 (R. 9052, 9080-9100).
7.

Although PacifiCorp did not have an interest in acquiring power from

Panda's power plant under a long term contract, PacifiCorp did have an interest
in acquiring the Panda project as a potential power plant site for PacifiCorp's
electric generation system. Barlow Depo. at pp. 142-146 (R. 8698-8702);
Thurgood Depo. at pp. 137-141 (R. 9101-9105).
8.

PacifiCorp periodically published its Integrated Resource Plans

outlining the anticipated needs for electric power generation throughout
PacifiCorp's system. As Managing Director of Asset Optimization (later as
Director of Resource Development in 2001), Rand Thurgood had been given the
task beginning in 2000 of assembling as many new resource (i.e., power plant)
options as he could so that PacifiCorp could select from among the best
resources to serve its customers' increasing demand for electricity. Thurgood
Depo. at pp. 51-58 (R. 9056-9063), 67 (R. 9064), 80-81 (R. 9065-9066).
9.

Mr. Thurgood considered all available resource options, not just

Panda. He met with Mirant Corporation ("Mirant") as early as 2001 about a
possible equity interest in Mirant's Apex 1 combined cycle power plant in Las

11

Vegas. In June 2002, while it was still under construction, Mr. Thurgood visited
the Apex 1 plant and he and his team of PacifiCorp engineers investigated Apex
1's combined cycle equipment, plant layout and design. Thurgood Depo. at pp.
99-103 (R. 9067-9071). While nothing further came of Mr. Thurgood's
discussions with Mirant, his discussions with Panda were in the same vein, i.e.,
to assemble as many options for PacifiCorp as he could for possible new
generation resources. Thurgood Depo. at pp. 99-109 (R. 9067-9077), 397 (R.
9120), 465-466 (R. 9121-9122).
10.

Mr. Thurgood spoke with Panda several times between June 2001

and July 2002, inquiring each time whether Panda would sell its project to
PacifiCorp. Panda consistently rebuffed Mr. Thurgood's inquiries until finally, on
July 31, 2002, Panda communicated to Mr. Thurgood that Panda would entertain
selling its project to PacifiCorp. Barlow Depo. at pp. 78 (R. 8649), 142-153 (R.
8698-8709), 229-230 (R. 8715-8716); Thurgood Depo. at pp. 137-141 (R. 91019105).
11.

Negotiations and due diligence followed, and on February 20, 2003,

PacifiCorp acquired Panda's project for approximately $1.0 million. Id.; Barlow
Depo. at pp. 77-80 (R. 8648-8651), 142-147 (R. 8698-8703), 154-158 (R. 87108714). PacifiCorp acquired the following Panda assets: (a) Option Agreements
and Purchase Contracts to purchase 240 acres of land; (b) Environmental Site
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Evaluation and Planning Report; (c) Ground Water Study Feasibility Screening
Study Report; (d) Meteorological and Air Quality Monitoring Quality Assurance
Plan; (e) Dispersion Modeling Protocol - approved by Utah Division of
Environmental Quality; (f) Air Quality PSD Monitoring Protocol; (g) 1-year Audited
Meteorological data from plant site property; (h) Meteorological Tower and
associated equipment; (i) Market Study from R.W. Beck; (j) Transmission Study
from R.W. Beck; and, (k) PacifiCorp Interconnect Study Report. Barlow Depo. at
pp. 156-157 (R. 8712-8713); Thurgood Depo. at pp. 138-140 (R. 9102-9104);
See, deposition exhibits 301 (R. 9169-9175) and 302 (R. 9177-9208).

Spring Canyon Energy
12.

In February 2002, Spring Canyon Energy filed a Notice of Intent

(NOI) with the Utah Department of Environmental Quality, Division of Air Quality,
seeking an air permit for a combined cycle power plant to be located on a 40
acre parcel located approximately V2 mile north of the Panda plant site. The NOI
immediately became a public document. Ted Banasiewicz Deposition, taken
March 6-9, 2006, at pp. 803 (R. 9280), 815-816 (R. 9291-9292), 821-826 (R.
9293-9298); see, Affidavit of Kenneth "Ian" Andrews (R. 4135-4138), including
the NOI attached thereto (R. 4144-4172)4; see also, Utah Division of Air Quality
file for Spring Canyon Energy marked as deposition exhibit 168 (R. 7345-7548)
4

A copy of Kenneth "Ian" Andrews Affidavit is included in the addendum at Tab 5.
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at Bates No. UDAQ0108 (R. 7437), UDAQ0110 (R. 7439), UDAQ0115-0117 (R.
7444-7446), UDAQ0147-0175 (R. 7477-7505).
13.

Spring Canyon's NOI not only identified the location of Spring

Canyon's plant site, it laid out many of the details of the proposed plant. For
instance, it identified the plant's combustion technology based on General
Electric 7FA gas turbines, and it confirmed that the Spring Canyon plant would
have heat recovery steam generators equipped with selective catalytic reduction
systems, supplemental duct firing and a steam turbine generator. The NOI
explained that the proposed plant would take natural gas from the two high
pressure natural gas transmission sources in the area, meaning the Questar
Mainline 104 and Kern River transmission pipelines, and that the proposed plant
would interconnect to PacifiCorp's transmission system at the Mona switching
station. The NOI identified the manufacturer of the proposed plants' pollution
control equipment, the heat input rate for the gas turbine and the duct burners,
and the expected capacities of the gas turbine generator and the steam turbine
generator. According to Spring Canyon's public filing, Spring Canyon selected
an air cooled condenser to air cool, rather than wet cool, the condensed steam
from its plant, because an air cooled condenser uses less water. See, Ian
Andrews Affidavit (R. 4135-4138) and the NOI attached thereto (R. 4144-4172);
Ted Banasiewicz Depo. at pp. 800-813 (R. 9277-9290).
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14.

As part of the air permitting process, a notice of Spring Canyons

application for an air permit was published in the Nephi Times on October 16,
2002.5 Like the NOI, the published notice laid out many of the details of the
project concept. See, newspaper notice in deposition exhibit 168 at Bates No.
UDAQ0032-0034 (R. 7364-7366); Ted Banasiewicz Depo. at pp. 812-813 (R.
9289-9290).
15.

The NOI ultimately culminated in the issuance of an Approval Order

(i.e., air permit) to Spring Canyon from the Executive Secretary of the Utah Air
Quality Board on November 27, 2002. Like the NOI and the newspaper notice,
the publicly available Approval Order laid out many of the details of the proposed
Spring Canyon plant. See, Approval Order attached to Ian Andrews Affidavit (R.
4176-4186); see also, deposition exhibit 168 at Bates No. UDAQ001-0018 (R.
7345-7356).
16.

The first meeting between PacifiCorp and USA Power occurred on

August 22, 2002. This first meeting occurred: (a) more than a year after Panda
made its detailed presentation to PacifiCorp; (b) two months after Mr. Thurgood
had toured the Apex 1 plant in Las Vegas; and, (c) three weeks after Panda had
told PacifiCorp that Panda would consider selling its Mona project assets. Ted

5

A copy of the Notice published in the Nephi Times is included in the addendum at
Tab 6.
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Banasiewicz Depo. at pp. 155-156 (R. 9211-9212). See, Undisputed Facts ffl| 5,
9-10, above.
17.

A week prior to the August 22, 2002 meeting, PacifiCorp's Ian

Andrews requested and immediately received a faxed copy of Spring Canyon's
NOI from the Division of Air Quality. He immediately e-mailed Rand Thurgood
outlining details of the NOI. Ian Andrews Aff. at ffll 3-4 (R. 4135-4138), including
e-mail dated August 15, 2002 (Bates No. 31456) attached thereto (R. 4174);
Kenneth "Ian" Andrews Deposition taken February 15, 2006 at pp. 79-82 (R.
9434-9438).
18.

USA Power met with PacifiCorp a second time on September 11,

2002. At the beginning of the meeting Mr. Thurgood signed a Confidentiality and
Non-Disclosure Agreement with USA Power Partners, LLC. Thurgood Depo. at
pp. 288-289 (R. 9114-9115); Confidentiality and Non-Disclosure Agreement,
deposition exhibit 9 (R. 9452-9455).
19.

On August 21, 2002, the day before their first meeting with

PacifiCorp, the USA Power principals met with Tom Florence of Utah Associated
Municipal Power System (UAMPS) in Salt Lake City, Utah. They handed Mr.
Florence a copy of the same volume of information that they later gave to
PacifiCorp. Mr. Florence and UAMPS did not sign a confidentiality agreement.
See, Affidavit of Tom Florence (R. 4210-4212).

Currant Creek Power Plant
20.

PacifiCorp utilized the project assets that Panda had started

assembling in late 2000 and early 2001, including land options and purchase
contracts, environmental studies, and most significantly a year's worth of
meteorological data, to apply for and obtain an air permit and construct the
Currant Creek power plant on the Panda site. Thurgood Depo. at pp. 111-112
(R. 9078-9079), 124-125 (R. 9089-9090), 163-164 (R. 9109-9110); Bob Van
Engelenhoven Deposition, taken September 29, 2006, at pp. 74-75 (R. 94639464); Ian Andrews Depo. at pp. 160-161 (R. 9442-9443).
21.

Currant Creek was designed, engineered and constructed for

PacifiCorp by Shaw/Stone & Webster, which designed, engineered and
constructed the Apex 1 plant for Mirant Corporation in Las Vegas, Nevada. Apex
1 was completed in 2003. Affidavit of Mark Green at U 5 (R. 4128-4134).6
22.

Like the Apex 1 plant and many other combined cycle plants,

Currant Creek is a 2x1 combined cycle design, meaning it has two natural gas
turbine generators and a single steam turbine generator. Currant Creek and
Apex 1 were both designed and engineered based on Shaw/Stone & Webster's
standard plant design for a 2x1 combined cycle power plant with air cooling.
Currant Creek, like Apex 1, is based on a recognized and proven 2x1 combined

6

A copy of Mark Green's Affidavit is included in the addendum at Tab 7.
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cycle configuration that is well understood and widely utilized in the electric
power plant industry. Id. at U 8 (R. 4128-4134).
23.

Although there are minor differences in output rating between Apex

1 and Currant Creek,7 the plants are essentially sisters. Both plants utilize two
General Electric 7FA7241 gas turbines with almost identical nominal ratings; both
plants have two similarly sized heat recovery steam generators equipped with
selective catalytic reduction systems; both plants have a single similarly sized
steam turbine generator; both plants have duct firing with similar capability; both
plants are 100% dry (air) cooled; and both plants are designed for zero
wastewater discharge. Id. at U 7 (R. 4128-4134).
24.

In 2002, a combined cycle plant in a 2x1 configuration was not a

secret. A combined cycle plant with General Electric 7FA gas turbines was not a
secret. A combined cycle plant with heat recovery steam generators was not a
secret. A combined cycle plant with additional duct burner capacity was not a
secret. A combined cycle plant with a steam turbine generator was not a secret.
A combined cycle plant with air cooling was not a secret. A combined cycle plant
designed for zero wastewater discharge was not a secret. All of these features
of a combined cycle power plant were openly used in the electric generation
industry well before 2002. Id. at U 8 (R. 4128-4134).
1

The minor differences are due primarily to differences in elevation, and higher
expected temperatures and the use of steam injection at Apex 1.
19

25.

At PacifiCorp's request, Shaw/Stone & Webster assembled a

detailed project cost analysis for Currant Creek, which was a second-level design
(i.e., beyond the conceptual or preliminary design), so that PacifiCorp would have
available a cost estimate that was worthy of consideration for budgetary
purposes and in a Public Service Commission process. Shaw/Stone &
Webster's employees began their work on the project cost analysis in late April
2003 and submitted the project cost analysis to PacifiCorp in a large binder on or
about June 9, 2003. Completing this work during the period from late April to
early June was not unusual for Shaw/Stone & Webster. The detailed project cost
analysis utilized Shaw/Stone & Webster's in-house databases and reference
plant designs, and was a normal part of Shaw/Stone & Webster's regular
business designing and engineering combined cycle power plants like Currant
Creek, Apex 1, and other combined cycle plants in the United States and around
the world. Id. at fflj 9, 11 (R. 4128-4134); Thurgood Depo. at p. 182 (R. 9111).
26.

PacifiCorp used Shaw/Stone & Webster's project cost analysis, plus

operational and maintenance information that was furnished by General Electric,
as well as operational and maintenance studies that PacifiCorp had already
performed on its gas fired Gadsby plant, and manpower requirements that
PacifiCorp developed from its Hermiston combined cycle plant in Oregon, and
put this information together with financial information compiled by its financial
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analyst, to form its Currant Creek project. See, Ian Andrews Depo. at pp. 227231 (R. 9446-9450).
27.

Currant Creek is located adjacent to the Mona switching station,

where Currant Creek interconnects to PacifiCorp's transmission system. The
Mona switching station is connected to three transmission lines that are operated
at 345 kV and run north and south along the eastern edge of the Oquirrh
Mountains through Juab County. Green Aff. at U 4 (R. 4128-4134); see also,
CH2MHill Critical Issues Analysis Mona Site, deposition exhibit 363 at Bates No.
PAC004986 (R. 9467-9468).
28.

The route of the 20" lateral gas line to bring natural gas to Currant

Creek from Questar's Mainline 104 gas transmission pipeline was designed by
Questar Pipeline Company. Questar not only designed the route of the lateral
line, it performed the environmental work, obtained the necessary permits and
rights of way, did all of the necessary engineering, and hired a contractor to
construct the lateral line. Questar paid for all of the costs and maintains
ownership of the lateral line. PacifiCorp has entered into long term contracts to
re-pay Questar for the lateral line over time. Deposition of Lynn Arnold, taken on
September 28, 2006, at pp. 4-6, 18-21, 24, 26, 31-32 (R. 9493-9504).
29.

The design, engineering and construction of Currant Creek

represents Shaw/Stone & Webster's own efforts. Shaw/Stone & Webster did not
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use any information from, or about, USA Power, USA Power Partners, Spring
Canyon Energy, or the Spring Canyon Energy project, in any aspect of the
Currant Creek power plant, whatsoever. Green Aff. at fl 14 (R. 4128-4134).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In moving for summary judgment, PacifiCorp set forth 29 paragraphs - the
same set forth in this brief- of material facts. Under Rule 7(c)(3)(B), USA Power
could have controverted those facts and/or provided a "separate statement of
additional facts in dispute." USA Power did neither. Instead, it filibustered. The
district court used nicer words, ruling that USA Power had "employed a practice
contrary" to Rule 7 by "arguing about the implication of the facts instead of
specifically controverting them with the factual record."
On appeal, USA Power now argues that the district court erred in so ruling
because USA Power had literally complied with the form of Rule 7(c)(3)(B). The
gist of USA Power's argument is that because it quoted verbatim PacifiCorp's
facts, "provided an explanation" of its position, and had citations to the record,
there must be questions of material fact. But, to use an appropriate cliche, that
elevates form over substance. Following the form of the rule does not mean that
the facts were controverted. Although USA Power repeatedly used the word
"disputed" followed by a lengthy text with references to the record, a careful
reading of USA Power's responses, which the district court clearly performed,
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shows that USA Power did not convert any of the material facts cited in
PacifiCorp's 29 paragraphs. Therefore, as the district court held, PacifiCorp's
three core groups of material facts were deemed admitted.
USA Power's abuse of Rule 7 required the district court, in its words, "to
engage in the tedious practice of separating fact from argument." In this brief we
have attempted to reduce the tedium by using examples of USA Power's abuse.
But unfortunately, this Court will of necessity be forced to review many of
PacifiCorp's material facts and USA Power's purported "dispute" with those
material facts. But reading USA Power's lengthy responses to PacifiCorp's
material facts and concluding that, despite all the words used, USA Power has
not actually controverted the material facts is not making "credibility"
determinations or "weighing" the evidence. Rather, it is, in the district court's
words, "separating fact from argument." And, just because USA Power cites to
many other "facts," some of which may have been undisputed, does not
necessarily controvert PacifiCorp's material facts.
Thus, as detailed below, the district court correctly held that three core
groups of facts were uncontroverted: (1) Panda had the idea first of building a
power plant near Mona and had assembled the assets necessary to build such a
plant, except for the water. PacifiCorp acquired Panda's development assets; (2)
USA Power publicly disclosed the technical details of its power plant when it filed
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for an air permit; (3) PacifiCorp's power plant was designed and built by
Shaw/Stone & Webster. Shaw/Stone & Webster had already designed and
commenced construction on Apex I, a nearly identical power plant in Las Vegas,
before USA Power ever provided any information to PacifiCorp.
Faced with these three core groups of facts being uncontroverted, USA
Power struggled before the district court, and now on appeal, to say what was
secret and what PacifiCorp used. It argued below (and again on appeal) that
because PacifiCorp considered buying USA Power's development rights (as it
had bought Panda's development rights), something USA Power had must be a
trade secret. That argument fails both logically and factually. USA Power had,
among other things, options on land and water and an approved air permit from
the State of Utah. All had value, but none was a trade secret.
The district court repeatedly asked counsel for USA Power to describe just
what was secret and what PacifiCorp improperly used. Counsel's response was
"the entire concept," and particularly the air-cooling, were trade secrets stolen by
PacifiCorp. But as the undisputed facts show, the "concept" or "vision" of a
power plant near Mona was never a trade secret. Panda had it first and USA
Power clearly disclosed its entire concept when it filed for an air permit. And aircooling was not secret either. It was fully disclosed in the air permit and
Shaw/Stone & Webster was already using it at Apex 1. Nor were any of the
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other things USA Power now claims to be secret because they were not
expressly disclosed in the air permit. We take up each of them and demonstrate
that they were not secret.
Finally, USA Power claims that while its many facts may not controvert
PacifiCorp's material facts, USA Power's facts create circumstantial evidence of
trade secrets and that PacifiCorp wrongfully misappropriated such secrets.
First, there is no authority from any court that circumstantial evidence can create
evidence of the existence of a trade secret. The use of circumstantial evidence
is only allowed after the predicate of a trade secret is established. The law in
Utah is clear that the plaintiff has the burden to prove by direct evidence that it
has a trade secret. What some courts have said is that because there is seldom
a "smoking gun" proving misappropriation, misappropriation can be shown
circumstantially by comparing what is truly secret with what the defendant did.
Therefore, whether or not Utah would accept circumstantial evidence to prove
misappropriation is irrelevant here since USA Power never offered evidence of a
trade secret. Second, the district court did accept USA Power's argument that
circumstantial evidence could be used to show misappropriation, but held that
USA Power's proffered circumstantial evidence was nothing more than
speculation and argument. Similarities between the two power plant projects
was not enough. There must have been similarities between both projects of
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something that was innovative or secret. Nor was it enough to contend that
because USA Power did various calculations that were not publicly disclosed,
PacifiCorp "must have used" these calculations in order to build its power plant.
As detailed below, these were not secret calculations and even if they were, USA
Power never offered evidence comparing the water balances, energy penalty and
performance curves done by or on behalf of PacifiCorp to show that they were
similar to those done by or on behalf of USA Power.
In sum, USA Power never presented evidence to the district court from
which a jury could find a trade secret, let alone evidence that showed that
PacifiCorp used anything that was secret. On appeal, USA Power does no
better. The district court should be affirmed.

ARGUMENT

I.

PACIFICORP'S UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS WERE DEEMED
ADMITTED BECAUSE THEY WERE NOT CONTROVERTED.
A party opposing a summary judgment motion is required by Utah R. Civ.

P. 7(c)(3)(A) to actually controvert the movant's material undisputed facts, or else
those facts are deemed admitted. PacifiCorp's material facts were very specific
and were incontrovertible. So, instead of controverting them, USA Power
quibbled about the phrasing, stated that certain facts were disputed without
demonstrating how or why, or in most instances repetitiously argued that
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PacifiCorp "must have" stolen USA Power's information. The district court was
not fooled.
A.

PacifiCorp's Material Facts Were Incontrovertible.

In its opening summary judgment memorandum (R. 8555-8598),
PacifiCorp provided twenty-nine (29) statements of undisputed facts (the same
facts that are set forth above), each supported by sworn affidavits or appropriate
deposition or other documentary evidence. In their opposition memorandum
(R.5904-5995), USA Power responded with a specific statement that they did not
dispute five (5) paragraphs of the undisputed facts.8 USA Power also omitted
any mention of three (3) paragraphs of undisputed facts, thus admitting them.9
Although USA Power purported to controvert the remaining paragraphs,
the district court, after carefully reviewing what USA Power had submitted, found
that USA Power had not actually controverted twenty (20) paragraphs,10 and
therefore deemed those paragraphs as admitted.11 (Memorandum Decision at
pp. 5-7, R. 7599-7624, included in addendum at Tab 1).

B
9
10
11

i.e., paragraphs 12, 13, 14, 15, and 25.
i.e., paragraphs 18, 27 and 28.
(i.e., paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 17, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27,
28, 29.
There were only three paragraphs of undisputed facts (i.e., paragraphs 4, 16, and
19) that were either not specifically admitted by USA Power or were not found by the
district court to be deemed admitted. We have included in the addendum at Tab 8 a
verbatim restatement of these undisputed facts and USA Power's responses. It is
readily apparent that these three paragraphs were also not controverted by USA
Power.
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According to the district court those undisputed facts established the
following three core matters which met PacifiCorp's burden of presenting
evidence that no genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether USA Power
had any trade secrets, or that PacifiCorp used any information about USA
Power's power plant project:
(1)

The undisputed facts identified Panda's independent

development of a power plant in Mona, next to PacifiCorp's electrical
transmission station, PacifiCorp's knowledge of Panda's development
before ever meeting with the USA Power principals, and PacifiCorp's
ultimate purchase of Panda's assets necessary for the development of the
Currant Creek power plant in Mona. (Memorandum Decision at pp. 5-6);
(2)

The undisputed facts confirmed that Shaw/Stone & Webster

designed and built a virtually identical sister plant to Currant Creek, known
as the Apex 1 power plant, in Las Vegas, Nevada, that was already
designed and under construction before the USA Power principals first met
with PacifiCorp. The Currant Creek power plant represented PacifiCorp's
and Shaw/Stone & Webster's own work. The Currant Creek power plant
and the Apex 1 power plant, with all of their own component parts and
technologies, were well understood and widely utilized in the electric power
plant industry. The design, engineering and construction of the Currant
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Creek power plant was not based upon nor utilized any information from or
about USA Power. (Memorandum Decision at pp. 6-7);
(3)

The undisputed facts identified USA Power's public filings with

the Utah Division of Air Quality, including its application for an air permit,
which confirmed that USA Power's "concept," "vision," and claimed
confidential information, were of public record, and were disclosed to
PacifiCorp by the public record. (Memorandum Decision at p. 7)

B.

Utah R. Civ. P. 7 Required USA Power to Actually Controvert the
Material Undisputed Facts.

On summary judgment, if the responding party fails to controvert the
moving party's material facts, the facts are deemed admitted. Utah R. Civ. P.
7(c)(3)(A).
In Bluffdale City v. Smith, 2007 UT App 25, 156 P. 3d 175,12 the court of
appeals reviewed prior case law, Rule 4-501 of the Rules of Judicial
Administration, and Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and concluded
that the district court has discretion for a responding party's failure to comply with
the Rule 7; it may grant the motion for summary judgment based on the other
side's failure to comply with the requirements of the rule, or it may decide the
motion on the merits. Id. 2007 UT App. 25 at "fl 9; see also, Salt Lake County v.

12

Included in the addendum at .
TO

Metro West Ready Mix, Inc., 2004 UT 23, 89 P. 3d 155; Anderson Development
Co. v. Tobias, 2005 UT 36, 116 P.3d 323. If the party opposing the motion for
summary judgment fails to substantially comply with Rule 7, and the failure
amounts to more than just a technical violation of the rule, the court is clearly
justified in granting the motion for summary judgment for non-compliance with
the rule. Id. at TJ12. Regardless of which course the district court takes, the law
remains that "motions for summary judgment should be granted when 'there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law'." Id. at fl 4.
USA Power argues on appeal that the district court erred because it
wrongly insisted that USA Power had to "specifically" controvert PacifiCorp's
facts. USA Power contends that all it needed to do to survive summary judgment
was restate PacifiCorp's facts verbatim, give an explanation of the grounds for
any dispute, and support the explanation with affidavits and discovery material.
But the explanation of the grounds for the dispute and the cited evidence must
actually controvert the moving party's material facts, otherwise Rule 7(c)(3)(A)
and the word "controverted" have no meaning.
When Rule 4-501 was replaced, the procedural content of the rule was
located in Utah R. Civ. P. 7(c)(3)(A) and (c)(3)(B). See id, fl 5, fn 1. While
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revised Rule 7(c)(3)(A)13 does not use the word "specifically" controverted as did
Rule 4-501, 14 the two rules are comparable and the meaning of Rule 7 has not
changed. Id. fl 8. The burden is still on the responding party to show that the
fact is controverted, and to do so in a coherent manner. Id. fl 11.
What the district court was looking for in USA Power's motion papers was
an actual dispute about PacifiCorp's material facts. Instead, USA Power
quibbled about PacifiCorp's phrasing, speculated about PacifiCorp's motives,
and repetitiously argued USA Power's view of the world that was supposed to
circumstantially prove that their asserted trade secrets had been
misappropriated. The district court correctly observed that USA Power had not
followed the rule:
"[Plaintiffs have employed the practice contrary to Rule 7(c)(3)(A) of
arguing about the implication of the facts asserted instead of
"specifically controverting" them with the factual record. This
practice has required the Court to engage in the tedious exercise of

13

Rule 7(c)(3)(A) reads in relevant part: "[EJach fact set forth in the moving party's
memorandum is deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless
controverted by the responding party." Utah R. Civ. P. 7(c)(3)(A). (underline added).

14

Rule 4-501 required the party opposing a summary judgment motion to begin its
opposition memorandum with a section containing a verbatim restatement of each of
the movant's facts to which the non-movant claimed a genuine issue existed,
followed by a concise statement of material facts which supported the non-movant's
contention. All material facts set forth in the movant's statement that were properly
supported by an accurate reference to the record were deemed admitted for the
purpose of summary judgment unless they were "specifically controverted" by the
opposing party's statement. Utah R. Jud. Admin. 4-501 (2)(B) (repealed) (included in
the addendum at Tab 10).
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separating fact from argument throughout plaintiffs' Memorandum in
opposition."
Memorandum Decision at page 5.
C.

Specific Examples Demonstrate USA Power's Non-Compliance With
Rule 7.

USA Power's blatant failure to follow Rule 7 can be found by examining
USA Power's responses to the material undisputed facts.
By way of example, we examine some of USA Power's responses to the
undisputed material facts to demonstrate USA Power's non-compliance with the
rule.
1.

The Uncontroverted Material Facts About Panda Energy.

PacifiCorp separated its undisputed material facts into three core groups
that demonstrated that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The first
group of facts - undisputed facts nos. 1 through 1 1 - dealt with Panda Energy.
By way of example, we refer just to undisputed facts nos. 1, 2, 5 and 6 (with
PacifiCorp's record references and citations omitted) and USA Power's
responses in order to demonstrate USA Power's improper tactics and why these
facts were deemed admitted.
Undisputed Fact No. 1:
In late 2000 and early 2001 a successful power plant
developer from Texas, known as Panda Energy, began its
development of a combined cycle power plant site
immediately adjacent to PacifiCorp's switching station near
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the town of Mona, in Juab County, Utah. The Deseret News
reported Panda's plans in an article published July 19, 2001.
USA Power's Response:
Disputed. PacifiCorp's description of Panda as "successful" is
not a material fact but a self-serving statement. In fact, Panda
never took any substantive steps to develop the Mona project
besides buying the land ("which was amazingly cheap") and
acquiring the meteorological data. (Barlow Depo. at 51; Ex.
355] Panda's initial objective in 2001-2002 was to build a
merchant plant, but the project had become "kind of iffy" when
Panda's financing began to dwindle. [Barlow Depo. at 47,
116].
As the district court held, USA Power did not controvert any of the material
facts in this paragraph. (Memorandum Decision at p. 5). USA Power did not
controvert the fact that Panda began its development efforts in 2000 and 2001,
which was material because Panda selected Mona as the site for its combined
cycle power plant before USA Power chose a much smaller 40 acre site VA mile
to the North. (See USA Power's Real Estate Purchase Contract, dated January
4, 2002) (R. 5139-5142). USA Power also failed to controvert the fact that
Panda's plans were published in the Deseret News over a year before USA
Power came to PacifiCorp with USA Power's idea to build a power plant. The
publication of Panda's plans in the newspaper was material because the idea to
build a combined cycle plant near Mona was no one's secret, and certainly not
USA Power's.

^9

The argument that USA Power substituted for actually controverting the
material facts was also inaccurate. Panda did much more than acquire land and
gather meteorological data for an air permit. By the time Panda met with
PacifiCorp, Panda had already assembled all of the elements for Panda's power
plant, except the acquisition of water. The extent of Panda's efforts was detailed
in undisputed facts nos. 2, 3, 6 and 11.
USA Power's pattern of non-compliance with Rule 7 was repeated in each
response to the other numbered undisputed facts. In none did USA Power
specifically dispute any fact. Instead, at best, USA Power cited to other "facts"
that even if true, did not put PacifiCorp's facts in dispute.
Undisputed Fact No. 2:
By the end of April 2001, Panda had secured options to
purchase 240 acres of land next to PacifiCorp's Mona
switching station. The site was ideal for a combined cycle
plant because of its immediate proximity to PacifiCorp's
transmission system and high pressure natural gas
transmission pipelines owned by Questar Pipeline Company
("Questar") and Kern River Gas Transmission Company
("Kern River").
USA Power's Response:
Disputed. See Response to paragraph 1. The description by
PacifiCorp of the Mona spot as "ideal" and "obvious" is not a
material fact but rather a self-serving statement. In fact,
Mona had never previously been the site of a power plant
and was not seriously considered by PacifiCorp as a site prior
to 2002. [Exs. 1-2, 354-55; Ted Depo. at 188-190].
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Although it responded to undisputed fact no. 2 with six lines of argument,
USA Power did not controvert the material fact that by April 2001, Panda had
already acquired options to purchase 240 acres for a power plant site next to
PacifiCorp's Mona electrical switching station. This fact was important because it
was a significant milestone for Panda's power plant development that was in
place by the time Panda met with PacifiCorp and laid out Panda's plans to build
a power plant over a year prior to PacifiCorp's introductory meeting with the USA
Power principals, and the 240 acre site that Panda optioned ultimately became
the site for the Currant Creek power plant.
Furthermore, although undisputed fact no. 2 did not say that Mona was an
"obvious" place to build a power plant, it was undisputed that the convenient
confluence at Mona of PacifiCorp's 345 kV electric transmission system and
Questar Pipeline Company's natural gas transmission line really did make Mona,
Utah an "ideal place" to put a natural gas fired power plant. Rand Thurgood
called Mona "ideal." Thurgood Depo. at 119:13 (R. 9084). Panda's Dave Barlow
was more effusive. He testified that Mona was "absolutely perfect" for a power
plant. Dave Barlow Depo. at 35:9 (R. 8609). Significantly, USA Power cited no
testimony or other evidence to the contrary.
Undisputed Fact No. 3:
In addition to acquiring land, Panda took the following steps to
develop its power plant, among others:

i.

hired a market consultant (R.W. Beck) to prepare a
report assessing the electric power market within the
state of Utah;

ii.

hired environmental and air quality firms to prepare an
Environmental Site Evaluation and Planning Report
and erect an on-site meteorological/monitoring station
to gather meteorological data to support Panda's
application to the Utah Division of Air Quality for an air
permit;

iii.

met with PacifiCorp's transmission group in Portland,
Oregon, to arrange for an Interconnection Study at
Panda's cost to provide an analysis of the cost of
interconnecting Panda's power plant to PacifiCorp's
transmission system at the Mona switching station;

iv.

hired a lobbyist to lobby state and local officials;

v.

visited the Mona switching station with its engineers to
design a transmission path from the power plant site
to the switching station;

vi.

located the nearby Questar Mainline 104 and Kern
River natural gas transmission pipelines using
available maps and visible markers;

vii.

mapped out two alternate routes to place lateral gas
lines to transport natural gas from Questar's and Kern
River's gas transmission pipelines; and, hired a water
lawyer to pursue the acquisition of water from at least
three sources.

USA Power's Response:
Disputed. See Response to paragraphs 1-2. The "steps"
described by PacifiCorp are carefully phrased but actually
reveal the limit of Panda's work, e.g. it "hired" a water lawyer
but never found water, it "met" with PacifiCorp transmission
and "visited" the switching station but never obtained a
transmission agreement, it "hired" a market expert but never
developed a financial analysis, it "located" the pipelines but
never entered a supply agreement, it "hired" a lobbyist but
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never obtained a property rezoning or an air permit. In sum,
these steps added no value to the Panda project (and were
not used in any way by PacifiCorp in its decision to site its
project at Mona). [Exs. 301, 302, 355] The only valuable
assets for the plant, as described by Thurgood in his
deposition, were the land and the "met data" collected by
Panda. In fact, even Panda's engineering work was not
transferred to PacifiCorp because it was considered
proprietary. [Thurgood Dep. at 118-128, 138-139].

Notice that not one of these facts was controverted in USA Power's
response. These material undisputed facts not only established the elements
Panda assembled for a Mona power plant site, including market reports, phase 1
environmental assessment, interconnection study, transmission study, marketing
study, land options, air dispersion protocol, meteorological data, etc. (see
undisputed fact no. 11), but also demonstrated conclusively that the idea of
putting a power plant next to the Mona switching station was not a secret or
unique to USA Power.

Undisputed Fact No. 6:
Panda explained [to Rand Thurgood] the intended combustion
technology of its plant based on Panda's standard plant design
using General Electric 7FA gas turbines in a "2 on 1" (also
referred to as 2x1) configuration. Panda explained how it was
gathering a year's worth of meteorological data to support its
application for an air permit. It explained how the electricity from
the power plant would flow over PacifiCorp's transmission system
from an interconnect at the Mona switching station. It explained
how and where the natural gas would be transported to the plant
from a new lateral pipeline connected to Questar's and Kern
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River's transmission pipelines along one of two routes that Panda
had mapped out. It explained how water could be acquired from
Kennecott and piped to the plant. And, it touted the positive
attitude of local zoning officials to a proposed zoning change and
the enthusiastic response that Panda had received from
legislative and community leaders.
USA Power's Response:
Disputed. The description in the above paragraph is not
supported by the citations. [See Barlow Dep. At 102-115;
Thurgood Depo at 115-135]
USA Power did not say how or why PacifiCorp's facts were not supported
by the record. Nor did they direct the district court to contrary evidence.
Although not necessary to sustain the district court, USA Power's brief response
was also inaccurate. 15

15

As demonstrated to the district court in PacifiCorp's reply memorandum (R. 66746712), these material facts in paragraph no. 6 were supported by the record. Dave
Barlow and Rand Thurgood did meet for the first time on June 19, 2001. Barlow Depo.
at 102:14-103:11 (R. 8670). During the meeting, Barlow made a "[fjull presentation of
everything that we had done just to show [Thurgood] everything we had completed." Id.
at 106:16-18 (R. 8674). Barlow told Thurgood about the intended combustion
technology of Panda's plant based on Panda's standard plant design using General
Electric 7FA gas turbines in a "2-on-1" configuration. Id. at 104:16-105:11 (R. 8672),
106:17-18 (R. 8674), 111:22-112:12 (R. 8679-8680). Barlow explained to PacifiCorp's
transmission group in Portland, even before he met with Thurgood, that Panda was
gathering a year's worth of meteorological data to support its application for an air
permit. Id. at pages 37, 48-49 (R. 8611, 8622-8623). Barlow explained to Thurgood
how the electricity from the power plant would flow over PacifiCorp's transmission
system from an interconnect at the Mona switching station. Id. at 110:11-25 (R. 8678).
Barlow also explained how and where the natural gas would be transported to the plant
from a new lateral pipeline connected to Questar's and Kern River's transmission
pipelines along one of two routes that Panda had mapped out. Id. at 106:19-107:13 (R.
8674-8675), 111:8-14 (R. 8679). He explained how water could be acquired from
Kennecott and piped to the plant. Id. at 111:15-21 (R. 8679). And, Barlow touted the
positive attitude of local zoning officials to a proposed zoning change and the
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In sum, the undisputed facts nos.1-11 concerning Panda, including its
efforts to develop a power plant starting in 2000, amply supported the district
court's conclusion that:
"These undisputed facts identify Panda Energy's development of a
power plant in Mona, next to PacifiCorp's transmission station,
PacifiCorp's knowledge of Panda's development before ever
meeting plaintiffs and PacifiCorp's ultimate purchase of Panda's
assets necessary for the development of the Currant Creek Power
plant in Mona .. . With respect to Panda, it is undisputed that Panda
initially had the idea to build a combined cycle power plant in Mona,
started its development efforts in late 2000, secured options to
purchase 240 acres of land next to PacifiCorp's Mona transmission
station, undertaken meteorological and other assessments pivotal to
PacifiCorp's development of Currant Creek and the publication of
Panda's development in the Deseret News demonstrate the vision
and concepts underlying the Currant Creek Power Plant in Mona
was no secret and was not a trade secret of plaintiffs as defined
under the Trade Secrets Act."
Memorandum Decision at pp. 5-6.

2.

The Uncontroverted Material Facts About USA Power's Public
Filings With The Division Of Air Quality.

PacifiCorp's second group of core facts - undisputed facts nos. 12 through
19 - dealt with the public documents that were part of USA Power's (actually
Spring Canyon Energy's) application for an air permit (a/k/a Notice of Intent or
NOI). These documents revealed that USA Power's power plant project near
Mona was no secret. By way of example, we refer here just to undisputed facts

enthusiastic response that Panda had received from legislative and community leaders.
Thurgood Depo. at 120:18-121:1 (R. 9085-9086), 122:4-6 (R. 9087).
TR

nos. 13 and 17 (with PacifiCorp's record references and citations omitted) and
USA Power's responses to demonstrate why the district court correctly held that
these facts were deemed admitted.

Undisputed Fact No. 13:
Spring Canyon's NOI not only identified the location of Spring
Canyon's plant site, it laid out many of the details of the
proposed plant. For instance, it identified the plant's
combustion technology based on General Electric 7FA gas
turbines, and it confirmed that the Spring Canyon plant would
have heat recovery steam generators equipped with selective
catalytic reduction systems, supplemental duct firing and a
steam turbine generator. The NOI explained that the
proposed plant would take natural gas from the two high
pressure natural gas transmission sources in the area,
meaning the Questar Mainline 104 and Kern River
transmission pipelines, and that the proposed plant would
interconnect to PacifiCorp's transmission system at the Mona
switching station. The NOI identified the manufacturer of the
proposed plants' pollution control equipment, the heat input
rate for the gas turbine and the duct burners, and the
expected capacities of the gas turbine generator and the
steam turbine generator. According to Spring Canyon's
public filing, Spring Canyon selected an air cooled condenser
to air cool, rather than wet cool, the condensed steam from
its plant, because an air cooled condenser uses less water.
USA Power's Response:
Not disputed, except for the material omissions. PacifiCorp
fails to mention that the items identified by USA Power as
part of their air permit application did not include the
confidential detailed findings and studies USA Power had
conducted over the past several months (and years) and
based their design decisions upon them. Among other
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important and confidential information the application did not
include was the following items:
1.
A report from Waldron Engineering on the
economic feasibility of the "2 on 1" combined cycle operation.
2.
A report from Waldron Engineering on the
feasibility of operating Spring Canyon within the restrictions
of the anticipated air permit.
3.
A report from Waldron Engineering on the
feasibility of operating Spring Canyon within the boundaries
of the anticipated water supply.
4.
A "Fatal Flaw Analysis" by ABB Consulting
calculating the transferability of any electric power originated
and sold by Spring Canyon.
5.
Scaled drawings by Waldron Engineering
demonstrating how the generators, turbines and related
buildings would fit together on site.
6.
Sales contracts showing price and option terms
for land in Juab County.
7.
Sales contract showing location, price and option
terms for water rights in Juab County.
8.
Legal opinions from Jody Williams and HRO
regarding title to water rights for the Garret and Keyte
properties.
9.
Marketing studies in the fall of 2002 and early
2003 demonstrating the economic need for a 500 megawatt
facility at Mona and potential cost savings to PacifiCorp.
10. Pro forma economic assumptions, preliminary
cost breakdown and detailed economic analysis (forty pages
of single-spaced calculations) amortizing initial investment
and factoring cost of fuel supply, financing, et al. for a longterm power purchase agreement arising from the Mona site.
[SeeExs. 10,11, and 16]
11.
Financial Pro formas that demonstrated the
financial viability of the Spring Canyon project. fSee Exs. 10,
11 and 16].

ACi

These items were the confidential work product shared with
PacifiCorp in 2002-2003 which demonstrated the actual
financial viability of the proposed plant, and gave USA Power
a competitive edge as the "first to market."
The first line in USA Power's response admitted they were not disputing
these material facts. We drew the district court's attention to the undisputed
facts in paragraph 13 because the publicly available information that the Division
of Air Quality maintained in its file for the USA Power project, including the
Notice of Intent (i.e., application)(R. 4141-4172) and the Approval Order (i.e., air
permit)(R. 4176-4186), disclosed the very information about USA Power's
project that Ted Banasiewicz said in his deposition was "stolen" by PacifiCorp.
For instance, Banasiewicz initially said that USA Power's selected location
for a power plant was a secret that had been stolen by PacifiCorp.16 He then
conceded that the public information in the Division's file gave the precise
location for USA Power's proposed plant site.17 Banasiewicz said the type of
gas turbines that USA Power intended for its power plant was a secret,18 but on
cross-examination he confirmed that the public information listed the gas turbine
manufacturer (General Electric) and the exact turbine model number
(PG7241FA).19 When his lawyer asked the questions, Banasiewicz said that

16
17
18
19

Ted Banasiewicz Depo. at page 370 (R. 6843).
Id. at pages 804-805 (R. 6856-6857).
Id. at pages 370-371 (R. 6843-6844).
Id. at page 806 (R. 6858).
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USA Power's plan to supplement its proposed plant's megawatt output with duct
firing was a secret that had been stolen by PacifiCorp,20 but when he was crossexamined, Banasiewicz conceded that the public air permit file for USA Power
gave these details about duct firing, too.21 As shown in its appellate brief, USA
Power's theme was that PacifiCorp "stole" their secret idea to air-cool, rather
than water-cool, Currant Creek. All anyone had to do was read the public file to
realize that USA Power planned to air-cool their power plant in order to cut down
on the amount of water the plant would use.22 It was no secret. Banasiewicz
also said that PacifiCorp stole USA Power's secret to transport natural gas to
Mona through Questar's gas transmission line23 and that PacifiCorp stole the
idea to transmit electricity from the plant to PacifiCorp's own nearby electrical
switching station.24 In the end, all of this information was in the public
documents.25
In short, as soon as USA Power applied for an air permit with the Division
of Air Quality, its "vision" and "concept" for a power plant near Mona, including
the location and power plant technology, was, as a matter of law, not a trade
secret. None of the 11 items listed in USA Power's response altered those facts.

20
21
22
23
24
25

Id. at pages 372-373 (R. 6845-6846).
Id. at page 803 (R. 6855).
Id. at page 804, 810 (R. 6856, 6862).
Id. at page 377 (R. 6850).
Id. at pages 374-375 (R. 6847-6848).
Id. at pages 800-814 (R. 6852-6866).
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As we discuss later in this brief, USA Power never demonstrated that
anything they had, let alone the eleven items they listed in their response to
undisputed fact no. 13, was a trade secret or confidential information, or that
PacifiCorp used any of the information.
The information furnished by Waldron Engineering was, according to the
engineer who created it, nothing more than preliminary calculations that were not
secret. See pp. 62-69, infra.
The Fatal Flaw analysis that was prepared for USA Power (R. 5117) was
an analysis of PacifiCorp's own transmission system and load forecast - hardly a
secret to PacifiCorp. USA Power never identified how or why this information
was a trade secret, or that PacifiCorp ever used the information.
The precise location of USA Power's proposed plant site was identified in
its public air permit. (R. 4176, 4178). Its option contract to acquire that 40 acre
parcel was irrelevant to PacifiCorp. Panda was the first to acquire the options to
purchase its 240 acre parcel immediately adjacent to PacifiCorp's electrical
switching station and PacifiCorp purchased those land options from Panda.26
USA Power never provided the district court with evidence that its land options,
which were contracts with third parties, were trade secrets, or that PacifiCorp
ever made use of the information.

See Assignment and Assumption Agreement (R. 9205-9208).
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The list of owners of water rights in the State of Utah is public information,
and when the two individuals (Keyte & Garrett) from whom USA Power had
optioned water rights filed Change Applications with the State Engineer, that
information became public too.27 Although the price USA Power offered to pay
for its water rights may have been confidential, it was no trade secret and USA
Power never provided evidence to the district court that it was. More
importantly, USA Power never provided evidence that the price was relevant or
material to what PacifiCorp actually did. It is undisputed that PacifiCorp acquired
its water for Currant Creek from W.W. Ranches, LLC, which was owned by two
experienced water rights lawyers.28 They conceived the idea of taking water
rights originating in a different county that had been designated for a different
purpose and changing the location and use to suit PacifiCorp's needs.29 The
price that W.W. Ranches charged PacifiCorp for irrigation company stock bore
no relationship to the price USA Power had agreed to pay Messrs. Keyte and
Garrett for their certificated water rights.30 What PacifiCorp paid W.W. Ranches
for irrigation company stock was based on the price W.W. Ranches had paid to
acquire the water, how long they had held it, how risky the transaction was, the
27
28

29
30

Affidavit of Jody L. Williams atfflf18-20 (R. 8251 -8257).
See Affidavit of Marc T. Wangsgard. (R. 8467-8470)(included in addendum at Tab
11).
/d.1|10(R. 8469).
See Affidavit of Steven E. Clyde (R. 8484-8498) at p. 9 (R. 8494); see also, Revised
and Restated Water Rights Purchase Agreement (R. 8471-8483) at p. 3 (R. 8473).

opportunity to market the water somewhere else and what the market would
bear.31 USA Power offered the district court no evidence to the contrary.
USA Power commissioned a marketing study (R. 5088) for their own
purposes to determine which electric utility companies (including PacifiCorp)
were potential customers for the electricity USA Power expected to produce if
they ever built a power plant. However, every two years during the period 20002005, PacifiCorp published its own strategic report known as its Integrated
Resource Plan (R. 5088p - 5088v and 5088k-5088n) that assessed the needs
for electricity in its own market.32 USA Power never provided evidence to the
district court that their marketing study was a trade secret, or that PacifiCorp ever
made use of the study.
Finally, aside from the fact that USA Power never provided evidence to the
district court that their pro formas (R. 10,073-10,090) were trade secrets, those
pro formas were useless to PacifiCorp. USA Power's pro formas were an
attempt to estimate the "profit" USA Power might make from the sales of
electricity from their proposed power plant to a utility company such as
PacifiCorp. However, within PacifiCorp's regulated environment the concept of a
"profit" has absolutely no meaning. Rather, PacifiCorp is allowed a specified rate

31

Id. at H13 (R. 8469).

32

Thurgood depo. at pp. 52-58 (R. 9057-9063), 105-106 (R. 9073-9074).
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invested capital and any excess is returned to its customers.

Whether USA

Power's pro formas were confidential, or not, they had no relevance to
PacifiCorp's business.34 We asked Dave Graeber point blank whether it was
USA Power's contention that PacifiCorp misappropriated USA Power's pro
formas. His vague answer demonstrated that he had no evidence that
PacifiCorp made any use of the information.35
During discovery, PacifiCorp produced its own complex financial
projections for Currant Creek that took into account its allowed regulatory
recovery. If PacifiCorp had misappropriated USA Power's pro formas, USA
Power should have been able to provide evidence of misappropriation by
offering the district court a comparison of USA Power's pro formas and
PacifiCorp's financial projections. Significantly, USA Power did not.
" Terrell Spackman Depo. at pages 14 (R. 7018), 23-27 (R. 7019-7023), 37-49 (R.
7024-7037).
34
Id.
35
Q. (By Mr. Badger) Do you contend that PacifiCorp misappropriated the pro formas
found in volume three?
MS. TOMSIC: I object to the question on the grounds it calls for a legal
conclusion, on the grounds there is lack of foundation, on the grounds the
Second Amended Complaint speaks for itself.
A. THE WITNESS: The pro formas tied the entire concept that we provided and
demonstrated to PacifiCorp in volumes one, two and three and included a pro forma
that determined in our estimation, and in all probability in the estimation of
PacifiCorp, that that design was feasible, doable, achievable and efficiently put
together so that it represented a power plant opportunity that they did not
contemplate before they received volumes one, two, and three.
Deposition of David Graeber at 443:1-16 (R. 1420).

Af.

Undisputed Fact No. 17:
A week prior to the August 22, 2002 meeting, PacifiCorp's Ian
Andrews requested and immediately received a faxed copy of
Spring Canyon's NOI from the Division of Air Quality. He
immediately e-mailed Rand Thurgood outlining details of the
NOI. Ian Andrews Aff. atffi] 3-4, including e-mail dated
August 15, 2002 (Bates No. 31456) attached thereto; Ian
Andrews Deposition taken February 15, 2006 at pp. 79-82,
attached hereto as Exhibit P.
USA Power's Response:
"Disputed. The repeated use of the word "immediately" is not
an undisputed material fact and is self-serving.
Clearly, USA Power did not controvert the material facts.
What was material and undisputed was that PacifiCorp knew all about
USA Power's plans before USA Power provided any of its claimed "confidential
information" to PacifiCorp. The public filings also announced that USA Power
believed (accurately or not) they had an economically and technically viable
project; otherwise they would not have bothered to seek an air permit, which was
both an expensive and time consuming endeavor.
Thus, as demonstrated by this discussion of undisputed facts nos. 13 and
17, the district court was correct in concluding the following:
"The Court finds that PacifiCorp's Undisputed Facts Nos. 13 and 17,
which identify Spring Canyon's public filings and application for an
air permit, are not 'specifically controverted' and thus deemed
admitted. These undisputed material facts demonstrate that
plaintiffs' concept, vision and claimed confidential information were
of public record, and were disclosed to PacifiCorp by the public
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record. Consequently, the information contained therein being
generally known and readily ascertainable from the public record by
PacifiCorp and other persons in the field cannot possibly constitute
trade secrets as defined by Utah Code Ann. § 13-24-2(4):
Memorandum Decision at page 7.
3.

The Uncontroverted Material Facts About Shaw/Stone &
Webster.

PacifiCorp's third group of core undisputed facts - nos. 20 through 29 dealt with the design, engineering and construction of the Currant Creek power
plant by Shaw/Stone & Webster. Again, although USA Power did not controvert
any of these undisputed facts, by way of example we refer to undisputed facts
Nos. 22, 23, 24 and 29 (with PacifiCorp's record references and citations
omitted) and USA Power's responses to demonstrate that USA Power did not
comply with Rule 7 and why these facts were deemed admitted.

Undisputed Fact No. 22:
Like the Apex 1 plant and many other combined cycle plants,
Currant Creek is a 2x1 combined cycle design, meaning it
has two natural gas turbine generators and a single steam
turbine generator. Currant Creek and Apex 1 were both
designed and engineered based on Shaw/Stone & Webster's
standard plant design for a 2x1 combined cycle power plant
with air cooling. Currant Creek, like Apex 1, is based on a
recognized and proven 2x1 combined cycle configuration that
is well understood and widely utilized in the electric power
plant industry.

A9

USA Power's Response:
Disputed. All the statements related here by PacifiCorp,
including its description of various technologies are
"recognized," "proven," "well understood" and "widely utilized,"
are not statements of material fact but rather opinions. In fact,
Currant Creek was developed based upon the concept put
forward by USA Power Partners in their Spring Canyon project.
[Ted Dep. at 372-379, 402-407] See Response to paragraph
21.

Undisputed Fact No. 23:
Although there are minor differences in output rating between
Apex 1 and Currant Creek, the plants are essentially sisters.
Both plants utilize two General Electric 7FA7241 gas turbines
with almost identical nominal ratings; both plants have two
similarly sized heat recovery steam generators equipped with
selective catalytic reduction systems; both plants have a
single similarly sized steam turbine generator; both plants
have duct firing with similar capability; both plants are 100%
dry (air) cooled; and both plants are designed for zero
wastewater discharge.
USA Power's Response:
Disputed. The statements related here by PacifiCorp are not
statements of material facts but rather opinions. The site
conditions at Mona were substantially different than Las
Vegas. This is both a reason why site-specific testing was
essential at Mona and why Thurgood was initially skeptical of
USA Powers' idea to construct a plant utilizing dry-cooling at
that elevation. See PSF Nos. 11-26, 33-41.

Undisputed Fact No. 24
In 2002, a combined cycle plant in a 2x1 configuration was
not a secret. A combined cycle plant with General Electric
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7FA gas turbines was not a secret. A combined cycle plant
with heat recovery steam generators was not a secret. A
combined cycle plant with additional duct burner capacity was
not a secret; a combined cycle plant with a steam turbine
generator was not a secret. A combined cycle plant with air
cooling was not a secret. A combined cycle plant designed
for zero wastewater discharge was not a secret. All of these
features of a combined cycle power plant were openly used in
the electric generation industry well before 2002.
USA Power's Response:
Disputed. The characterization of plaintiffs' claim here
misrepresents the essence of the claim. The surface
characteristics and actual function of the proposed power
plant is not a trade secret - it was (and is) visible to the
public. The trade secret consisted of the combination of the
individual details, and underlying testing, data and evaluation,
which formed the Spring Canyon vision and demonstrated its
technical and financial viability at an extremely challenging
physical location - this vision was subsequently was built as
Currant Creek. [Ted Dep. At 372-379, 402-407] See
Response to paragraph 13; PSF Nos. 1-26.

Undisputed Fact No. 29:
The design, engineering and construction of Currant Creek
represents Shaw/Stone & Webster's own efforts. Shaw/Stone
& Webster did not use any information from, or about, USA
Power, USA Power Partners, Spring Canyon Energy, or the
Spring Canyon Energy project, in any aspect of the Currant
Creek power plant, whatsoever.
USA Power's Response:
Disputed. As stated in response to paragraph 23-25, Shaw did not
become involved in the Currant Creek project until two months after
PacifiCorp had purchased the Mona site and committed all its
resources to developing a project there. This decision - which was

<n

the only tangible response by Thurgood's group in acquiring an
option to respond to PacifiCorp's own RFP - was made in January February 2003 after PacifiCorp reviewed all the confidential
information and work product of Spring Canyon for developing an
air-cooled 500-megawatt combined cycle power plant at that site.
Shaw/Stone & Webster had no role in that process [Thurgood Dep.
at 72-73].
It is clear that USA Power did not controvert these material facts which
were all supported by the affidavit of Mark Green, Shaw/Stone & Webster's
project manager. Significantly, USA Power did not cite to any evidence disputing
that: (1) Apex 1 was virtually identical to the Currant Creek power plant; (2)
Shaw/Stone & Webster designed and constructed both Apex 1 and Currant
Creek with their own work; and, (3) both Apex 1 and Currant Creek were built
using Shaw/Stone & Webster's standard design well known in the industry.
Thus, the district court was correct in concluding that:
"With respect to Shaw/Stone & Webster, it is undisputed that they
built a sister plant to the Currant Creek Power Plant (Apex 1), and
that the Currant Creek Power Plant represents PacifiCorp's and
Shaw/Stone & Webster's own work. That the Currant Creek Power
Plant and Apex 1 Power Plant with all of their own component parts
and technologies are well understood and widely utilized in the
electric power plant industry. Significantly, plaintiffs concede in their
response to PacifiCorp's Undisputed Fact No. 24 that 'The surface
characteristics and actual function of the proposed power plant is
not a trade secret - it was (and is) visible to the public.' The Court
finds the undisputed material facts establish that the design,
engineering and construction of the Currant Creek Power Plant was
not based upon nor utilized any information from or about USA
Power, USA Power Partners, Spring Canyon Energy or the Spring
Canyon Energy project (Undisputed Fact No. 29)."
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Memorandum Decision at pp. 6-7.
II.

USA POWER DID NOT MEET ITS BURDEN TO DEMONSTRATE THAT
IT HAD A TRADE SECRET.
As the movant, PacifiCorp had the initial burden to present evidence

establishing that there were no genuine issues of material fact. Orvis v.
Johnson, 2008 UT 2, U 16,177 P. 3d 600. PacifiCorp met its burden; its facts
were undisputed. The burden then shifted to USA Power to demonstrate that
there was a genuine issue for trial as to whether USA Power had a trade secret
and whether PacifiCorp misappropriated the trade secret or breached the
confidentiality agreement? Id. at ffl[ 16-18. As demonstrated below, the district
court correctly held that USA Power did not meet its burden

A.

A Trade Secret First and Foremost Has To Be A Secret.

The Utah Uniform Trade Secrets Act defines trade secret misappropriation
as follows:
(b) disclosure or use of a trade secret of another without express or
implied consent by a person who:
(i) used improper means to acquire knowledge of the trade secret; or
(B) acquired [the trade secret] under circumstances giving rise to a
duty to maintain its secrecy or limit its use . . .
Utah Code Ann. § 13-24-2(2)(b)(i)(B). The threshold issue in determining
whether a trade secret has been misappropriated is "whether, in fact, there is a
trade secret to be misappropriated." Medspring Group v. Feng, 368 F. Supp. 2d

1270 (D. Utah 2005)(included in the addendum at Tab 12) (quoting
Microbiological Res. Corp. v. Muna, 625 P. 2d 690, 696 (Utah 1981)) (included in
the addendum at Tab 13). The Trade Secrets Act defines a Trade Secret as:
[information, including a formula, pattern, compilation,
program, device, method, technique, or process that:
(a) derives independent economic value, actual or potential,
from not being generally known to, and not being readily
ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can
obtain economic value from its disclosure or use; and
(b) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the
circumstances to maintain its secrecy.
Utah Code Ann. § 13-24-2(4)(1999). The burden is on the plaintiff to prove the
existence of a trade secret, and there is no presumption in his favor. Utah
Medical Products, Inc. v. Clinical Innovations Associates, Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d
1290, 1311 (D. Utah 1999)(included in the addendum at Tab 14) (citing Muna at
696). In order to constitute a trade secret, the information "must be unknown; it
should not be in the public domain nor within the knowledge of the trade . . . " Id.
(citing Muna at 696).
USA Power had the burden to bring forth specific trade secret information
that was not generally known or readily ascertainable. Id. at 1312. "This
standard cannot be viewed as whether the information is generally known and
readily ascertainable to the general public, but, based on [PacifiCorp's]
knowledge and experience, whether the information was known or ascertainable
to [PacifiCorp]." Id. (citing Muna at 699). "[T]he 'subject matter of the trade
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secret must be unknown; it should not be in the public domain or within the
knowledge of the trade'." Id. Thus, even if the supposedly secret information was
not known by PacifiCorp, such information that is generally and widely known
within the electric power generation industry cannot be a trade secret within the
meaning of the Trade Secrets Act. See, Medspring Group, 368 F. Supp. 2d at
1278.
It was USA Power's burden to demonstrate that there was a genuine issue
for trial as to whether it had a trade secret. As we demonstrate below, USA
Power failed to meet its burden.

B.

What USA Power Claimed Were Trade Secrets Were Nothing More
Than The Similarities Common To All Combined Cycle Power Plants

From the inception of this lawsuit, USA Power routinely sidestepped their
burden to identify their trade secret(s). Instead of identifying anything secret,
they argued that they must have had a trade secret because PacifiCorp at one
point made a non-binding offer to purchase USA Power's development rights.36
While it is true that PacifiCorp did make a non-binding "expression of interest",
subject to further investigation, to purchase USA Power's development rights37
(including its land and water rights options and its air permit that the Division of
36

37

Rand Thurgood thought that the material he received from Ted Banasiewicz, aside
from the air permit (a public document), was remedial engineering and had no value.
Thurgood Depo. at page 322 (R. 6733).
Id. at pages 357 (R. 6734), 375-376 (R. 6735-6736), 414-415 (R. 6737-6738).
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Air Quality had approved for a power plant one-half the size of Currant Creek), a
deal was never reached.38 But extending a non-binding "expression of interest"
to possibly purchase these assets did not make them trade secrets. At best, it
showed only that PacifiCorp at one time thought that these assets had some
value to PacifiCorp which was worth further investigation.
Each of USA Power's principals was deposed and repeatedly asked to
identify their trade secrets. Asked in his deposition to create a written list, Ted
Banasiewicz wrote down a list of things which, as it turned out, were primarily the
similarities between USA Power's proposed power plant and Currant Creek.39
Because Currant Creek is the sister plant of Apex 1, Banasiewicz's list of
supposed trade secrets also described Apex 1.
When questioned about each item on his list, Banasiewicz conceded that
the features of Currant Creek and USA Power's plant were found in every one of
the dozens of combined cycle power plant he had ever visited.40 Significantly,

PacifiCorp gave three reasons why it cut off its negotiations to acquire Spring
Canyon's land and water options and air permit: (1) PacifiCorp had acquired
Panda's assets, which was all PacifiCorp needed; (2) the Utah Division of Air Quality
had advised PacifiCorp that it would not be able to use the air permit that had been
issued to USA Power; and, (3) the price USA Power was asking was simply too
high. Rand Thurgood 30(b)(6) Depo. at pages 29-32, 35 (R. 6740-6744, 6746).
Ted Banasiewicz depo. at pp. 672-688 (R. 9218-9231); See deposition exhibit 166
(R. 10386 - a page from a large easel pad - too large to be hyper-linked).
Ted Banasiewicz depo. at pp. 691-708, 714 (R. 9234-9251, 9253).
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he admitted that there was nothing secret about air-cooling a power plant.41
Indeed, Apex 1, like Currant Creek and many other combined cycle power
plants, is air-cooled.42
After giving this testimony, Banasiewicz went to lunch with his attorney.
When he returned he testified that USA Power's trade secret was actually their
"entire project concept" for a combined cycle power plant near Mona.43
However, when pressed by the district court at oral argument, USA Power was
never able to identify anything that met the definition of a trade secret.

C.

USA Power's Vague Notion of its "Vision" For A Power Plant Was
Not A Trade Secret.

In response to PacifiCorp's summary judgment motion, USA Power set out
the following explanation of their supposed trade secret:
"The trade secret consisted of the combination of individual
details, and underlying testing, data and evaluation, which
formed the Spring Canyon Vision and demonstrated its
technical and financial viability at an extremely challenging
physical location - this vision was built as Currant Creek."44
(bold in original).
"USA Power has repeatedly and narrowly defined its trade
secrets as the concept; site-specific modeling, evaluations
and consequent findings that provided the formula for the

41
42
43
44

Id. at 708:11-709:4 (R. 9251).
See, undisputed facts no. 23.
Ted Banasiewicz Depo. at pp. 738-749 (R. 9254-9265).
See USA Power's opposition memorandum at page xxiv (R. 5932).
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Spring Canyon development; and the financial pro forma that
demonstrated the development was economically viable.
The totality of the development and the interrelation of its
parts which formed USA Power's trade secret are
represented by Volumes 1-3 and the related information
presented to PacifiCorp between September 11, 2002 and
March 2003. It was this formula and 'proof of viability' which
USA Power presented to PacifiCorp and which PacifiCorp
utilized to develop and accelerate the development of Currant
Creek. The misappropriation allowed PacifiCorp to skip the
crucial, time consuming and expensive development stage.'"*5
The district court struggled with this vague statement during USA Power's
lengthy oral argument and repeatedly asked USA Power's counsel which
combination of factors for USA Power's proposed power plant were not
commonly known in the industry.46 The district court obviously focused on the
proper inquiry and counsel had a difficult time answering. When the district court
continued to press, the answer finally came, although no less vague than before.
Counsel responded:
"What is the trade secret is the financial viability, the viability of
these factors put together. The factors themselves are not
extraordinary. Air-cooling is unusual but they themselves are
nothing that's novel, for example, but it's the work product that was
put in to pull these factors together, that is the trade secret. It's the
viability. It's the proof of viability. That's the trade secret. "47
The district court continued to press for a specific secret that was unknown,
not in the public domain, and not within the knowledge of the trade. Counsel's
45
46
47

See id. at page 15.
Tr. 9/24/07 vol.1, at page 218:18 - 222:16.
Id. 222:18-25.
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final response was that the trade secret was the work USA Power had done to
demonstrate that an air-cooled power plant would be profitable to USA Power:
The Court:

And again, the most important factor you're relying
on for that site specific evaluation is the feasibility of
the dry cooling process at Mona?

Mr. Peterson: Yes sir.
The Court:

Is that your strongest point?

Mr. Peterson: Yes.
The Court:

Is it your only point that you're relying on in
identifying it as a trade secret?

Mr. Peterson: No, Your Honor, because as I said, the overall
combination of details is the fact we showed that to
be profitable. It's the air cooling The Court:

Profitable as a dry cooling facility.

Mr. Peterson: As a dry cooling facility, yes, Your Honor. I mean,
we showed that basically the entire project would be
viable but the dry cooling as I said, that's where you
need to have specific testing, precise testing and we
were the only ones that did it.
The Court: Move on. Thank you.48
Not only did USA Power not demonstrate that this was a trade secret, USA
Power's engineer had earlier testified in his deposition that no analysis was ever
done to weigh the economics of air-cooling against the water-cooling alternative,
and USA Power's choice of an air-cooled power plant was public information.

Id. at 239:25-240:17
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Air-cooling a combined cycle power plant means that the steam exiting the
steam turbine is condensed back to water droplets by means of an air-cooled
condenser (like a big automobile radiator, in this case with 30 very large fans).
Air-cooling is a well understood technology that is always a viable option for a
combined cycle plant, although it is not necessarily the most economical
alternative.49 The alternative to air-cooling is a water-cooled method that uses 10
times more water.50 USA Power's expert published a paper explaining that aircooling can be designed to work under environmental conditions that are
expected to occur 99.44% of the time.51 Currant Creek at Mona, and Apex 1 in
Las Vegas, are both air-cooled. In the end, whether to go with water-cooling or
air-cooling is an economic decision driven by the availability and cost of water
and the impact an air-cooled condenser has on plant performance.52
Air-cooling Currant Creek was never PacifiCorp's first choice, nor was it
USA Power's first choice. PacifiCorp ran its own extensive economic analysis
(which was produced during discovery), which took into account its anticipated
regulatory recovery, the cost of water, the cost of equipment, and the impact an

49

50
51

52

Rand Thurgood Rule 30(b)(6) Deposition at pp. 117, 121-122, 126 (R. 9149-9151,
9155); Ian Andrews depo. at pp. 159-160 (R. 6764-6765), 221-222. (R. 9444-9445).
See Power magazine article in addendum at Tab 4.
See Wayne C. Micheletti and John M. Burns, Estimating Energy Penalties For Wet
and Dry Cooling Systems At New Power Plants, deposition exhibit No. 425
(R. 6777-6790) at p. 5 (R. 6781).
Ray Racine Depo. at pages 39-41 (R. 6871-6873).
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air cooled condenser would have on plant performance, and concluded that
water-cooling Currant Creek was the most economical cooling alternative.53 The
company's management even approved the expenditure of $16.0 million to
acquire enough water to water-cool Currant Creek.54 However, water ultimately
proved to be too scarce and the agricultural area in and around Mona was in the
middle of a draught, so PacifiCorp changed course and instead built a less
economical air-cooled power plant.55
USA Power's counsel repeatedly told the district court that USA Power's
engineers had done "literally years of testing" of air-cooling versus water-cooling
to determine if an air-cooled power plant design was viable for Mona,56 Although
Ted Banasiewicz testified in his deposition in response to his own attorney's
questioning that he had instructed USA Power's engineer, Ray Racine, to
perform "testing" that Banasiewicz described as: (1) an analysis of the amount of
water required to water-cool and air-cool a power plant; and (2) the identification
of the capital costs associated with the two cooling methods (which was clearly

See deposition exhibit 369 (R. 9634-9636) and deposition exhibit 367 (R. 84288465); see also, fn. 55.
Id.
See, deposition exhibit 375 (R. 9647-9691 )(included in addendum at Tab 15);
Thurgood 30(b)(6) depo. at pp. 93-114 (R. 9127-9148), 117 (R. 9149), 121-130 (R.
9150-9159); Thurgood depo. at pp. 481-482 (R. 9123-9124); Ian Andrews depo. at
pp. 146-147 (R. 6760-6761).
Tr. at 223:15-19.
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not testing),

Ray Racine testified in his deposition that he did no testing. He

merely performed preliminary calculations adding up the number of gallons of
water that a water-cooled plant design would use so that USA Power could
decide how much water it would need.58 Mr. Racine further testified that an
analysis was never performed to compare the relative economics of watercooling versus air-cooling.59 Had Racine performed such an economic analysis,
USA Power certainly could have compared it for any similarities against
PacifiCorp's own economic analysis that was produced during discovery.60 No
comparison was ever offered.
Mr. Racine also revealed, not surprisingly, that the sheer expense of
acquiring enough water, not "years of testing," drove USA Power's decision to
opt for an air-cooled plant design.61
As with its many of its other claimed secrets, USA Power's air permit
application explained that USA Power's proposed plant was to be air-cooled. In
other words, that was no secret. In describing the proposed plant, the NOI
stated: "An air-cooled condenser will condense spent steam back into water for
recycling to the [boiler]. Use of the dry type air-cooled condenser greatly reduces

57
58
59
60
61

Ted Banasiewicz Depo at 231:25-233:5 (R. 2154-2156).
Ray Racine Depo. at pages 103:11-23 (R. 6897).
Ray Racine Depo. at pages 39-42 (R. 6871-6874).
Seefn. 55.
Seefn. 59.
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the plant's water usage." USA Power's conclusion that an air-cooled design
would be profitable to USA Power was obviously implicit in its decision to apply
for an air permit. Again, that was no secret.
Having questioned its attorney and having considered USA Power's vague
written statements of its supposed trade secrets, the district court correctly
decided that:
"The Court finds from the undisputed material facts set forth herein,
in plaintiff's Memorandum in opposition, and plaintiff's oral
argument, that plaintiffs have not defined with sufficient particularity
or precision what constitutes the trade secrets which PacifiCorp
allegedly misappropriated. Instead, plaintiffs allude to the trade
secrets as consisting of their "project concept," "vision," "formula,"
and "test data" for the Spring Canyon Power Plant. However, these
vague and conclusory assertions fall short of actually describing
those specific features of the power plant development, including
specific features of the data and formula which were not generally
known and not readily ascertainable by PacifiCorp .. . Plaintiffs'
identifying and labeling of documents they claim contain trade
secret information, including the economic and technical viability of
their project, which at oral argument was stated to be the essence
of their trade secret, is insufficient."
Memorandum Decision at pp. 7-8.

D.

The Information in USA Power's Three-Ring Binders Was Not
Secret.

USA Power argued that the papers they had given to PacifiCorp in 3 threering binders were trade secrets, but they failed to show how or why. And, even if
the papers contained trade secrets, USA Power never presented any evidence

eo

that PacifiCorp used them. We addressed some of these documents in
reference to undisputed fact no. 13, above, and will address the other documents
here.
It was USA Power's burden to bring forward sufficient evidence that the
information in its three-ring binders was not already known to PacifiCorp; that
PacifiCorp could not have readily ascertained the information by proper means;
that the information was not within the knowledge of the trade; that the
information had not been published; and that the information was not in the
public domain. See, Utah Medical Products, supra at p. 1312 (citing Muna at
696). The district court searched for this evidence in USA Power's motion
papers, in the affidavits and deposition transcripts, and at oral argument, but
never found it.
USA Power posited that the following four things prepared for it by Ray
Racine, an engineer at Waldron Engineering, were trade secrets: (1) site
drawings; (2) water balances; (3) a performance curve; and, (4) a letter from Mr.
Racine that referred to Racine's "informal studies" to determine the energy
penalty associated with an air cooled condenser. USA Power asserted, without
proof, that the later three things represented "comprehensive and sophisticated
testing" and were secret. However, Racine testified otherwise.

63

Before discussing these four things it is important to note what Racine said
during his deposition about all of his work for USA Power's project. He explained
that there are three phases of a power plant project: (1) development; (2)
detailed design; and, (3) construction. The development phase is all of the
preliminary work leading up to the issuance of an air permit and everything
Racine and Waldron Engineering ever did for USA Power was only preliminary
work.62 Racine added that Waldron Engineering was simply not capable of doing
anything more than preliminary work.63

1.

Site Plans Were Not Secret.

The site plans that Mr. Racine drew for the USA Power project, that
incidentally did not represent the site layout for Currant Creek, were found in the
Division of Air Quality's file for USA Power and were public information (R. 74987500). They could not have been a trade secret.

2.

Water Balances Were Not Secret.

Water balances are simply flow charts of the calculated gallons of water
used by a power plant at each stage of the electricity making process.64 Racine
testified that the water balances he created were hypothetical and

62
63
64

Racine Depo. at pages 16, 28-29 (R. 6869-6870).
Id. at page 29 (R. 6870).
Ian Andrews Depo. at pages 193-194 (R. 6768-6769).
&d

preliminary and would have needed to be re-done had USA Power's planning
ever advanced to the next stage.65
What Racine did to create the water balances made the information, by
statutory definition, not a trade secret. Racine simply e-mailed or telephoned the
vendors of each piece of major plant equipment and asked how much water
each plant component would use.66 Then, he put the information into an Excel
spreadsheet.67 There was nothing secret about the information or the
spreadsheet.
It was undisputed that Shaw/Stone & Webster, not Racine, prepared the
plant water balances for Currant Creek that were included in the Project Cost
Analysis that Shaw/Stone & Webster completed for PacifiCorp in June 2003.68
Mark Green swore under oath that Shaw/Stone & Webster did not use any of
USA Power's information69 and that fact was never controverted.
During discovery, PacifiCorp produced the actual water balances that
Shaw/Stone & Webster had prepared for Currant Creek70 and gave USA Power

b5
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See, Ray Racine Depo. at pages 41 (R. 6873), 88-104 (R. 6881-6898) and
specifically page 93 (R. 6886).
Id. at pages 99-102 (R. 6893-6896).
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Id.
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Ian Andrews Depo. at pages 193-194 (R. 6768-6769).
Mark Green Aff. atU 11 (R. 4128-4134).
PacifiCorp's Answers to Plaintiffs First Set of Interrogatories and documents
attached thereto (R. 6907-7015).
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the names and telephone numbers of the engineers who had prepared them.

If

there had been some comparison between Racine's work and Shaw/Stone &
Webster's work, USA Powers could, and should, have pointed it out to the district
court. They never did.

3.

Energy Penalty Calculation Was Not Secret.

An air-cooled condenser impacts the performance of the power plant's
steam turbine generator.72 The impact on performance is reflected in a
calculated "energy penalty"73 Racine wrote a letter to Ted Banasiewicz
referencing his "informal studies" to calculate the energy penalty for an air-cooled
condenser at the Mona site. Banasiewicz shared the letter with Rand Thurgood.
Racine testified, however, that his energy penalty calculation was nothing more
than his informal manual calculation,74 that Ian Andrews later pointed out failed to
include a number of variables that were necessary to make the calculation
meaningful.75 Most importantly, Racine's calculation was not a trade secret
because the information was within the knowledge of the trade; it was undisputed
that PacifiCorp's engineers were perfectly capable of performing energy penalty

72
73
74
75

Id. at Interrogatory No. 3.
Ian Andrews Depo. at page 96 (R. 6757).
Id.
Ray Racine Depo. at pages 145-147 (R. 6903-6905).
Ian Andrews Depo, at pages 213-214 (R. 6770-6771).
6f>

calculations themselves.

USA Power characteristically offered absolutely no

evidence to the contrary. USA Power failed to provide any proof that Racine's
energy penalty calculation was a trade secret.
Shaw/Stone & Webster and another engineering firm, Burns & McDonnell,
performed the actual detailed energy penalty calculations that were necessary to
design and engineer Currant Creek.77 This fact too was undisputed. USA Power
never dared suggest that either engineering firm used Racine's inadequate
informal manual calculation, or any of USA Power's other information. This was
not lost on the district court which correctly concluded that:
u

[\]t is important to note that the design, development, and
construction analyses prepared for PacifiCorp by Shaw/Stone &
Webster/Burns, independently, without any evidence of reliance or
use of plaintiffs' claimed trade secrets, is undisputed."
Memorandum Decision at pp. 12-13.

4.

Performance Curves Were Not Secret.

The output of a combustion turbine is directly proportional to the density of
air that enters the combustion turbine inlet. Because cold air is more dense, a
combined cycle power plant (which mates one and often two combustion
turbines with one steam turbine) is capable of generating more electricity in cold

Id. at pages 96-98 (R. 6757-6759).
Id. at pages 146-147, 157 (R. 6904-6905, 6762); Rand Thurgood 30(b)(6) Depo. at
pages 128-130 (R. 6749-6751), 135-136 (R. 6752-6753), 179 (R. 6754).
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weather than in hot weather. Racine had prepared a one page performance
curve for General Electric combustion turbines which estimated plant megawatt
output at different air temperatures. USA Power gave PacifiCorp a copy of
Racine's performance curve.
During his deposition, Racine conceded that there was nothing secret
about his performance curve. He created it by inputting temperature and
elevation data for Mona into two software programs licensed by General
Electric;78 one provided at no cost, the other requiring a licensing fee.79 Racine
confirmed that both software programs were readily available to utility
companies, including PacifiCorp.80 The data Racine used with the General
Electric software programs was filed with the Division of Air Quality as part of
USA Power's application for an air permit. It became public information.81 We
obtained a copy of the data during discovery simply by making a GRAMMA
request to the Division of Air Quality for a copy of the entire USA Power file.82
It was also undisputed that PacifiCorp's in-house engineer did his own
preliminary performance calculations for Currant Creek,83 and Shaw/Stone &
78
79
80
81
82
83

Racine Depo. at pages 69-74 (R. 6875-6880).
Id.
Id.
Racine Depo. at pages 126-129 (R. 6899-6902).
See Affidavit of Michele Hardgrave (R. 6671-6673).
Rand Thurgood 30(b)6) Depo. at pages 103-104 (R. 6747-6748); Bob Van
Engelenhoven Depo. at pages 54-55 (R. 6830-6831).

68

Webster created the actual performance curves for Currant Creek when they
designed and engineered the plant.84 These were produced during discovery.
Ignoring the fact that Racine's performance curve was not a secret, a simple
comparison between Racine's performance curve and Shaw/Stone & Webster's
actual performance curves for Currant Creek would have revealed any
similarities. Not surprisingly, USA Power never explored or offered the
comparison.
The district court properly recognized USA Power's failure to demonstrate
that any of the information related to its project was a trade secret.
"[WJith respect to each item or document which plaintiffs purport to
be trade secrets, including the documents plaintiffs claim were not
part of their public filings, there is no aspect of this information which
plaintiffs make any effort to demonstrate specifically that PacifiCorp
could not have readily ascertained either through public information,
the plaintiffs' filings with the Utah Division of Air Quality, knowledge
generally known in the industry, the independent analysis and
evaluations performed by Shaw/Stone & Webster, and PacifiCorp's
prior knowledge and purchase of the Panda assets. Plaintiffs'
identifying and labeling of documents they claim contain trade
secret information . . . is insufficient."
Memorandum Decision at page 8.
III.

USA POWER DID NOT MEET ITS BURDEN TO DEMONSTRATE THAT
THERE WAS A MISAPPROPRIATION
USA Power, as an essential element of both their misappropriation of trade

secrets claim and their breach of contract claim, was required to establish a

Id. at pages 68-69 (R. 6832-6833).
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genuine issue of material fact that PacifiCorp used or disclosed their claimed
trade secrets and confidential information. USA Power did not meet that burden.

A.

Circumstantial Evidence of Misappropriation Requires Similarity With
the Innovative Features of a Claimed Trade Secret.

Because USA Power could not identify any direct proof that PacifiCorp
misappropriated any of its information, regardless of the fact that the information
was neither a trade secret, nor confidential information, USA Power responded
that they ought to be able to satisfy their burden with a tangled web of
circumstantial evidence from which the trier of fact could then draw inferences
which would convince the trier of fact that it was more probable than not that
PacifiCorp misappropriated trade secrets.
While recognizing that there was no Utah law on point, the district court
accepted USA Power's proposition, acknowledging that there may be no
"smoking gun." (Memorandum Decision at page 9). Even with this concession,
USA Power failed to meet its burden.
Several years prior to the district court's decision, the federal court in Utah
decided Utah Medical Products, Inc. v. Clinical Innovations Associates, Inc.,
supra. In that case the plaintiff sought to meet its burden to demonstrate that a
trade secret misappropriation had occurred by arguing that: "I don't know how
[the defendant] couldn't have used trade secrets." Id. 79 F. Supp. 2d at 1314.
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Justifiably, the court held that this was not nearly enough to meet the accuser's
burden. To meet its burden, "the plaintiff must offer more than just argument." Id.
Since the district court entered its Memorandum Decision, Judge Ted
Stewart published a federal court decision ruling that if faced with the issue, Utah
appellate courts would allow circumstantial evidence of a trade secret
misappropriation if the following could be shown: (1) access by the accused party
to the trade secret; and, (2) similarity in the respective designs or products of the
accused party and the trade secrets owner. Hammerton, Inc. v. Heisterman,
2008 WL 2004327 (D. Utah) (attached to USA Power's principal brief at Tab 7).
Judge Stewart was of the opinion that the Utah Supreme Court had already
implicitly recognized the possibility of using circumstantial evidence to prove
misappropriation in Water & Energy Systems Technology v. Keil, 974 P. 2d 821
(Utah 1999)(included in the addendum at Tab 16). Because circumstantial
evidence does not encompass "evidence that is as consistent with the fact
sought to be proved as with its opposite," see, Dep't of Econ. Dev. v. Arthur
Anderson & Co., 924 F. Supp. 449 (S.D. N.Y. 1996), the Hammerton case
cannot be construed to stand for the proposition that any similarity between two
designs is circumstantial evidence of a misappropriation. And if it does,
Hammerton is wrongly decided.
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In Keil, the Supreme Court explained that mere similarity between two
designs is not necessarily evidence of misappropriation: "Similarities which can
be explained by industry or regulatory demands cannot suffice to meet the
requirement that [the new employer] copied [the former employer's] confidential
formulae, especially in light of

the substantial amount of information in the

public domain involving water treatment chemicals." Keil at fl 14.
Judge Stewart in Hammerton cited Stratienko, M.D. v. Cordis Corporation,
429 F. 3d 592 (6th Cir. 2005)(included in the addendum at Tab 17), which
provides useful guidance about which similarities in design might fairly support
an inference of a trade secret misappropriation. Stratienko involved a design for
a catheter device. The Sixth Circuit explained that once the summary judgment
movant demonstrates that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the burden
shifts to the non-movant to demonstrate by sufficient evidence that a
misappropriation occurred. If there is no direct evidence the non-movant may
rely on indirect circumstantial evidence. But still, there must be sufficient
evidence of access and similarity to create a genuine issue of material fact of
misappropriation worthy of submitting the matter to a jury. Inferences that are
simply too tenuous do not create genuine issues of material fact as to use of the
trade secret. Id. at 599. And, most importantly, the requisite "similarity" to permit

7?

a circumstantial inference of misappropriation must relate to the "innovative"
features of the claimed trade secret. Id. at 600.

B.

Even Assuming That A Circumstantial Case Was Enough to Get to a
Jury, USA Power Failed to Meet its Burden.

Having given USA Power the benefit of the doubt that "a web of
circumstantial evidence" might spare them from summary judgment, the district
court marshaled USA Power's eleven pieces of circumstantial evidence, noting
that:
"Plaintiffs rely heavily on the similarities of Spring Canyon and
Currant Creek and suggest that because of PacifiCorp's access to
their trade secrets and the significant similarities, a "powerful"
inference of misappropriation arises for the jury to determine that
PacifiCorp misappropriated the trade secrets."
Memorandum Decision at pp. 10-11.
Although USA Power pointed out the similarities between its proposed
power plant project and Currant Creek, it never demonstrated that any of these
similarities were innovative, let alone secret. Ted Banasiewicz went through his
list of features for USA Power's plant project and admitted that they were obvious
in dozens of other power plants.85 USA Power conceded in its response to
undisputed fact no. 24 that "[t]he surface characteristics and actual function of
the proposed power plant is not a trade secret - it was (and is) visible to the

Ted Banasiewicz depo. at pp. 691-708, 714 (R. 9234-9251, 9253).
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public

At oral argument, USA Power's counsel conceded that: "the hardware

in the ground is not a trade secret."87 Ultimately, the fact that Currant Creek, its
air-cooled sister plant Apex 1, and USA Power's proposal, were all similar, only
demonstrated that there was nothing innovative about any of them. Accordingly,
the district court correctly concluded that:
"[N]o such reasonable inference [of misappropriation] can be
inferred from the similarities of the two projects in the present case
because the undisputed facts establish the design development,
construction, location and component parts and their arrangement
are not secret, are all well known in the industry and the similarities
can be found in almost every combined cycle power plant built in the
industry. .. [T]he undisputed facts establish that dry-cooling versus
wet-cooling at all locations is an economic decision based upon the
availability of water, and that the dry-cooling and wet-cooling
technologies are widely recognized and understood in the
industry..."
Memorandum Decision at pp. 11-12.
In reference to USA Power's three-ring binder materials the district court
found no direct or circumstantial evidence worthy of submitting the case to a jury:
"Plaintiffs have not provided any evidence, direct or circumstantial,
that specifically identifies any trade secrets that were used or
misappropriated by PacifiCorp. This includes... performance
curve data intended to show the megawatt output at different air
temperatures actually disclosed in plaintiffs' public application for an
air permit, plaintiffs' energy penalty and water balances calculations,
both of which are readily ascertainable by PacifiCorp's engineers
and performed by Shaw/Stone & Webster/Burns, and plaintiffs' pro
formas which contain projections of profitability of a non-regulated
See USA Power's response to undisputed fact no. 24 at p. 50, supra.
Tr. at 220:14.
id

entity which fails to consider PacifiCorp's structured specified rate of
return on its capitol investments as a highly regulated entity. "
Memorandum Decision at page 12.
Although they lacked any specific evidence that PacifiCorp used their
materials, USA Power argued in the district court, and again on appeal, that
PacifiCorp never could have developed the Currant Creek project in four months
without using USA Power's supposed "confidential information." The four month
reference apparently came from a statement Ian Andrews made that this was the
length of time it took PacifiCorp to assemble its proposal for Currant Creek that
was submitted to an independent outside evaluator as part of a regulatory bid
process approved by the Public Service Commission of Utah.88 USA Power
argued that because they took much longer than four months to develop their
power plant proposal, PacifiCorp "must have" used the supposed "confidential
information" in order to develop Currant Creek so quickly.
Of course, what USA Power ignored (and the district court did not) was
that the development of Currant Creek did not begin four months before
PacifiCorp proposed Currant Creek. The development of Currant Creek actually
began in late 2000 when Panda began developing its Mona plant site. By the

See, Ian Andrews depo. at pp. 227-231 (R. 9446-9450). For more details about the
regulatory bid process, see PacifiCorp's opening summary judgment memorandum
(R. 8555-9691) at pages 24-27 ( R. 8582-8586, 10386).
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time Panda sold its Mona project to PacifiCorp, Panda had already: (1)
assembled 240 acres of land with land options and purchase contracts; (2)
erected a meteorological monitoring tower and hired consultants who compiled
an air modeling protocol that was submitted to, and accepted by, the Utah Dept.
of Environmental Quality; (3) gathered a year's worth of on-site meteorological
data that was submitted to, and audited by, the Utah Dept. of Environmental
Quality to support a full PSD air permit89; (4) met with PacifiCorp's transmission
group in Portland, Oregon, and arranged for an Interconnection Study Report
that provided an analysis of the cost of interconnecting the power plant to
PacifiCorp's 345 kV transmission system at the Mona switching station; (5) hired
a lobbyist who lobbied state and local officials and gained consensus among
them for the power plant and a zoning change; (6) designed a transmission path
from the power plant site to the switching station; (7) located the nearby Questar
Mainline 104 and Kern River natural gas transmission lines and mapped out two
alternate routes for lateral gas lines to transport natural gas to the plant; and (8)
hired a water lawyer who talked to at least three potential sources of water for the
plant. See, undisputed fact nos. 3,6, 11.

Once PacifiCorp submitted this meteorological information and it became publicly
available in support of the Currant Creek air permit, USA Power took this same data
from the public record and used it to support their application for an air permit for a
2x1 configured, rather than a 1x1 configured, combined cycle plant. Ted
Banasiewicz depo. at pp. 824-826 (R. 9296-9298).
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Furthermore, Apex 1 had already been designed, engineered, and was
well under construction by Shaw/Stone & Webster before USA Power gave
PacifiCorp any supposed "confidential information." The two months it took
Shaw/Stone & Webster to complete the detailed project cost analysis for
PacifiCorp, utilizing Shaw/ Stone's existing in-house databases and reference
plant designs, was standard fare for Shaw/Stone & Webster. See, undisputed
facts nos. 20, 21-23, 25.
To compile its proposal for Currant Creek, PacifiCorp used: (a)
Shaw/Stone & Webster's project cost analysis; (b) operational and maintenance
information furnished by General Electric; (c) existing operational and
maintenance studies that PacifiCorp had already conducted on its gas-fired
Gadsby plant; (d) manpower requirements compiled from PacifiCorp's combined
cycle power plant in Hermiston, Oregon; and, (e) financial information compiled
by PacifiCorp's financial analyst. See, undisputed fact no. 26.
Four months was all it took PacifiCorp to assemble its Currant Creek
proposal in 2003, because Panda had been working since late 2000. USA
Power certainly had no evidence to the contrary and the district court was not
fooled by USA Power's omission of the undisputed facts:
"Plaintiffs' argument that PacifiCorp could not have developed
Currant Creek in four months without use of their trade secrets...
is nothing more than argument, opinion and theory. The undisputed
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material facts establish that Current Creek's development through
Panda was not of short duration."
Memorandum Decision at page 11.
Neither Hammerton, Keil, nor Stratienko support USA Power's resort to
sheer speculation which was really nothing more than the "they must have"
argument that was eschewed in Medical Products, Inc., supra.
The district court was correct. Even though it was no trade secret, USA
Power did not present sufficient evidence, indirect or otherwise, that PacifiCorp
misappropriated any of USA Power's information.
IV.

THE DISTRICT COURT WAS CORRECT THAT USA POWER'S
BREACH OF CONTRACT CLAIM HAD NO MORE MERIT THAN THEIR
MISAPPROPRIATION OF TRADE SECRETS CLAIM.
At USA Power's second meeting with PacifiCorp, which took place on

September 11, 2002, USA Power Partners, LLC and PacifiCorp signed a
Confidentiality and Non-Disclosure Agreement (R. 9452-9455). USA Power
claimed that PacifiCorp breached this agreement by using the information in the
3 three-ring binders previously mentioned. For the same reasons explained
above, PacifiCorp did not violate the terms of the Confidentiality Agreement,
because the information provided by USA Power was neither secret, nor
"Confidential Information."
As noted above, much of the information USA Power gave to PacifiCorp
was either public information, or was information that was already known to
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PacifiCorp and to everyone else in the power plant industry, or was information
that PacifiCorp learned from others including Panda and Shaw/Stone & Webster
and was, therefore, not "Confidential Information" under the terms of the
Confidentiality Agreement. 90 Still, PacifiCorp treated all of USA Power's
information as confidential and did not use it for any purpose. 91 USA Power had
no evidence to the contrary which is what led the district court, in addition to all of
the foregoing, to conclude the following:
"After carefully considering the parties' respective legal arguments,
the Court determines that the plaintiffs have not presented any
specific evidence from which a jury could draw a reasonable

Paragraph 3 of the Confidentiality and Non-Disclosure Agreement (with emphasis
added) reads:
Definition of "Confidential Information". As used in this Agreement, "Confidential
Information" means all information that is identified as confidential or proprietary when
furnished to Receiving Party or its Representatives by Disclosing Party that concerns
the Potential Transaction, Disclosing Party, its partners or co-venturers, affiliates, or
subsidiaries, and that is either confidential, proprietary, or otherwise not publicly
available. Any information furnished to Receiving Party or its Representatives by a
director, officer, employee, stockholder, partner, co-venturer, consultant, agent, or
representative of Disclosing Party will be deemed furnished by Disclosing Party for the
purpose of this Agreement. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the following does not
constitute Confidential Information for purposes of this Agreement: (i) information that is
or becomes publicly available other than as a result of a disclosure by Receiving Party
or its Representatives; (ii) information that was already known to Receiving Party on a
non-confidential basis prior to being furnished to Receiving Party by Disclosing Party;
(iii) information that becomes available to Receiving Party on a non-confidential basis
from a source other than Disclosing Party or a representative of Disclosing Party if such
source, to Receiving Party's knowledge, is neither subject to any prohibition against
transmitting the information to Receiving Party nor bound by a confidentiality agreement
with Disclosing Party; and (iv) information that is independently developed by Receiving
Party or its Representatives without use of or reference to Confidential Information.
91

Rand Thurgood depo. at pp.302-303, 306-307 (R. 9116-9119).
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inference that PacifiCorp used any of the plaintiffs' confidential
information. The plaintiffs' suggestion that PacifiCorp "must have"
used their confidential information in order to develop Currant Creek
in a short time frame simply overlooks or ignores the undisputed
facts referenced hereinbefore."
Memorandum Decision at page 14.
The district court was correct. There was no credible evidence from which
a jury could have concluded that PacifiCorp breached the confidentiality
agreement.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth, the Utah Supreme Court should affirm the district
court decision granting PacifiCorp's Motion for Summary Judgment on the
misappropriation of trade secrets and breach of contract claims.

DATED this / ^ " " d a y of January, 2009.

'^tee^/

^0c<f^>7

P. Bruce Badger
FABIAN & CLENDENIN
a Professional corporation
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee PacifiCorp
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

USA POWER, LLC; USA POWER
PARTNERS, LLC; and SPRING CANYON
ENERGY, LLC,
Plaintiffs,

:

MEMORANDUM DECISION

:

CASE NO.

050903412

:

vs.

:

PACIFICORP; JODY L. WILLIAMS, and
HOLME, ROBERTS & OWEN, LLP,

:

Defendants.

This matter came before the Court for hearings on September 24, 2007
and

October

2,

2007,

in

connection

with

the

following

Motions:

PacifiCorp's Motion for Summary Judgment; PacifiCorp's Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment with respect to the Claim for Intentional Interference
with Existing Contractual Relations; Defendants Jody L. Williams and
Holme Roberts & Owen, LLP's (Ms. Williams and Holme Roberts & Owen are
collectively referred to as "HRO") Motion for Partial Summary Judgment:
Confidential Information; HRO's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re:
Loyalty Claim; HRO's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Against USA
Power, LLC/ and USA Power Partners, LLC, for Lack of Standing and
Speculative Damages; USA Power's Motion to Strike

the Affidavit of

Michael G. Jenkins and Paragraphs 7 and 8 of the Supplemental Affidavit
of Jody L. Williams; and USA Power's Motion for Leave to File

USA POWER V. PACIFICORP
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Supplemental Affidavit of Peggy A. Tomsic.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
At the conclusion of these

hearings, the Court took the matter under advisement to further consider
the parties' written

submissions,

relevant legal authority,

counsels' oral

argument

and

the

Being now fully informed, the Court rules as

stated herein.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
PacifiCorp's Motion for Summary Judgment
The
settled.

standard

for

determining

Motions

for

Summary

Judgment

is

Summary Judgment is proper only upon a showing "that there is

no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a Judgment as a matter of law."

Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c).

Initially, defendant as the moving party has the burden of presenting
evidence demonstrating that no genuine issue of material facts exist and
that Judgment as a matter of law is appropriate.
Once the moving party

has met

its burden,

Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e) .

the nonmoving

party by

affidavits or as otherwise provided in Rule 56 must set forth specific
facts showing that there are genuine issues of material fact for trial.
The nonmoving party is required to produce more than just conclusory
assertions or theories that an issue of material fact exists to establish
genuine triable issues in order to survive summary judgment. Shaw Res.
Ltd., L.L.C., v. Pruitt, Gushee & Bachtell , 2006 UT App 313, 142 P. 3d
560; Orvis v

Johnson, 2006 UT App 394, 146 P.3d 886.

In substance, the

Court is required to examine the factual record and reasonable inferences
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drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party and only
grant summary judgment when reasonable minds could not differ on the
facts

to be

determined

from

the

evidence

presented.

Shopping Ctr. v. Smith's Food & Drug Ctrs.,

Olympus

889 P. 2d 445

Hills

(Utah App.

1994) .
Violation of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act
In its Motion for Summary Judgment, PacificCorp first argues that
it is entitled to Summary Judgment on the plaintiffs' First Count for
violation

of

the

Utah

Uniform

Trade

Secrets

Act

("the

Act").

In

assessing whether a violation of the Act has occurred, the Court must,
as threshold matter, determine whether the plaintiffs had a trade secret
which PacificCorp misappropriated. Utah Med. Prods., Inc. v.
Innovations

Assocs.,

Inc.,

79

F.Supp.2d

1290,

1311

(D.

Clinical

Utah

(internal citations omitted).
The Act defines the term "Trade secret" to mean:
Information, including a formula, pattern, compilation,
program, device, method, technique, or process, that:
(a) derives independent economic value, actual or
potential, from not being generally known to, and
not being readily ascertainable by proper means by,
other persons who can obtain economic value from
its disclosure or use; and
(b) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable
under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.
Utah Code Ann., § 13-24-2(4).

1999)
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The burden of establishing the existence of a trade secret is the
plaintiffs7

and

there

is

no

presumption

in

plaintiffs'

favor.

Microbiological Research Corp. V. Muna, 625 P.2d 690 (Utah 1981); Utah
Med. Prods., v. Clinical Innovations Assocs., Inc., supra.
The essential elements of a claim for misappropriation of trade
secrets under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act require a plaintiff to prove
(1) the existence of a trade secret,

(2) communication of the trade

secrets to PacifiCorp under an express duty not to disclose or use it,
and (3) PacifiCorp's use of the trade secret information that injures
plaintiffs.
1999).

Water & Energy Sys. Tech., Inc. v. Keil, 974 P.2d 821 (Utah

Elements (1) and (2) are the focus of this Decision.

In its Motion, PacifiCorp contends they are entitled to Summary
Judgment because the information plaintiffs claim were trade secrets were
actually

known

ascertainable by

within

the

industry,

PacifiCorp by

general

public

or

readily

independent proper means based upon

PacifiCorp's knowledge and experience in the industry.

Significantly,

PacifiCorp further asserts that based upon the undisputed material facts,
plaintiffs have produced

no

evidence

that

PacifiCorp

ever used

misappropriated any of plaintiffs' claimed trade secrets.

or

Plaintiffs

counter that the trade secrets which PacifiCorp misappropriated consisted
of a combination of details, including tests and evaluations which were
site specific and which formed the Spring Canyon "vision".

Plaintiffs

contend that PacifiCorp stole their Spring Canyon Power Plant trade
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secrets in order to build the competing Currant Creek Power Plant, which
is a replica of the Spring Canyon Power Plant in the same Mona location.
At the outset, it is important to note that Rule 7 of the Utah R.
Civ. P. requires that with respect to Summary Judgment Motions, that:
"Each fact set forth in the moving party's memorandum is deemed admitted
for the purpose of summary judgment unless specifically controverted by
the

responding

Memorandum

party."

Rule

in opposition,

as

7(c)(3)(A).
noted

by

Throughout

PacifiCorp,

plaintiffs'

plaintiffs

have

employed the practice contrary to Rule 7(c)(3)(A) of arguing about the
implication'of the facts asserted instead of "specifically controverting"
them with the factual record.
engage

in

the

tedious

This practice has required the Court to

exercise

of

separating

throughout plaintiffs' Memorandum in opposition.

fact

from

argument

In many instances as

referenced hereinafter, plaintiffs' failure to "specifically controvert"
defendants'
admitted.

undisputed
Those

facts

results

in

facts deemed admitted

those

facts

being

deemed

identified hereinafter are

incorporated into this Decision by this reference.

The Court finds that

PacifiCorp's Undisputed Facts Nos. 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11
which are not "specifically controverted" are thus deemed admitted.
These undisputed facts identify Panda Energy's development of a power
plant in Mona, next to PacifiCorp's transmission station, PacifiCorp's
knowledge of Panda's development before ever meeting plaintiffs' and
PacifiCorp's ultimate purchase

of Panda's assets necessary

for the

PAGE 6
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development of the Currant Creek Power plant in Mona.

With respect to

Panda, it is undisputed that Panda initially had the idea to build a
combined cycle power plant in Mona, started its development efforts in
late 2000,

secured

options

to purchase

240 acres

of

land next

to

PacifiCorp's Mona transmission station, undertaken meteorological and
other assessments pivotal to PacifiCorp's development of Currant Creek
and

the publication of Panda's development in the

Deseret

News

demonstrate the vision and concepts underlying the Currant Creek Power
Plant in Mona was no secret and was not a trade secret of plaintiffs as
defined under the Trade Secrets Act.
The Court finds that PacifiCorp's Undisputed Facts Nos. 20, 21, 22,
23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28 and 29, which identify PacifiCorp's and Shaw/Stone
& Webster's'design, engineering and construction of the Currant Creek
Power Plant are not "specifically controverted", thus deemed admitted.
Again, at their core, plaintiffs' responses to PacifiCorp's undisputed
facts argues theories and implications of the facts without "specifically
controverting" the facts.

With respect to Shaw/Stone & Webster, it is

undisputed that they built a sister plant to the Currant Creek Power
Plant

(Apex

1 ) , and that

the Currant

Creek

Power Plant

represents

PacifiCorp's and Shaw/Stone & Webster's own work. That the Currant Creek
Power Plant and Apex 1 Power Plant with all of their component parts and
technologies are well understood and widely utilized in the electric
power plant

industry.

Significantly,

plaintiffs

concede

in

their

Ko<$
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to PacifiCorp's

Undisputed
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Fact No. 24 that

"The surface

characteristics and actual function of the proposed power plant is not
a trade secret--it was (and is) visible to the public."

The Court finds

the undisputed material facts establish that the design, engineering and
construction of the Currant Creek Power Plant was not based upon nor
utilized any information from or about USA Power, USA Power Partners,
Spring Canyon Energy or the Spring Canyon Energy project (Undisputed Fact
No. 29).
The Court finds that PacifiCorp's Undisputed Facts Nos. 13 and 17,
which identify Spring Canyon's public filings and application for an air
permit, are not "specifically controverted" and thus deemed admitted.
These undisputed material facts demonstrate that plaintiffs' concept,
vision and claimed confidential information were of public record, and
were disclosed to PacifiCorp by the public record.
information

contained

therein

being

generally

Consequently, the
known

and

readily

ascertainable from the public record by PacifiCorp and other persons in
the field cannot possibly constitute trade secrets as defined by Utah
Code Ann., § 13-24-2(4).
The Court finds from the undisputed material facts set forth herein,
in plaintiffs' Memorandum in opposition, and plaintiffs' oral argument,
that

plaintiffs

have

not

defined

with

sufficient

particularity

or

precision what constitutes the trade secrets which PacifiCorp allegedly
misappropriated.

Instead, plaintiffs allude to the trade secrets as
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consisting of their "project concept," "vision," "formula," and "test
data" for the Spring Canyon Power Plant.

However, these vague and

conclusory assertions fall short of actually describing those specific
features of the power plant development, including specific features of
the data and formula which were not generally known and not readily
ascertainable by PacifiCorp.

Further, with respect to each item or

document which plaintiffs purport to be trade secrets, including the
documents plaintiffs claim were not part of their public filings, there
is no aspect of this information which plaintiffs make any effort to
demonstrate

specifically

that

PacifiCorp

could

not

have

readily

ascertained either through public information, the plaintiffs' filings
with the Utah Division of Air Quality, knowledge generally known in the
industry,

the

independent

analysis

and

evaluations

performed

by

Shaw/Stone & Webster, and PacifiCorp7s prior knowledge and purchase of
the Panda assets. Plaintiffs' identifying and labeling of documents they
claim contain

trade secret

information,

including

the economic and

technical viability of their project, which at oral argument was stated
to be the essence of their trade secrets, is insufficient.

See, Utah

Med. Prods., v. Clinical Innovations, supra.
Plaintiffs, as an essential element of their misappropriation of
trade secrets cause of action, are required to establish a genuine issue
of material fact that PacifiCorp used or misappropriated their claimed
trade secrets information.

Utah Code Ann., § 13-24-2, states that a
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a trade secret when it uses or discloses

another's trade secret without that party's express or implied consent.
This Court acknowledges plaintiffs' general proposition that it may be
rare

to

have

a

"smoking

gun"

or

misappropriation of trade secrets.

direct
Sokol

evidence

Crystal

Communications Corp., 15 F.3d 1427 (7th Cir. 1994).

of

use

Prods., v.

or
DSC

Plaintiffs also

claim that they are only required to "construct a web of. . .circumstantial
evidence from which the trier of fact may draw inferences which convince
him that it is more probable than not that what the plaintiffs allege
happened did in fact take place."

Citing Eden Hannon & Co. v. Sumitomo

Trust & Banking Co. , 914 F.2d 556 (4th Cir. 1990).
that

the holding

in the Eden

Hannon

It should be noted

case has nothing

to do with

authorizing plaintiffs to construct a web of circumstantial evidence from
which a jury may draw inferences which convince a jury that it is more
probable than not that defendants used plaintiffs' trade secrets.

The

Court in Eden Hannon expressly stated that: "Since our disposition of
this case

does not

depend

on knowing

whether

Sumitomo

(defendant)

actually used this information, we will not dwell on this point."
dicta relied upon by plaintiffs

cited in

Eden Hannon

is

The

found in

Greenberg v. Croydon Plastics Co., et al. , 378 F.Supp. 806 (E.D. Pa.
1974), a case with remarkably distinguishing facts which will not be
addressed here. Although the parties have not referred to and I have not
discovered any Utah cases that hold in a trade secrets cause of action,
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a web of

circumstantial

evidence from which the jury may draw inferences which convince them that
it is more probable than not that PacifiCorp used plaintiffs' trade
secrets, for the purpose of this Motion and Decision the Court assumes
this to be an accurate statement of Utah law.
Plaintiffs' web of circumstantial evidence consists primarily of (1)
PacifiCorp's access to the claimed trade secrets and the significant
similarities between the Spring Canyon Power Plant and Currant Creek; (2)
that in response to an observation regarding the similarities of the two
projects, PacifiCorp stated (Thurgood), "We learned a lot from you guys";
(3) that without trade secret information, PacifiCorp could not have
developed Currant Creek in four months; (4) PacifiCorp deleted emails and
lost a key notebook relating to plaintiffs and PacifiCorp;

(5) that

PacifiCorp never planned or tested a dry-cooled plant and could have only
made the decision for dry-cooling after receiving plaintiffs' dry-cooling
data; (6) PacifiCorp's abrupt stoppage of negotiations regarding purchase
of Spring Canyon assets; (7) that Mona has only a finite amount of room
for large scale power plants;

(8) that plaintiffs had the only site

developed that could meet PacifiCorp's 2005 need for electricity; (9) an
internal memo

from PacifiCorp

(Ian Andrews)

to

experience and experience with inlet chillers";
committed

to

the

Currant

Creek

project

"stress

dry-cooling

(10) that PacifiCorp

without

any

preliminary

engineering; and (11) the retention of Jody Williams, plaintiffs' lawyer.
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Plaintiffs rely heavily on the similarities of Spring Canyon and
Currant Creek and suggest that because of PacifiCorp's access to their
trade secrets and the significant similarities, a upower/full" inference
of misappropriation arises for the jury to determine that PacifiCorp
misappropriated the trade secrets. 3M v. Pribyl, 259 F.3d 587 (7th Cir.
2001). The dourt finds that no such reasonable inference can be inferred
from the similarities of the two projects in the present case because the
undisputed facts establish the design development, construction, location
and component parts and their arrangement are not secret, are all well
known in the industry and the

similarities can be found in almost every

combined cycle power plant built in the industry. Plaintiffs' suggestion
that PacifiCorp's deletion of emails, loss of a key note book, and
statement that "we learned a lot from you guys" (Thurgood) , is sufficient
circumstantial

evidence

of

misappropriation

is a

stretch,

no

such

reasonable inference of use or misappropriation can be drawn from these
facts.

Plaintiffs' argument that PacifiCorp could not have developed

Currant Cre^k in four months without use of their trade secrets, that
PacifiCorp did not test for dry-cooling and therefore could not have made
the decision to go with dry-cooling until reviewing their claimed drycooling trade secrets is nothing more than argument, opinion and theory.
The undisputed material facts establish that Currant Creek's development
through Panda was not of short duration.

The undisputed facts establish

that dry-cooling versus wet-cooling at all locations is an economic

USA POWER V. PACIFICORP
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decision based upon the availability of water, and that the dry-cooling
and wet-cooling technologies are widely recognized and understood in the
industry. The fact that an internal memo from PacifiCorp (Andrews) notes
"stress dry-cooling experience and experience with

inlet chillers,"

technologies common and known in the industry, cannot reasonably support
an inference of misappropriation.
plaintiffs

have

failed

to

Finally, as determined hereinafter,

produce

any

evidence

that

Williams/HRO

disclosed any confidential information.
Plaintiffs have not provided any evidence, direct or circumstantial,
that

specifically

misappropriated
plaintiffs

by

identifies

any

PacifiCorp.

trade
This

secrets

that

were

includes

the

trade

claim were not publicly disclosed,

used

or

secrets

including plaintiffs'

performance curve data intended to show the megawatt output at different
air temperatures actually disclosed in plaintiffs' public application for
an

air

permit,

plaintiffs'

energy

penalty

and

water

balances

calculations, both of which are readily ascertainable by PacifiCorp's
engineers and performed by Shaw/Stone &. Webster/Burns, and plaintiffs'
pro formas

which contain projections of profitability of a non-regulated

entity which fails to consider PacifiCorp's structured specified rate of
return on it^s capitol investments as a highly regulated entity.

It is

important to note that the design, development, and construction analyses
prepared for PacifiCorp by Shaw/Stone & Webster/Burns, independently,
without any evidence of reliance or use of plaintiffs' claimed trade

secrets, is undisputed.
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Absent from the record is any comparison of any

of the independent work performed at PacifiCorp's direction against
plaintiffs' claimed trade secrets, and identification with specificity
of exactly what trade secrets were used.

At best, plaintiffs offer

indirect circumstantial evidence from which a reasonable jury could only
speculate

and

could

not

reasonably

plaintiffs' claimed trade secrets.
of

circumstantial

inferences

that it

evidence

from

which

is more probable

"must have

felt

that

PacifiCorp

used

Plaintiffs have not presented a web

plaintiffs' claimed trade secrets.
PacifiCorp

conclude

a

jury may

than not that

draw

reasonable

PacifiCorp used

The fact, if it be a fact, that

confident

that

an air

cooled

condenser

remained a viable option" (Micheletti), or that Spring Canyon was

u

an

opportunity not contemplated before we gave them our stuff," is pure
speculation, conjecture and does not raise a genuine issue of material
fact as to misappropriation of any of plaintiffs' claimed trade secrets.
It may very well be that PacifiCorp was further motivated and encouraged
to pursue the development of Currant Creek after review of the three
volumes of claimed trade secrets.

However, I can find no authority that

suggests motivation and encouragement are actionable. Plaintiffs' Motion
for Summary Judgment is granted.
Next, PacificCorp seeks Summary Judgment as to the plaintiffs'
Second Count, for Breach of Contract, and Third Count, for Breach of the
Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing.

Both of these Counts

USA POWER V. PACIFICORP
are

premised

on

the
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Confidentiality

and

Non-Disclosure

Agreement

("Confidentiality Agreement").
After carefully considering the parties' respective legal arguments,
the Court determines that the plaintiffs have not presented any specific
evidence

from which a jury could

inference

that

PacificCorp used any of the plaintiffs' confidential information.

The

plaintiffs'

suggestion

that

draw a reasonable

PacificCorp

"must

have"

used

their

confidential information in order to develop Currant Creek in a short
time frame simply overlooks or ignores the undisputed facts referenced
hereinbefore.
As

indicated hereinbefore,

PacifiCorp's

acquisition of

Panda's

project assets was clearly instrumental to the time frame because it
provided a foundation for the development of Currant Creek.
PacifiCorp's

In addition,

involvement of Shaw/Stone & Webster, with its existing

database oft information and experience, also created advantages and
assisted PacificCorp in moving the project forward more quickly.

Since

the plaintiffs have failed to present any evidence that PacificCorp used
its confidential information, in breach of the Confidentiality Agreement
and the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, PacifiCorp's Motion for
Summary Judgment as to Counts Two and Three is granted.
Finally,

the

Court

determines

that

unjust

enrichment

is

not

available to plaintiffs because of the existence of the enforceable
written Confidentiality Agreement.

Wood v. Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co.,
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Further, based upon the decision set forth

hereinbefore, the plaintiffs have not presented any facts upon which a
reasonable
plaintiffs7

jury

could

conclude

confidential

that

PacifiCorp

information, plaintiffs

used
cannot

any

of

the

establish a

genuine issue of material fact that plaintiffs conferred a benefit upon
PacifiCorp, that PacifiCorp appreciated or has knowledge of the benefit,
or

that

the benefit

was

accepted

or retained

by

PacifiCorp

under

circumstances as to make it inequitable for PacifiCorp to retain without
payment of its value.

Accordingly, PacifiCorp's Motion for Summary

Judgment as to Count Seven of plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint is
granted.
PacifiCorp's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Claim for Intentional
Interference with Existing Contractual Relations).
In the case of Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P. 2d 293
(Utah 1982) , the Utah Supreme Court outlined the three requirements for
a plaintiff

to establish a claim for intentional

economic relations.

Under

interference with

Leigh, "the plaintiff must prove " (1) that

the defendant intentionally interfered with the plaintiff's existing or
potential economic relations (2) for an improper purpose or by improper,
means, (3) causing injury to the plaintiff."

Id. at 304.

In this case, the plaintiffs' Sixth Count alleges that PacificCorp
intentionally interfered with their contractual relationship with HRO by
hiring them to represent it in the development of its Currant Creek

USA POWER V. PACIFICORP
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PacifiCorp seeks Summary Judgment on this claim, arguing that

Thurgood,

who

was

then

PacifiCorp's

Director

of

Resource

Development, specifically inquired of Ms. Williams whether she had a
conflict of interest in representing PacificCorp and whether there was
any reason that she could not represent PacifiCorp in acquiring water for
Currant Creek.

According to Mr. Thurgood's deposition testimony, Ms.

Williams indicated that her work for the plaintiffs was complete and that
she was free to represent PacifiCorp.

Based on these facts, PacificCorp

argues that no reasonable jury could find that by engaging Ms. Williams,
PacifiCorp intentionally
relationship with HRO.
establish

the

interfered with the plaintiffs' contractual

PacifiCorp adds that the plaintiffs also cannot

''improper

purpose"

element

of

their

intentional

interference claim.
The Court determines that the plaintiffs have not presented any
actual evidence that in engaging HRO, PacifiCorp acted with the requisite
intent necessary

to establish

a claim of intentional

interference.

Indeed, there is no evidence which would suggest that in engaging HRO,
PacifiCorp had any purpose other than to simply acquire water rights for
its Currant Creek power plant.

In addition, the uncontroverted evidence

is that Ms. Williams specifically informed Mr. Thurgood that her work was
complete and that there would be no conflict of interest.

At the same

time, the undisputed evidence demonstrates that Mr. Thurgood was informed
by USA Power that it had already acquired the necessary water rights.

USA POWER V. PACIFICORP
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testimony

is

PAGE 17
argue

that

"pretextual,"
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Mr. Thurgood's

"concocted"

and

and

Ms. Williams'

"fabricated"

or,

alternatively, that Mr. Thurgood inquired simply to give the appearance
that he was acting ethically.

These arguments and theories are without

factual support and amount to conjecture and speculation, rather than
evidence

capable of supporting

favor.

In addition,

reasonable inferences

the plaintiffs

have

in plaintiffs'

not presented

any

facts

specifically controverting this testimony.
In addition, it cannot be overlooked that Ms. Williams had been
PacifiCorp's water lawyer continuously

since 1982.

Further, it is

undisputed that by the time PacifiCorp engaged HRO in connection with
Currant Creek, Ms. Williams had already acquired water rights for the
plaintiffs' Spring Canyon project.
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that no reasonable jury
could draw the necessary inference that PacifiCorp intended to interfere
with

the

plaintiffs'

contractual

relationship

or

that

it

had

the

knowledge that interference was substantially certain to occur as a
result of it engaging HRO.

Mumford v. ITT Commercial Fin. Corp., 858

P.2d 1041, 1044 (Utah App. 1993).
Furthermore, the plaintiffs have not presented any evidence that
PacifiCorp's

predominant purpose in engaging Ms. Williams was to injure

the plaintiffs.

Rather, the undisputed

facts can only support the

conclusion that PacifiCorp, having acquired

Panda's project assets,

USA POWER V. PACIFICORP
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turned to Ms. Williams, as it had done m

the past, to acquire the water

it needed. These facts demonstrate that PacifiCorp engaged Ms. Williams,
its water lawyer, for the legitimate purpose of acquiring water relative
to its planned development of a power plant
Based on the undisputed facts, the Court determines that PacifiCorp
is entitled to Summary Judgment on the plaintiffs' Sixth Count as a
matter of law.

Therefore, PacifiCorp's Motion for Partial

Summary

Judgment (Claim for Intentional Interference with Existing Contractual
Relations) is granted.
HRO's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re: Confidential Information
The plaintiffs have alleged two causes of action against HRO: Breach
of Fiduciary Duty and Breach of Duty of Confidentiality.

HRO's Motion

for Partial Summary Judgment concerning confidentiality asserts that the
plaintiffs have failed to show that HRO breached its fiduciary duties to
the plaintiffs by obtaining and communicating or using the plaintiffs'
confidential information to their detriment
HRO primarily relies on Shaw Res

In making this argument,

Ltd , L L C ,

v

Pruitt, Gushee &

Bachtell, 142 P.3d 560, 565 (UT App. 2006)
In Shaw Resources, the plaintiffs asserted that their former counsel
obtained certain confidential maps showing possible gas formations and
confidential drilling locations and thereafter sought to develop that
area, m

competition with the plaintiffs.

affirmed summary judgment m

The Utah Court of Appeals

favor of the defendants

The court stated-
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When a law firm represents clients in the same business and
geographic area, it owes great caution to clients in
maintaining their confidentiality and loyalty. That is even
more true when attorneys in the law firm have personal stakes
in clients' businesses or in similar businesses. Nonetheless,
the evidence here does not allow us to conclude that
Defendants breached their duty of loyalty to Plaintiffs
because Plaintiffs have failed to specifically identify
material facts and have provided arguments based only on
speculation or "conclusory assertions."
Id. at 569.

Relying on Shaw Resources, HRO argues that the plaintiffs

have similarly failed to provide any evidence which is "nonspeculative
or nonconj ectural."
HRO also relies on Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein & Fielding, 37 P. 3d
1130

(Utah

2001),

for

the

proposition

that

the

plaintiffs

must

demonstrate that PacifiCorp had confidential information that could have
come from HRO (i.e. information beyond what PacifiCorp obtained directly
from the plaintiffs) .

The defendants point out that the information

which the plaintiffs allege was disclosed to PacifiCorp had already been
disclosed by the plaintiffs themselves to PacifiCorp.
In opposition, the plaintiffs contend that they need only present
evidence that would allow a jury to infer that HRO used and/or disclosed
confidential information.
At the outset, the Court determines that there are genuine issues
of material fact concerning the scope of the information acquired by Ms.
Williams in her representation of the plaintiffs.

As a corollary, it is

unclear whether this information was truly confidential or generally
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The Court also cannot determine whether this information was

indeed virtually identical to the information previously provided to
PacifiCorp by the plaintiffs themselves, as HRO claims.
Notwithstanding

the

factual

disputes

surrounding

the

type

of

information allegedly acquired by Ms. Williams, the dipositive issue for
the purpose of this Motion is whether the plaintiffs have presented
actual evidence that HRO communicated their confidential information to
PacifiCorp. Shaw Resources, 142 P. 3d at 567.
simultaneous

representation

(assuming

such

The Court finds that

occurred

in

this

case),

without more, is not sufficient alone to support an inference that an
attorney has improperly used and/or disclosed confidential information.
Further, the plaintiffs' reliance on legal authority to the contrary
(including cases which suggest that simultaneous representation actually
gives rise to a presumption) is unpersuasive. Therefore, the plaintiffs'
suggested

inferences

confidential

that

information

HRO

must

simply

have

by

used

virtue

or

of

disclosed
the

their

simultaneous

representation or the fact that both the plaintiffs and PacifiCorp sought
to

acquire

water

rights

or

that

they

had

similar

projects

is

insufficient.
Further, the plaintiffs have not identified any evidence which
would

support

a

reasonable

confidential information.

inference

that

HRO

used

or

disclosed

Rather, the plaintiffs have provided mere
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argument based on speculation and conclusory assertions, without any
material factual support.

Id. at 569.

Accordingly, the Court grants HRO's

Motion for Partial Summary

Judgment Re: Confidential Information.
HRO's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re: Loyalty Claim
In this Motion, HRO is seeking Partial Summary Judgment as to
plaintiffs' Count Four for Breach of Fiduciary Duty.

HRO argues that it

has not breached any duty of loyalty to the plaintiffs and that the
plaintiffs cannot establish causation.
In their opposition, the plaintiffs contend that they were in direct
competition with PacifiCorp and that HRO's representation was a conflict
of interest and a breach of the duty of loyalty.

The plaintiffs further

contend that HRO's breach of its duties was the legal cause of PacifiCorp
terminating

negotiations

with

the

plaintiffs,

resulting

in

the

plaintiffs' failure to sell the Spring Canyon assets to PacifiCorp and
ultimately causing the rejection of the plaintiffs' RFP bid.
At the outset, the Court notes that there are genuine issues of
material fact concerning the duration of HRO's representation of the
plaintiffs, the scope of that representation and the scope of HRO's
representation of PacifiCorp with respect to Currant Creek.

Therefore,

the Court cannot determine whether the duty owed to the plaintiffs by HRO
was the duty owed to a former client under Rule 1.9 or the duty owed
under Rule 1.7, pertaining to concurrent representation.

Since it is

USA POWER V. PACIFICORP
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unclear which of these Rules applies, the Court will not engage in an
either-or analysis, but instead rules that there are genuine issues of
material fact which preclude it from determining, as a matter of law,
whether HRO did or did not breach its obligations to uhe plaintiffs.
However, the Court determines that the dispositive issue presented
by this Motion is not whether HRO breached its duties to the plaintiffs,
but rather whether the plaintiffs can establish the element of causation.
Under Kilpatrick, 990 P.2d at 1291 and Shaw Resources, 142 P.2d at 569,
in order to establish the element of causation, plaintiffs must present
evidence that but for HRO's breach of its obligations, the plaintiffs
would have been benefitted.

The Court finds that the plaintiffs have not

presented any evidence upon which a reasonable jury could infer causation
and actual damages as claimed by plaintiffs.
Instead, the plaintiffs merely hypothesize without any evidence to
support that if HRO had not represented

PacifiCorp with respect to

Currant Creek, PacifiCorp would have certainly purchased their Spring
Canyon assets and signed a Joint Development Agreement with USA Power,
LLC. The plaintiffs alternative scenario is that if HRO had not assisted
PacifiCorp in securing water, PacifiCorp would have accepted their bid
on the RFP and entered into a power purchase agreement with plaintiffs.
Finally, plaintiffs claim that PacifiCorp terminated its negotiations
with

plaintiffs

PacifiCorp".

"as

a

direct

result

of

HRO's

representation

of

As HRO points out, there is a complete absence of evidence
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to support these various scenarios.
speculative

and

are based

on
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Clearly, these scenarios are highly

conjecture

that

HRO's

representation

influenced PacifiCorp's decision with respect to its negotiations with
the plaintiffs or affected
involved in the RFP.

the outcome and decision-making

process

Each of the plaintiffs' scenarios of what could

have been is based entirely on speculation unsupported by any record
evidence.
The undisputed material facts establish that HRO's representation
was not necessary for PacifiCorp to acquire water rights based upon the
availability of equally capable water rights lawyers in Salt Lake City
and PacifiCorp's budget commitment of $16.2 million for water rights in
connection with the Currant Creek Power Plant.

It should be noted here

the Court previously determined that plaintiffs have failed to produce
any evidence that HRO used or disclosed any of plaintiffs' confidential
information

to PacifiCorp.

Further, the undisputed material

facts

demonstrate plaintiffs' negotiations with PacifiCorp were terminated
prior to PacifiCorp's acquisition of water rights for the Currant Creek
project.

Accordingly, HRO's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to

plaintiffs' Loyalty claim is granted.

It is important to note that

plaintiffs' claim for Disgorgement for breach of the duty of loyalty
survive this decision, because this claim does not require evidence of
causation for disgorgement purposes.
(Tex. 1999).

Burrow v. Arce, 997 S.W.2d 229
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HRO/Williams' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment for Lack of Standing
and Speculative Damages
HRO/Williams, by this Motion, seeks an Order dismissing all claims
asserted by USA Power, LLC, and USA Power Partners, LLC, for lack of
standing and alternatively, for speculative damages.

The law is settled

in Utah that to establish standing, USA Power Partners and USA Power,
LLC, need only demonstrate "some distinct and palpable injury that gives
[them] a personal stake in the outcome of the legal dispute7' to establish
standing.

Sierra Club v. Utah Air Quality Bd. , 148 P.3d 975 (Utah 2006) .

The Court finds that USA Power, LLC, and USA Power Partners, LLC, have
stated a distinct and palpable injury that gives both a personal stake
in the outcome of the case, particularly in the form of attorney fees
related to the remedy of disgorgement. Accordingly, HRO/Williams' Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment dismissing plaintiffs' claims for lack of
standing is denied.

HRO/Williams' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

dismissing plaintiffs' claims alternatively as speculative damages has
been rendered moot based upon decisions in favor of HRO/Williams' Motions
for Partial Summary Judgment Re: Confidential Information and Re: Loyalty
Claim.
USA Power's Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Michael G. Jenkins and
Paragraphs 7 and 8 of the Supplemental Affidavit of Jody L. Williams
USA Power's Motion to Strike the Jenkins' Affidavit and paragraphs
7 and 8 of the Supplemental Affidavit of Jody L. Williams is denied in
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full. The Court finds both Affidavits have adequate foundation, are based
upon personal knowledge, and are therefore admissible.
USA Power7s Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Affidavit of Peggy A.
Tomsic
USA Power's Motion to File Supplemental Affidavit of Peggy A. Tomsic
is granted.
Counsel for defendants PacifiCorp and Williams/HRO are instructed
to submit Orders consistent with the Court's Memorandum Decision and Rule
7(f), Utah R. Civ. P.
Dated this

YS

day of October, 2007.

TYRONE E. MEDLEY
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c
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 13. Commerce and Trade
•\rj Chapter 24. Uniform Trade Secrets Act(Refs & Annos)
-* §13-24-1. Short title
This chapter is known as the "Uniform Trade Secrets Act."

CREDIT(S)
Laws 1989,c. 60, § 1.
Current through 2008 Second Special Session, including results from the November 2008 General Election.
Copr (c) 2008 Thomson Reuters/West. No claim to orig. U.S. govt.
END OF DOCUMENT

© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
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c
West's Utah Code Annotated Cunentness
Title 13 Commerce and Trade
^ j Chapter 24 Uniform Trade Secrets Act(Refs & Annos)
-f § 13-24-2. Definitions
As used in this chapter, unless the context requires otherwise

(1) "Improper means" includes theft, bribery, misrepresentation, breach or inducement of a breach of a duty to
maintain secrecy, or espionage through electronic or other means
(2) "Misappiopnation" means
(a) acquisition of a trade secret of another by a person who knows or has reason to know that the trade secret
was acquired by improper means, or
(b) disclosuie or use of a tiade secret of another without express or implied consent by a person who
(i) used improper means to acquire knowledge of the tiade seciet, or
(n) at the time of disclosuie oi use, knew or had reason to know that his knowledge of the trade secret was
(A) derived from or through a pet son who had utilized impropei means to acquire it,
(B) acquired under circumstances giving rise to a duty to maintain its secrecy or limit its use, or
(C) denved from or through a person who owed a duty to the person seeking relief to maintain its secrecy
or limit its use, or
(in) befoie a matei lal change of his position, knew or had reason to know that it was a trade secret and that
knowledge of it had been acquired by accident or mistake
(3) "Person" means a natural person, corporation, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, association, joint ventuie, government, governmental subdivision or agency, or any other legal or commercial entity
(4) "Trade secret" means information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process, that
(a) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being
readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or
use, and

© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West No Claim to Ong US Gov Works
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(b) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.
CREDIT(S)
Laws 1989, c. 60, §2.
Current through 2008 Second Special Session, including results from the November 2008 General Election.
Copr (c) 2008 Thomson Reuters/West. No claim to orig. U.S. govt.
END OF DOCUMENT

© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
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c
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 13 Commerce and Trade
\ j Chapter 24 Uniform Trade Secrets Act(Refs & Annos)
-+ § 13-24-3. Injunctive relief
(1) Actual or threatened misappropriation may be enjoined Upon application to the court, an injunction shall be
terminated when the trade secret has ceased to exist, but the injunction may be continued for an additional reasonable period of time in order to eliminate commercial advantage that otherwise would be derived from the misappropriation
(2) In exceptional circumstances, an injunction may condition future use upon payment of a reasonable royalty
for no longer than the period of time for which use could have been prohibited Exceptional cncumstances include, but are not limited to, a material and prejudicial change of position prior to acquiring knowledge or reason to know of misappropriation that renders a prohibitive injunction inequitable

(3) In appropriate circumstances, affirmative acts to protect a trade secret may be compelled by court order
CREDIT(S)
Laws 1989,c 60, § 3
Cuirent thiough 2008 Second Special Session, including results from the November 2008 General Election
Copr (c) 2008 Thomson Reuteis/West No claim to ong U S govt
END OF DOCUMENT
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c
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 13 Commerce and Trade
\ j Chapter 24 Uniform Trade Secrets Act(Refs & Annos)
-t § 13-24-4. Damages
(1) Except to the extent that a material and prejudicial change of position prior to acquinng knowledge or reason
to know of misappropriation renders a monetary recovery inequitable, a complainant is entitled to recover damages for misappropriation Damages can include both the actual loss caused by misappropriation and the unjust
enrichment caused by misappropriation that is not taken into account in computing actual loss In lieu of damages measured by any other methods, the damages caused by misappropriation may be measured by imposition
of liability for a reasonable royalty for a misappropriator's unauthorized disclosure or use of a trade secret

(2) If willful and malicious misappropriation exists, the court may award exemplaiy damages in an amount not
exceeding twice any award made under Subsection (1)
CREDIT(S)
Laws 1989, c 60, §4
Cunent through 2008 Second Special Session, including results from the November 2008 General Election
Copr (c) 2008 Thomson Reuters/West No claim to ong U S govt
END OF DOCUMENT
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West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 13. Commerce and Trade
*,=) Chapter 24. Uniform Trade Secrets Act(Refs & Annos)
_• § 13-24-5. Attorneys* fees
If a claim of misappropriation is made in bad faith, a motion to terminate an injunction is made or resisted in bad
faith, or willful and malicious misappropriation exists, the court may award reasonable attorneys' fees to the prevailing party.

CREDIT(S)
Laws 1989,c. 60, §5.
Current through 2008 Second Special Session, including results from the November 2008 General Election.
Copr (c) 2008 Thomson Reuters/West. No claim to orig. U.S. govt.
END OF DOCUMENT

© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.

U.C.A. 1953 § 13-24-6

Page 1

West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 13. Commerce and Trade
^d Chapter 24. Uniform Trade Secrets Act(Refs & Annos)
-+ § 13-24-6. Preservation of secrecy
In an action under this chapter, a court shall preserve the secrecy of an alleged trade secret by reasonable means,
which may include granting protective orders in connection with discovery proceedings, holding in-camera hearings, sealing the records of the action, and ordering any person involved in the litigation not to disclose an alleged trade secret without prior court approval.
CREDIT(S)
Laws 1989, c. 60, §6.
Current through 2008 Second Special Session, including results from the November 2008 General Election.
Copr (c) 2008 Thomson Reuters/West. No claim to orig. U.S. govt.
END OF DOCUMENT

© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
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c
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 13. Commerce and Trade
K
d Chapter 24. Uniform Trade Secrets Act(Refs & Annos)
-+ § 13-24-7. Statute of limitations
An action for misappropriation shall be brought within three years after the misappropriation is discovered or,
by the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have been discovered. For the purposes of this section, a continuing misappropriation constitutes a single claim.

CREDIT(S)
Laws 1989, c. 60, §7.
Current through 2008 Second Special Session, including results from the November 2008 General Election.
Copr (c) 2008 Thomson Reuters/West. No claim to orig. U.S. govt.
END OF DOCUMENT
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West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 13. Commerce and Trade
^=1 Chapter 24. Uniform Trade Secrets Act(Refs & Annos)
-+ § 13-24-8. Effect on other law
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (2), this chapter displaces conflicting tort, restitutionary, and other law of
this state providing civil remedies for misappropriation of a trade secret.

(2) This chapter does not affect:

(a) contractual remedies, whether or not based upon misappropriation of a trade secret;
(b) other civil remedies that are not based upon misappropriation of a trade secret; or
(c) criminal remedies, whether or not based upon misappropriation of a trade secret.
CREDIT(S)
Laws 1989, c. 60, § 8.
Current through 2008 Second Special Session, including results from the November 2008 General Election.
Copr (c) 2008 Thomson Reuters/West. No claim to orig. U.S. govt.
END OF DOCUMENT
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West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 13. Commerce and Trade
*y Chapter 24. Uniform Trade Secrets Act(Refs & Annos)
-+ § 13-24-9. Uniformity of application and construction
This chapter shall be applied and construed to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law with respect to the subject of the chapter among states enacting it.
CREDIT(S)
Laws 1989, c. 60, §9.
Current through 2008 Second Special Session, including results from the November 2008 General Election.
Copr (c) 2008 Thomson Reuters/West. No claim to orig. U.S. govt.
END OF DOCUMENT
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West's Utah Code Annotated C unentness
State Court Rules
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (Rets & Annos)
\ j Pail 111 Pleadings, Motions, and Orders
^ RULE 7. PLEADINGS ALLOWED; MOTIONS, MEMORANDA, HEARINGS, ORDERS, OBJECTION TO COMMISSIONER'S ORDER
(a) Pleadings. There shall be a complaint and an answer, a reply to a counterclaim, an answer to a cross claim,
if the answer contains a cross claim, a third party complaint, if a person who was not an original party is
summoned under the provisions of Rule 14, and a third party answer, if a third party complaint is served No
other pleading shall be allowed, except that the court may order a reply to an answer or a third party answer
(b)(1) Motions. An application to the court for an order shall be by motion which, unless made during a hearing
or trial oi in proceedings before a court commissioner, shall be made in accordance with this rule A motion
shall be in writing and state succinctly and with particularity the relief sought and the grounds for the relief sought
(b)(2) Limit on oidei to show cause An application to the court for an order to show cause shall be made only
tor enforcement of an existing order or for sanctions for violating an existing order An application for an order
to show cause must be supported by an affidavit sufficient to show cause to believe a party has violated a court
oi dei

(c) Memoranda.
(c)(1) Memo/anda requited exceptions filing times All motions, except uncontested or ex parte motions, shall
be accompanied by a supporting memorandum Within ten days after service of the motion and supporting
memoiandum, a party opposing the motion shall file a memorandum in opposition Within five days after ser
vice of the memorandum in opposition, the moving party may file a reply memorandum, which shall be limited
to rebuttal ot matters raised in the memorandum in opposition No other memoranda will be considered without
leave of court A party may attach a proposed order to its initial memorandum
(c)(2) Length Initial memoranda shall not exceed 10 pages of argument without leave of the court Reply
memoranda shall not exceed 5 pages of argument without leave of the court The court may permit a party to file
an over-length memorandum upon ex parte application and a showing of good cause
(c)(3) Content
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(c)(3)(A) A memorandum supporting a motion for summary judgment shall contain a statement of material facts
as to which the moving party contends no genuine issue exists Each fact shall be separately stated and
numbered and supported by citation to relevant materials, such as affidavits or discovery materials Each fact set
forth in the moving party's memorandum is deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless controverted b> the responding party
(c)(3)(B) A memorandum opposing a motion for summary judgment shall contain a verbatim restatement of
each of the moving paity's tacts that is controverted, and may contain a separate statement of additional facts in
dispute For each of the moving party's facts that is controverted, the opposing party shall provide an explanation of the grounds for any dispute, supported by citation to relevant materials, such as affidavits or discovery
materials For any additional facts set forth in the opposing memorandum, each tact shall be separately stated
and numbered and supported by citation to supporting materials, such as affidavits or discovery materials

(c)(3)(C) A memorandum with more than 10 pages of argument shall contain a table of contents and a table of
authorities with page references
(c)(3)(D) A party may attach as exhibits to a memorandum relevant portions of documents cited in the memorandum, such as affidavits or discovery materials
(d) Request to submit tor decision. When briefing is complete, either party may file a "Request to Submit for
Decision ' The request to submit for decision shall state the date on which the motion was served, the date the
opposing memorandum, if any, was served, the date the reply memorandum, if any, was served, and whether a
hearing has been requested If no party files a request, the motion will not be submitted for decision
(e) Hearings. The court may hold a hearing on any motion A party may request a hearing in the motion, in a
memorandum or in the request to submit for decision A request for hearing shall be separately identified in the
caption of the document containing the request The court shall grant a request for a hearing on a motion under
Rule 56 or a motion that would dispose of the action or any claim or defense in the action unless the court finds
that the motion or opposition to the motion is frivolous or the issue has been authoritatively decided

(f) Orders.
(f)(1) An order includes every direction of the court, including a minute order entered in writing, not included in
a judgment An order for the payment of money may be enforced in the same manner as if it were a judgment
Except as otherwise provided by these rules, any order made without notice to the adverse party may be vacated
or modified by the judge who made it with or without notice Orders shall state whether they are entered upon
trial, stipulation, motion or the court's initiative

(f)(2) Unless the court approves the proposed order submitted with an initial memorandum, or unless otherwise
directed by the court, the prevailing party shall, within fifteen days after the court's decision, serve upon the other parties a proposed order in conformity with the court's decision Objections to the proposed order shall be
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filed within five days after service The party preparing the order shall file the proposed order upon being served
with an objection or upon expiration of the time to object
(0(3) Unless otherwise directed by the court, all orders shall be prepared as separate documents and shall not mcorpoiate any matter by reference
(g) Objection to court commissioner's recommendation. A recommendation of a court commissioner is the
order of the court until modified by the court A party may object to the recommendation by filing an objection
in the same manner as filing a motion within ten days after the recommendation is made in open court oi, if the
court commissioner takes the matter under advisement, ten days after the minute entry of the recommendation is
served A party may lespond to the objection in the same manner as responding to a motion
CREDIT(S)
[Amended effective November 1, 2003, April 1, 2004, November 1, 2005, April 1, 2008 ]
Current with amendments effective November 1, 2008
Copr (c) 2008 Thomson Reuters/West No claim to ong U S govt
END OF DOCUMENT
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Tab 4

Currant Creek Power Plant
Mona, Utah

- ,S

•*&

Owner/operator PacifiCorp

,;,;n riierciai operation of PacifiCorp's first new power plant In more than
20 years coincided with the company's acquisition by MidAmerican
Energy Holdings Company this past March. Currant Creek treads lightly
on the environment provides needed power to PacifiCorp's eastern connot aiea, and has demonstrated its commitment to be a good corporate
citizen of the local community. By any account, Currant Creek is a model
for how to develop a power project.
By Qcfte F. Hill, Jr., PE, The Shaw Group, and Robert Van Engetenhoven, PacrfiCorp
hen Des Momes-based MidAmencan completed the puichase
ol PacifiCorp from ScottishPowei in late March of this year, one of its
prizes was the new, natural gas-fired 525MW Cunant Creek Powei Plant outside of
Mona, Utah (Figure I) Baton Rouge-based
The Shaw Gioup Inc (wwwshawgrp com),
through its subsidiary Shaw Stone & Webster, provided all of the engiiieenng, some

of the procuiement (PacifiCorp purchased
the combustion tuibines, the heat-recovery
steam generators, the mam tiansformer, and
the sw itchy aid components), and all of the
construction services for the combined-cycle
pioject—which is notable for having "gone
commercial" twice, as we'll explain latei
PacifiCorp, one of the lowest-cost elec
tncity producers in the U S , has 8,470 MW
of net geneiation capacity representing a

bioad mix of fuels coal, hydro, natural gas,
wind, and geothermai energy PacifiCorp
operates as Utah Power in Utah and Idaho,
and as Pacific Power in Oregon, Wyoming,
Washington, and California
In Utah, summer peak electricity demand
has been growing at a sizzling 5% a year,
about twice the national average of 2 6%
Accordingly, PacifiCorp's resource planners detemiined that the company's system

1. F l y i n g h i g h . PacifiCorp's new 525-MW Currant Creek Power Plant is 80 miles south of Salt Lake City, at an elevation of more than 5,000
feet Courtesy PacifiCorp

EXHIBIT
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STOP PLANTS
2 . B a r g a i n b u i l d i n g . Currant Creek is an outdoor plant that uses a huge air-cooled condenser to recover turbine exhaust steam. I he entire
plant cost just S350 million to build. Courtesy: PacifiCorp
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3. S a f e t y first. The Currant Creek project was awarded the 2006 PacifiCorp CEO Safety
Award for its outstanding safety record compiled during simple-cycle plant operations during
the summer of 2006. Accepting the award are (left to right) Clint Winn, PacifiCorp construction
manager; Odis Hill, Shaw project manager; John Bowater, PacifiCorp Currant Creek plant manager; and Bob Van Engelenhoven, PacifiCorp project manager. Courtesy: PacifiCorp

would require new summer peaking capacity
and new baseload capacity by 2005 and 2006,
respectively. Thus the Currant Creek project
was conceived as the first large (>300 M"W)
power plant built by PacifiCorp since 1983,
when the third unit of the Hunter Power Plant
in central Utah came on-line.
That the final bill for the project came in
under $350 million (about $660/kW) shows
that Shaw and PacificCorp know a thing or
two about squeezing a plant construction dollar. For comparison's sake, a very similar, utility-built 2 x 1 plant equipped with the-same
gas turbines (but with a less-costly wet cooling system) that recently went into service in
California cost over $410 million to build.
Western ratepayers got a real bargain with
Currant Creek (Figure 2).
Managing construction costs on this project was essential, due to its remote site, lack
of rail access, and fast-track project schedule.
To expedite erection and mitigate risk to craft
labor, Shaw Group shops in Louisiana and
Utah were used to assemble major pipe racks,
large portions of boiler feedwater, main steam
and reheat piping, and other modular components. These major subassemblies were then
trucked to die 160-acre site when required
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TCP PLANTS
as part of the construction sequence. This
helped the site io achieve an excellent safety
record: more than 1.5 million hours worked
without a lost-time accident (Figure 3).

•;.. "~vljki
?;i;r . Vogt Power International supplied the two triple-pressure heat-recovery
steam generators. Courtesy: PacifiCorp

The same, but different
At first glance, Currant Creek is similar to
many 2 x 1 combined-cycle plants based on
the ubiquitous General Electric 7FA gas turbine (see the profiles of PSEG Power's Linden Generating Plant and Bethlehem Energy
Center on pp. 59 and 40, respectively). It has a
nominal generating capacity of 145 MW at its
elevation of 5,051 feet. The two triple-pressure, horizontal gas-flow heat-recovery steam
generators (HRSGs)—manufactured by
Louisville-based Vogt Power International
Inc., a subsidiary of Babcock Power Inc.
(Danvers, Mass.)—generate low-pressure
(LP) steam at 78 psig and 565F, intermediatepressure (IP) steam at 462 psig and 1,048F,
and high-pressure (HP) steam at 1,950 psig
and 1,050F from turbine exhaust gas at 1,125F
(Figure 4). Currant Creek is supplied by a
1,075-psig dedicated pipeline that brings gas
to the plant from a trunk line 13 miles away.
Each HRSG is fitted with natural gas-fired
duct burners from Forney Corp. (Carrollton,
Texas) that boost the unit's output by 52 MW
when they kick in. NOx emissions are kept
under control by a selective catalytic reduction (SCR) system; its reagent of choice is
aqueous ammonia. CO emissions are likewise
reduced by a catalyst incorporated into each
HRSG (see the table). Currant Creek's steam
turbine, from Toshiba, is rated at a nominal
250 MW. Its combined HPAP cylinder is connected to a separate, double-flow LP cylinder
(Figure 5).

All power plants are local

i
*

nw
fttt,

Currant Creek's emissions limits
Source: PacifiCorp

Pollutant
PM/PM,U

Simple-cycle operation Simple-cycle
averaging
limits <@15%0,) per
period, hours
turbine
0.066 Ib/mmBtu
18
(10.8 Ib/hr)

Combined-cycle
operation Huiit$
<fe 15% GJ per turbine*
0.066 Ib/mmBtu
(108 Ib/hr)

Combined-cycle
averaging period
hours
24

W04

9.0 ppmvd
(54.0 Ib/hr)

18

2.25 ppmvd
(17.0 Ib/hr)

•3

CO

7.8 ppmvd
(28.0 Ib/hr)

24

3.0 ppmvd
(11.6 Ib/hr)

3

Note: a. Excluding start-up and shutdown events.

5 , SVlade In
PacifiCorp

J a p a n . Toshiba supplied the single 250-MW steam turbine. Courtesy:

Currant Creek's design incorporates an aircooled condenser that uses only 10% of the
amount of water that a similarly sized plant
with wet cooling towers would require. Supplied by GEA Power Cooling Inc. (Lakewood,
Colo.), the condenser uses thirty 250-hp variable-speed fans (controlled by a computer)
to maintain optimum vacuum conditions and
maximize steam turbine performance over the
wide range of ambient conditions at the plant
site. In winter, the fans' motors are reversed
to pull warmer air across the finned-tube surfaces, ensuring that no part of the condenser
could possibly freeze. The condenser is sized
to maintain a vacuum of 6.7 inches (Hg) at
87F and to operate effectively during the summer, when the temperature may reach more
than 100F (Figure 6).
What little water the plant needs (for feedwater and auxiliaries) comes from two deepbore wells on the outskirts of Mona, near the
1-15 freeway, 3 miles from the project site. A

/?s¥

POWffS? July/August 2006

TOP PLANTS
3 . i i i o w f r i g h o t & u d C O l d . Thirty 250hp variable-speed fans maintain optimum
vacuum conditions in the air-cooled condenser year-round (top). Air flow is reversed
during the freezing winter months to prevent
subcooling of the condensate (bottom). Courtesy: PacifiCorp

Radiator cooling units

Exhaust sleam . •'
from turbine '''

wet cooling system would have been much
cheaper to build but more costly (in a different
sense) in the long run. Locally, water is scarcer
than hens' teeth, and multi-year droughts have
occurred twice in the past 20 years. PacifiCorp
realized that buying up agricultural land to secure the necessary water rights wouldn't have
been neighborly. Investing in the air-cooled
condenser was a no-brainer.
PacifiCorp paid just as much attention to
effluent as influent. All wastewater streams
from drains, boiler and evaporative cooler
blowdown, and the water treatment plant are
directed to a 20-acre evaporative pond nearby. Sewerage goes to an on-site septic tank.
An all-volatile chemistry regime enables the
plant to maintain satisfactory water chemistry
without the use of hydrazine. The mixed beds
of the water treatment plant are designed to be
regenerated off-site, eliminating the need to
bring in bulk acid and caustic and store them
on-site.

One-two punch
The Currant Creek Plant was built in two
phases, beginning in January 2004. The first
phase focused on installing and placing into
service the two simple-cycle gas turbines (to.iuiv/Aiinii<:t suns I

nr-fimr

taling 280 MW) by the summer of 2005. Both
were completed on June 10. 2005, and declared commercial on June 20, 2005—when
they were turned over to PacifiCorp operations for dispatching to help meet summer
peak demand. The second phase—completing
the steam plant—took a back seat to serving
prime-time load.
The safe operation of the two simple-cycle
GTs last summer, while almost 500 tradesmen
were on-site installing the steam turbine and
HRSGs, was a testament to the skill and dedication of The Shaw Group and PacifiCorp.
Personnel from the two companies had to
work closely, on a daily basis, to identify and
solve problems quickly—or court disaster.
One example of their ingenuity was installing a large hydraulic damper and a second
steel safety plate (with an air gap between
the damper and the HRSG) as the solution to
the problem of keeping operators and craftsmen safely apart. Others included setting up
a lock out/tag out procedure that worked for
both teams and commissioning of the final
plant's distributed control system during the
first phase.
The simple-cycle turbines ran without any
forced outages throughout the 2005 summer
peak season. On September 23,2005,Currant
Creek was removed from commercial service and put back under control of The Shaw
Group for completion of construction of the
steam plant. During the second phase, the two
HRSGs and the steam turbine were installed,
increasing the plant's generating capacity by
245 MW to 525 MW. The entire combinedcycle plant was declared commercial on
March 22,2006, months before this summer's
peak-demand season.

HRSG with duct firing: 154 to 262 MW
; Two gas turbines + steam turbine: 268 to
430 MW
Two gas turbine + steam turbine + one
HRSG with duct firing: 288 to 482 MW
Two gas turbines + steam turbine 4- both
HRSGs with duct firing: 304 to 525
MW
The plant is designed for 250 to 260
starts per year and is typically dispatched
for 12 to 15 hours per day, depending on
the spark spread. To facilitate rapid startups, the HRSGs are equipped with stack
dampers, and an-auxiliary boiler has been
provided to maintain vacuum in the steam
turbine during overnight shutdowns. Those
are two pieces of equipment that should be
standard in any cycling plant.

The incredible shrinking staff
In keeping with advances in modern control
technology, Currant Creek has a small complement of staff responsible for day-to-day
operations and maintenance. Technical support from PacifiCorp's engineering group in
Salt Lake City eliminates the need to assign
full-time engineering specialists to the site.
Currant Creek has a staff of 24. However, five of those 24 —the plant manager, a
chemist/environmental specialist, a safety/
training guru, a procurement professional,
and an administrative whiz—will be responsible, beginning next summer on a 50/50
basis, for duty at the new Lake Side Power
Plant being built by Summit Vineyard LLC
and Siemens Power Corp. 40 miles south
of Salt Lake City. As a result, the effective
FTE (full-time equivalent) position count at
Currant Creek will be a stingy 21.

Jump? How high?
Nearly continuous variable plant output
and fast system response are two key features of Currant Creek's design. The plant's
capacity can be set for any of several load
ranges within 90 minutes of a call from dispatch. "One thing that's really great about
this plant is its flexibility," explained John
Bowater, Currant Creek's manager. uOn
high-demand days, it can respond very
quickly and precisely."
Currant Creek's flexibility is particularly
valued by PacifiCoip's commercial and
trading group. They realize that any capacity that can be bid in discrete blocks has a
better chance of being dispatched. Following are the five ways that Currant Creek can
be configured, and the capacity range produced by that configuration:
Single gas turbine + steam turbine: 134
to210MW
Single gas turbine + steam turbine + one

First, do no harm
Bringing in almost as many construction
workers as residents of the town of Mona
(population: 750) would have been a recipe for disaster if The Shaw Group and
PacifiCorp managers hadn't recognized the
potential for problems and dealt with them
in a respectful way before groundbreaking.
Many meetings with the town and county
leadership paved the way for a wonderful
working relationship.
It was The Shaw Group's intent to leave
the community better off than it had been
before the workers arrived. They took the
time to help with cancer and blood drives,
for example, and to contribute to many
other worthwhile projects. "We are mighty
thankful you came to our county," said
Robert Steele, Juab County commissioner. PacifiCorp also funded over $180,000
worth of projects that will directly benefit
Juab County residents, c
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Tab 5

P. Bruce Badger (A4791)
Peter W. Billings (A0330)
Kevin N. Anderson (A0100)
Jason W. Hardin (A8793)
FABIAN & CLENDENIN,
A Professional Corporation
215 South State Street, 12th Floor
P.O. Box 510210
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151
Telephone: (801)531-8900
Facsimile: (801)531-1716
Michael G. Jenkins (A4350)
Assistant General Counsel, PacifiCorp
1407 W. North Temple, Suite 310
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116
Telephone: (801) 220-2233
Facsimile: (801) 220-3299
Attorneys for Defendant PacifiCorp

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
USA POWER, LLC; USA POWER
PARTNERS, LLC; and SPRING

)
)

AFFIDAVIT OF

CANYON ENERGY, LLC,

)

KENNETH IAN ANDREWS

Plaintiffs,
vs.
PACIFICORP; JODY L. WILLIAMS and
HOLME, ROBERTS & OWEN, LLP,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)

Civil No. 050903412
Judge Tyrone E. Medley

STATE OF UTAH

)
) ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Kenneth "Ian" Andrews, being first duly sworn, deposes and states:
1.

I am currently Manager, Resource Development for PacifiCorp Energy, a division

of PacifiCorp.
2.

I have a B.S. degree in Chemical Engineering from the University of Utah and a

MBA from Brigham Young University.
3.

On August 15, 2002,1 contacted Milka Radulovic at the Utah Department of

Environmental Quality, Division of Air Quality, by telephone and requested a copy of Spring
Canyon Energy's Notice of Intent (NOI), which is a publicly available document. I was told that
Spring Canyon had initially proposed a 2x1 combined cycle power plant, but that Spring Canyon
had amended its NOI and was proposing a lxl combined cycle plant. Ms. Radulovic was kind
enough to fax me a copy of the NOI that same day. A true and correct copy of the NOI that I
received on August 15, 2002, is attached hereto as Exhibit A.
4.

On August 15, 2002, after I had received and read the NOI, I prepared a memo to

Rand Thurgood concerning some of the relevant information in the NOI. A true and correct
copy of my memo to Mr. Thurgood is attached hereto as Exhibit B.
5.

The NOI identified the location of the proposed Spring Canyon plant site. It also

laid out the other details of the proposed Spring Canyon combined cycle power plant, which are
typical features of a combined cycle plant. Notably, the NOI detailed the combustion technology
of the proposed Spring Canyon plant based on using a General Electric 7FA (PG7241FA) gas
turbine, and the plaint's other features, including inlet air chilling (which is not common), a heat

2

recovery steam generator equipped with a selective catalytic reduction system, supplemental duct
firing with Coen (or equivalent) burners, and a steam turbine generator.
6.

The NOI also explained that the proposed Spring Canyon plant would be located

near existing high capacity power lines, obviously referring to PacifiCorp's 345 kV transmission
system, and near a high pressure natural gas supply line, which was a reference to two nearby
gas transmission pipelines - the Mainline 104 transmission pipeline owned by Questar, and a
transmission pipeline owned by Kern River Gas Transmission Company. According to the NOI,
the proposed Spring Canyon plant was to be dry (air) cooled, meaning it would have an air
cooled condenser which, according to the NOI, would greatly reduce the plant's water usage.
7.

By reading the NOI, I was also able to determine the manufacturer of the

proposed plant's pollution control equipment, the heat input rate for the gas turbine and the duct
burners and the expected capacities of the gas turbine generator and steam turbine generator..
8.

The NOI ultimately culminated in the issuance of an Approval Order (or air

permit) from the Division of Air Quality on November 27, 2002. I obtained a copy of the
Approval Order from the Division of Air Quality after it was issued. Like the NOI, the publicly
available Approval Order laid out the details of the proposed Spring Canyon combined cycle
plant, including the precise GPS coordinates for the proposed plant site. A true and correct copy
of the Approval Order that I obtained is attached hereto as Exhibit C.
Dated this 25th day of April, 2007.

Kenneth Ian Andrews
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SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this & *

day of April 2007.

#zo
Notary Public

TERE8ALLYOM
HOTARYPUBUC • STAR Of UTAH
1712 CBmERBROOK DRIVE
SALT LAKE CmrUT 6411Q

COMM EXP. 04/21/2006
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
On the 30th day of April, 2007,1 hereby certify that I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the AFFIDAVIT OF KENNETH IAN ANDREWS as follows:
Via Hand Delivery
Peggy A. Tomsic
Kristopher S. Kaufman
TOMSIC & PECK
136 East South Temple, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Via Hand Delivery
Thomas R. Karrenberg
Scott A. Call
Anderson & Karrenberg
50 West Broadway, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Defendants Jody L. Williams
and Holme, Roberts & Owen, LLP
Via U.S. Mail
J. Chapman Petersen
Robert Surovell
Surovell, Markle, Isaacs & Levy
4010 University Drive, Suite 200
Fairfax, Virginia 22030
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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EXHIBIT A

RECEIVED

Utah Division of Air Quality
New Source Review Section

AUG I 3 ?C02

Form 1
General Information

AIR QUALITY

dC initial Approval Order

Application for;

a Approval Order Modification

A PERMIT TO CONSTRUCT MUST BE APPROVED BEFORE ANY ACTUAL WORK IS BEGUN ON THE
FACILITIES, This is not a stand alone document Please refer to the Permit Application Instructions for
>edf»c details required to complete the applicatbn. Please print or type all information requested. All Information requested
?rein must be completed and submitted before an engineering review can be completed. Contact the Engineering Section
the Division of Air Quality with any questions at (801) 536-4000. Written Inquiries may be addressed to: Division of Air Quality,
igineering Section, P.O. Box 144820, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-4820.

.

(fcneral 0*mo_r and Facility Information

l

Company name and address:
Spring Canyon Energy, LLC
PO Box 774000-359
Steamboat S p r i n g s CO 80477
Phone No,: (970) 871-6223
Fax No.:
(970)871-6234

2. Company contact for environmental issues:
Dr. Ted Guth

Facility address (if different from above):
Spring Canyon Energy, LLC
same a d d r e s s , phone and f a x

4. Owners name and addres$:
Same as company namej a d d r e s s , phone, fax

Phone no.: (
Fax no.: (
)

J
|

Phone No.: ( 6 1 9 ) 6 7 0 - 3 1 5 7
Fax No.:
( 619 670-9454

)

Phone no.: {
Fax no,:
(

County facility is located in:

)
)

j
1

!

II

;
i

[
I

6. Latitude & longitude^ township & range,
and/or UTM coordinates of plant NAD27 Zone 12
422810 Easting X 4410042 Northing

Juab

|
I
I

Directions to Installation (street address and/or directions to site) (include U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey map if
|
necessary): F r o m S a l t L^KQ c i t y . 1 5 south approximately 77 m i l e s t o Hwy 5 4 . Take e x i t
J
and proceed west through Mona. Go 1/2 mile north on Goshen Canyon Road, Plant s i t e i s

1/2 mile to the v e s t
Identify any current Approval Order(s):
AO#.
AO#
AO#

.

Date
Date
Date

|

_

AO#
AO#
AO#

If request for modification, previous permit # and date: DAQE #
Type of business at this facility:

YP<;

ry

. _... DATE:

1
|
|
/

/

E l e c t r i c i t y Generation

Total company employees greater than 100?
n

Date
Date
JDate

|
|

12. Standard Industrial Classification Code
4__9_1_ 1

I

Kin

1

PAC007341

Form 1 (Continued)
13. Application for:
XP New construction
D Existing equipment operating without permit
*% o Change of permit condition

a

Q Modification
n Permanent site
Change oi location

14. For new construction or modification, enter estimated start date: ^-01 - 0 2
5. For change of permittee, location or condition, enter
date of occurrence:
N/A

Estimated completion date: 10-01-03

16. For existing equipment in operation without pnor permit.
enter initial operation date:
MA

7, Has facility been modified or the capacity increased since November 29,1969:

a Yes

a No

Process Information
B Site plan of facility (Attach as Appendix A):
9. Flow diagram of entire process to include flow rates and other applicable information (Attach as Appendix B):
0. Detailed process/equipment description. (Attach as Appendix C)
Description must include:
Process/Equip specific form(s) identified in the instructions
Fuels and their use
Equipment used In process
Raw materials used
Operation schedules
Production rates
(including daily/seasonal variances)
1. Does this application contain confidential data? Xi Yes

Description of produces)
Description of changes to process (if applicable

D No

Emissions Related Information
2, Describe all potential emissions of air pollutants. (Attach as Appendix D).
Include the following:
(2 Emissions for which the source is major.
00 Emissions of regulated and/or hazardous air pollutants.
M Description of any operational constraints or work practices imposed that limit the amount of regulated or hazardou
air pollutants.
£J Emissions above described »n terms of Ibs/hr, lbs/day, and tons/yea/.
Qfl All calculations used to support the emissions data above.
83 AH Material Safety Data sheets for products used in process.
•'-—

Identify ° o the site plan (see #18 above) all emissions points, building dimensions, stack parameters, etc^
Air Pollution Control Equipment Information

List all air pollution control equipment and include equipment specific forms identified in the instructions
Attach as Appendix E.
List and describe all compliance monitoring devices and/or activities (suet) as CEM. pressure gages). Attach as
Appendix F.
Submit modeling for the project if required. See attached instructions.
As part of BACT, Attach as Appendix G an evaluation of the control technologies that have been considered
I hereby certify that the information and data submitted in and with this application is completely true, accurate and
complete, based on reasonable inquiry and to the best of my knowledge and belief.
Signature:

Ted Banasiewicz

Title: Managing Member/ SpringCanvon Energy, LLC
Telephone Number:
(979 8 7 1 - 6 2 2 3

30 Date;
2-11-02

Name (Type or print)

PAC007342

t(lcfU

Date

jph.

. n # ?nn?.

Company Spring Canyon Energy, LLC
Sjte
Sprang Canyop/frona

Utah Division of Air Quality
New Source Review Section

Form 2
Process Information

Process Data
1. Name of process; G a s - f i r e d

2. End product of this process:

electric

Electricity

generation
3. Primary process equipment: . .
g^ft t u r b i n e Manufacturer Gen*
Make or model:GE Model PG 724r_FA
„
Identification #: _ _
Capacity of equipment (Ibs/hr): combined c y c l e Year installed: 2002/2003
Rated 270 MW _ _
Max. 285 MW
.

(Add additional sheets as needed) Gas turbine

only: Nominal 170MW .

m

a t iso conditions

k Method of exhaust ventilation;
(X Stack

D Window fan o Roof vent

Are there multiple exhausts:

30 Yes

• Other, describe
2

o No
Operating Data

Maximum operating schedule:

24
7.
52

hrs/day
days/week
weeks per yr

Hourly production rates (lbs): ( T o t a l
Average

^2J9jtSS

Plant)

6»

Percent annual production by quarter.
Winter
25
Spring 25
Summer 2$
Fall
25

8.

Maximum Annual production (indicate units)
2 , 3 m i U f o n MW hours

Maximum 270 MW
Projected percent annual increase in production

Type of operation:

iX

Continuous

D

Intermittent

Batch

10. If batch, indicate minutes per cycle.
Minutes between cycles .

Materials Used in Process
Raw Materials

Principal Use

Amounts
(Specify Units)

Natural Gas
tfater

source of fuel for combustiord 2155 MMBTU/hr (HHV)
177 gpm
converted t o steam

\ir

source of oxygen for combusti bn 0-7

\mroonia

reactant to reduce N 0 Y

MMcfm

60 l b / h r

PAC007343

Process
Form 2 (Continued)

Control Equipment (attach additional pages if necessary)

•*2.

Pnmary Collector

Item
IYPP

Secondary Collector

Manufacturer

SCR
Catalyst,
Englehardt (or equivalent)

Model

Selective Catalytic Reduction ( M P r ) ,

d

Year installed

2003

e

Serial or ID#

TBD

f.

Pollutant controlled

NO*

g

Controlled pollutant emission
rate (if known)

N0 X 2.0 ppmv; CO^ppmv

Pressure drop across control
device

8"

Design efficiency

NOy. 86,6%

Operating efficiency

N0 X 03%

b.

removal

Stack Data
(attach additional pages if necessary)

14. Height-Above roof
Above ground

3 Stack identification*
3TS 1
5 Are other sources vented to this stack,
a Yes
AC No

16

NA
_269

ft
ft.

ex Round, top inside diameter dimension 19 f e e t
D Rectangular, top inside dimensions
length
x width

If yes. identity sources:
7 Exit gas

Temperature,

sufm
23Q_ °F Volume 744999 . .acfm

8 Continuous monitoring equipment. OC yes
If yes, indicate- Type NQKr CD, 0 2

3 Emission data.

ft/min

a no
Manufacturer

KVB,
Make or Model.

Velocity jjOOQ

Aldora (or equivalent)

Pollutant(s) monitored

NOx, CO, 0 2

Supply maximum annual emission rates (in tons/year) of PM10, S0 2 , NO,, Volatile Organic
Compounds, CO, and Hazardous Air Pollutants from source
see a t t a c h e d *
Check source of data

a
o

Stack test
Material balance

%i Emission factor
-p Manufacturer

PAC007144

Date Feb. 1 1 , 2002
Company_JSp£ing CanYQEL-Energy, LLC
Facility Spring ^nyon/M^n^

Utah Division of Air Quality
New Source Review Section

Form 22
Combustion Turbines

Equipment Information
1.

Manufacturer:

General

Operating time of Emission Source:
AVERAGE
MAXIMUM
24
Hours/day
24
Hours/day
7. Days/week _ 7 Days/week
57
Weeks/year
52 Weeks/yeai

Model PG 7241 ?k

Model no.:

unit

3.

Manufacturer's rated output at baseload, ISO
J3IL
Proposed site operating range ___.
170
Manufacturer's rated heat rate at baseload. ISO , ?48Q_
4.

Percent of annual heat input:
Dec-Feb _ 2 5 _ %
Mar-May

25 %

.XDMWorDhp
XD MW or o hp
(BTU/kW-hr) ( t u r b i n e o n l y )
Jun-Aug25

%

Solid fuel
gasification

u

Sep-Nov ^ 5 _ %

GAS FIRING
Ongin of gas:

5.

ex Pipeline

6.

D

Distillate fuel a
oil gasification

Other liquid
a
fuel gasification

Are you on an Interruptible gas supply:
a Yes
X?
No
If "yes", specify alternate
fuel:

•8.

Heat content: HHV 1011
( n a t u r a l gas)
m

10.

Byproduct:
specify source

Annual consumption of fuel.

17,670
"9.

Sulfur content

BTU/scf

Maximum firing rate: 2 , 1 7 0 , 0 0 0 * * s c f / h r

(I unji[L
scf/hr

MM scf

%bywt.

tt). Average finng rate:
2,030,00 per u n i t

"if the gas fired is natural gas, these items need not be completed.

**1.6 MMscf/hr ( t u r b i n e ) plus 0.57 (duct f i r i n g ) = 2.17MMscf/hr

scf/hr

Combustion Turbine
Form 22 (Continued)
Oil Firing
-tt.
13.

JJL.

Type of oil:
N/A
Grade number n 1

02

05

D4

Annual consumption:
Sulfur content:

17.

Direction of firing:

18.

Average firing rate:

D horizontal

Q

a Other: specify

06
gallons

14.

Heat content:

% bywt

16.

Ash content

tangential

o

.
a BTU/tb
a BTU/qal
%bywt

other: specify
19.

gal/hr

Maximum firing rate:

gal/hr

Operation
20.
*
D

X
D

22.

Application:
Electric generation
X
Base load
Peaking
Driving pump/compressor
Exhaust heat recovery
Other (specify)

Cycle
o Simple cycle
o Regenerative cycle
a Cogeneration
8 Combined cycle

Is turbine equipped with exhaust heat recovery equipment? B Yes
D N O ( f o r both u n i t s )
If yes, supply the size, flaw rate, steam output capacity and temperature profile.

0.633 MMlb/hr
23.

21.

188 psi lOOpOp high pressure steam; 0.790 MMlb/hr 432 psi

989°F hot

Is turbine equipped with duct burners?
Xi Yes
o No ( f o r b o t h u n i t s )
If yes, provide burner description, fuel usage, combustion air input and location of the burners. Show all heat transfer
surface locations with the waste heat boiler and temperature profile.

Coen (or equivalent b u r n e r s ) -

512 MMBTU/hr (HHV)

see attached heat balance

Emissions Data
14.

Attach manufacturer's information showing emissions of NO,, CO, VOC, S Q , and P^ 0 for each proposed fuel a
turbine loads and site ambient temperatures representative of the range of proposed operation. The information mus
be sufficient to determine maximum hourly and annual emission rates. Annual emissions may be based on z
conservatively low approximation of site annual average temperature. Provide emissions in pounds per hour anr
except for PM10. parts per million by volume at actual conditions and corrected to dry, 15% oxygen conditions.

lethod of Emission Control:
Lean premixcombustors
Other low-NO, combustor

X3

c Oxidation catalyst
SCR catalyst
n

o Water injection
...,_
^ Other (specify)
j?
Steam injection Pry-LoNO x

Additional Information
On separate sheets provide the following:
A. Details regarding principle of operation of emission controls. If add-on equipment is used, provide make an
model and manufacturer's information. Example details include: controller input variables and operations:
algorithms for water or ammonia injection systems, combustion mode versus turbine load for variable mod
combustors, etc.
B. Exhaust parameter information on attached form.
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1.0 Introduction
Summary
In an effort to ensure a reliable supply of electrical generation to Utah, Spring
Canyon Energy, LLC intends to install a natural gas fueled turbine-generator at a
new power plant to be located in Spring Canyon near Mona in Juab County.
(see Appendix A). The facility will consist of one natural gas fueled gas turbine
(GT) engine generator set operating in a combined cycle configuration with heat
recovery steam generator (HRSG) and a single steam turbine-generator. The
HRSG will be supplementary fired with natural gas duct burners to augment
waste heat from the gas turbine exhaust which produces steam for powering the
steam turbine generator. The Spring Canyon Energy facility will have a nominal
generating capacity of 270 MW (net) at 59°F with duct firing and inlet chillers
operating.
The gas turbine emissions (corrected to 15% 0 2 ) will be 2.0 ppm NOx and 4.0
ppm CO (9.0 ppm with duct firing). Annual emissions from the facility are
estimated to be no greater than 63.5 tons of NOx, 97.5 tons of CO, 70.6 tons of
fine particulates (PMIQ), 44.7 tons of volatile organic compounds (VOCs), 4.9
tons of S 0 2 and 5.7 tons of hazardous air pollutants (HAPs). Modeling of these
emissions indicates no violations of the National Ambient Air Quality Standards
(NAAQS) as a result of operations. The complete modeling study, performed
after approval of the proposed air dispersion modeling protocol, is being
submitted to Division of Air Quality with this application. This Notice of Intent
(NOI) is being submitted to obtain an Approval Order (AO) for the installation of
the gas turbine at the Spring Canyon site.
Background
The need for the facility is a result of a significant increase in the electrical
demand. Addftionally, the plant will act as a hedge against high prices for
independent operators in the Utah area as well as to provide voltage support.
Power generation from natural gas fuel provides the lowest emission option. It is
necessary to locate the facility within the Juab Valley near the existing high
capacity power lines and high pressure natural gas supply line.
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2.0 Process Description
The Spring Canyon facility will consist of one natural gas fueled turbine genenitor
set. Natural gas (no other fuel will be used) will be introduced with ambient air
(chilled when ambient temperatures are above 59°F) into a General Electric
Frame 7-FA (PG7241FA) gas turbine to produce approximately 170 MW output,
gross.
The gas turbine is a heavy-duty industrial type frame unit representing state of
the art current day technology. Gas turbine inlet air is compressed and fuel is
then introduced and ignited to produce hot exhaust gases that are then
expanded through the turbine section of the machine. The rotating turbine in turn
drives the generator that produces electricity, the only product delivered by the
facility. Waste exhaust heat from the gas turbine is augmented by natural gas
fired duct burners and is then directed into a heat recovery steam generator to
produce steam. This steam is used internally at the plant to drive a steam
turbine to create up to 100 MW of additional "combined cycle" power for export.
An air- cooled condenser will condense spent steam back into water for recycling
to the HRSG. Use of the dry type air-cooled condenser greatly reduces the
plants water usage.
It is anticipated that the gas turbine will be purchased from General Electric. The
unit is being manufactured in Greenville, South Carolina, and is being configured
with the latest technology Dry Lo-NOx combustion systems and catalyst for
Lowest Achievable Emission Rate (LAER) for NOXl CO and the remaining criteria
pollutants. NOx emissions in the turbine exhaust gas will be controlled to 12-15
ppm by Dry Lo-NOx prior to passing through the selective catalytic NOx removal
(SCR) system. NOx emissions willbe reduced to 2.0 ppmvd at the stack exit with
the SCR catalyst and CO emissions will be 4.0 ppmvd at the stack exit (9.0 ppmi
when the turbine is augmented with duct firing).
The plant is designed to operate up to 8760 hours per year in base load
configuration 24 hours per day, 7 days per week, wrth only minimal down time for
required maintenance. Raw materials used at the Spring Canyon plant in
addition to natural gas and air are water (to generate the steam) and ammonia
for the selective catalytic (NOx) reduction process.
The Spring Canyon facility will have a maximum generating capacity of
approximately 270 MW at 59°F and is projected to begin operation in September
2003. Annual emissions from the facility (assuming 8,760 hours of operation per
year) are estimated to be 63.5 tons of NO*, 97.5 tons of CO, 70.6 tons of fine
particulates (PM10), 44.7 tons of volatile organic compounds (VOCs), 4,9 tons of
S 0 2 and 5.7 tons of hazardous air pollutants (HAPs). All levels are well-below
the 250 ton-per-year PSD threshold. Modeling of the emissions indicates no
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violations of the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) will result from
operation of the plant.
Monitoring of emissions from these units will be performed pursuant*to 40 CFR
60.334 (a) and 40 CFR Part 75.
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3.0

Emissions Summary

Emissions estimates for NOx, and CO are based on emissions data provided by
equipment manufacturers. S 0 2 emissions are based on sulfur content data from
Questar. Emissions estimates for VOC's are based on the EPA's Compilation of
Air Pollutant Emission Factors (AP-42), Ammonia slip from the SCR will be
limited to approximately 10 ppmvd, (also based on vendor design data).
The hourly emission rates listed in Table 1 are the maximum rates for operation
of the proposed turbine and duct burners firing natural gas at 100 percent load.
The annual emissions from the turbine running with SCR control are also
displayed. This assumes a maximum fuel throughput with duct firing of 2017
MMBtu/hr (HHV at 59°F) and 8760 hours of annual operation for the turbine.
See Appendix D for detailed emissions model/summary
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TABLE 1
Spring Canyon Turbine Emissions Summary with SCR Catalyst Control1*8

Pollutant

Annual
Emissions (tpy)

Emission Factor
Reference

Hourly
Emissions (IboV)

Criteria Pollutants
Nitrogen Oxides

63.5

14.5

Carbon Monoxide

97.5

39.4

4.9

1.1

Sulfur Dioxide

Vendor
Vendor
Questar S data

VOCs (Hydrocarbons)

44.7

10.2

5

Paniculate Matter4

70.6

16.1

Vendor

F'm» Particulate Mater (PM 10 )

70.6

16.1

\/endor

Hazardous Air Pollutants (HAPs)
1.3 Butadiene

.017

.004

5

Acetaldehyde

.015

.035

6

.015

Acrolein
Benzene
Ethylbenxene

.003

6

0.17

.04

6

1.35

.30

5

Formaldehyde

1.51

.346

6

Naphthalene

0.01

.002

6

PAH

0.002

.0005

6

Propylene Oxide

1.20

.27

5

Toulene

1.12

.25

6

Xylenes

0.26

.06

6

_
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

_

131

"

The emissions values provided in the tables are the cumulative emissions for both turbines.
The hourly emission rates are the maximum rates for operation of th^ proposed turbines with duct burners firing natural
gas at 100 percent loads based on operation at 59°F.
Annual emissions are based on operation for 8760 hours per year on natural gas, with duct firing.
The PM and PM,0 emissions are condensible and ttterable.
AP-42
Ventura County (CA) Air Pollution Control District
Notes:
CO
hrs/yr
ib/hr
NO*
PM
PM10
SO2
Tpy
VOC

= Carbon monoxide
- hours per year
* pounds per hour
« Oxides of nitrogen
= Particulate matter
= Particulate matter less than 10 microns in size
= Sulfur dioxide; based on fuel sulfur = 2 gr/1000 cu ft
= tons per year
- Volatile organic compound
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4,0

Regulatory Review

This section provides a regulatory review for the installation of the turbine at the
Spring Canyon facility in Utah. The review is divided into two sections. The first
section addresses approval order permitting requirements, and the second section
addresses other air quality regulatory requirements.

4.a. Air Permit Requirements
Notice of Intent and Approval Order
As required by UAC R307-401, Permit: Notice of Intent and Approval Orderf this
Notice of Intent application (NOI) is required to be submitted to UDAQ to obtain an
approval order (AO) permit prior to installation of the turbine. Juab County is
attainment for all pollutants. As required by R307-401-6, best available control
technology (BACT) will be used to control carbon monoxide (CO) emissions. In
fact, LAER is being proposed for all remaining criteria pollutants.

New and Modified Sources in Non-attainment Areas
and Maintenance Areas
UAC R307-403, Permits: New and Modified Sources in Non-attainment Areas
and Maintenance Areas describes the requirements for proposed source permit
approval. R307-403-3, Review of Major sources of Air Quality Impact, requires; the
Executive Secretary to determine if a source will cause or contribute to a violation
of the National Ambient Air Quality Standard (NAAQS) as of the sources projected
start-up date. The installation of the turbine at the Spring Canyon plant will not
cause or contribute to a violation of the NAAQS. The air quality impact analysis
demonstrating this is presented in Section 6.

Offsets: General Requirements
The project location is in Juab County, which is an attainment area for all
pollutants. Hourly, daily, and annual emission levels are below any and all offset
threshold levels. Additionally modeling results show insignificant impact of the
project on adjacent non-attainment (for PM10) Utah County. As such, offsets are
not required for any pollutant. Thus, provisions of UAC R307-403-4(2)t 403-5 and
420 do not apply.
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Operating Permit Requirements
The Spring Canyon turbine is required to obtain a Title V Operating Permit. An
application for operating permit is required within 12 months of the commencement
of operation (UAC R307-415A (B), Permits: Operating Permit Requirements.)

4.b

Other Air Quality Regulatory Requirements

New Source Performance Standards
NSPS Subpart GG is applicable to the turbine at Spring CanyonSubpart GG- Standards of Performance for Stationary Gas Turbines Subpart GG of 40 CFR 60 establishes emission limits for NO* and SO z emissions
from stationary gas-fired turbines with a heat input at peak load equal to or
greater than 10.7 gigajoules per hour (10 MMBtu/hr), based on the lower heating
value of the fuel fired. The turbine at the Spring Canyon facility is subject to this
regulation. The higher heating value heat input (fuel flow) of the facility is
approximately 2017 MMBtu per hour at 59°F at full load when burning natural
gas. This is equal to approximately 1590 gigajoules per hour on a lower heating
value basis.
The Spring Canyon facility turbine also meets the Subpart GG definition for
electric utility stationary gas turbines, since the heat input of the turbine at peak
load is greater than 107.2 gigajoules per hour (100 MMBtu/hr), The Spring
Canyon turbine is therefore subject to the standards for nitrogen oxides
requirements in 40 CFR 60.332. The turbine is also subject to the S 0 2 provisions
of 40 CFR 60.333.
The applicable standard limiting the discharge of NOx into the atmosphere from
the turbine described in 40 CFR 60.332 is expressed as:
STD = 0.0075 (14.4)/Y + F,
Where

,^
STD = allowable NO x emissions (percent by volume at 5%
Oxygen [0 2 ], and on a dry basis)
Y
= manufacturer's rated heat rate in kilojoules per watt
hour(kJ/W~hr), not to exceed 14.4
F
= fuel-bound nitrogen allowance.
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The heat input rate for the Frame 7 turbine is approximately 10 kJ/W-hr at 100%
load and 59°F. The resulting NSPS limitation for NOx is approximately 100 pairts
per million by volume (ppmvd). The maximum emission rate for the turbine of 12
-15 ppmvd before SCR control and 2.0 ppmvd with SCR control will be well
below the NSPS emission limit for NOx.
The S 0 2 standard of Subpart GG restricts gaseous discharges form the turbine
to a maximum SO z content of 0.015% by volume at 15% 0 2 and on a dry basis.
The S 0 2 content of the discharged gases when combusting natural gas will be
negligible
40 CFR 60.334 describes monitoring requirements for stationary gas turbines.
NOx, CO and 0 2 will be the parameters monitored continuously.
This part also contains requirements for monitoring the sulfur and nitrogen
content of the fuel being fired in the turbine; 40 CFR 60.334(b) details the
frequency with which the fuel must be tested.

Acid Deposition Regulations
The requirements for affected sources under the Acid Rain Program, established
pursuant to Title IV of the CAA, are covered under 40 CFR 72 through 78. The
turbine at Spring Canyon is subject to these requirements. Specifically this
facility will be subject to 40 CFR 72, Permit Regulations, and 40 CFR 75,
Continuous Emission Monitoring.

National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for
Source Categories
The turbine at Spring Canyon will not emit or have the potential to emit 10
tons/year or greater of any hazardous air pollutant (HAP) or 25 tons/year or
greater of any combination of HAPs; therefore, the Spring Canyon facility is not a
major source of HAPs. As such, the requirements of 40 CFR part 63 do not
apply to the Spring Canyon turbine.
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5,0 Control Technology Analyses
In accordance with EPA's "top-down" policy for NOXf CO and S0 2 , this section
presents the required best available control technology (BACT) analyses. The
section also addresses lowest achievable emission rates (LAER) requirements
for PM, PM10, and VOC emissions.

5.a

Applicability

UACR R307-401-6 states, "The Executive Secretary shall issue an approval
order if he determines through plan review that the following conditions have
been met: The degree of pollution control for emissions, to include fugitive
emissions and fugitive dust, is at least BACT except as otherwise provided in
these regulations".
The following analyses are presented to determine the BACT/LAER controls for
each criteria pollutant being emitted for this project.

5.b

Top-Down BACT Process

EPA developed a process for conducting BACT analyses, referred to as the "topdown" method. The steps to conducting a top-down analysis were listed in
EPA's New Source Review Workshop Manual, Draft, October 1990.

Step 1 - Identify Potential Control Technologies
The following were conducted; A thorough search of the EPA's
RACT/BACT/LAER clearinghouse; Federal/state/local NSR permits; control
technology vendors; and environmental consultants.

Step 2 - Eliminate Technically Infeasible Options
Technically feasible option means a technology that is available and applicable
to the permitee's operations. The analysis is based on chemical, physical and
engineering principles or empirical data.

Step 3 - Rank Remaining Control Technologies by Control
Effectiveness
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Step 4 - Evaluate Most Effective Controls and Document Results
The factors considered while evaluating the most effective control options are
energy impacts, environmental impacts, and economic impacts.

Step 5 - Select BACT
Each of these steps has been conducted for CO, and are
described below. A LAER analysis of NO* SO2, PM, PMi 0f and VOC has also
been conducted. Note - it is the Spring Canyon project applicant's desire to
install LAER for these criteria pollutants.

5x

LAER NOx Control Analysis

Step 1 - Identify Potential Control Technologies
Potential NOx control technology options are:
•
•
•
•
•
•

Selective Catalytic Reduction (SCR) and Dry Lo-NOx (DLN);
Xonon
SCONO*
DLN only
SCR only
Water or Steam Injection

Step 2 - Eliminate Technically Infeasible Options
Conventional SCR requires an exhaust temperature in the 400°F to 800°F range,
and when combined with Dry Lo-Nox, achieves 2.0 ppm NOx. No other
technology has achieved this level on gas turbines of this size.
XONON is not available as a control technology for this application. XONON is
being developed by Catalytica Combustion Systems, Inc. It is a catalytic
combustion system that reduces the production of NOx. Extensive information on
the technology's development indicates that the technology has only been tested
on small turbines (less than 10 MW) and is not yet used commercially. This
technology has not yet been tested on turbines in the size range of this project's
turbine^
Catalytica has entered into an agreement with GE to collaboratively develop the
technology for installation on GE Frame E-cfass and F-class turbines. Catalytica
cautions potential investors that adaptation of the technology to GE's turbines will
require anywhere from 12 to 24 months. In fact, in a comparison of NOx control
technologies on the website, Catalytica indicates that the technology is I n
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process" of being proven in practice. XONON cannot be considered an available
technology for this project.
Another promising developing technology is SCONO x SCONOXl like SCR,
operates effectively in temperatures ranging from 300°F to 700°R SCONO* has
not been demonstrated in practice on gas turbines of this scale.
Water injection into the combustion process is an option to reduce NO x
production. Water or steam injection can be utilized to reduce NOx levels. By
injecting water or steam into the flame, flame temperatures are reduced, thereby
lowering thermal NO x formation and overall NO x levels. Water or steam injection
can reduce NOx levels by up to 80% (when firing natural gas) and can achieve
greater reduction when firing oil. There is a practical limit to the amount of water
or steam that can be injected into the flame before flame stability problems are
experienced. Additionally, under normal operating conditions, water/steam
injection can result in 3-10% efficiency loss. Many times water or steam injection
is used in conjunction with other NOx control methods such as burner
modifications or flue gas recirculation. Water or steam injection alone can only
achieve NO* levels of 25 ppm.
In summary, for gas turbines of this size, SCR (combined with Dry-Lo-NO*) is the
only viable option to achieve 2.0 ppm NO* for exhaust temperatures cooled to
between 400°F to 850°F. The control effectiveness of any other viable options
and possible combinations are presented in Step 3.

Step 3 - Rank Remaining Control Technologies by Control
Effectiveness
There is only one other proven NO x reduction control technology combination
proven on the large General Electric frame units. A combination of water
injection and SCR control can lower emission rates to 5 ppmvd for NO x . Since
the top (minimum NO x emissions) alternative is proposed for NO*, no cost,
environmental or energy impact analyses are required-

Step 4 - Evaluate Most Effective Controls and
Document Results
For combined-cycle operation, LAER is a combination of Dry Lo-NO* and SCR
controls for NOx.

Step 5 - Select LAER
The final step is to select LAER for the General Electric Frame 7-FA combined
cycle operations at Spring Canyon, For the combined cycle GE Frame 7-FA
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turbine operations, Dry Lo-NOx and SCR control with a corresponding emission
limit of 2.0 ppmvd is proposed as LAER.

5.d

B A C T A n a l y s i s for C O E m i s s i o n s (see Appendix E)

Step 1 - Identify AH Control Technologies
Only two control technologies have been identified for CO control:
1.

Combustion Controls

2.

CO catalyst

Step 2 - Eliminate Technically Infeasible Options
Both identified control technologies are technically feasible for this project.

Step 3 - Rank Remaining Control Technologies by
Control Effectiveness
CO catalyst vendors quote guarantee emissions levels of 4.0 ppm. For this
project, the turbine vendor has indicated that proper operation of the turbine will
result in CO emissions from the combustor of 4.0 ppmvd (corrected to 15% O2).
Thus there is no additional cost to achieve 4.0 ppm CO on the turbine. This level
is below that listed in the California Air Resources Board BACT guidance
document (6 ppm),
TABLE 5-1
Control Technology Emission Rate Ranking
Control Technology

CO Emissions
(ppmv)

Reduction

Combustion Controls

4

NA

CO Catalyst

4

0%

Step 4 - Evaluate Most Effective Controls and
Document Results
This step involves the consideration of energy, environmental, and economic
impacts associated with each control technology. The top-down process
requires that the evaluation begin with the most effective technology. The "top1'
technologies are Combustion Controls or a CO catalyst. Since the top alternative
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is proposed as BACT for CO, the cost, environmental, and energy impact
analyses ^re not required.

Step 5 - Select BACT
The final step in the top-down BACT analysis process is to select BACT. Good
combustion control is proposed as BACT for this project. Good combustion
control with CO emissions of 4,0 ppm is proposed as BACT for this project.
Note: CO emissions will be kept below 9.0 ppm when the turbine is augmented
with duct firing.

5.e

LAER Analysis for PM/PM™ Emissions

Step 1 - Identify Potential Control Technologies
Three control methods have been identified for PM/PM10 control in power
generation units:
•
•
•

Electrostatic precipitators (ESPs)
Fabric filters
Combustion of pipeline-quality gas (primary) as the primary fuel

Step 2 - Eliminate Technically Infeasible Options
Neither electrostatic precipitators nor fabric filters are considered to be technically
feasible options for combined cycle combustion turbines because of the high
exhaust flow rates and the low concentration of particulate in the turbine exhaust.
The particle resistivity associated with gas turbine exhaust is a major problem for
ESPs. ESPs remove particles by charging the particles and then collecting them
on plates. ESP performance is greatly affected by the ability of the particles to
accept and maintain a charge. Because of the resistivity of the exhaust particles
from gas turbines, ESPs are not an effective control of turbine particulate matter.

LAER control
The only remaining feasible control method is the use of pipeline-quality natural
gas as combustion fuel This option is PM and PM10 LAER for this project.

5.f

LAER Analysis for S 0 2 Emissions

Step 1 - Identify Potential Control Technologies
Four potential control methods have been identified for S 0 2 control:
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•
•
•
•

Wet flue gas desulfurization (FGD) systems;
Dry FGD systems;
Spray dryers
Combustion of pipeline-quality gas as the combustion fuel.

Step 2 - Select LAER
No wet FGD systems, dry FGD systems, nor spray dryers have been applied to the
exhaust gases from turbines, and significant technological difficulties are
envisioned to apply all of these technologies. The low SO2 emissions levels
inherent with firing natural gas in a turbine constitutes BACT. In a review of the
EPA Clearinghouse, the only control methods for S 0 2 with turbines were related to
the fuel combusted. Each turbine listed in the database was required to fire either
pipeline-quality natural gas or a low sulfur fuel oil.
For this application, LAER for S 0 2 is the use of pipeline-quality natural gas as the
combustion fuel.

5.g

LAER Analysis for VOC Emissions

S t e p 1 - Identify Potential Control T e c h n o l o g i e s
A review of EPA's Clearinghouse showed LAER control for combined cycle gas
turbine combustion units is combustion of pipeline-quality natural gas as the
primary fuel.
Select LAER
Use of only pipeline-quality natural gas as the fuel for the turbine is LAER for
VOCs for this project
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6.0 Ambient Air Quality Impact Analysis
(attached)
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7.0

Alternate Siting Analysis

As the Spring Canyon project is located in a county (Juab) in attainment with all
national air quality standards, no alternate siting analysis is required.

Appendix A
Site Plan of Facility
(attached)
There are is one emission point - a stack (269 ft high, 19 feet in diameter).
Building dimensions are shown on the Site Plan and the Elevations Drawing.
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Appendix B
Flow Diagram
(attached)
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Appendix C
Process/Equipment Description
Natural gas (no other fuel will be used) will be introduced with ambient air (chilled
when ambient temperatures are above 59°F) into one General Electric Frame 7FA gas turbine. The gas turbine is an oversize version of the turbines on the
wings of aircraft. The gas turbine inlet air is compressed and fuel is then
introduced and ignited to produce hot exhaust gases that are expanded through
the turbine section of the machine. The rotating turbine in turn drives the
generator that produces electricity, the only product delivered by the facility.
Waste exhaust heat from the gas turbine is augmented by natural gas fired duct
burners and is then directed into a heat recovery steam generator to produce
steam. This steam is used internally at the plant to drive a steam turbine to
create additional "combined cycle" power for export. An air-cooled condenser
will condense spent steam back into water for recycling to the HRSG. Use of the
dry type air-cooled condenser greatly reduces the plant's water usage.
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Appendix D
Potential Emissions of Air Pollutants

TABLE 1
Spring Canyon Turbine Emiwions Summary with SCR Catalyst Control''"

Pollutant

Annual
Emissions (tpy)

Hourly
Emissions (Ib/hr)

Emission Factor
Reference

Criteria Pollutants
Nitrogen Oxides

63.5

14.5

Vendor

Carbon Monoxide

97.5

39.4

Vendor

4.9

1.1

44.7

10.2

Sulfur Dioxide
VOCs (Hydrocarbons)
Particulate Matter

4

Fine Particulate Mater (PM 10 )

Questar S data

5

70.6

16.1

Vendor

70.6

16.1

Vendor

Hazardous Air Pollutants (HAP*)
1,3 Butadiene

.017

.004

5

Acetaldehyde

.015

.035

6

Acrolein

015

.003

6

.04

6

Benzene

0.17

Ethylbenzene

1.35

.30

5

Formaldehyde

1.51

.346

6

Naphthalene

0.01

.002

6

PAH

0.002

.0005

6

Propylene Oxide

1.20

27

5

Toulene

1.12

25

6

Xylenes

0.26

.06

6

_
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

T31

"~

The emission*i values provided in the tables are the cumulative emissions for both turbines.
The hourly emission rates are the maximum rates tor operation of the proposed turbines with duct burners firing natural
gas at 100 percent loads based on operation at 59°F.
Annual emissions are based on opcroHon for 8760 hours per year on natural gas, with duct firing.
The PM and PM, 0 emissions are condensibJe and filterable.
AP-42
Ventura County (CA) Air Pollution Control District
Notes:

CO
hrs/yr
Ib/hr

NO*
PM
PM, 0

SO*
Tpy
VOC

= Carbon monoxide
~ hours per year
= pounds per hour
» Oxides of nitrogen
=5 Particulate matter
» Particulate matter less than 10 microns in size
- Sulfur dioxide; based on fuel sulfur - 2 gr/1000 cuft
= tons per year
= Votatfle organic compound
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Appendix E
Air Pollution Control Equipment
Air pollution control equipment for this project includes:
Combustion Control for CO
Dry Lo-NOy Combustor
Selective Catalytic Reduction (SCR) Catalyst (NOx)
Note: Natural Gas is the only fuel proposed for use at the Spring Canyon Energy
plant. Natural gas is LAER for PM-10, VOC and SQ2 control.
Maximum stack exhaust flow is 744,999 ACFM @230°F at low ambient
temperature conditions.
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Appendix F
Compliance Monitoring Devices and/or Activities
1.

Monitoring of emissions from this unit will be performed pursuant to 40 CFR
60.334 and 40 CFR 75.

2.

Applicable test methods used to determine compliance will be confined to
those methods defined in 40 CFR 60-335.

PAC007372

EXHIBIT B

From:
Sent:
To:
Subject:
Have a faxed copy of the

Andrews, Kenneth
Thursday, August 15, 2002 1:47 PM
Thurgood, Rand
Spring Canyon
NOI. here \s some of the relevant info based on their latest NOI application:

1-1x1 GE FA machine. Total max generating capacity = 270 MW (includes duct firing); 8760
hours/year operation
Natural gas firing only; Inlet chilling (this is not common); Dry cooling.
Fuel consumption (LHV implied based on GE data) = 1.6 MMScf/hour; 2.17 MMScf with duct
firing.
FA machine equipped with DLN to 15 ppm with an SCR for a stack rate of 2.0 ppm NOx/10 ppm
NH3 slip.
No CO catalyst; assumed can maintain CO below 4 ppm based on manufacturer's claims (this
may be an issue)
Estimated start date: June 1, 2002.
Projected on-line date: September, 2003 (See start date?)
Stack Height - 269*
Data submitted by Ted Banasiewicz, Managing Member, Spring Canyon Energy LLC, 970-8716223
Company Name: Spring Canyon Energy Steamboat Springs, CO 80477.
Company contact for environmental issues: Dr. Ted Guth, 619-670-3157.
Site: "located in Spring Canyon in Juab County" Hlt is necessary to locate the facility within Juab
Valley near the existing high capacity power lines and high pressure natural gas supply line."
Directions: Take Highway 54 west through Mona. 1/2 mile north on Goshen Canyon Road. Plant
site is 1/2 mile to west.
Originally proposed as two machines, now they are just looking at one. UDAQ said that there may be
requirements for offsets based on modeling impacts with more generation on non-attainment area (Utah
County).
It looks like there are a few issues with the calcs (used LHV heat rate) but as Fred would say "our dog is
not in that fight".
I will see about meeting UDAQ this afternoon, if you need more information.
Some other related information you may be interested in. Both Lehi Independent Power Assodates and
Geneva Steel have recently banked a few credits in Utah County. If someone needs credits in Utah
County, they should be available.
Lehi Ind Power.
IMOx - 249.87
S02 - 5.31
PM10-1.86
Geneva Steel:
NOx - 705.2
S02 - 434.2
PM10-187
PacifiCorp:
NOx - 458.7
S02-1.4
PM10-24.5

PAC031456

EXHIBIT C

STATE OF UTAH
Department of Environmental Quality
Division of Air Quality

APPROVAL ORDER: POWER GENERATING FACILITY
WITH ONE NATURAL GAS FIRED COMBINED CYCLE
TURBINE GENERATOR SET WITH DUCT BURNER
Prepared By: Milka M. Radulovic, Engineer
(801) 536-4232
Email: mllkar@utah.gov

APPROVAL ORDER NUMBER

DAQE-AN2627001-02

Date: November 27, 2002

Spring Canyon Energy, LLC.
Source Contact
Lois Banasiewicz
(970) 871-6223

Richard W. Sprott
Executive Secretary
Utah Air Quality Board
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Abstract
Spring Canyon Energy, LLC (SCE) is proposing to construct, own, and operate a new power
generating facility in the Juab Valley, Juab County, just west of the Mona Reservoir. The facility will
consist of one natural gas turbine generator set in a combined cycle configuration [with one heat
recovery steam generator (HRSG) and one steam turbine-generator]. In addition, there will be one
diesel fired emergency generator, one diesel-fired emergencyfirepump, small dieselfuel storage tanks,
an air- cooled condenser (to condense spent steam back into water for recycling to the HRSG), and
aqueous ammonia storage and handling equipment The HRSG duct burners will be fired with natural
gas to augment waste heat from the gas turbine exhaust The power facility will operate with a
combined net maximum generating capacity of about 280 MW at (fF. It is anticipated that the gas
turbine will be purchased from General Electric with Dry Lo-NOx combustion system. NOx emissions
from the gas turbine will be controlled to 2 ppmvd at 15% 02 reference (by selective catalytic reduction
system), CO to 4 ppmvd at 15% 02 reference (9 ppmvd with duct firing), and ammonia slippage to 10
ppnu The turbine will not be designed to operate in a simple-cycle mode (Le., bypassing the HRSG
unit). Raw materials used at the Spring Canyon plant in addition to natural gas and air, are water (to
generate the steam) and ammonia for the selective catalytic (NO*) reduction process. Use of the dry
type air-cooled condenser greatly reduces the plant's water usage.
Juab County is an attainment area of the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for all
pollutantsNew Source Performance Standards (NSPS) 40 CFR 60, Subpart GG (Standards of Performance for
Stationary Gas Turbines) applies to the proposed turbine. NSPS 40 CFR 60, Subpart Da (Standards of
Performance for Electric Utility Steam Generating Units for Which Construction is Commenced After
September 18,1978) applies to the duct burners.
Estimated annual emissions from the entire facility, in tons per year, will be as follows: 66,4 ofNO„
97.5 of CO, 5.3 of SO* 70.9 ofPMj* 67.12 of VOC, and 5J tons of hazardous air pollutants (mainly
formaldehyde).
Since the emissions have increased above modeling threshold levels for the NO*, CO, PM!09 and
formaldehyde, an air quality modeling assessment consistent with UAC R307-41Q-2 was performed.
The US EPA and the State accepted Industrial Source Complex Short Term - Version 3 (ISCST3)
model was used by the Applicant to predict air pollutant concentrations under a simple/complex
terrain/wake effect situation. The modeling analysis indicated, and the State verified, that there would
be no violations of NAAQS and Prevention of Significant Deterioration increments consumption for
the proposed project
The project has been evaluated and found to be consistent with the requirements of the Utah
Administrative Code Rule 307 (UAC R307). A public comment period was held in accordance with
UAC R307-401-4 and comments were received. The comments were evaluated and no comment was
found to be adverse to the proposed AO. This air quality Approval Order (AO) authorizes the project
with the following conditions, and failure to comply with any of the conditions may constitute a violation
of this order.
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General Conditions:
1.

This Approval Order (AO) applies to the following company:
Corporate Office Location
USA Power Partners, LLC
Spring Canyon Energy, LLC
PO Box 774000-359
Steamboat Springs, Colorado 80477
Phone Number (970)871-6223
Fax Number
(970) 871 -6234
The equipment listed in this AO shall be operated at the following location:
From Salt Lake City take 1-15 south approximately 77 miles to Hwy 54. Take exit and
proceed west through Mona. Go Vi mile north on Goshen Canyon Road; Plant site is Vi
mile to the west.
Juab County
Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM) Coordinate System: UTM Datum NAD27
4,410.042 kilometers Northing, 422.81 kilometers Easting, Zone 12

2.

All definitions, terms, abbreviations, and references used in this AO conform to those
used in the Utah Administrative Code (UAC) Rule 307 (R307) and Title 40 of the Code
of Federal Regulations (40 CFR). Unless noted otherwise, references cited in these AO
conditions refer to those rules.

3.

The limits set forth in this AO shall not be exceeded without prior approval in accordance
withR307-40l.

4.

Modifications to the equipment or processes approved by this AO that could affect the
emissions covered by this AO must be reviewed and approved in accordance with
R307-401-1.

5.

All records referenced in this AO or in applicable NSPS standards, which are required to
be kept by the owner/operator, shall be made available to the Executive Secretary or
Executive Secretary's representative upon request, and the records shall include the twoyear period prior to the date of the request Records shall be kept for the following
minimum periods:

6.

A.

Emission inventories

Five years from the due date of each emission statement
or until the next inventory is due, whichever is longer.

B

All other records

Two years

Spring Canyon Energy, LLC shall install and operate one natural gas fueled combined
cycle turbine generator set with duct burner and ambient air inlet chiller with maximum
combined rating of approximately 280 MW, one diesel fired emergency generator rated
at 700 bhp, one diesel fired fire pump rated at 250 bhp, and miscellaneous small diesel
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fuel storage tanks (each with storage capacity of less that 10,000 gallons) at the Spring
Canyon Energy power generating facility in accordance with the terms and conditions of
this AO, which was written pursuant to Spring Canyon Energy, LLC's Notice of Intent
submitted to the Division of Air Quality (DAQ) on August 13, 2002 and additional
information submitted to the DAQ on August 15, 2002, August 29, 2002, September 18,
2002, September 26, 2002, and October 10, 2002.
7.

The approved installations shall consist of the following equipment or equivalent*:
A.

One (1) General Electric Frame 7-FA (PG7241 FA)* gas turbine, with one (1)
HRSG, and one (1) steam turbine generator set.
The gas turbine is provided with ambient inlet air chiller coils. The Heat
Recovery Steam Generator (HRSG) is equipped with a Selective Catalytic
Reduction System for abatement of NOx emissionsfromthe Duct Burner and the
Gas Turbine. Continuous Emission Monitoring System (CEMS) for the HRSG
stack is provided for monitoring emissionsfromthe gas turbine and duct burners.
The power generating facility has the following characteristics:
Maximum plant site rated output at 100% Load,
0°F, 12.19 psia and 25% relative humidity:
280 MW
Heat input at the baseload, ISO (59^, site elevation): 1,472.9 x Btu/hr (HHV)***
Maximum gas turbinefiringrate:
1,621.5 x 106 Btu/scf (HHV)

B.

One (1) Coen Power Plus* duct burner state of the art, low emission technology
Coen Power Plus* (subject to 40 CFR 60, Subpart Da)
Maximum firing rate:
520 x 106 Btu/hr (HHV)

C.

One (1) Diesel Fired Emergency Generator

rated at 700 bhp

D.

One (1) Diesel Fired Emergency Fire Pump

rated at 250 bhp

E.

Miscellaneous diesel fuel storage tanks, each individual tank storage capacity is
less than 10,000 gallons

F.

One (1) Dry type air-cooled condenser.**

* Equivalency shall be determined by the Executive Secretary.
** This equipment is listed for informational purposes only. There are no emissions from
this equipment.
** *Fuel Higher Heating Value

Spring Canyon Energy, LLC shall notify the Executive Secretary in writing when the
installation of the equipment listed in Condition #7 has been completed and is
operational, as an initial compliance inspection is required. To insure proper credit when
notifying the Executive Secretary, send your correspondence to the Executive Secretary,
attn: Compliance Section.
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If construction and/or installation have not been completed within eighteen months from
the date of this AO, the Executive Secretary shall be notified in writing on the status of
the construction and/or installation. At that time, the Executive Secretary shall require
documentation of the continuous construction and/or installation of the operation and
may revoke the AO in accordance with R307-401-11.
Limitations
9.

Visible emissions from the following emission points shall not exceed the following
values:
A.
Natural gas combustion exhaust stacks - 10% opacity
B.
All other points - 20% opacity
Opacity observations of emissionsfromstationary sources shall be conducted according
to 40 CFR 60, Appendix A, Method 9.

10.

The following limits shall apply:
A.
B.

1L

Gas Turbine, Stack Height - no less than 295.27 feet (90 meters) as measured
from the ground
Gas Turbine, Stack Exit Diameter - not greater than 17 feet

Combined source wide CO emissions shall be no greater than 97.5 tons per rolling 12month period.
Compliance to the above emission limitation shall be determined as follows:
COfromthe gas turbine and the duct burner shall be obtainedfromCEMS recorded data
(conversionfromppmvd into pounds shall be done using the procedure in the EPA
reference Method 19 or other procedure approved by the Executive Secretary).
COfromthe emergency generators shall be obtained by multiplying the engine rating,
recorded hours of operation and emission factorsfromthe Vendor data if available or
EPA' s Compilation of Air Pollutant Emission Factors, AP-42
To determine compliance with a rolling 12-month total the owner/operator shall calculate
a new 12-month total by the twentieth day of each month using datafromthe previous 12
months. Records of hours of operation and emissions rates shall be kept for all periods
when the plant is in operation. For emergency generator and the emergency lire pump
hours of operation shall be determined by supervisor monitoring and maintaining of an
operations log. The records of consumption/production shall be kept on a daily basis.

12.

Combined emission rate of PM,0+ NOx + SO? shall not be greater than of 780.72 lb per
any rolling 24-hour average at the stack exhaust (turbine and the duct burner)
Compliance to the above emission limitation shall be determined as follows:
NOxfromthe gas turbine and the duct burner shall be obtainedfromCEMS recorded data
(conversionfromppmvd into pounds shall be done using the procedure in EPA reference
Method 19 or other procedure approved by the Executive Secretary).
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PMio from the gas turbine and the duct burner shall be from the latest emission test
recorded data.
S0 2 from the gas turbine and the duct burner shall be from the latest emission test or if
testing is not required by the other alternative method as approved by the Executive
Secretary or Administrator.
To determine compliance with rolling 24-hour total the owner/operator shall calculate
average hourly rate and sum them over 24-hour period. New 24-hour total shall be
calculated by the noon of the next day. Records of hours of operation and emissions rates
shall be kept for all periods when the plant is in operation.
13.

Emergency generators shall be used for electricity producing operation only during the
periods when electric power from the public utilities is interrupted, or for regular
maintenance of the generators. Records documenting generator usage and fire pump
usage shall be kept in a log and they shall show the date the generator was used, the
duration in hours of the generator usage, and the reason for each generator usage.

14.

The owner/operator shall use only natural gas, as fuel in the gas turbine and duct burner;
fuel oil #2 or better in the emergency generator and the fire pump.

15.

The sulfur content of any fuel oil or diesel burned shall not exceed:

Fuels

0.5 percent by weight for diesel fuels
The sulfur content shall be determined by ASTM Method D-4294-89 or approved
equivalent. Certification of other fuels shall be either by USA Power, LLC=s own testing
or test reports from the fuel marketer
Federal Limitations and Requirements
16.

In addition to the requirements of this AC), all applicable provisions of 40 CFR 60, New
Source Performance Standards (NSPS) Subpart A, 40 CFR 60.1 to 60.18, Subpart GG, 40
CFR 60.330 to 60.334 (Standards of Performance for Stationary Gas Turbines) and
Subpart Da, 40 CFR 60.40a to 60.49a (Standards of Performance for Electric Utility
Steam Generating Units for Which Construction is Commenced After September 18,
1978) apply to this installation.

17.

In addition to the requirements of this AO, all applicable provisions of 40 CFR Part 72,
73, 75, 76, 77, and 78 Federal regulations for the Acid Rain Program under Clean Air Act
Title IV apply to this installation.

Limitations and Tests Procedures
18.

Emissions to the atmosphere from the indicated emission points shall not exceed the
following rates and concentrations:
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Source: Turbine GE Frame 7-FA (PG7241FA)) and Duct Burner Exhaust Stack
Pollutant

NOx
CO

ppmvd*
(15%Oidry)
(30-day rolling
average)
2
4

ppmvd**
(15%02dry)
(30-day rolling
average)
2
9

ppmvd
(15%02dry)

***

NA

•Total emissions concentrationfromthe gas turbine under steady state operation not
including startups and shutdowns
••Combined emissions concentrationfromthe gas turbine and the duct burner under
steady state operation not including startups and shutdowns
• • • Emissions from the gas turbine (in accordance with 40 CFR 60 Subpart GG
requirements)
19.

Emissions testing, and compliance monitoring to the atmospherefromthe duct burner
shall be performed in accordance with all applicable provisions of 40 CFR 60, New
Source Performance Standards (NSPS) Subpart A and Subpart Da, 40 CFR 60.40a to
60.49a (Standards of Performance for Electric Utility Steam Generating Units for Which
Construction is Commenced After September 18, 1978) apply to this installation.

20.

Stack testing to show compliance with the emission limitations stated in the above
condition shall be performed as specified below

Emissions Point

Pollutant

Testing
Status

Test
Frequency

Gas turbine
NO,
•, • •
CEMs
only
CO
•
CEMs
Gas turbine &
NOx
*
CEMs
duct burner
CO
*
CEMs
Gas turbine
PMl0
••*
NA
Gas turbine & duct burner PM|0
****
NA
Duct Burner
*****
•Initial compliance shall be demonstrated with Relative Accuracy Testing Audit.
••Initial compliance testing for NOx for the gas turbine shall be performed in
accordance with the 40 CFR 60 Subpart GG.
••*, ••••Initial test to establish emission rate value for the calculations in the
Condition #12
••*** Initial compliance testing for the Duct Burner shall be performed in
accordance with the 40 CFR 60 Subpart Da.
Initial compliance testing shall be performed within 60 days after achieving the
maximum production rate at which the affected facility will be operated and in
no case later than 180 days after the start up of a new emission source.
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B.

Notification
The Executive Secretary shall be notified at least 30 days prior to conducting any
required emission testing. A source test protocol shall be submitted to DAQ
when the testing notification is submitted to the Executive Secretary.
The source test protocol shall be approved by the Executive Secretary prior to
performing the test(s). The source test protocol shall outline the proposed test
methodologies, stack to be tested, procedures to be used. A pretest conference
shall be held, if directed by the Executive Secretary.

C.

Sample Location
The emission point shall be designed to conform to the requirements of 40 CFR
60, Appendix A, Method 1, or other methods as approved by the Executive
Secretary. An Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) or Mine
Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) approved access shall be provided to
the test location.

D.

Volumetric Flow Rate
40 CFR 60, Appendix A, Method 2 or other testing methods approved by the
Executive Secretary.

E.

PMio
For stacks in which no liquid drops are present, the following methods shall be
used: 40 CFR 51, Appendix M, Methods 201,201a, 202 or other testing methods
approved by the Executive Secretary. The back half condensibles shall also be
tested using the method specified by the Executive Secretary. All particulate
captured shall be considered PM^.
For stacks in which liquid drops are present, methods to eliminate the liquid
drops should be explored If no reasonable method to eliminate the drops exists,
then the following methods shall be used: 40 CFR 60, Appendix A, Method 5,
5a, 5d, or 5e as appropriate, or other testing methods approved by the Executive
Secretary. The back half condensibles shall also be tested using the method
specified by the Executive Secretary. The portion of thefronthalf of the catch
considered PMio shall be based on information in Appendix B of the fifth edition
of the EPA document, AP-42, or other data acceptable to the Executive
Secretary.
The back half condensibles shall not be used for compliance demonstration but
shall be used for inventory purposes.

F.

Calculations
To determine mass emission rates (Ib/hr, etc.) the pollutant concentration as
determined by the appropriate methods above shall be multiplied by the
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volumetric flow rate and any necessary conversion factors determined by the
Executive Secretary, to give the results in the specified units of the emission
limitation.
G.

New Source Operation
For a new source/emission point, the production rate during all compliance
testing shall be no less than 90% of the production rate listed in this AO. If the
maximum AO allowable production rate has not been achieved at the lime of the
test, the following procedure shall be followed:

H.

1.

Testing shall be at no less than 90% of the production rate achieved to
date.

2.

If the test is passed, the new maximum allowable production rale shall be
110% of the tested achieved rate, but not more than the maximum
allowable production rate. This new allowable maximum production rate
shall remain in effect until successfully tested at a higher rate.

3.

The owner/operator shall request a higher production rate when necessary.
Testing at no less than 90% of the higher rate shall be conducted. A new
maximum production rate (110% of the new rate) will then be allowed if
the test is successful. This process may be repeated until the nmximum
AO production rate is achieved.

Existing Source Operation
For an existing source/emission point, the production rate during all compliance
testing shall be no less than 90% of the maximum production achieved in the
previous three (3) years.

Monitoring - Continuous Emissions Monitoring
21.

The owner/operator shall install, calibrate, maintain, and operate a continuous monitoring
system for measuring nitrogen oxides, oxygen and carbon monoxide emissions
discharged to the atmospherefromeach turbine stack and record the output of the system.
The monitoring system shall be used for measuring and determining compliance. The
continuous monitoring system shall comply with applicable provisions of UAC, R307170 and applicable Federal regulations for the Acid Rain Program under Clean Air Act
Title IV.

22.

Spring Canyon Energy, LLC shall submit for review and Executive Secretary approval
CEMs monitoring plan 45 days before the turbine become operational. The plan shall
address the number of monitors to be used, the method of measuring the rate in tons per
hour, and the method of calculating emissions during the CEMs breakdowns.
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Records & Miscellaneous
23.

At all times, including periods of startup, shutdown, and malfunction, owners and
operators shall, to the extent practicable, maintain and operate any equipment approved
under this Approval Order including associated air pollution control equipment in a
manner consistent with good air pollution control practice for minimizing emissionsDetermination of whether acceptable operating and maintenance procedures are being
used will be based on information available to the Executive Secretary which may
include, but is not limited to, monitoring results, opacity observations, review of
operating and maintenance procedures, and inspection of the source. AH maintenance
performed on equipment authorized by this AO shall be recorded.

24.

The owner/operator shall comply with R307-150 Series. Inventories, Testing and
Monitoring.

25.

The owner/operator shall comply with R307-107. General Requirements: Unavoidable
Breakdowns.

The Executive Secretary shall be notified in writing if the company is sold or changes its name.
Under R307-150-1, the Executive Secretary may require a source to submit an emission inventory for any
full or partial year on reasonable notice.
This AO in no way releases the owner or operator from any liability for compliance with all other
applicable federal, state, and local regulations including R307.
A copy of the rules, regulations and/or attachments addressed in this AO may be obtained by contacting
the Division of Air Quality. The Utah Administrative Code R307 rules used by DAQ, the Notice of
Intent (NOI) guide, and other air quality documents and forms may also be obtained on the Internet at the
following web site: http://www.deq.state.ut.us/eqair/aq^ home.htm
The annual emission estimations below include point source and do not include fugitive emissions,
fugitive dust, road dust, tail pipe emissions, etc. These emissions are for the purpose of determining the
applicability of Prevention of Significant Deterioration, non-attainment area, maintenance area, and Title
V source requirements of the R307. They are not to be used for determining compliance.
The Potential To Emit (PTE) emissions for this source (the entire plant, or specify what portion) are
currently calculated at the following values:
Pollutant
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

PM!0
SO,
NOx
CO
VOC

Tons/yr
70.9
5.3
66.4
97.5
67.12
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HAPs
Acetaldehyde
Acrolein
1,3 Butadiene
Benzene
Ethylbenzene
Formaldehyde
Naphthalene
PAH
Propylene Oxide
Toluene
Xylenes
Totals

0.015
0.015
0.017
0.17
1.35
1.51
0.01
0.002
1.20
1.12
0.26
5.7

Approved By:

Richard W. Sprott, Executive Secretary
Utah Air Quality Board
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October 11, 2002

Nephi Times News
P.O.Box 77
Nephi, UT 84648
RE:

Legal Notice of Intent to Approve

This letter will confirm the authorization to publish the attached NOTICE in the Nephi Times News on
October 16, 2002.
Please mail the invoice and affidavit of publication to the Utah State Department of Environmental
Quality, Division of Air Quality, P O. Box 144820, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114^820.
Sincerely,

^c

(^yruA^i

Renae Emery
Office Technician
Utah Division of Air Quality
Enclosure
cc:

Juab County
Juab Co Courthouse
160 N Main
Nephi UT 84648
Six-County Association of Governments
Sevier County Courthouse
250 N Main
PO Box 820
Richfield UT 84701

UDAQ0032
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NOTICE
The following notice of intent to construct, submitted in accordance with Section R307-401-1, Utah Air
Quality Rules, has been received for consideration by the Executive Secretary, Utah Air Quality Board:
Spring Canyon Energy, LLC.
Location: From Salt Lake City take 1-15 south approximately 77 miles to Hwy 54. Take
exit and proceed west through Mona. Go Vi mile north on Goshen Canyon Road; Plant
site is Vi mile to the west. Juab County
Project Description: Spring Canyon Energy, LLC (SCE) is proposing to construct,
own, and operate a new power generating facility in the Juab Valley, Juab County, just
west of the Mona Reservoir. The facility will consist of one natural gas turbine generator
set in a combined cycle configuration [with one heat recovery steam generator (HRSG)
and one steam turbine-generator]. In addition, there will be one diesel fired emergency
generator, one diesel-fired emergency fire pump, small diesel fuel storage tanks, an aircooled condenser (to condense spent steam back into water for recycling to the HRSG),
and aqueous ammonia storage and handling equipment. The HRSG duct burners will be
fired with natural gas to augment waste heat from the gas turbine exhaust. The power
facility will operate with a combined net maximum generating capacity of about 280 MW
at 0°F. It is anticipated that the gas turbine will be purchased from General Electric with
Dry Lo-NOx combustion system. NOx emissions from the gas turbine will be controlled
to 2 ppmvd at 15% 0 2 reference (by selective catalytic reduction system), CO to 4 ppmvd
at 15% 0 2 reference (9 ppmvd with duct firing), and ammonia slippage to 10 ppm. The
turbine will not be designed to operate in a simple-cycle mode (i.e., bypassing the HRSG
unit). Raw materials used at the Spring Canyon plant in addition to natural gas and air
are water (to generate the steam) and ammonia for the selective catalytic (NOx) reduction
process. Use of the dry type air-cooled condenser greatly reduces the plant's water
usage. It has been determined that the conditions of the Utah Administrative Code R307401-6 and the Federal rules have been met. The Executive Secretary intends to issue an
Approval Order after a 30-day public comment period is held. This comment period is
being held to receive and evaluate public input on the project proposed by Spring Canyon
Energy, LLC.
The Proposed Emissions increase will be:
PM10
S0 2
NOx
CO
VOC

70.90 tons/year
5.30 tons/year
66.40 tons/year
97.50 tons/year
67.12 tons/year
HAPs
Ethylbenzene
Formaldehyde
Propylene Oxide
Toluene
Xylenes
Miscellaneous HAPs
Totals

1.35
1.51
1.20
1.12
0.26
0.26
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The completed engineering evaluation and air quality impact analysis showed that no new violations of
National Ambient Air Quality Standards or Prevention of Significant Deterioration Increments will occur.
It is the intent of the Executive Secretary to approve the construction project.
The construction proposal and estimate of the effect on local air quality are available for public inspection
and comment at the Utah Division of Air Quality, Department of Environmental Quality, 150 North 1950
West, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-4820. Any questions may be directed to Milka Radulovic, (801) 5364232, Email:Milkar@utah.gov. There will be a 30-day comment period held. Written comments
received by the Division, at the same address on or before November 15,2002 will be considered in
making the final decision on the approval/disapproval of the proposed construction.
If anyone so requests to the Executive Secretary at the Division in writing, within 15 days of publication
of the Notice, a hearing will be held to explain the project and technical rationale for the proposed action.
The hearing will be scheduled as close as practicable to the proposed project location. Comments
obtained during the hearing will be evaluated and considered by the Executive Secretary before making a
final decision on the approval/disapproval of the project.
Date of Notice: October 16, 2002
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P. Bruce Badger (A4791)
Peter W. Billings (A0330)
Kevin N. Anderson (A0100)
Jason W. Hardin (A8793)
FABIAN & CLENDENIN,
A Professional Corporation
215 South State Street, 12th Floor
P.O. Box 510210
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151
Telephone: (801)531-8900
Facsimile: (801)531-1716
Michael G. Jenkins (A4350)
Assistant General Counsel, PacifiCorp
1407 W. North Temple, Suite 310
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116
Telephone: (801)220-2233
Facsimile: (801) 220-3299
Attorneys for Defendant PacifiCorp

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
USA POWER, LLC; USA POWER
PARTNERS, LLC; and SPRING
CANYON ENERGY, LLC,
Plaintiffs,

)
)
)

AFFIDAVIT OF MARK GREEN

)
)

vs.

PACIFICORP; JODY L. WILLIAMS and
HOLME, ROBERTS & OWEN, LLP,
Defendants.

)
)
)

Civil No. 050903412
Judge Tyrone E. Medley

STATE OF GEORGIA

)
)ss.

COUNTY OF FULTON

)

Mark Green, being first duly sworn, deposes and states:
1.

I am currently employed by Mirant Corporation as Program Manager for Air

Quality and Construction.
2.

I was employed by Shaw/Stone & Webster from October 2001 to August 2006.

3.

I was the project manager for the study and estimate phase and ultimately the

Manager of Projects, Gas Turbines for the design, engineering and construction of the combined
cycle power plant that Shaw/Stone & Webster designed, engineered and constructed for
PacifiCorp named Currant Creek, which is located next to the Mona switching station in Juab
County, Utah.
4.

The location of Currant Creek is a logical choice for a combined cycle power

plant because it is next to PacifiCorp's switching station, which provides transmission of the
electricity produced by the power plant, and it is in proximity to two natural gas transmission
lines that can provide fuel for the plant. Currant Creek was designed to interconnect to
PacifiCorp's transmission system at the Mona switching station at 345 kV, because this is the
voltage carried on PacifiCorp's transmission system at the switching station.
5.

Shaw/Stone & Webster designed, engineered and constructed the Apex 1

combined cycle power plant in Las Vegas, Nevada, for Mirant Corporation, that was completed
in 2003.
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6.

Like the Apex 1 plant and many other combined cycle plants with which I am

familiar, Currant Creek is a 2 on 1 combined cycle design, meaning it has two natural gas
turbines and a single steam turbine generator. Currant Creek and Apex 1 were both designed and
engineered based on Shaw/Stone & Webster's reference plant design for a 2 on 1 combined
cycle power plant with air cooling. Currant Creek, like Apex 1, is based on a recognized and
proven 2 on 1 combined cycle configuration that is well understood and widely utilized in the
electric power plant industry.
7.

Although there are minor differences in output rating between Apex 1 and Currant

Creek, due primarily to differences in elevation, higher expected temperatures at Apex 1, and the
use of steam injection at Apex 1, the plants are essentially sisters. Both plants utilize two General
Electric 7FA7241 gas turbines with almost identical nominal ratings; both plants have two
similarly sized heat recovery steam generators equipped with selective catalytic reduction
systems; both plants have a single similarly sized steam turbine generator; both plants have duct
firing with similar capability; both plants are 100% dry cooled; and both plants are designed for
zero wastewater discharge.
8.

A combined cycle plant in a 2x1 configuration was not a secret; a combined cycle

plant with General Electric 7FA gas turbines was not a secret; a combined cycle plant with heat
recovery steam generators was not a secret; a combined cycle plant with additional duct burner
capacity was not a secret; a combined cycle plant with a steam turbine generator was not a
secret; a combined cycle plant that is air cooled was not a secret; a combined cycle plant
designed for zero wastewater discharge was not a secret. All of these features of a combined
cycle power plant were openly used in the electric generation industry well before 2002.
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9.

At PacifiCorp's request, Shaw/Stone & Webster performed and assembled a

detailed Project Cost Analysis for what was to become the Currant Creek power plant. As the
project manager, I oversaw this work.
10.

Shaw/Stone & Webster prepared its Project Cost Analysis for the following

scenarios:
a.

A simple cycle plant with two "F" class gas turbines to be converted into a

nominal 500 MW 2x1 combined cycle power plant;
b.

A simple cycle plant with two "F" class gas turbines to be converted into a

nominal 500 MW 2x1 combined cycle power plant, and an additional 2x1 power block
configured for combined cycle yielding an additional nominal 500 MW;
c.

A simple cycle plant with two "F" class gas turbines;

d.

A simple cycle plant with four UF" class gas turbines to be converted into

a nominal 1000 MW 2x1 configured combined cycle power plant.
11.

A number of Shaw/Stone & Webster's employees, including Dave Galpin, Rich

Sowers, Rod Gartner, Rob Gappa and Elmer Mitchell began this work in late April 2003. The
Project Cost Analysis, which included plant configuration, site arrangements, conceptual design,
preliminary plant water balance calculations and the basis of design, was completed and
submitted to PacifiCorp in a large binder on or about June 9, 2003. Completing this work during
the period from April-June was not unusual. The detailed Project Cost Analysis utilized Shaw/
Stone & Webster's in-house databases and reference plant designs, and was a normal part of
Shaw/Stone & Webster's regular business designing and engineering combined cycle power
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plants like Currant Creek, Apex 1, and other combined cycle plants in the United States and
around the world.
12.

Shaw/Stone & Webster began the preliminary engineering for the Currant Creek

power plant when PacifiCorp issued a Limited Notice to Proceed in August 2003. A number of
Shaw/Stone & Webster's employees participated in the engineering work, including Dennis
Reed, Rod Gartner, Rich Sowers, Steve Pozder, Ray Herrera and John Hunt. As the Manager of
Projects, Gas Turbines, I oversaw this work. The Limited Notice to Proceed was in effect until
the contract with PacifiCorp was signed in February 2004.
13.

Shaw/Stone & Webster began construction of the Currant Creek power plant in

January 2004 under an interim construction contract associated with the Limited Notice to
Proceed. The simple cycle phase went into commercial operation in June 2005. The combined
cycle phase went into commercial operation in March 2006.
14.

The design, engineering and construction of Currant Creek represents Shaw/Stone

& Webster's own efforts. Shaw/Stone & Webster did not use any information from, or about,
USA Power, USA Power Partners, Spring Canyon Energy, or the Spring Canyon Energy project,
in any aspect of the Currant Creek power plant, whatsoever.

DATED this 11 day of April, 2007.

Mark Green
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SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this I 7 * - day of April 2007.

My Commission Expires:

Notary Public

x

„

Residing in

VMb

JuML {p. 2.00*7

r °k
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
On the 30th day of April, 2007,1 hereby certify that I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the AFFIDAVIT OF MARK GREEN as follows:
Via Hand Delivery
Peggy A. Tomsic
Kristopher S. Kaufman
TOMSIC & PECK
136 East South Temple, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Via Hand Delivery
Thomas R. Karrenberg
Scott A. Call
Anderson & Karrenberg
50 West Broadway, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Defendants Jody L. Williams
and Holme, Roberts & Owen, LLP
Via U.S. Mail
J. Chapman Petersen
Robert Surovell
Surovell, Markle, Isaacs & Levy
4010 University Drive, Suite 200
Fairfax, Virginia 22030
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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Three Material Undisputed Facts That Were Not Mentioned In
The District Court's List of Facts That Were Deemed Admitted
Undisputed Fact No. 4:
After all of these pieces of its power plant development were in place,
Panda contacted PacifiCorp's Managing Director of Resource Development,
Rand Thurgood, PhD., and set up a meeting in Salt Lake City, Utah. Barlow
depo. at pp. 102-116. Panda's hope at the time was that PacifiCorp would be
interested in purchasing the power generated from Panda's power plant under a
long term power purchase contract. See, Id.
USA Power's Response:
Disputed. There were no "pieces in place" for the development of the
Panda project prior to its abandonment. See Response to paragraphs 1-3.

Undisputed Fact No. 16:
The first meeting between PacifiCorp and USA Power occurred on August
22, 2002. This first meeting occurred (a) more than a year after Panda made its
detailed presentation to PacifiCorp, (b) two months after Mr. Thurgood had
toured the Apex 1 plant in Las Vegas, and (c) three weeks after Panda had told
PacifiCorp that Panda would consider selling its Mona project assets. Ted
Banasiewicz depo. at pp. 155-156; See, Undisputed Facts fflj 5, 9-10, above.
USA Power's Response:
Disputed. See Response to paragraphs 5, 7, and 9.

The characterizations of PacifiCorp, e.g. that Panda's presentation was
"detailed," are inherently self-serving and belied by the actions of PacifiCorp in
delaying purchase of Panda.

Undisputed Fact No. 19:
On August 21, 2002, the day before their first meeting with PacifiCorp, the
USA Power principals met with Tom Florence of Utah Associated Municipal
Power System (UAMPS) in Salt Lake City, Utah. They handed Mr. Florence a
copy of the same volume of information that they later gave to PacifiCorp. Mr.
Florence and UAMPS did not sign a confidentiality agreement. See, Affidavit of
Tom Florence, filed concurrently herewith.
USA Power's Response:
Disputed: The statement by PacifiCorp ignores the fact that the materials
given to UAMPS were given on the condition that UAMPS agree to keep them
confidential and sign a confidentiality agreement. UAMPS agreed to keep them
confidential, and did not misuse the information. [Graeber Dep. at 340-42; Exs.
225-226]
[USA Power did not accurately controvert this fact. What Dave Graeber
said in his deposition was that he had no memory of the meeting with UAMPS
and he could not even confirm that UAMPS was given a copy of USA Power's
volume of information Graeber Depo. at page 339-342 (R.7039-7043). Tom
Florence's affidavit stating that Volume 1 of USA Power's supposed "confidential
information" was handed to him without any assurance of confidentiality was
uncontroverted.]
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c
Court of Appeals of Utah.
BLUFFDALE CITY, a Utah municipal corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Taylor SMITH, an individual; and Wallingford Development, Inc., a Utah corporation, Defendants
and Appellants.
No. 20051020-CA.
Feb. 1,2007.
Background: City brought action against defendants, alleging breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and unjust enrichment. The Third District
Court, Salt Lake Department, Judith S. Atherton, J.,
granted city summary judgment. Defendants appealed.
Holding: The Court of Appeals, Thorne, J., held
that trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting summary judgment based on defendants' noncompliance with rule of civil procedure regarding
requirements for memorandum in opposition to
summary judgment motion.
Affirmed.
West Headnotes
(11 Judgment 228 C^>183
228 Judgment
228V On Motion or Summary Proceeding
228k 182 Motion or Other Application
228k 183 k. In General. Most Cited Cases
The trial court has discretion in requiring compliance with rule of civil procedure regarding requirements for memorandum in opposition to summary
judgment motion. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 7.
[2J Judgment 228 €=>183
228 Judgment
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228 V On Motion or Summary Proceeding
228kl 82 Motion or Other Application
228k 183 k. In General. Most Cited Cases
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting
city summary judgment against defendants based
on defendants' noncompliance with rule of civil
procedure regarding requirements for memorandum
in opposition to summary judgment motion; defendants' memorandum failed to provide the specific disputed facts together with applicable record
references. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 7(c)(3)(B).
*175 David K. Smith, Midvale, for Appellants.
Dale F. Gardiner and Craig R. Kleinman, Parry Anderson & Gardiner, Salt Lake City, for Appellee.
Before GREENWOOD, Associate P.J., DAVIS and
THORNE, JJ.

OPINION
THORNE, Judge:
% 1 Defendants Taylor Smith and Wallingford Development, Inc. appeal the district court's order
granting Plaintiff Bluffdale City's motion for summary judgment based on Defendants' failure to
comply with rule 7(c)(3)(B) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure. SeeUtah R. Civ. P. 7(c)(3)(B). We
affirm.

BACKGROUND
f 2 On July 9, 2004, Plaintiff filed a complaint
against Defendants alleging claims for breach of
contract, promissory estoppel, and unjust enrichment. Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment on all alleged claims, together with a supporting memorandum and the affidavits of Shane Jones
and Brent Bluth. Defendants filed an opposing
memorandum with the affidavit of Taylor Smith.
Defendants' opposing memorandum contained thenown statement of the facts and an argument section.
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The argument section consisted of a brief statement
of the law pertaining to summary judgment, as well
as a list enumerating approximately six issues of
fact that Defendants deemed disputed.
f 3 Plaintiff filed a reply memorandum arguing that
summary judgment should be granted because Defendants failed to comply with rule 7(c)(3)(B). See
id. Plaintiff asserted that Defendants failed to controvert the facts because Defendants' opposing
memorandum did not contain a verbatim restatement of Plaintiffs stated facts, noting which fact or
portion was disputed, and did not cite to any relevant materials, such as affidavits or discovery materials. The district court agreed that Defendants had
failed to comply with the directives of rule
7(c)(3)(B). See id. The district court concluded that
Plaintiffs arguments therefore remained unopposed, *176 accepted the facts as stated by
Plaintiff, and granted Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment. Defendants appealed.

ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
% 4 Defendants contend that the trial court erred in
granting Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment
because Defendants substantially complied with
rule 7(c)(3)(B) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. SeeUtah R. Civ. P. 7(c)(3)(B). Motions
for summary judgment should be granted when
"there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as
a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c).
[1] f 5 We review a district court's grant of summary judgment for correctness, affording no deference to the district court. See Ford v. American
Express Fin. Advisors, 2004 UT 70, K 21, 98 P.3d
15. "However, 'the trial court has discretion in requiring compliance with [rule 7 of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure].' " Gary Porter Constr. v Fox
Constr., Inc., 2004 UT App'354, % 10, 101 P.3d 371
(quoting Fennell v. Green, 2003 UT App 291, H 9,
77 P.3d 339\cert denied, 123 P.3d 815 (Utah
2005).FNt
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FN1. Both Gary Porter Constr. v Fox
Constr., Inc. 2004 UT App 354, 101 P.3d
371, cert, denied, 123 P.3d 815 (Utah
2005), and Fennell v. Green, 2003 UT App
291, 77 P.3d 339, were decided under
former rule 4-501(2)(B) of the Utah Rules
of Judicial Administration. See Utah R.
Jud. Admin. 4-501(2)(B) (2000 & 2002).
The procedural content of rule 4-501 (2)(B)
is presently located in rule 7(c)(3)(B) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
SeeUtzh R. Civ. P. 7(c)(3)(B); Gary Porter Constr., 2004 UT App 354 at % 15 n. 2,
101 P.3d371.
ANALYSIS
K 6 Defendants assert that they substantially complied with rule 7(c)(3)(B) because the portions of
Plaintiffs statement of facts that were in dispute
were set forth in and controverted by the Smith affidavit attached to Defendants' opposing memorandum. Defendants maintain that the Smith affidavit is sufficient to raise genuine issues of material
fact to defeat summary judgment.
f 7Rule 7(c)(3)(B) states:
A memorandum opposing a motion for summary
judgment shall contain a verbatim restatement of
each of the moving party's facts that is controverted, and may contain a separate statement of additional facts in dispute. For each of the moving
party's facts that is controverted, the opposing party
shall provide an explanation of the grounds for any
dispute, supported by citation to relevant materials,
such as affidavits or discovery materials. For any
additional facts set forth in the opposing memorandum, each fact shall be separately stated and
numbered and supported by citation to supporting
materials, such as affidavits or discovery materials.
Utah R. Civ. P. 7(c)(3)(B). Defendants admit that
their opposing memorandum did not contain a verbatim restatement of each of Plaintiffs facts that
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they sought to contest. Thus, we must determine
whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting as uncontroverted the facts submitted by
Plaintiff in support of its request for summary judgment, which were not addressed by Defendants in
accordance with rule 7(c)(3)(B).
f 8 The district court's discretion in enforcing compliance with Rile 7(c)(3)(B) has been addressed in
several cases decided under the former but comparable rule 4-501(2)(B) of the Utah Rules of Judicial
Administration. This court in Fennel! v. Green,
2003 UT App 291, 77 P.3d 339, relying on the supreme court's ruling in Lovendahl v. Jordan School
District, 2002 UT 130, 63 P.3d 705, held that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in deeming
facts admitted due to noncompliance with rule
4-501(2)(B). See FennelI, 2003 UT App 291 at 1) 8,
77 P.3d 339; Lovendahl, 2002 UT 130 at H 50, 63
P.3d 705 ("[A]ll facts set forth in the movant's
statement of facts are 'deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless specifically controverted by the opposing party's statement.5 "
(emphasis added) (quoting Utah R. Jud. Admin.
4-501(2)(B))).
f 9 Since then, the supreme court in Salt Lake
County v. Metro West Ready Mix, Inc., 2004 UT 23,
89 P.3d 155, declined to accept, for purposes of
summary judgment and appeal, the facts as stated
by the defendant based on the plaintiffs failure to
comply *177 with rule 4-501 (2)(B). In Metro West,
the plaintiffs "opposing memorandum did not set
forth disputed facts listed in numbered sentences in
a separate section." Id. at f 23 n. 4. However, the
supreme court, in a footnote, ruled plaintiffs failure
to comply with the technical requirements of rule
4-501(2)(b) to be harmless because "the disputed
facts were clearly provided in the body of the
memorandum with applicable record references."
Id. Later, the supreme court in Anderson Development Co. v. Tobias, 2005 UT 36, 116 P.3d 323, acknowledged that the trial court had discretion to
either grant summary judgment for noncompliance
with rule 4-501 or to hear the motion on its merits.
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See id. at f 21 n. 3 ("While the district court could
have granted [the defendants'] motion for summary
judgment on the basis of [the plaintiffs] noncompliance with rule 4-501, it exercised its discretion to
address the motion on its merits....").
[2] f 10 Defendants maintain that this case is analogous to Metro West, and that their failure to include a verbatim restatement of the contested facts
is merely a technical violation. Defendants assert
that this failure, as in Metro West, was harmless because the disputed facts were set forth in and controverted by the Smith affidavit that was attached to
the opposing memorandum. We disagree. This case
is distinguishable from Metro West.Here, Defendants failed to provide the specific disputed facts together with applicable record references in the body
of their opposing memorandum. The entire body of
Defendants' opposing memorandum purporting to
address the disputed facts is as follows:
1. The Plaintiff asserts that there is a breach of contract. No physical evidence has been produced to
suggest that there was ever a written agreement
between the parties that would require the Defendants would [sic] pay for water provided by the
Plaintiff for the city's own parking strip.
2. The Plaintiff asserts that there was an implied
contract to provide water service. Again, the Defendant, in his affidavit, denies that either he or
Wallingford Development, Inc. ever agreed
verbally either implicitly or explicitly to pay for
water provided by Bluffdale to the city's parking
strip.
3. The Plaintiff attempts, by letter dated September
9, 1999, some three months after the water began to
be supplied to the parking strip, to suggest that it
implies that the [D]efendant[s] as alleged developers are responsible for the water "until each
lot has its own irrigation system."
4. This was never agreed to by the Defendants, and
in fact the Defendants deny that they agreed to such
a proposal, and specifically allege they wrote to
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Bluffdale City advising them they were not going
to be responsible for any water supplied to the city's
parking strips.
5. The Defendants further aver in their affidavit,
they were not owners of Heritage Industrial Park,
nor signers of the Restrictive Covenants.
6. The Defendants further allege that there was a
global settlement reached between SK Development and Bluffdale City on May 20, 2004[,] which
renders the Plaintiffs lawsuit moot.
7. As to each theory for relief there remain issues of
disputed fact to preclude any entry of summary
judgment in favor of the Plaintiff.
f 11 The preceding passage readily demonstrates
that Defendants' failure to comply with the requirements of mle 7(c)(3)(B) was not merely technical
in nature and thereby harmless. Defendants' opposing memorandum, to the extent controverted facts
were raised therein, did not include a coherent explanation of the grounds for the dispute as required
by rule 7(c)(3)(B). SeeUtah R. Civ. P. 7(c)(3)(B).
Nor did Defendants, with the exception of two nonspecific references to the Smith affidavit, provide
supporting citations as the basis for any dispute of
fact. Thus, we are unpersuaded that Defendants
substantially complied with rule 7(c)(3)(B), and we
conclude that the district did not abuse its discretion when it granted Plaintiffs motion for summary
judgment based on Defendants' noncompliance
with rule 7(c)(3)(B)™2
FN2. Even had we determined that Defendants substantially complied with rule
7(c)(3)(B), we would still affirm the district court's order granting summary judgment on the alternate ground of unjust enrichment. To establish an unjust enrichment cause of action, Plaintiff must meet
three elements:
First, there must be a benefit conferred
on one person by another. Second, the
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conferee must appreciate or have knowledge of the benefit. Finally, there must
be the acceptance or retention by the
conferee of the benefit under such circumstances as to make it inequitable for
the conferee to retain the benefit without
payment of its value.
Groberg v. Housing Opportunities, Inc.,
2003 UT App 67,^21. 68 P.3d 1015.
Plaintiff, in its motion for summary
judgment, maintained that Plaintiff had
conferred the benefit of water services
on Defendants' parking strip, and Defendants accepted and retained said services with knowledge and without compensation to Plaintiff Defendants' opposing memorandum and attached affidavit both fail in their entirety to provide
any evidence to dispute that Defendants
(1) received water services
from
Plaintiff, (2) knew Plaintiff was supplying them with water services, and (3) retained the water. Although Defendants
refer to the parking strip as the "city's
parking strips," they do not provide any
reasoned argument or evidence pertaining to ownership of the parking strip, nor
do they deny receiving and benefitting
from the water services. Thus, because
Defendants failed to present evidence
sufficient to raise a factual dispute regarding any element of unjust enrichment, they would not have been able to
defeat summary judgment on Plaintiffs
unjust enrichment claim.
*178 CONCLUSION
f 12 Defendants' opposing memorandum fails to
substantially comply with rule 7(c)(3)(B) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Defendants' failures
amount to more than a technical violation of the
rule. Defendants do not provide an explanation of
the basis for any dispute, nor do they provide ap-
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propriate supporting citations. Rather, Defendants'
opposing memorandum contains only a separate
statement of additional facts and a list of facts
deemed disputed without further explanation or
support. As a result, Defendants' opposing memorandum does not controvert each of Plaintiffs facts.
Therefore, we conclude that the district court did
not abuse its discretion when it enforced rule
7(c)(3)(B) by deeming Plaintiffs facts to be admitted. We affirm the district court's order granting
summary judgment.
f 13 WE CONCUR: PAMELA T. GREENWOOD,
Associate Presiding Judge and JAMES Z. DAVIS,
Judge.
Utah App.,2007.
Bluffdale City v. Smith
156 P.3d 175, 570 Utah Adv. Rep. 64, 2007 UT
App 25
END OF DOCUMENT
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Rule 4-406

RULES OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION

(5)(E) The clerk of the court shall enter the payment due
the juror or witness in the State Accounting System (FINET).
The state will mail the payment to the juror or witness within
3 days. The clerk of court shall maintain both a list of
undeliverable juror and witness checks and the checks. A
payment is considered abandoned one year after it became
payable and will be sent to the Division of Unclaimed Property
pursuant to Utah Code Section 67-4a-301.
(6) Audit of records. At least once per month, the clerk of
the court or a designee shall compare the jurors summoned
and the witnesses subpoenaed with the FINET log of payments. Any unauthorized payment or other irregularity shall
be reported to the court executive and the audit department of
the Administrative Office of the Courts. The Administrative
Office of the Courts shall include the audit ofjuror and witness
payments within the scope of their regularly scheduled audits.
Rules 4-406, 407. Repealed.
Rule 4-408. Locations of trial courts of record.
Intent:
To designate locations of trial courts of record.
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to all trial courts of record.
Statement of t h e Rule:
(1) Each county seat and the following municipalities are
hereby designated as locations of trial courts of record: American Fork; Bountiful; Cedar City; Layton; Orem; Roosevelt;
Salem; Sandy; Spanish Fork; West Valley City.
(2) The following unincorporated areas of a county are
designated as locations of trial courts of record: the Silver
Summit area of Summit County
(3) Subject to limitations imposed by law, any trial court of
record may hold court in any location designated by this rule.
Rule 4-408.01. Responsibility for administration of trial
courts.
Intent:
To designate the court locations administered directly
through the administrative office of the courts and those
administered through contract with local government pursuant to § 78-3-21.
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to the trial courts of record and to the
administrative office of the courts.
Statement of t h e Rule:
(1) All locations of the juvenile court shall be administered
directly through the administrative office of the courts.
(2) All locations of the district court shall be administered
directly through the administrative office of the courts, except
the following, which shall be administered through contract
with county or municipal government pursuant to § 78-3-21:
Fillmore, Junction, Kanab, Loa, Manila, Manti, Morgan,
Panguitch, Randolph, and Salem.
ARTICLE 5. CIVIL PRACTICE
Rule 4-501. Motions.
Intent:
To establish a uniform procedure for filing motions, supporting memoranda and documents with the court.
To establish a uniform procedure for requesting and scheduling hearings on dispositive motions.
To establish a procedure for expedited dispositions.
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to motion practice in all trial courts of
record except proceedings before the court commissioners and
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small claims cases. This rule does not apply to petitions for
habeas corpus or other forms of extraordinary relief.
Statement of the Rule:
(1) Filing and service of motions and memoranda.
(1)(A) Motion and supporting memoranda. All motions
except uncontested or ex-parte matters, shall be accompanied
by a memorandum of points and authorities appropriate
affidavits, and copies of or citations by page number to
relevant portions of depositions, exhibits or other documents
relied upon in support of the motion. Memoranda supporting
or opposing a motion shall not exceed ten pages in length
exclusive of the "statement of material facts" as provided in
paragraph (2), except as waived by order of the court on
ex-parte application. If an ex-parte application is made to file
an over-length memorandum, the application shall state the
length of the principal memorandum, and if the memorandum
is in excess of ten pages, the application shall include a
summary of the memorandum, not to exceed five pages.
(1KB) Memorandum in opposition to motion. The responding party shall file and serve upon all parties within ten days
after service of a motion, a memorandum in opposition to th?
motion, and all supporting documentation. If the responding
party fails to file a memorandum in opposition to the motion
within ten days after service of the motion, the moving party
may notify the clerk to submit the matter to the court for
decision as provided in paragraph (1)(D) of this rule.
(1)(C) Reply memorandum. The moving party may serve
and file a reply memorandum within five days after service of
the responding party's memorandum.
(1)(D) Notice to submit for decision. Upon the expiration of
the five-day period to file a reply memorandum, either party
may notify the clerk to submit the matter to the court for
decision. The notification shall be in the form of a separate
written pleading and captioned "Notice to Submit for Decision/'The Notice to Submit for Decision shall state the date on
which the motion was served, the date the memorandum in
opposition, if any, was served, the date the reply memorandum, if any, was served, and whether a hearing has been
requested. The notification shall contain a certificate of mailing to all parties. If neither party files a notice, the motion will
not be submitted for decision.
(2) Motions for summary judgment.
(2)(A) Memorandum in support of a motion. The points and
authorities in support of a motion for summary judgment shall
begin with a section that contains a concise statement of
material facts as to which movant contends no genuine issue
exists. The facts shall be stated in separate numbered sentences and shall specifically refer to those portions of the
record upon which the movant relies.
(2)(B) Memorandum in opposition to a motion. The points
and authorities in opposition to a motion for summary judgment shall begin with a section that contains a verbatim
restatement of each of the movant's statement of facts as to
which the party contends a genuine issue exists followed by a
concise statement of material facts which support the party's
contention. Each disputed fact shall be stated in separate
numbered sentences and shall specifically refer to those portions of the record upon which the opposing party relies. All
material facts set forth in the movant's statement and properly supported by an accurate reference to the record shall be
deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless specifically controverted by the opposing party's statement.
(3) Hearings.
(3)(A) A decision on a motion shall be rendered without a
hearing unless ordered by the court, or requested by the
parties as provided in paragraphs (3)(B) or (4) below.
(3KB) In cases where the granting of a motion would
dispose of the action or any claim in the action on the ments
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
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USA POWER, LLC, USA POWER
PARTNERS, LLC and SPRING
CANYON ENERGY, LLC,
Plaintiffs,
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PACIFICORP, JODY L. WILLIAMS and
HOLME, ROBERTS & OWEN, LLP,

;)
;

The Honorable Tyrone E. Medley

Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SUMMIT

]

)
: ss.
)

Marc T. Wangsgard, being first duly sworn, deposes and states as follows:

EXHIBIT

1.

I am a lawyer licensed to practice law in the State of Utah, having been admitted

in October, 1988.
2.

From the onset of my legal career, and until I ceased the full-time private practice

of law in May, 2000, ninety percent (90%) of my practice focused on water rights and related
property issues.
3.

During the course of my water law practice, I became acquainted with another

Salt Lake lawyer, Bill White, whose practice also focused on water rights issues.
4.

Around 1999, Mr. White and I began a business of buying and selling water

rights, primarily in Salt Lake County, Wasatch County and Utah County.
5.

Our specialty was acquiring one type of water from one location, and changing

the use and location of the water right to make it more valuable.
6.

In late July/August, 2003, I became aware of the potential of our selling water

rights to PacifiCorp for industrial use in Juab County.
7.

Jody Williams, another water lawyer with whom Mr. White and I both had

previously worked on other water rights issues and transactions, advised us of PacifiCorp's water
needs for a potential power plant to be located in Juab County. It was left entirely up to Mr.
White and me to figure out how to supply the quality of water needed by PacifiCorp at the
specific location.
8.

At this time, Mr. White and I were conducting our water rights business through a

Utah limited liability company, WW Ranches, LLC (UWW Ranches"), which is solely owned by
Mr. White and myself.
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9.

Based on my understanding of PacifiCorp's water rights needs, and after meeting

with Jim Riley at the State Engineer's office, I prepared and sent to Jody Williams, on August 6,
2003, a proposal to sell PacifiCorp a firm water supply for 800 acre feet to use near Mona, Utah.
10.

Mr. White and I conceived the idea of taking water rights originating in a

different county, a different water right area, and from a different source and changing the
location and use of those water rights to that requested by PacifiCorp near Mona, Juab County,
Utah. We had previously accomplished numerous similar transactions. Jody Williams played no
role in coming up with the idea or in finding the water rights we sold to PacifiCorp.
11.

The package of water rights that WW Ranches put together for PacifiCorp

included water rights WW Ranches already owned in water coming from Utah Lake and also
included shares of irrigation water from Utah County that WW Ranches acquired to sell to
PacifiCorp.
12.

On September 2, 2003, WW Ranches and PacifiCorp entered into a Water Rights

Purchase Agreement. Subsequently, on October 6, 2003, WW Ranches and PacifiCorp entered
into a Revised and Restated Water Rights Purchase Agreement. A copy of that agreement is
attached hereto as Exhibit A.
13.

The price that WW Ranches charged PacifiCorp for the water rights was based on

Mr. White's and my consideration of several factors, including, the price we had paid for the
water, how long it had held it, how risky the transaction was, the opportunity to market the water
somewhere else and what the market would bear.
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14.

The price set by WW Ranches was not based on any pricing information provided

to WW Ranches by Jody Williams.
15.

Jody Williams never discussed with us the price that Spring Canyon Energy had

agreed to pay for the Keyte and Garrett water rights or any aspect of Spring Canyon Energy's
agreements with Keyte and Garrett.
DATED this / /

day of January, 2007.

Marc T. Wangsgard
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this / Q d a y of January, 2007.

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing at: S \ J L _ V \ m 'ft

My Commission Expires: z?

NOTARY PUBLIC

jS^VT

DEBBIE PURVIS
1483NewparkBlvd
PO Box 981748
My Commission Expires
March 15, 2009

STATE OF UTAH
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REVISED AND RESTATED WATER RIGHTS PURCHASE AGREEMENT

This Agreement is entered into this /? ~* day of (yQAlnJ^A^

2003 between

WW Ranches, LC, a Utah limited liability company ("Seller"), and PacifiCorp, an
Oregon Corporation doing business as Utah Power ("Buyer").
RECITALS
A.

Seller owns water rights evidenced by shares of stock in Goshen Irrigation

and Canal Company and Utah and Salt Lake Canal Company, both Utah corporations
(collectively, the "Shares"). The Goshen Irrigation and Canal Company water rights are
identified as Water Right Nos. 53-988, 53-1089 and 53-1094 with priority dates of 1858,
1859 and 1858 respectively. The Utah and Salt Lake Canal Company water right is
identified as Water Right No. 59-3499 with a priority date of 1870.
B.

Buyer desires to acquire the right to divert and totally consume 400 acre-

feet of water annually from one or more groundwater wells to be located in north Juab
County. The water will be used for industrial purposes for cooling, and for domestic uses
in Buyer's proposed power generating facility (hereinafter the "Plant") to be located near
Mona in Juab County, Utah.
C.

In addition to the 400 acre feet of consumptive use water, Buyer desires to

acquire from Seller sufficient water to provide return flow owed to Utah Lake and
downstream users as a result of the consumptive use of the 400 acre feet and provide any
required carrier water to the remaining shareholders of Goshen Irrigation and Canal
Company and other water users in the Currant Creek system. The return flow and carrier
water requirement may be as high as 400 acre-feet but will be set out definitively in the
State Engineer's Memorandum Decision authorizing the use of the water as described in
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this Agreement. This return flow water and carrier water are collectively referred to in
this Agreement as the "Return Flow Requirement."
D.

Seller intends to file companion "Applications for Permanent Change of

Water" (the "Change Applications") which are described in detail in paragraph 3, with
the Shares to be assigned new Water Right numbers by the Utah State Engineer. The
Change Applications will request approval of the Utah State Engineer for Buyer annually
to totally consume 400 acre-feet of water for power generation and domestic uses at the
Plant and provide the Return Flow Requirement designated by the State Engineer as a
condition to approval of the consumptive use of the 400 acre-feet of water. The Change
Application to be filed on the Goshen Irrigation and Canal Company Shares will also
provide for Buyer's annual leaseback of that portion of water Buyer does not intend to use
in any given year to Goshen Irrigation and Canal Company. Seller intends to prosecute
the Change Applications to final approval, as set forth in this Agreement. The combined
Shares and the Change Applications approved for the annual diversion from Buyer's
groundwater wells of the 400 acre feet of consumptive use water at the Plant together
with the annual Return Flow Requirement are referred to hereinafter as the "Water
Rights."
E.

Buyer desires to purchase and Seller desires to sell the Water Rights

pursuant to the terms and conditions of this Agreement.
AGREEMENT
In consideration of the covenants and promises contained herein, the parties agree
as follows:

#151717 v3
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1.

Quantity of Water to be Purchased. Buyer agrees to purchase from Seller

and Seller agrees to sell and deliver to Buyer the Water Rights sufficient for the annual
diversion and total consumptive use of 400 acre-feet of water at the Plant together with
the annual Return Flow Requirement.
2.
Seven

Purchase Price. The purchase price for the Water Rights is Two Million

Hundred

Sixty-Nine Thousand,

Eight Hundred

and

Forty

Six

Dollars

($2,769,846.00), to be paid as set forth in paragraph 4 of this Agreement.
3.

The Change Applications.

A.

Utah Code Ann. section 73-3-3 controls the Change Application process.

As a condition precedent to the purchase and sale of the Water Rights, Seller shall obtain
State Engineer approval of companion Change Applications that will
(i) entitle Buyer to the right to annually divert and consume 400 acre-feet of
water made available from the Water Rights from one or more groundwater wells
for the purpose stated in Recital B of this Agreement; and
(ii) provide the annual Return Flow Requirement sufficient to insure the right to
the annual diversion and use of the 400 acre-feet of consumptive use water.
B.

The Change Applications, when approved by the State Engineer, shall

authenticate the annual consumptive use of the 400 acre-feet of water at Buyer's Plant
and the satisfaction of the annual Return Flow Requirement from water made available
by the Water Rights. The forms of the Change Applications are attached to this
Agreement as Exhibit "A."
C.

At its sole expense, Seller shall diligently and continuously prosecute the

approval of, and complete all tasks necessary to obtain the State Engineer's approval of,

#151717 v3
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the companion Change Applications. Buyer will consult and cooperate with Seller to
prepare and file the Change Applications to insure that they meet Buyer's approval. Each
party will bear its own attorney's fees and other costs in the Change Application process.
Seller will keep Buyer fully informed of all proposals, correspondence and developments
that occur during the administrative proceedings related to the Change Applications.
Buyer may, at its sole discretion, participate in the proceedings in support of the approval
of the Change Applications to insure that such approval meets its needs, including
appearing at public hearings and submitting pleadings and evidence in support of the
Change Applications.
D.

The Change Applications shall be considered final 30 days following the

date of the State Engineer's written Memorandum Decision consistent with Buyer's
requirements, unless a timely request for reconsideration is filed with the State Engineer
or a judicial review action is filed in the Utah District Court.

If a request for

reconsideration or a judicial review action is filed challenging the approval of one or both
of the Change Applications, at Buyer's request both parties will pursue the defense of
such action with each party to be responsible for its own costs, expenses and attorney's
fees. The date on which the. Change Applications shall be considered final will be
extended for the period of the reconsideration or the court proceedings, including any
appeals, until such time that all appeals to the State Engineer's written Memorandum
Decisions have been decided in favor of the terms of the Change Applications. If the
Change Applications have not received final approval, including the expiration of all
rights of appeal, by March 1, 2004, either party may terminate this Agreement without

#151717 v3

4

HRO-PC 000262

penalty upon notification to the other party Alternatively, the parties may extend the
March 1, 2004 date by mutual agreement
E

Each party shall use its best efforts to timely satisfy all of the conditions of

this paragraph 3 and to obtain the approval of the Change Applications
F
of Closing

Seller shall pay all assessments against the Shares existing as of the date
Buyer will assume responsibility for all assessments that may be levied

against or upon the Shares after the Closing
4

Closing The Closing of the purchase and sale transaction descnbed in

this Agreement shall occur on or before 10 days after the date of final approval of the
Change Applications descnbed in paragraph 3 D of this Agreement Prior to the Closing,
Seller shall instruct Buyer to whom the payment is to be made and in what amounts the
check(s) should be wntten At the Closing, Seller shall deliver assignments to Buyer of
Seller's interest in the Change Applications and appropnate certificates for the Shares
issued in Buyer's name evidencing the Water Rights, together with any agreements
obligating Buyer to meet certain requirements subsequent to the Closing, including
agreements descnbed in paragraph 5 below with Goshen Imgation and Canal Company
and Utah and Salt Lake Canal Company At the Closing, Buyer shall deliver to Seller the
total purchase pnce payable in funds acceptable to Seller and the executed assumption
agreements The parties do not expect there to be any costs associated with the Closing,
however, any closing costs shall be shared equally
5

Agreements to be Assumed by Buyer, Including Agreements with

Imgation Companies

Goshen Imgation and Canal Company and Utah and Salt Lake

Canal Company may require Seller to enter into vanous agreements as conditions of
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gaining such companies' consents to the filing of the Change Applications. Buyer shall
have 10 days to review and approve said agreements prior to Seller's execution of such
agreements. Seller does not anticipate executing agreements which will obligate Buyer
to meet certain requirements subsequent to the Closing other than those with Goshen
Irrigation and Canal Company and Utah and Salt Lake Canal Company. However, prior
to executing such agreements, if any, Buyer shall have 10 days to review and approve
said agreements prior to Seller's execution of them.
6.

Seller's Representations. The Parties acknowledge that it is essential to

Buyer's business that the Water Rights are available to Buyer as contemplated hereby,
and that Buyer is relying upon Seller's commitments, agreements and covenants
contained herein. Based upon this reliance, Seller represents and warrants to Buyer as
follows:
A.

Seller is a limited liability company that is duly organized, validly existing

and in good standing under the laws of the State of Utah. It possesses the authority and
power to execute and deliver this Agreement and perform all acts and obligations
required of it by this Agreement. The Water Rights, consisting of the Shares and the
approved Change Applications, will be transferred free and clear of all liens,
encumbrances and security interests and all other obligations other than those set forth in
the State Engineer's Memorandum Decisions approving the Change Applications, or
such agreements described in paragraph 5 of this Agreement.
B.

Seller is in compliance with each judgment, order, writ, injunction,

decision, law, ordinance or regulation of any court or governmental authority to which it
is subject and is not in breach of any lease, mortgage, and other agreement to which it,
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the Water Rights or any portion thereof is or might be subject, or with respect to any
matter which might prohibit, delay or interfere with the consummation of the transactions
contemplated hereby or affect the right, title and interest or condition of the Water Rights.
The execution and delivery of this Agreement, and the performance by Seller of its
obligations hereunder will not (i) result in the breach or termination of or violate or
constitute a default under any lease, mortgage or other agreement to which Seller is a
party, (ii) result in the creation or imposition of any lien, charge or encumbrance upon the
Water Rights, or (iii) violate any law, regulation, judgment or order of any governmental
entity.
C.

Each person who executes this Agreement on behalf of Seller has all

necessary legal right, power and authority to enter into this Agreement and to
consummate the transactions contemplated hereby. The execution and delivery of this
Agreement by or on behalf of Seller and the consummation of the transactions
contemplated hereby have been duly and validly authorized by Seller, have been duly
executed and delivered by it, and all instruments and documents executed and delivered
by or on behalf of Seller will constitute legal, valid and binding agreements of Seller,
enforceable in accordance with their terms.
D.

Seller is not in default in respect to any judgment, order, writ, injunction,

decision, law, ordinance or regulation of any court or governmental authority or under
any lease, order or other agreements to which Seller is or might be subject, or which
might prohibit, delay or interfere with the consummation of the transaction contemplated
hereby.
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E.

Seller has not received any notice of and is not otherwise aware of any

claim, action, suit or other proceeding, pending or threatened, that would constitute a
basis for any claim or litigation which might prohibit, delay or interfere with the
consummation of the transactions contemplated hereby.
F.

Except as contemplated hereby, there is no requirement applicable to

Seller to make any filing, declaration of, or registration with, to obtain any permit,
authorization, consent or approval of, any governmental entity as a condition to the
consummation by Seller of the transactions contemplated by this Agreement.
G.

The Water Rights to be transferred pursuant to this Agreement are and will

be owned by Seller, free and clear of any mortgage, pledge, lien, security interest,
encumbrance or claim of any third party.

Upon consummation of the transactions

contemplated hereby, Buyer will acquire good and marketable title to the Water Rights
free and clear of any restrictions, liens, or adverse claims. No person or entity other than
Seller has any right or interest in Water Rights.
H.

There are no claims, actions, suits, inquiries, proceedings or investigations

against Seller which are currently pending or, to the best of Seller's knowledge,
threatened at law or in equity by or before by any court, administrative body or
governmental entity. Seller is not in default under or with respect to any judgment, order,
writ, or decree of any court or any governmental entity which could reasonably be
expected to have a material adverse effect on the use of the Water Rights or the
transactions contemplated hereby.
I.

Seller is not aware of any facts pertaining to the Water Rights or the

transactions contemplated hereby which it believes may affect or are likely in the future
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to affect the Buyer's business. The statements, representations and warranties of Seller
herein taken together do not contain any untrue statement of a material fact, nor do they
omit to state any material fact necessary in order to make the representations and
warranties contained herein not misleading.
7.

Buyer's Representations.

Buyer represents and warrants to Seller as

follows:
A.

Buyer is a corporation duly organized, validly existing and in good

standing under the laws of the State of Oregon and is duly qualified to do business in the
State of Utah. It possesses the corporate authority and power to execute and deliver this
Agreement and perform all acts and obligations required of it by this Agreement..
B.

Buyer is in compliance with each judgment, order, writ, injunction,

decision, law, ordinance and regulation of any court or governmental authority to which
it is subject that relates in any way to the Water Rights, and is not in breach of any lease,
mortgage or other agreement to which it, the Water Rights, the Change Applications or
any portion thereof, is or might be subject, or with respect to any matter which might
prohibit, delay or interfere with the consummation of the transactions contemplated
hereby. The delivery of this Agreement and the performance by Buyer of its obligations
hereunder will not (i) result in the breach or termination of or violate or constitute a
default under any lease, mortgage or other agreement to which Buyer is a party, (ii) result
in the creation or imposition of any lien, charge or encumbrance upon the Water Rights,
or (iii) violate any law, regulation, judgment or order of any governmental entity.
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C.

The operation of its business by Buyer has been conducted in all material

respects in accordance with all applicable laws, regulations and other requirements of any
governmental agency.
D.

Buyer is not aware of any facts pertaining to the transactions contemplated

hereby which it believes may affect or is likely in the future to affect the Buyer's
purchase of the Water Rights. The statements, representations and warranties of Buyer
herein taken together do not contain any untrue statement of a material fact, nor do they
omit to state any material fact necessary in order to make the representations and
warranties contained herein not misleading.
8

Assignment. This Agreement may be assigned by Buyer prior to the

Closing upon the fiill payment of the Purchase Price and the consent of Seller, which
consent shall not be unreasonably withheld.
9.

Time is of the Essence. Time is of the essence regarding the dates and

time constraints set forth in this Agreement.
10.

Entire Agreement.

This Agreement constitutes the entire Agreement

between the parties and supersedes and replaces any and all prior negotiations,
representation, understanding, or contracts, including that certain "Water Rights Purchase
Agreement" relating to the purchase and sale of Goshen Irrigation and Canal Company
and Utah Lake Distributing Company shares, between the parties with respect to the
Water Rights to be purchased and sold hereunder.
11.

Default. An "Event of Default" shall occur under this Agreement if either

party fails to perform any of its obligations hereunder when those obligations are due and
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the defaulting party has not cured or satisfied the delinquent obligations within 10 days
following delivery to the delinquent party of written notice of such delinquency.
12.

Remedies.

A.

Seller shall indemnify, defend and hold harmless Buyer, and each of its

shareholders, officers, directors, employees, agents, successors and assigns, from any and
all liabilities, losses, damages, claims, costs and expenses, interest, awards, judgments
and penalties, (including legal costs and expenses and interest on the amount of any loss
from the date suffered or incurred) (a "Loss") arising out of or resulting from or caused
by (i) any failure by the Seller to perform its obligations under this Agreement; or (ii) any
inaccuracy in or breach of any representation or warranty made by or covenant or
agreement of Seller contained in this Agreement.
B.

Buyer shall indemnify, defend and hold harmless Seller, and each of its

members, managers, officers, directors, employees, agents, successors and assigns, from
any and all Losses arising out of or caused by (i) any failure by Buyer to perform its
obligations under this Agreement, or (ii) any inaccuracy in or breach of any
representation or warranty made by, or covenant or agreement of Buyer contained in this
Agreement.
C.

In addition to its other rights hereunder, either party may avail itself of all

remedies provided in law or in equity, including specific performance. The parties agree
that the obligations under this Agreement may not necessarily be compensated by
monetary damages. In addition to Buyer's other remedies, it may sue to rescind this
Agreement and retain any monies previously recovered by it, may claim title to the
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portions of the Water Rights not released and conveyed pursuant to this Agreement and
may utilize the Water Rights. All of these rights and remedies are cumulative.
13.

Notice. Any and all notices, demands or other communications required

or desired to be given hereunder by Buyer and Seller shall be in writing and shall be
validly delivered to the other Party if served either personally or if delivered by a
reputable courier firm such as Federal Express or UPS to the following addresses:
To Buyer:

PacifiCorp
201 South Main Street, Suite 2200
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

with a copy (which shall not constitute notice) to:
Jody L. Williams
Holme Roberts & Owen LLP
299 South Main Street, Suite 1800
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
To Seller:

WW Ranches LC.
206 Seemore Drive
Kaysville, UT 84037

Either Party may change its address for the purpose of receiving notices, demands and
other communications as herein provided by written notice given in the manner set forth
above.
14.

Further Assurances. Each of the parties hereto shall execute and deliver

any and all additional papers, documents and other assurances and shall do any and all
acts and things reasonably necessary in connection with the performance of their
obligations hereunder and to carry out the intent of the parties hereto.
15.

Knowledge.

The parties have read this Agreement and executed it

voluntarily after having been apprised of all relevant information and risks and having
had the opportunity to obtain legal counsel.
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16.

Drafting Party. This document has been and shall be deemed to be a

product of joint drafting by the parties and there shall be no presumption otherwise.
17.

Authority. Each party warrants that the signatory to this Agreement is

executing it with full authority on behalf of the party.
18.

1031 Exchange. Seller intends to apply the proceeds of the sale of the

Water Rights to purchase property that will qualify for an exchange of like property
under Section 1031 of the Internal Revenue Code. So long as Buyer does not incur
additional expense, Buyer will cooperate with Seller by executing the documents
normally required to fulfill the 1031 Exchange requirements.
EXECUTED on the date written above.

PACIFICORP

WW RANCHES, LC

Its:

#15I717v3

Its:

13

HRO-PC 000271

Tab 12

Westlaw.
Page 1

368 F.Supp.2d 1270
368 F.Supp.2d 1270
(Cite as: 368 F.Supp.2d 1270)

c
United States District Court, D. Utah, Northern Division.
MEDSPRING GROUP, INC., a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff,
v.
Vicky FENG, an individual; Gate International, a
California corporation; and Does I through V, Defendants.
No. 1:05 CV 00042 DAK.
April 25, 2005.
Background: Medical device company brought
state court action against former employee, alleging
employee's misuse of proprietary information after
starting her own company. Action was removed.
Company moved for preliminary injunction.
Holdings: The District Court, Kimball, J., held that:
(!) company failed to establish likelihood of success on claims under Utah Uniform Trade Secrets
Act;
(2) company failed to establish likelihood of success on claim for breach of non-disclosure agreement;
(3) company did not demonstrate irreparable harm;
(4) balance of harms favored former employee; and
(5) public interest weighed against injunction.
Motion denied.
West Headnotes
IIJ Antitrust and Trade Regulation 29T €^>410
29T Antitrust and Trade Regulation
29TIV Trade Secrets and Proprietary Information
29T1V(A) In General
29Tk410 k. In General. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 382k981 Trade Regulation, 379kl0(5))

Under Utah Uniform Trade Secrets Act, threshold
issue in determining whether trade secret has been
misappropriated is whether, in fact, there is trade
secret to be misappropriated. West's U.C.A. §
13-24-2(2)(b)(ii)(B).
12] Antitrust and Trade Regulation 29T €^>431
29T Antitrust and Trade Regulation
29T1V Trade Secrets and Proprietary Information
29TIV(B) Actions
29Tk429 Evidence
29Tk431 k. Presumptions and Burden
of Proof. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 382k 1001 Trade Regulation, 379k27)
Under Utah law, burden is on plaintiff to prove existence of trade secret, and there is no presumption
in his favor.
|3| Injunction 212 € ^ 1 3 8 . 3 3
212 Injunction

2121V Preliminary and Interlocutory Injunctions
2I2IV(A) Grounds and Proceedings to Procure
212IV(A)3 Subjects of Relief
212k 138.30 Property, Conveyances
and Encumbrances
212k 138.33 k. Trade Secrets; Customer Lists. Most Cited Cases
Antitrust and Trade Regulation 29T €^>420
29T Antitrust and Trade Regulation
29TIV Trade Secrets and Proprietary Information
29TIV(A) In General
29Tk420 k. Particular Cases, in General.
Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 382k990 Trade Regulation, 379kl0(5))
Medical device company that sued former employee, alleging employee's misuse of proprietary information after starting her own company, failed to
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368 F.Supp.2d 1270
368 F.Supp.2d 1270
(Cite as: 368 F.Supp.2d 1270)
establish likelihood of success on claim under Utah
Uniform Trade Secrets Act regarding methods of
obtaining Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval for new devices, for purpose of obtaining
preliminary injunction; approval methods were not
"trade secrets," since FDA provided general public
information on different regulatory classes and on
how to properly classify and describe devices.
West's U.C.A. § 13-24-2(2).
[4] Antitrust and Trade Regulation 29T €^>417
29T Antitrust and Trade Regulation
29TIV Trade Secrets and Proprietary Information
29TIV(A) In General
29Tk417 k. Necessity That Information
Be Secret. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 382k987 Trade Regulation, 379kl0(5))
In order to constitute "'trade secret" under Utah law,
information must be unknown; it should not be in
public domain nor within knowledge of trade.
[5| Injunction 212 €^>138.33
212 Injunction
212IV Preliminary and Interlocutory Injunctions
212IV(A) Grounds and Proceedings to Procure
212IV(A)3 Subjects of Relief
212k 138.30 Property,
Conveyances
and Encumbrances
212kl38.33 k. Trade Secrets; Customer Lists. Most Cited Cases
Antitrust and Trade Regulation 29T €==>420
29T Antitrust and Trade Regulation
29TIV Trade Secrets and Proprietary Information
29TIV(A) In General
29Tk420 k. Particular Cases, in General.
Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 382k990 Trade Regulation, 379kl0(5))
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Medical device company that sued former employee, alleging employee's misuse of proprietary information after starting her own company, failed to
establish likelihood of success on claim under Utah
Uniform Trade Secrets Act regarding methods of
marketing products, for purpose of obtaining preliminary injunction; marketing methods were not
"trade secrets," since such information was generally known within medical device industry, company did not make efforts to keep its marketing
strategy confidential, and former employee's
strategy differed substantially from that relied upon
by company. West's U.C.A. § 13-24-2(2).
|6| Antitrust and Trade Regulation 29T €^>421
29T Antitrust and Trade Regulation
29TIV Trade Secrets and Proprietary Information
29TiV(A) In General
29Tk421 k. Customer Lists and Information. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 382k991 Trade Regulation, 379kl0(5))
In order to constitute "trade secret" under Utah law,
identity of customers must not be readily ascertainable outside employer's business as prospective
users or consumers of employer's service or products.
[7] Injunction 212 €^>138.33
212 Injunction
2121V Preliminary and Interlocutory Injunctions
212IV(A) Grounds and Proceedings to Procure
212IV(A)3 Subjects of Relief
212k 138.30 Property, Conveyances
and Encumbrances
212k 138.33 k. Trade Secrets; Customer Lists. Most Cited Cases
Antitrust and Trade Regulation 29T €^>421
29T Antitrust and Trade Regulation
29T1V Trade Secrets and Proprietary Informa-
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29TIV(A) In General
29Tk421 k. Customer Lists and Information. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 382k991 Trade Regulation, 379k 10(5))
Medical device company that sued former employee, alleging employee's misuse of proprietary information after starting her own company, failed to
establish likelihood of success on claim under Utah
Uniform Trade Secrets Act regarding methods of
identifying customers, for purpose of obtaining preliminary injunction; customers' identities were not
ft
trade secrets," since they were readily ascertainable by others. West's U.C.A. § 13-24-2(2).
[8] Injunction 212 €^>138.33
212 Injunction
212IV Preliminary and Interlocutory Injunctions
212IV(A) Grounds and Proceedings to Procure
212IV(A)3 Subjects of Relief
212k 138.30 Property,
Conveyances
and Encumbrances
212kl38.33 k. Trade Secrets; Customer Lists. Most Cited Cases
Medical device company that sued former employee, alleging employee's misuse of proprietary information after starting her own company, failed to
establish likelihood of success on claim for breach
of non-disclosure agreement under Utah law, for
puipose of obtaining preliminary injunction; all allegedly misappropriated information was either developed by former employee independently, was
generally available to public, or was disclosed by
company to third party without restriction of confidentiality.
[9] Injunction 212 €^>138.6
212 Injunction
212IV Preliminary and Interlocutory Injunctions
212IV(A) Grounds and Proceedings to Procure
212IV(A)2 Grounds and Objections
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212k 13 8.6 k. Nature and Extent of Injury; Irreparable Injury. Most Cited Cases
"Irreparable harm," for purpose of preliminary injunctive relief, is suffered where injury cannot be
adequately atoned for in money.
[10] Injunction 212 €^>138.33
212 Injunction
212IV Preliminary and Interlocutory Injunctions
2121V(A) Grounds and Proceedings to Procure
212IV(A)3 Subjects of Relief
212kl38.30
Property, Conveyances
and Encumbrances
212kl38.33 k. Trade Secrets; Customer Lists. Most Cited Cases
Medical device company that sued former employee, alleging employee's misuse of proprietary information after starting her own company, failed to
establish that it would be irreparably harmed if preliminary injunction were not entered against employee's enterprise; any damages potentially incurred by company during time that three-year nondisclosure agreement was in effect would have been
identifiable and calculable.
(Ill Injunction 212 €^>138.33
212 Injunction
212IV Preliminary and Interlocutory Injunctions
2I2IV(A) Grounds and Proceedings to Procure
212IV(A)3 Subjects of Relief
212k 138.30 Property, Conveyances
and Encumbrances
212kl38.33 k. Trade Secrets; Customer Lists. Most Cited Cases
Medical device company that sued former employee, alleging employee's misuse of proprietary information after starting her own company, failed to
establish that its threatened injury would have outweighed resultant harm to employee from issuance
of preliminary injunction; any threatened injury to
company would have been for limited time, while
injunction would have prevented employee's enter-
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the law and facts relating to the motion. Now being
fully advised, the court renders the following
Memorandum Decision and Order.

[12] Injunction 212 €>^>138.33
212 Injunction
212IV Preliminary and Interlocutory Injunctions
212IV(A) Grounds and Proceedings to Procure
212IV(A)3 Subjects of Relief
212kl38.30
Property,
Conveyances
and Encumbrances
212kl38.33 k. Trade Secrets; Customer Lists. Most Cited Cases
Medical device company that sued former employee, alleging employee's misuse of proprietary information after starting her own company, failed to
establish that issuance of preliminary injunction
against employee's enterprise would not adversely
affect public interest; although public policy supported development of new technologies by authorizing protection of trade secrets, there was strong
interest in encouraging competition and supporting
individual's right to exploit her own skill and knowledge.
*1272 Peter W. Guyon, Esq., Salt Lake City, UT,
for Plaintiff
Robyn L. Phillips, Esq., Workman Nydegger, Salt
Lake City, UT, for Defendant.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
KIMBALL, District Judge.
This matter is before the court on Plaintiffs Motion
for Preliminary Injunction. A hearing on the motion
was held on April 19, 2005 at 10:30 a.m. At the
hearing, Plaintiff was represented by Peter W. Guyon and Defendants were represented by L. David
Griffin and Robyn L. Phillips. Before the hearing,
the court carefully considered the memoranda and
other materials submitted by the parties. Since taking the motion under advisement, the court has considered all additional materials submitted by the
parties since the hearing and has further considered

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Medspring Group, Inc. ("Medspring") is a
corporation located in Bountiful, Utah, which researches, develops and markets medical devices.
Medspring's products include a Hemostatic Biodegradable Gauze (the "S-99 Gauze") and Hemostatic
Satin Gauze (the "S-100 Gauze"), a medical device
made out of a gauze material which speeds up
bleeding coagulation and then dissolves at the
bleeding wound. In the spring of 2002, Plaintiff
hired Defendant Vicky Feng (uFeng") as a consultant. Medspring claims that in this capacity, Feng
was exposed to confidential information and trade
secrets relating to Medspring's medical devices, including the S-99 and S-100 Gauze. In order to protect its confidential information and trade secrets,
Medspring had Feng execute a Mutual NonDisclosure Agreement ("Agreement") by which
Feng agreed not to disclose Plaintiffs "Confidential
Information," including trade secrets. Plaintiff
claims that Feng executed the Agreement on May
31, 2002, in both her individual capacity and as the
C.E.O. for Defendant Gate International, a California corporation.
Feng terminated her employment with Medspring
on August 1, 2002. In early 2005, Medspring became aware that Feng had started her own company, Regional Medical Solutions, Inc., through
which she has been marketing a medical device
identical to that of the S-99 and S-100 Gauze under
the name of "BloodSTOP." Medspring believes
that Feng is illegally and wrongfully using trade
secrets belonging to MedSpring in order to market
her "BloodSTOP" products. Medspring has *1273
accordingly brought suit against the Defendants alleging a cause of action for injunctive relief based
on Defendants' breach of the Agreement as well as
causes of action for Violation of the Uniform Trade
Secrets Act, Tortious Interference with Business

© 2009 Thomson ReutersAVest. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.

368 F.Supp.2d 1270
368 F.Supp.2d 1270
(Cite as: 368 F.Supp.2d 1270)
Relationships and Civil Conspiracy.

Page 5

static Biodegradable Gauze (the "S-99 Gauze") and
a product known as the Hemostatic Satin Gauze
(the "S-100 Gauze").

PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On March 24, 2005, Medspring filed a Verified
Complaint for Injunctive and Other Relief (the
"Complaint") and a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and for Order to Show Cause (the
"Motion") in the Second District Court of Davis
County, State of Utah. On the same day, the Second
District Court held a hearing on the Motion and issued a Temporary Restraining Order ("TRO")
which was to remain in place until April 3, 2005.
The TRO essentially prohibits the Defendants from
"using, referring to, disclosing and appropriating"
or "encouraging, helping, aiding or abetting others
to use, refer to, disclose and appropriate" any number of listed items relating to MedSpring's products,
including the S-99 and S-100 Gauze. It also orders
Defendants to immediately deliver to MedSpring all
"Confidential Information" in Defendants possession or control.
On April 1, 2005, before the scheduled preliminary
injunction hearing had occurred, the Defendants removed this action to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction. Upon removal, this court issued
an Order construing Medspring's Motion as a Motion for Preliminary Injunction. This court additionally ordered that the state court issued TRO was to
stay in effect until the court could hear argument on
the Motion and enter an order either granting or
denying the Motion.

FINDINGS OF FACT
The court finds that the following facts have been
proven by a preponderance of the evidence:
Feng's Employment with MedSpring
1. MedSpring is a Utah corporation which researches, develops and markets a number of medical devices, including a product known as the Hemo-

2. On or around May 22, 2002, MedSpring hired
Defendant Vicky Feng ("Feng"), a native of China
who speaks fluent Mandarin Chinese, as a consultant. At the time Feng was hired, she had no experience in the medical industry.
3. At the time MedSpring hired Feng, it was a startup company in need of operating capital to further
its business activities, especially its business activities in China. Feng was hired to qualify and introduce investors to Plaintiff. In return for her services, Feng was to receive 10% of all investment
capital she brought into the company.
4. In her position as a consultant with MedSpring,
Feng had access to confidential information regarding MedSpring's products, including the S-99 and
S-100 Gauze. Accordingly, MedSpring requested
that she execute a Mutual Non-Disclosure Agreement.
5. On May 31, 2002, Feng executed a Mutual NonDisclosure Agreement ("Non-Disclosure Agreement"). Under this agreement, Feng agreed not to
disclose MedSpring's "Confidential Information,"
including trade secrets, for a period of three years
from the date of the Non-Disclosure Agreement.
6. During the Spring and Summer of 2002, Feng
raised approximately $50,000 in capital for MedSpring.
*1274 7. During her fund raising efforts, Feng researched hemostatic gauze on the internet and
learned that there were numerous manufacturers of
hemostatic gauze in China. Her research further
discovered that one of these manufacturers, Beijing
Textile Research Institute ("Bejing Textile"), owns
Chinese patents for the S-99 and S-100 Gauze and
has filed patent applications for the S-99 and S-100
Gauze in Europe and with the Patenl Cooperation
Treaty.
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8. In or around June of 2002, Feng traveled to
China and met with Beijing Textile to obtain information regarding their S-99 and S-100 hemostatic gauze products.
9. Feng disclosed the results of her research and the
information she obtained from Beijing Textile to
Richard Baggett and Ralph Thomson, officers of
MedSpring.
10. On July 20, 2002, Feng and Ralph Thompson
met with Beijing Textile regarding its manufacturing of hemostatic gauze.
11. During this meeting, Beijing Textile made it
clear to MedSpring that it was the patent holder in
China for hemostatic gauze, including the S-99 and
S-100 gauze.
12. On August 1, 2002, MedSpring's Board of Directors sent Feng a Confidential Memorandum regarding "Protocols-Negotiating with Beijing Textile Research Institute." This memorandum set
forth MedSpring's decision to pursue entering into a
deal with Beijing Textile regarding the hemostatic
gauze project and made clear that Feng was to have
no future contact with Beijing Textile. The Board
requested that Feng sign the memorandum indicating her understanding and complete acceptance of
the policies set forth therein.
13. Feng did not sign the memorandum. Instead, on
August 1, 2002, Feng sent an e-mail to the Board of
Directors informing them of her decision to resign
from MedSpring.
MedSpring's Marketing of the S-99 and S-100 Gauze
14. MedSpring currently markets the S-99 Gauze
and S-100 Gauze under the trade names of HemoStyp, ActCel and M+D Gauze.
15. MedSpring does not, as it alleges in its Complaint, have an "exclusive worldwide right to market" the S-99 and S-100 Gauze. The S-99 and S-
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100 Gauze are subject to several patents, none of
which are owned by MedSpring.
16.. There are numerous manufacturers of hemostatic gauze throughout China. One of these manufacturers, Beijing Textile, owns Chinese patents for
the S-99 and S-100 Gauze and has filed patent applications for the S-99 and S-100 Gauze in Europe
and with the Patent Cooperation Treaty.
17. MedSpring has never entered into an agreement
with Beijing Textiles to purchase these patents and
Beijing Textile has never given, licensed or assigned MedSpring the rights to any of its products,
including the S-99 and S-100 Gauze.
18. All medical devices must be registered with and
approved by the United States Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") before they can be sold in the
United States.
19. MedSpring has registered its S-99 and S-100
Gauze with the FDA and obtained FDA approval.
20. MedSpring's President and Chief Executive Officer, Richard W. Baggett, has extensive knowledge
regarding the methods and requirements imposed
upon small manufacturers of medical devices by the
FDA and has been hired in the past as a consultant
to assist companies with obtaining* 1275 FDA approval of their medical devices.
21. MedSpring relied upon Mr. Baggett's experience and understanding of FDA requirements in registering the S-99 and S-100 Gauze with the FDA.
22. Because of his experience registering medical
devices with the FDA, Mr. Baggett knew that FDA
regulatory Class I, the class for devices which pose
the lowest risk to the patient and/or user, is the
most desirable class to register a device under. Using his knowledge and experience of FDA procedures, Mr. Baggett was able to register the S-99 and
S-100 Gauze under Class I by defining the device
as a "sponge for internal use."
23.

MedSpring

markets
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"non-traditional" markets within the medical industry.
24. The majority of manufacturers and distributors
of medical devices sell to "traditional" medical customers, i.e., hospitals and out-patient surgical centers, because they are the most lucrative to sell to.
MedSpring, knowing the difficulty of breaking into
this market when not part of a large "buying
group," decided to market the S-99 and S-100
Gauze to non-traditional customers such as emergency service providers, municipalities, police and
fire departments, veterinarians and dentists.
25. The identity of MedSpring's customers is a
closely guarded secret.
26. Currently, MedSprmg's largest customer is ActSys Medical Systems ("ActSys").
27. Tri-Anim is a distributor for ActSys.

Feng's Marketing of "BloodSTOP "
28. After resigning from her position with MedSpring, Feng started her own company, Regional
Medical Solutions, Inc. dba LifeScience PLUS
("Regional").
29. Regional has negotiated an agreement with
Beijing Textile to import and sell Beijing Textile's
S-99 and S-100 hemostatic gauze products into the
United States.
30. Regional obtained FDA approval of its S-99
and S-100 hemostatic gauze products and is currently marketing these products under the name of
"BloodSTOP."
3 L In December of 2004, Feng hired an FDA regulation consultant by the name of Dr. Richard Fang
to assist Regional in complying with FDA regulations and getting FDA approval of the
"BloodSTOP" products. Dr. Fang had previously
worked with Johnson & Johnson as an expert on
FDA applications and issues.

32. After conducting some research on how to register the "BloodSTOP" products with the FDA,
Dr. Fang advised Feng to list the "BloodSTOP"
products under FDA regulatory Class I, under regulatory category 878.4450, i.e., "gauze sponge for
internal," instead of filing a 510k application as
Feng had planned. Dr. Fang was paid $640.00 for
his consulting work.
33. Information regarding how to properly classify
and describe gauze is also available on the FDA
website.
34. The process for obtaining FDA approval of a
medical device is a public process.
35. In an effort to market the "BloodSTOP"
products, Feng purchased a database of nearly
5,000 different medical supply purchasers. Regional has been marketing "BloodSTOP" to the companies and individuals identified in the database.
36. Feng has been in contact with MedSpring's
largest customer, ActSys, to discuss ActSys' possible purchase of "BloodSTOP" products.
*1276 37. ActSys is easily identified by a simple
internet search as a company which purchases hemostatic gauze.
38. A Regional salesperson has contacted TriAnim, a distributor of ActSys, in an effort to market the "BloodSTOP" product.
39. Tri-Anim is listed as a medical supply purchaser in the database of medical supply purchasers
which Feng purchased.
40. Tri-Anim is listed as a ActSys distributor on
ActSys' website.
CONCL USIONS OF LA W
The Tenth Circuit has held that in order to obtain
injunctive relief, a moving party must establish
that: (1) it has a substantial likelihood of prevailing
on the merits; (2) that it will suffer irreparable harm
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unless the preliminary injunction is issued; (3) that
the threatened injury outweighs the harm the preliminary injunction might cause the opposing party;
and (4) that the preliminary injunction if issued will
not adversely affect the public interest. Prairie
Band of Potawatomi Indians v. Pierce, 253 F.3d
1234, 1246 (10th Cir.2001).
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[Information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or
process, that:
(a) derives independent economic value, actual
or potential, from not being generally known
to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use; and

A. Likelihood of Prevailing on the Merits
MedSpring's request for injunctive relief is based
on its claim that Defendants have misappropriated
MedSpring's trade secrets in violation of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act and/or in breach of the
Non-Disclosure Agreement. In order to obtain the
injunctive relief requested, MedSpring must first
establish that it is likely to prevail on at least one of
these claims.

1. Violation of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act.
[1][2] The Utah Uniform Trade Secrets Act ("Trade
Secrets Act") defines trade secret misappropriation
as:
(b) disclosure or use of a trade secret of another
without express or implied consent by a person
who....
(i) used improper means to acquire knowledge
of the trade secret; or....
(B) acquired [the trade secret] under circumstances giving rise to a duty to maintain its
secrecy or limit its use ....
Utah Code Ann. § 13-24-2(2)(b)(ii)(B) (2001). The
threshold issue in determining whether a trade
secret has been misappropriated is "whether, in
fact, there is a trade secret to be misappropriated."
Novell, Inc. v. Timpanogos Research Group, Inc.,
46 U.S.P.Q.2d 1197, 1212 (Utah Dist.Ct.1998)
(quoting Microbiological Research Corp. v. Mima,
625 P.2d 690, 696 (Utah 1981)). The Trade Secrets
Act defines a trade secret as:

(b) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable
under the circumstances to maintain its
secrecy.
Utah Code Ann. § 13-24-2(4). The burden is on the
plaintiff to prove the existence of a trade secret, and
there is no presumption in his favor. Novell, 46
U.S.P.Q.2dat 1212.
MedSpring does not dispute that Feng has the right
to sell hemostatic gauze products. MedSpring
claims, however, that in selling the BloodSTOP
product, Feng has illegally misappropriated three of
MedSpring's trade secrets: (a) MedSpring's* 1277
method of completing the requirements imposed by
the FDA for registering a medical device; (b) MedSpring's method of marketing the S-99 and S-100
gauze; and, (c) the identity of MedSpring's customers.
a. Method of Obtaining FDA Approval
Richard Baggett, MedSpring's President and CEO,
has extensive knowledge of the requirements imposed upon small manufacturers of medical devices
by the FDA, knowledge which he has accumulated
over the last twenty years. Mr. Baggett used his
knowledge of the FDA registration to register the
S-99 and S-100 Gauze with the FDA and obtain
FDA approval. He defined the S-99 and S-100
Gauze as a "sponge for external use" so that it
would fit within the FDA regulatory Class I, the
most desirable class to register a device under.
MedSpring alleges that this method of classifying
and defining the S-99 and S-100 Gauze with the
FDA constitutes a trade secret because it is unique,
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not generally known in the industry, and is protected by MedSpring as a secret.
[3] The court finds that the process for obtaining
FDA approval of a medical device is a public process. The FDA website contains general information on the different regulatory classes and on how
to properly classify and describe medical devices.
In addition, once a product is registered, its device
name, classification, device description and regulation number all become available to the public. For
example, a search on the FDA website for "gauze"
results in a list of gauze devices which have been
registered under Class I and gives the device names
and descriptions under which they were registered.
[4] In order to constitute a trade secret, the information "must be unknown; it should not be in the public domain nor within the knowledge of the trade
...." Microbiological Research Corp. v. Muna, 625
P.2d 690, 696 (Utah 1981). The process for registering a medical device with the FDA is clearly in
the public domain. At the very least, MedSpring's
method for seeking FDA approval is within the
general knowledge of the trade as evidenced by the
fact that other manufacturers have registered their
gauze devices with the FDA by using the same
methodology as the one used by MedSpring. MedSpring has therefore failed to meet its burden of
proving that its method of obtaining FDA approval
constitutes a trade secret.
Even if MedSpring could successfully argue that its
method of obtaining FDA approval constitutes a
trade secret, it is not likely to succeed in arguing
that its method was misappropriated by Feng. Feng
has registered the "BloodSTOP" product with the
FDA under the same class and definition as that
used by MedSpring. MedSpring alleges that there is
no way that Feng could have amassed the knowledge and expertise to register her product in this
same way without misappropriating the information
from MedSpring. The evidence shows, however,
that Feng hired an FDA regulation consultant in
December of 2004 by the name of Dr. Richard Fang
for the purpose of assisting Regional in getting
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FDA approval of the "BloodSTOP" products. After
conducting research on how to register the
"BloodSTOP" products with the FDA, Dr. Fang advised Feng to list the "BloodSTOP" products under
FDA regulatory Class I, under regulatory category
878.4450, i.e., "gauze sponge for internal," instead
of filing a 510k application as Feng had planned. In
light of this evidence, it is not substantially likely
that MedSpring will prevail on its claim that Feng
misappropriated information obtained by MedSpring in registering her "BloodSTOP" device.

*1278 b. Method of Marketing the S-99 and S-100
Gauze.
MedSpring
markets
its
products
to
"non-traditional" customers within the medical industry. The majority of manufacturers and distributors of medical devices sell to "traditional" medical
customers, i.e., hospitals and out-patient surgical
centers, because they are the most lucrative customers to sell to. MedSpring, however, knowing the
difficulty of breaking into this market when not part
of a large "buying group," decided to market the S99 and S-100 Gauze to non-traditional customers
such as emergency service providers, municipalities, police and fire departments, veterinarians and
dentists. MedSpring claims that its targeting of nontraditional customers is a unique marketing plan
which is not generally known, and so constitutes a
trade secret.
[5] Although MedSpring's marketing plan may not
be generally known, it does not constitute a trade
secret if it is "within the knowledge of the trade
...." Muna, 625 P.2d at 696. MedSpring claims that
the difficulty of marketing new medical devices to
traditional customers is known only to those with
knowledge of how purchases of medical devices are
made, and would not be known to someone like
Feng who has no experience in the medical industry. Regardless of whether MedSpring's marketing method would be unknown to someone with no
experience in the medical industry, by MedSpring's
own admission, it is generally known within the
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medical device industry.

identify of MedSpring's customers.

In addition, MedSpring's claim that it made efforts
to keep its marketing strategy confidential is disputed by MedSpring's own testimony. MedSpring
testified at the preliminary injunction hearing that
Mr. Baggett recently told Feng and Feng's boyfriend, who were trying to start a business selling
hospital beds, of the difficulty of trying to sell to
hospitals when not part of a large buying group.
MedSpring relied on this testimony to support its
claims that Feng had knowledge of MedSpring's
marketing strategy. The fact that Mr. Baggett disclosed MedSpring's marketing strategy to Feng's
boyfriend, someone who was not subject to a nondisclosure agreement, evidences that reasonable efforts were not made to maintain the secrecy of
MedSpring's marketing strategy. The court therefore finds that MedSpring's marketing strategy does
not constitute a trade secret.

[6] [7] In order to constitute a trade secret, the identity of customers must not be "readily ascertainable
outside the employer's business as prospective users
or *1279 consumers of the employer's service or
products ...." Munay 625 P.2d at 700 (quoting Leo
Silfen, Inc. v. Cream, 29 N.Y.2d 387, 328 N.Y.S.2d
423, 278 N.E.2d 636, 639-641 (1972)). A simple
internet search for the term "hemostatic gauze"
identifies ActSys as a company which distributes
hemostatic gauze under the product name ActCel.
ActSys is therefore readily ascertainable as a prospective consumer of hemostatic gauze. ActSys'
home page on the internet includes a list of its current distributors, including Tri-Anim. In addition,
Tri-Anim is listed as a medical supply purchaser in
the database purchased by Feng. The identity of
Tri-Anim is therefore readily ascertainable as well.
Because MedSpring's customers are readily ascertainable by others, their identity does not constitute
a trade secret.

Even if MedSpring's marketing strategy were a
trade secret, MedSpring has failed to demonstrate
that Defendants have misappropriated this marketing strategy. Regional has purchased a database of
nearly 5,000 different medical supply purchasers
and has been marketing "BloodSTOP" to the companies and individuals identified in the database.
This marketing strategy differs substantially from
the marketing strategy relied upon by MedSpring.
MedSpring's claim that its marketing strategy has
been misappropriated by Defendants is simply unsupported.

MedSpring has failed to meet the burden of proving
the existence of its three alleged trade secrets. MedSpring has also failed to establish that Feng has
used any of these alleged trade secrets in marketing
the BloodSTOP product. MedSpring therefore has
not established that it has a substantial likelihood of
prevailing on its claim that Defendants have violated the Trade Secrets Act.

2. Breach of the Non-Disclosure Agreement.
c. The Identity of MedSpring's Customers.
MedSpring additionally argues that the identity of
its customers constitutes a trade secret. Feng has attempted to market the BloodSTOP product to ActSys, MedSpring's largest customer. Feng has also
contacted one of ActSys' distributors, Tri-Anim.
MedSpring alleges that the only possible way that
Feng could have learned that ActSys was MedSpring's customer, and identify Tri-Anim as a distributor of ActSys, was by misappropriating the

MedSpring's Motion is also based on its claim that
Defendants have misappropriated or disclosed
MedSpring's confidential information in breach of
the Non-Disclosure Agreement. Pursuant to this
agreement, Defendants are not to disclose or use
MedSpring's "Confidential Information" for a term
of three years from the date of the agreement, or
until May 31, 2005. The agreement's definition of
"Confidential Information" is broader than the
Trade Secret Act's definition of "Trade Secret."
Trie fact that MedSpring is not likely to prevail on
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its claim that Defendants violated the Trade Secrets
Act, therefore, does not preclude a finding that Defendants misappropriated confidential information
in breach of the Non-Disclosure Agreement.
f8] As explained in Paragraph 1.2 of the NonDisclosure Agreement, "Confidential Information"
does not include information that:
(b) is developed by [Defendants] independently
of any of the Confidential Information received
in confidence from [MedSpring], as evidenced by
[Defendants'] written records;....
(d) is or becomes generally available to the public other than as a result of a disclosure by
[MedSpring]; or
(e) is disclosed by [Defendants] to a third party
without confidentiality restriction ....
MedSpring alleges that Defendants have breached
the Non-Disclosure Agreement by misappropriating
MedSpring's method of applying for FDA approval,
its method of marketing medical devices, and the
identity of MedSpring's customers. As explained
previously, however, all of the information allegedly misappropriated by Defendants was either
developed by the Defendants independently, was
generally available to the public, or was disclosed
by MedSpring to a third party without restriction of
confidentiality. Pursuant to Paragraph 1.2 of the
Non-Disclosure Agreement, therefore, none of the
information allegedly misappropriated constitutes
"Confidential Information."
MedSpring has not demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success on its claim that Defendants
breached the Non-Disclosure Agreement. The court
therefore finds that MedSpring has failed to establish the first element necessary to obtain injunctive
relief.
B. Irreparable Harm
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be irreparably harmed if a *1280 preliminary injunction is not entered. Irreparable harm is suffered
where an injury cannot be adequately atoned for in
money. Pierce, 253 F.3d at 1250. MedSpring
claims that the damages it will suffer over time as a
result of the Defendants misappropriation of its
trade secrets, such as the loss of its customers and
the loss of its stake in the hemostatic gauze market,
are intangible and cannot be atoned for in money.
Pursuant to the terms of the Non-Disclosure Agreement, Defendants are bound not to disclose MedSpring's "Confidential Information,'' including
trade secrets, only for a period of three years from
the date of the agreement. The three year term expires on May 31, 2005. From this point forward, the
Defendants can freely disclose MedSpring's
"Confidential Information". MedSpring's damages
are therefore limited to the time from which Defendants allegedly first misappropriated MedSpring's confidential information until May 31,
2005. Any damages incurred by MedSpring during
this discrete period of time will be identifiable and
so can be calculated and atoned for in money. MedSpring, therefore, has not established that it will be
irreparably harmed if a preliminary injunction is
not issued.

G Balance of Hardships
[11] The court also finds that the harm which will
result to Defendants from the issuance of a preliminary injunction outweighs any threatened injury to
MedSpring. Defendants are contractually obliged
not to use or disclose MedSpring's Confidential Information only until May 31, 2005. Any threatened
injury to MedSpring, therefore, is for a very limited
period of time. The issuance of a preliminary injunction, however, would prevent Defendants from
marketing or selling its "BloodSTOP" device for
the duration of the litigation thereby causing it to
lose the benefits of efforts it has already spent publicizing the product. Defendants would lose clients,
lose market power and lose credibility within the
trade. The issuance of a preliminary injunction at

[9][10] MedSpring also fails to establish that it will
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this time would also be particularly harmful to Defendants in light of the upcoming trade show which
it would be prevented from participating in
D. Public Interest
[12] Medsprmg additionally fails to establish that
the issuance of a preliminary injunction would not
adversely affect public interest As demonstrated by
Utah's adoption of the Trade Secrets Act, public
policy does support the development of new technologies by authonzmg mjunctive protection of
trade secrets Novell 46 U S P Q 2d at 1215 This
goal, however, must be balanced against the public's interest m encouraging competition and supporting an individual's right to exploit his own skill
and knowledge Utah Medical Products Inc v
Clinical Innovations Assoc Inc 79 F Supp 2d
1290, 1312 (DUtah 1999) Preventing Defendants
from using information which is within the public
domam, readily ascertainable, or generally known
withm the medical device manufacturing trade to
compete against MedSprmg would be adverse to
this interest In light of the evidence presented by
the parties, the Court finds that the issuance of a
preliminary injunction in this case would adversely
affect the public interest in encouraging competition
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tion for Preliminary Injunction is therefore deniedFN1
FN1 Although the court has ruled in favor
of the Defendants by denying the
Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary injunction, it notes that Mr Griffin's use of sarcasm and personal attacks against the
Plaintiff and the Plaintiffs counsel at the
preliminary injunction hearing was improper and unhelpful

CONCLUSION
For the foregomg reasons, and good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that
(1) MedSpnng's Motion for Preliminary Injunction
(originally filed as a motion for temporary restraining order in the state court action) is DENIED, and,
(2) The Temporary Restraining Order issued by
Judge Thomas L Kay of the Second District Court
of Davis County, State of Utah on March 24, 2005,
is hereby DISSOLVED
D Utah,2005
MedSprmg Group, Inc v Feng
368 F Supp 2d 1270
END OF DOCUMENT

E. Summary
MedSprmg has failed to establish that it has a substantial likelihood of prevailing on the merits of
either its claim that Defendants violated the Trade
Secrets Act or that Defendants breached the NonDisclosure Agreement by misappropriating MedSpnng's "Confidential Information" *1281 The
court additionally finds that MedSprmg will not
suffer irreparable harm unless the preliminary injunction is issued, that the harm which will result to
Defendants from the issuance of a preliminary injunction outweighs any threatened injury to MedSprmg, and the issuance of a preliminary injunction
would adversely affect the public interest The Mo-
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Stewart, J., concurred in result.

Supreme Court of Utah.
MICROBIOLOGICAL RESEARCH CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation, Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
Nadeem M. MUNA, Defendant and Appellant.
No. 16643.
Jan. 22,1981.
Employer brought action against former employee
to enjoin defendant from competing with employer.
The Second District Court, Davis County, J. Duffy
Palmer, J., granted employer injunctive relief, and
defendant appealed. The Supreme Court, Maughan,
C. J., held that: (1) once employer's board of directors had knowledge of 1968 employment contract
entered into with employee, no subsequent change
of personnel required a new notice of the terms of
the agreement, and employee, who had been removed as managing officer, did not violate his fiduciary duty to employer by failing to reveal terms of
the 1968 agreement during the negotiation of a
1978 employment agreement; therefore, the 1978
employment agreement entered into between employer and employee was not a nullity, and employee was not bound by the noncompetition clause in
the 1968 employment contract; (2) evidence was insufficient to sustain trial court's finding that employer had trade secrets in the manufacture of certain diagnostic kits which defendant had developed
while an employee, since evidence established that
the processes of employer constituted skill and
knowledge of the trade and not confidential information; and (3) employer failed to sustain its burden
of proof that the names and location of its customers were a trade secret, since there was no evidence
that, by the nature of employer's business, extraordinary effort was involved in compiling a customer list.
Reversed and remanded.

West Headnotes
[1] Labor and Employment 231H €^>35
231H Labor and Employment
231 HI In General
231Hk31 Contracts
231Hk35 k. Construction and Operation
in General. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 255k3(2) Master and Servant)
Employment contract drafted by employer's counsel
would be strictly construed against employer.
[2] Corporations 101 €^>428(1)
101 Corporations
101XI Corporate Powers and Liabilities
101XI(B) Representation of Corporation by
Officers and Agents
101R428 Notice to Officer or Agent as
Affecting Corporation
101k428(l) k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
A corporation, being once charged with notice of
the character of a transaction, continues to be affected by such notice whatever changes may occur
in personnel of its working force.
13] Corporations 101 €^>292
101 Corporations
101X Officers and Agents
101X(A) Election or Appointment, Qualification, and Tenure
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its inception while fiduciary relationship is in existence, employee cannot, by resigning and not disclosing all he knows about the negotiations, subsequently continue and consummate the transaction
in a manner in violation of his fiduciary duties.
[4] Corporations 101 €^>315
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by failing to reveal terms of the 1968 agreement
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agreement; therefore, the 1978 employment agreement entered into between employer and employee
was not a nullity, and employee was not bound by
the noncompetition clause in the 1968 employment
contract.
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29T Antitrust and Trade Regulation
29T1V Trade Secrets and Proprietary Information
29TIV(A) In General
29Tk412 k. Purpose and Scope of Trade
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A trade secret, whether it be a secret formula, process, pattern, device, compilation of information or
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property, with power in the owner thereof to make
use of it to the exclusion of the world or to deal
with it as he pleases.
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29TIV(A) In General
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against its appropriation or use without the consent
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Employer, to obtain relief on a claim of misappropriation of trade secret, must establish that his
former employee's product is a copy of his own
product, that its method of production was secret
and that former employee has used or intends to use
confidential information acquired during his employment; the employee is protected by the rule that
owner may not arbitrarily pronounce anything a
trade secret.
[10] Labor and Employment 231H €=>121
231H Labor and Employment
231H1II Rights and Duties of Employers and
Employees in General
231Hkl20 Post-Employment Duties
23 lHkl21 k. In General. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 255k60 Master and Servant)
Upon termination of his employment, employee has
prerogative to use his general knowledge, experience, memory and skill, however gained, provided
he does not use, disclose, or impinge upon any
secret processes or business secrets of his former
employer.
[Ill Antitrust and Trade Regulation 29T €^> 414
29T Antitrust and Trade Regulation
29T1V Trade Secrets and Proprietary Information
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29Tk414 k. Elements of Misappropriation. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 382k984, 382k428 Trade Regulation)
In action based upon secret process and unfair competition, plaintiff must establish the following: his
possession of knowledge or information not generally known; and either his communication of the
secret to defendant under express or implied agreement limiting its use or further disclosure and the

Page 3

defendant's use thereof in violation of the confidence to the injury of the plaintiff, or defendant's acquisition of secret by some wrongful manner and
the use thereof to the plaintiffs damage.
[12] Antitrust and Trade Regulation 29T € ^ > 420
29T Antitrust and Trade Regulation
29TIV Trade Secrets and Proprietary Information
29TIV(A) In General
29Tk420 k. Particular Cases, in General.
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(Formerly 382k990, 382k594 Trade Regulation)
In action brought by employer against former employee, evidence was insufficient to sustain trial
court's finding that employer had trade secrets in
the manufacture of certain diagnostic kits which defendant had developed while an employee, since
evidence established that the processes of employer
constituted skill and knowledge of the trade and not
confidential information.
[13| Antitrust and Trade Regulation 29T © ^ 421
29T Antitrust and Trade Regulation
29T1V Trade Secrets and Proprietary Information
29TIV(A) In General
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(Formerly 382k991, 382k594 Trade Regulation)
In action brought by employer against former employee, employer failed to sustain its burden of
proof that the names and location of its customers
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*691 Steven D. Luster, Curtis J. Drake, Salt Lake
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MAUGHAN, Chief Justice:
Plaintiff, Microbiological Research Corporation,
hereinafter identified as M.R.C., initiated this action to obtain injunctive relief and damages against
its former employee, Muna. Upon trial before the
Court, an order was entered enjoining defendant
from competing with M.R.C. in any of its product
lines or services for a period of two years from the
date of entry of the judgment and restraining defendant from soliciting M.R.C.'s customers for the
sale of products presently manufactured by M.R.C.,
whose identity and location Muna learned of during
the course of his employment. The judgment is reversed and remanded for disposition in accordance
with this opinion.
M.R.C. is a Delaware corporation with its principal
offices and place of business situated in Bountiful,
Utah. At the time of trial M.R.C. was engaged in
the production of four medical diagnostic kits,
which it sells to hospitals and clinical laboratories
to detect human diseases. By utilizing the immunofluorescence technique of tracing diseases, a laboratory can detect lupus erythematosis (A.N.A. kit),
Toxoplasmosis (Toxo kit), Herpes I and Herpes II
(Herpes kits) and infectious mononucleosis (I.M.
kit). M.R.C. also engages in some testing for these
diseases.
*692 The defendant, Dr. Muna, was awarded his
Ph.D. in Immunology and Microbiology in 1968.
From 1956 to 1968, he has worked with the immunofluorescence technique of tracing diseases. In
1966, he, in cooperation with two other scientists,
published an article in the American Journal of
Clinical Pathology describing a procedure to test
patients for lupus erythematosis by using immunofluorescence to perform an antinuclear antibody test
(A.N.A.). In 1956 and 1957, defendant developed
an immunofluorescence test for Herpes virus, while
he was at U.C.L.A. While studying for his doctorate at the University of Utah, defendant was taught
a technique for growing large batches of tissue culture cells by placing them in Pyrex baking dishes
and covering the container with Saran wrap.
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In 1968, defendant met a stock broker, Edward J.
Mawod, who is currently President of M.R.C. Dr.
Muna described a research project in which he was
engaged, which had the objective of developing a
new method to detect cancer. Mr. Mawod, in association with several others, raised the capital to organize a corporation to develop and market the cancer kit. Microbiological Sciences, Inc., the predecessor to M.R.C, was incorporated and a laboratory
was built. By a contract, dated September 4, 1968,
Dr. Muna was employed as President and general
manager of the corporation. By May 1969, the
funds of the corporation were depleted, and the
company had been unable to procure the tumors required to develop the cancer detection kit. Dr.
Muna suggested the company utilize its existing
laboratory facilities to produce an A.N.A. kit. Defendant testified he commenced working on the
project in July and had the A.N.A. kit on the market
by September 1969. In 1972, M.R.C. began marketing the Toxo kit, and in 1976, the Herpes kit was
added to the company's line of products. At the
time of trial, there were several competitors to
M.R.C. in the manufacture of A.N.A., Herpes, and
Toxo kits.
Defendant served as President of M.R.C. until February 1978, when as a culmination of a proxy fight,
Mr. Mawod became President. On February 28,
1978, by written agreement, Dr. Muna was employed by M.R.C. as a consultant, research microbiologist and Director of the Laboratory. On July 30,
1978, Mr. Mawod terminated defendant's employment. Thereafter, Dr. Muna initiated plans to manufacture a line of products similar to M.R.C.'s. In
September 1978, the corporation commenced this
action, and since that time, defendant has been restrained from competing with M.R.C, first by a
temporary restraining order, then by a preliminary
injunction, and finally by a permanent injunction.
The trial court found that defendant, while President of M.R.C, learned of its confidential, proprietary, and secret methods of operation, such as, clientele list, combinations of chemicals, and methods of
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production; that this information was of substantial
and significant value to the plaintiff in the successful conduct of its business. In the manufacture of
the A.N.A. kits, Toxo kits, Herpes 1 and 2 kits, and
the I.M. kits, plaintiff had trade secrets, which conferred upon it an advantage in the market place.
These trade secrets were developed by defendant
for plaintiffs benefit while defendant was employed to develop these human diagnostic kits.
Plaintiffs processes for the test kits, taken as a
whole, were not known to the industry and were
guarded by security precautions. The trade secrets
were specifically described as the plaintiffs use of
certain chemicals and nutrients in the propagation
of its cell lines and its techniques and chemical formulations in the manufacturing process of the kits.
Die trial court further found that in February, 1978,
defendant lost his bid for re-election as President of
M.R.C., and thereafter entered into an employment
agreement, dated February 28, 1978. Defendant had
previously been employed under a contract, dated
September 4, 1968, which he had entered into with
plaintiffs predecessor corporation. On February 28,
1978, according to the findings, plaintiff, through
its officers and directors, had no knowledge of the
existence of the 1968 employment contract; defendant knew of the 1968 contract and the lack of
plaintiffs knowledge thereof.*693 Defendant was
found to have failed to reveal and to have deliberately concealed the existence of this agreement,
while he was negotiating the 1978 employment
contract. The 1968 contract contained conditions
limiting defendant's right to compete with plaintiff,
which the court found in full force and effect and
valid and binding on defendant.
Finally, the trial court found that unless restrained,
it was likely defendant would solicit plaintiffs customers which became known to him during his employment and would appropriate for his own use or
for others the secret and proprietary information of
M.R.C. The use of such information would cause
plaintiff irreparable damage, the amount of which
could not be exactly established and for which no
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adequate remedy at law existed.
The trial court concluded as a matter of law that
M.R.C.'s formulations of chemicals and nutrients
used in the propagation of cells and used in the
manufacture of its diagnostic test kits were proprietary information and trade secrets; it would be unjust to allow defendant to use this information for
his own benefit or that of others. The defendant
should be restrained for a period of two years from
competing with plaintiff in its present product liens,
to wit, the A.N.A., Toxo, I.M., and Herpes 1 and 2
kits and all of the components therein.
The trial court further concluded that defendant had
a fiduciary duty during the negotiation of his 1978
employment contract to reveal to the new officers
of the plaintiff the existence and the terms and conditions of his 1968 employment contract and that
his concealment thereof nullified the 1978 employment contract.
On appeal defendant challenges the rulings of the
trial court in regard to the 1968 and 1978 employment contracts and that trade secrets were involved
in the manufacture of the diagnostic test kits.[FNl]
Plaintiff responds that the permanent injunction issued by the trial court can be sustained on two alternative grounds: first, there existed an express
contract between the parties prohibiting the conduct
enjoined; second, there was an implied obligation
on the part of an employee not to reveal trade
secrets or other confidential information.
FN1. During the course of the trial, defendant agreed by stipulation not to manufacture for sale any I.M. kits, although he
did not concede any secret processes were
involved therein.
I. The Contract
The 1978 agreement was entitled ''Employment
Agreement." Its first provision stated:
"1. All previous employment agreements and
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understandings in connection therewith
hereby mutually terminated and settled."
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are

In this 1978 agreement, Dr. Muna was employed as
a consultant and research microbiologist and as Director of the Laboratory. The contract further
provided:
"6. During the term of the agreement Muna
shall not act as consultant for, or accept employment from any competitor of Micro nor shall he
compete directly or indirectly with Micro.
"7. Micro shall be the owner of all the research
data, ideas and materials discovered or developed
at Micro by Muna during the term hereof."
Thus, the noncompetition clause was limited to the
period of defendant's employment, which terminated in July 1978, about five months after its inception.
The 1968 agreement was entitled a "Management
Contract," wherein Dr. Muna was employed as
President and General Manager for a period of five
years and thereafter from year to year, unless terminated by either party by written notice at least
sixty days prior to any anniversary date (September
4) of the agreement. Defendant agreed therein that
any and all developments, processes, inventions
and/or procedures developed, invented, or processed by him during the term of the agreement
would belong to and be the sole and absolute property of the Company.

that he will not disclose to any other person any
information which is the property of the Company or its affiliated companies."
Although the trial court declared the 1978 contract
a nullity and the 1968 contract valid and binding on
defendant, the actual effect on this action was to
nullify provision 1 of the 1978 agreement and to revive Paragraph 6 of the 1968 Management Contract. The other provisions of the 1968 agreement
were not invoked, e. g., the requirement that defendant could only be removed as President and
General Manager by sixty days written notice prior
to September 4, the anniversary date of the contract. The basis of the trial court's ruling was that
defendant had a fiduciary duty to reveal the existence of the 1968 contract and specifically paragraph 6 therein to the present officers of the corporation, who had no knowledge of this matter. This
ailing cannot be sustained.
Plaintiffs current President, Mawod, testified that
at the time the 1978 agreement was signed, he did
not know of any other agreement, and defendant
did not so inform him. Mr. Mawod further testified
that at the time he assumed his position he combed
through the files of the company, and he could not
locate a written agreement with defendant. Mr. Mawod stated that he did review the minutes of the
Board of Directors for 1970 and 1975, wherein
there were references to the need of the company to
have a written contract with Dr. Muna. After this
action was filed Mr. Mawod contacted plaintiffs
former legal counsel, who produced a copy of the
1968 contract from his files.

The 1968 agreement further provided:
"6. Muna agrees that during the terms of this
Agreement he will not engage*694 in any other
commercial activity in any way competitive with
the business of the Company, or its affiliated
companies, and that, for a period of five (5) years
after leaving the employ of the Company, he will
not engage in any way, directly or indirectly, in
any business competitive with the Company or its
affiliated companies any (sic) any state in which
any of them do business. Muna further agrees

There was no evidence that Mr. Mawod ever asked
Dr. Muna about the existence of any prior written
agreements. The concealment found by the trial
court can only be inferred by Dr. Muna's failure to
speak and the fact there was no copy of the agreement in the files. At the trial the only inquiry of Dr.
Muna concerning the 1968 contract involved the
identification of his signature, neither counsel pursued any line of questioning concerning this agreement. [FN2] There was evidence that during the
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time Dr. Muna was President, the company always
employed a business manager and that for a period
an executive committee of which Mr. Mawod was a
member participated in the management of the
company, which negates any exclusive control by
Dr. Muna of the company's business records.
FN2. There is an affidavit in the record in
connection with a pretrial motion in which
Dr. Muna has sworn that he did not recall
ever having received a copy of the 1968
agreement, until the hearing on the preliminary injunction. He further swore at the
time he executed the 1978 agreement, he
did not remember and was therefore, not
aware of the specific terms of the 1968
contract.
[1] Plaintiffs counsel drafted the 1978 agreement;
such a document should be strictly construed
against M.R.C.[FN3] There was introduced at trial
a copy of an employment agreement, which was
drafted in 1974 or 1975 and contained a confidentiality and noncompetition clauses. Initially, only
new employees were required to sign such a contract, but subsequently all employees were required
to do so. Dr. Muna was never requested to sign
such a document, although during the time period
of approximately 1974 to 1976 he was not the final
authority in the company. Since 1978 all employees
were required by plaintiff, as a condition of employment, to execute agreements with noncompetition clauses, the omission of such a clause in Dr.
Muna's 1978 contract is consistent with an intentional choice on the part of plaintiff rather than the
result of some deliberate concealment on the part of
Dr. Muna.
FN3. Guinand v. Walton, 22 Utah 2d 196,
198-199, 450 P.2d 467 (1969); Skousen v.
Smith, 27 Utah 2d 169, 171, 493 P.2d 1003
(1972).
*695 The finding of the trial court that the officers
and directors of plaintiff had no knowledge of the
1968 contract cannot be sustained under the evid-
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ence. Plaintiff introduced into evidence Exhibit 28,
which Mr. Mawod identified as a document from
the business files of the company. This exhibit was
the minutes of the first board of directors' meeting
on September 4, 1968. The minutes indicate the
management contract of Dr. Muna was introduced
and discussed. The board then unanimously adopted the following resolution:
"Resolved, that the officers of this corporation
shall be and they are hereby authorized and directed to execute and deliver to Dr Nadeem M.
Muna, the president and general manager of the
corporation, the management contract presented
to this meeting, an executed copy of which shall
be inserted in the minute book of the corporation
immediately following the minutes of this meeting."
[2] A corporation, being once charged with notice
of the character of a transaction, continues to be affected by such notice whatever changes may occur
in the personnel of its working force."... A fortiori,
notice to the board of directors of a fact, at the time
of a transaction in regard thereto, is notice to the
corporation, and no subsequent change of directors
can require a new notice of such fact ..."[FN4]
FN4.3 Fletcher Cyclopedia Corporations
(1975 Rev.Vol.) Sec. 801, pp. 38-39.
Plaintiff is confronted with a dilemma, unless the
board of directors, with full knowledge of all its
terms, authorized the 1968 contract employing the
company's president, there would be no valid and
binding agreement; [FN5] on the other hand, once
the board of directors had knowledge of the contract at the time of the transaction, no subsequent
change of personnel requires a new notice of the
terms of the agreement.
FN5.19 Am.Jur.2d, Corporations, Sec.
1081. pp. 528-529; Sec. 1155, pp. 583-584.
[3] The trial court ruled that defendant had violated
his fiduciary duty to plaintiff by his failure to reveal
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the terms of the 1968 agreement during the negotiations of the 1978 agreement. These negotiations
occurred after defendant's removal as a managing
officer. When a corporate officer ceases to act as
such, because of his resignation or removal, the fiduciary relationship ceases. However, where a
transaction has its inception while the fiduciary relationship is in existence, an employee cannot by
resigning and not disclosing all he knows about the
negotiations, subsequently continue and consummate the transaction in a manner in violation of his
fiduciary duties. [FN6] This exception is well illustrated in Glen Allen Mining v. Park Galena Mining
Company,[FN7] wherein the defendants while officers of the company developed and put into motion the plans that ultimately resulted in certain
contracts disadvantageous to the corporation. This
court ruled that under such conditions, an officer
cannot avoid responsibility for violating his fiduciary duties by delaying the final execution of a
contract until the expiration of his relation.
FN6.3 Fletcher Cyclopedia Corporations
(1975 Rev.Vol.) Sec. 860, pp. 203-204;
Bentz v. Vardaman Manufacturing Co..
Miss.,210So.2d35,41 (1968).
FN7. 77 Utah 362, 382-383, 296 P. 231
(1931).
[4] The aforementioned exception is not applicable
in the instant case, for the 1978 employment contract was not the result of plans and negotiations
conducted by defendant while he was a managing
officer of plaintiff. Furthermore, the plaintiff, as explained ante, had knowledge of the 1968 agreement. There was also substantial evidence that
plaintiff, under the direction of Mr. Mawod, had
embarked on a course of action of including
nondisclosure and noncompetition clauses in its
corporate agreements. Under all of these circumstances, the trial court's ruling was erroneous, viz.,
that the 1978 agreement was a nullity and defendant was bound by the noncompetition clause in the
1968 contract. The contractual relationship of the
parties is to be determined in accordance with the
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1978 contract, which was drafted by plaintiffs *696
scrivener and is thus to be construed accordingly.
The first provision of this agreement, mutually terminating and settling all previous employment
agreements, is particularly appropriate because of
the radical change of circumstances, viz., Dr. Muna
was discharged as chief managing officer and employed as a consultant. This provision is completely
consistent with an intention to abandon mutually
and completely all prior agreements and to initiate a
new relationship.[FN8] The permanent injunction
against defendant cannot be predicated on the 1968
Management Contract, for the 1978 contract constituted a novation and controls the relationship
between the parties.
FN8. Jewett-Gorrie Insurance Agency, Inc.
v. Visser, 12 Wash.App. 707, 531 P.2d
817,822(1975).

Trade Secrets
Defendant further contends that plaintiff failed to
sustain its burden of proof that trade secrets were
involved in the manufacture of the kits. This issue
is of particular importance since plaintiff urges the
permanent injunction can be sustained on the alternative ground that defendant should be restrained
from appropriating or using plaintiffs trade secrets.
(This would not be grounds to restrain Dr. Muna
from using the test kits to conduct testing, which
could have only been sustained under the no competition clause of the 1968 contract.)
[5][6][7] A trade secret, whether it be a secret formula, process, pattern, device, compilation of information or otherwise, is under the majority view
held to be property, with power in the owner thereof to make use of it to the exclusion of the world or
to deal with it as he pleases. [FN9] As a property
right, the trade secret is protected against its appropriation or use without the consent of the
owner. [FN 10] The trade secret is a type of intellectual property, in effect, a property right in dis-
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625 P.2d 690
625 P.2d 690, 214 U.S.P.Q. 567
(Cite as: 625 P.2d 690)
covered knowledge.[FN 11 ]
FN9. 2 Callman Unfair Competition,
Trademarks and Monopolies (3rd Ed.),
Sec. 51.1, pp. 349-350.
FN10.Id.atp. 351.
FNll.Id.atp. 352.
[8] The threshold issue in every case is whether, in
fact, there is a trade secret to be misappropriated.
The secret is of value only so long as it remains a
secret. The burden is upon the plaintiff to prove its
existence as a secret, and there is no presumption in
his favor. [FN 12]
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[9] An employer to obtain relief must establish that
his former employee's product is a copy of his own
product, that its method of production was secret
and that the former employee has used or intends to
use confidential information acquired during his
employment. The conflict must be resolved
between the employer's right to protect his trade
secrets and the employee's right not to be unreasonably hampered in the use of what he has learned
during the *697 employment. There must be a delineation between the general knowledge and experience of the employee and the trade secrets of the
employer. Furthermore, the employee is protected
by the rule that the owner may not arbitrarily pronounce anything a trade secret.[FN 15]
FN15.Id., Sec. 54.2, p. 415.

FN12.Id,Sec. 53.3, p. 387.
"Thus, a unique combination of generally
known elements or steps can qualify as a trade
secret, if it represents a valuable contribution attributable to the independent efforts of the one
claiming to have conceived it. The combination
must differ materially from other methods revealed by the prior art. The subject matter of the
trade secret must be unknown; it should not be in
the public domain nor within the knowledge of
the trade, i. e., known only to the owner and possibly several others to whom it was disclosed
with the admonition that its secrecy be maintained ..."[FN 13]

FN13.Id,p. 388.
"A secret may not be in the public domain if
extensive effort is required to pierce its veil by
assembling the literature concerning it and
thereby uncover its parts. If this can be readily
done by one who is normally skilled in the field
and has a reasonable familiarity with its trade literature, the secret may no longer be entitled to
protection as such ..."[FN 14]

[10] Upon termination of his employment, an employee has the prerogative to use his general knowledge, experience, memory and skill, however
gained, provided he does not use, disclose, or impinge upon any of the secret processes or business
secrets of his former employer.[FN16] The distinction between general and special knowledge can
only be resolved by a balancing of the conflicting
social and economic interests of two desirable
goals. The law encourages competition and supports an individual right to exploit his own skill and
knowledge; on the other hand, the lav/ should grant
established businesses reasonable protection against
unfair trade practices.[FN17] There has not been
devised any ready formula to differentiate clearly
between general and special knowledge so as to determine the manner and type of information an employee may use. One approach has been to recognize the distinction between the case of an employee, who leaves one employer and uses his own faculties, skill and experience in the establishment of
an independent business or in the sendee of another, and the case of one who uses confidential information, secured solely through his employment,
to the harm of his previous employer.
FN16.Id., Sec. 54.2(a), p. 416.

FNRId., pp. 391-392.
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625 P.2d 690
625 P.2d 690, 214 U.S.P.Q. 567
(Cite as: 625 P.2d 690)
FN17.Id.,p.417.
"... Confidential information of an employer,
however, loses any protection to which it may
have been entitled after it has been merged into
the employee's own faculties, skill and experience. Since experience is something a man acquires, a standard must be found to test whether,
in a particular case, an employee's experience is
such as will permit of its use after termination of
the employment, even though it may prove detrimental to his former employer.
"The distinction is between confidential information and * skill and knowledge of the trade'
or, as one court expressed it, the knowledge
which the employee might have acquired in previous employment. [FN 18]
FN18.W., pp. 418-419.
"The distinction between general experience
and special knowledge will still be difficult to
draw even after the formulation of an arbitrary
rule of thumb. The more important an employee's
job, the more difficult will it be to separate the
knowledge he is free to use from that which
should be within the secret sphere of the business
owner. Where the employee is an expert in a
newly developed science, whose creative mind
established a manufacturing department on the
basis of his own plans and ideas, or is a man
known to and desired by industry, any attempt to
draw the line between that which was or has become, by trial and error, a part of his own intellectual equipment and that which he cannot use
or divulge without a breach of confidence necessarily involves some injustice to one party. The
problem is highlighted by modern industry in
which inventors have now become an important
addition to management as part of the company
team.
"Complete justice is an ideal difficult to attain.
Old-fashioned concepts of loyalty are of no legal
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significance where complicated technical problems disrupt the balancing of economic
interest."[FN19]
FN 19.Id., pp. 420-421.
[11] In an action based upon a secret process and
unfair competition, the plaintiff must establish the
following: (1) his possession of knowledge or information not generally known (i. e., the secret);
and either (2) his communication of the secret to
the defendant under an express or implied agreement limiting its use or further disclosure, *698 and
trie defendant's use thereof in violation of the confidence, to the injury of the plaintiff; or (3) the defendant's acquisition of the secret by some wrongful manner and the use thereof to the plaintiffs
damage.[FN20]
FN20.Id.,Sec.58.1,p.478.
[12] The trial court found that plaintiff had trade
secrets in the manufacture of the diagnostic kits,
which defendant had developed while an employee.
These secrets were identified as certain formulations of chemicals and nutrients in the propagation
of cell lines and certain techniques and chemical
formulations in the manufacturing process of the
kits. Defendant asserts that plaintiff failed to sustain its burden to establish the foregoing were trade
secrets on the grounds that all the information was
published in the literature, including work done by
defendant on the A.N.A. techniques prior to his employment, that the techniques and processes were
known to others in defendant's field of expertise,
and that the processes and techniques were an integral part of defendant's own skill and knowledge.
Plaintiff called two witnesses to establish the secret
nature of its manufacturing process. Both witnesses
conceded that M.R.C. provided them with their first
opportunity to observe a laboratory involved in the
commercial production of test kits; consequently,
they were unfamiliar with the technics of other
companies. The evidence further established that
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625 P.2d 690
625 P.2d 690, 214 U.S.P.Q. 567
(Cite as: 625 P.2d 690)
M.R.C. had competitors producing A.N.A., Toxo
and Herpes kits. Both witnesses thought it was unusual to grow the cells on slides in pyrex dishes
covered with saran wrap; neither had read in the literature on tissue culture of using this method for
mass production of tissue culture slides. Dr. Muna
testified that he had learned this technique with all
his fellow students in the virology department at the
University of Utah. Dr. Muna further testified that
at the inception of production of the A.N.A. kit he
had utilized coverslips as he had in his tissue culture work prior to his employment with plaintiff. A
competitor, Virgo, marketed an A.N.A. kit using
slides, which were more convenient; so M.R.C.
changed from coverslips to slides.
Plaintiffs witnesses further identified as combinations peculiar to M.R.C. in production of the
A.N.A. and Herpes kits: 1) the specific nutrients
added to the media in which the cells were grown;
2) the rinsing of the slides three times with sodium
bicarbonate; 3) the use of isopropyl alcohol as a
fixative.
Plaintiffs witness, Leibovitz, testified there were
alternative methods of making media as effective as
M.R.C/s. He further testified that the basic techniques for making A.N.A. and Herpes kits were not
difficult; the problem was mass production. He
opined that one would have to proceed on the basis
of trial and error, using a large number of combinations in order to devise a procedure; he estimated it
would take three to six months.
Dr. Muna introduced into evidence the article he
wrote in 1966, which described the techniques he
utilized in producing the A.N.A. kit for M.R.C. For
the tissue culture he used FL, a strain of human amniotic cells, which are currently utilized by M.R.C.
in the A.N.A. and herpes kits. The nutrients added
to the media, which plaintiffs witness, Dr. Golden,
described as black magic, were additives which Dr.
Muna had used since he was introduced to tissue
culture at U.C.L.A. in 1956. (In the article Dr.
Muna had recommended growing the cells in any
suitable sustaining media.) Dr. Muna testified that
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the work described in his article involved standard
laboratory procedures in the tissue culture field.
There were two distinctions in the process described in the article and M.R.C.'s process; in the
former, the rinse was buffered saline, and the fixative was ether-alcohol; in the latter, the rinse contained sodium bicarbonate and the fixative was isopropyl alcohol. Dr. Muna testified that he used isopropyl alcohol as a fixing agent prior to 1968, but
he had used ethyl alcohol on FL cells prior to 1968
because it was a more refined alcohol; in his opinion there was no difference in either as a fixing
agent. Other*699 witnesses testified there are several equally effective fixing agents. Neither of
plaintiffs witnesses knew whether the use of sodium bicarbonate in the rinse had any effect on the
process.
In the production of the Toxo kit both Dr. Muna
and Dr. Golden testified the procedures utilized followed those described in a publication of the Center
for Disease Control. The only departure from this
published procedure was that M.R.C adds a surface-reducing agent, Tween 80, which is also used
by others in the field.
Dr. Marcus, whose process is used by M.R.C. to
manufacture the I.M. kit, testified thai a competent
microbiologist would need nothing further than the
information published in the literature and his own
general knowledge in order to manufacture the
A.N.A., Toxo, and Herpes kits on a commercial
basis.
The conclusion is compelling that from the evidence adduced the processes of plaintiff constitute
skill and knowledge of the trade and not confidential information. Dr. Muna cannot be enjoined from
using his knowledge, skill, and experience in an independent business. It should be further observed
that of the chemicals utilized by M.R.C, which it
contends are secret, there are alternative choices
which Dr. Muna could select in producing the kits.
The instant case is similar to Abbott Laboratories v.
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625 P.2d 690
625 P.2d 690, 214 U.S.P.Q. 567
(Cite as: 625 P.2d 690)
Norse Chemical Corporation, [FN21 ] wherein
plaintiff claimed the existence of trade secrets in
the areas of manufacture and sales. The court ruled
the claim could not be sustained. The court observed that in order to constitute a trade secret, protective by injunctive relief, Abbott had the burden
of proving a formula, process, or compilation of information known only to Abbott or its employees to
whom it was necessary to confide in secret. In its
analysis the court observed the alleged trade secrets
were published and were commonly known in the
trade and readily discernable in the chemical engineering field. In the area of manufacture defendants
had utilized basic chemistry for a basic process
consisting of a series of well known, published
steps. There was no showing the defendants had
copied any plans or taken any drawings, designs,
specifications, or specific details from Abbott. Each
element of the entire process was based on knowledge of chemical engineering, which the former
employee acquired by working with the process,
applying different engineering techniques at its
various stages, and being aware of the outcome.
The court characterized this type of information as
skill, which cannot be blotted out of an employee's
mind and cannot be labeled a trade secret.
FN21. 33 Wis.2d 445, 147 N.W.2d 529.
538(1967).
The court recognized that the former employee had
certain knowledge of particular engineering techniques which could be applied at a given point
more advantageously than another technique. This
was a result of his training and his experience in his
profession rather than a direct copying of Abbott's
process, and the skill and knowledge he possessed
from working in his profession should inure to his
benefit.
In the Abbott case, the court further ruled that the
customer list was not a trade secret. The list contained only the names and addresses of the customers and the individual to be contacted. There was no
complicated marketing data, which had been laboriously compiled, concerning projected market needs
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of the customer or the customer's market habits. A
policy of confidentiality as to the customer list had
not been invoked by the company. The court quoted
the following:
" '... Written customer lists generally have been
regarded as trade secrets when the nature of the
industry permits the list to be kept secret and the
list cannot be readily duplicated by independent
means. The size of the list and the type of information it contains about the customers may be relevant to the latter determination, as may the
amount of time and *700 effort which went into
its composition.' "[FN22]

FN22. At p. 541 of 147 N.W.2d.
Abbott argued that it had spent substantial time and
money on its customer list. The court responded
that the time and money was, in reality, spent on
the development of the market which the customer
list represented. Defendant was only attempting to
sell to this market, and Abbott's customer information, in view of its public nature, should not be protected so as to prevent competition.
[13] In the instant case there was neither evidence
adduced that defendant had a copy of a customer
list or that such a list constituted a trade secret. The
order of the trial court compelled defendant to surrender any list, memoranda, or written record of
any nature whatsoever, concerning the identity or
location of any customer of which he learned during his employment; and to account for any sales
made to such a customer since February 28, 1978.
In addition, defendant was restrained from soliciting plaintiffs customers, whose identity and location defendant had learned of during the course of
his employment.
At the trial the sole evidence in regard to the customers concerned the expenditures in an unidentified sum of plaintiff to develop a market; there was
no evidence that by the nature of plaintiffs business
extraordinary effort was involved in compiling a
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625 P.2d 690
625 P.2d 690,214 U.S.P.Q. 567
(Cite as: 625 P.2d 690)
customer list. Most of the customers were clinical
laboratories and hospitals, the location and identity
of which were readily accessible through public
sources and trade journals. Plaintiffs evidence concentrated on the fact that a major customer, a distributor in Germany, identified as B.A.G., terminated its contract. However, a specific provision in
this contract conferred on B.A.G. the right of termination after ninety days notice, if Dr. Muna were
no longer associated with M.R.C.
The principles applicable in the instant case are
clearly set forth in Leo Silfen, Inc. v. Cream.[FN23]
FN23. 29 N.Y.2d 387, 328 N.Y.S.2d 423,
278 N.E.2d 636, 639-641 (1972).
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from soliciting any customer of whom he gained
knowledge during his employment was overlybroad and constituted a restraint of trade.
HALL and CROCKETT,[FN*] JJ., concur.
FN* CROCKETT, J., concurred in this
case before his retirement.
STEWART, J., concurs in result.
WILKINS, J., heard the arguments but resigned before the opinion was filed.
Utah, 1981.
Microbiological Research Corp. v. Muna
625 P.2d 690, 214 U.S.P.Q. 567
END OF DOCUMENT

"Generally, where the customers are readily ascertainable outside the employer's business as
prospective users or consumers of the employer's
services or products, trade secret protection will
not attach and courts will not enjoin the employee from soliciting his employer's customers.
(Citations) Conversely, where the customers are
not known in the trade or are discoverable only
by extraordinary efforts courts have not hesitated
to protect customer lists and files as trade secrets.
This is especially so where the customers' patronage had been secured by years of effort and advertising effected by the expenditure of substantial time and money. (Citations)
"In the absence of express agreement to that effect between the parties, or a demonstration that a
customer list has the several attributes of a trade
secret, courts, without more, should not enjoin an
ex-employee from engaging in fair and open
competition with his former employer. The limiting effects upon the former employee with respect to his ability to earn a living are marked
and obvious..."
M.R.C. failed to sustain its burden of proof that the
names and location of its customers were a trade
secret. In addition, the order enjoining defendant
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H
United States District Court, D. Utah, Central Division.
UTAH MEDICAL PRODUCTS, INC., Plaintiff,
v.
CLINICAL INNOVATIONS ASSOCIATES, INC.,
William Dean Wallace, Christopher A. Cutler,
Steven R. Smith, and Does 1-10, Defendants.
No. 2:97-CV-0074 B.
Oct. 28, 1999.
Owner of patent for intrauterine catheter sued
former employees for infringement, false advertising, misappropriation of trade secrets and breach
of fiduciary duty. On defendants' motion for summary judgment, the District Court, Benson, J., held
that: (1) patent was not infringed; (2) defendant's
advertising was not false; (3) no trade secrets were
identified; and (4) breach of fiduciary duty claim
was time-barred.
Motion granted.
West Headnotes
[11 Patents 291 €^>226.6

291X11 Infringement
291XII(A) What Constitutes Infringement
291k233 Patents for Machines or Manufactures
291k237 k. Substitution of Equivalents. Most Cited Cases
Accused device infringes under doctrine of equivalents if every limitation in patent claim or its
"equivalent," i.e., something that only differs from
claim limitation insubstantially, is found in accused
device.
[31 Patents 291 €^=>237
291 Patents
291X11 Infringement
291XII(A) What Constitutes Infringement
291k233 Patents for Machines or Manufactures
291k237 k. Substitution of Equivalents. Most Cited Cases
To find patent infringement under doctrine of equivalents, court must determine whether accused
device performs substantially same overall function
in substantially same way to achieve substantially
same overall result as element of the patented
device, or whether substitute element plays role
substantially different from claimed element.

291 Patents
291X11 Infringement
291Xil(A) What Constitutes Infringement
291k226.5 Substantial Identity of Subject
Matter
291k226.6 k. Comparison with Claims
of Patent. Most Cited Cases
To establish literal patent infringement, plaintiff
must demonstrate that every limitation in claim is
literally met by accused device; absence of just one
claim element mandates determination of noninfringement by court.

291 Patents
291IV Applications and Proceedings Thereon
291kl01 Claims
291 kl 01(8) k. Functions, Advantages or
Results of Invention. Most Cited Cases
When interpreting means-plus-function limitations
in patent claims, such limitations are construed to
cover structure described in specification and equivalents thereof. 35 U.S.C.A. § 112.

[2] Patents 291 €>=>237

[5] Patents 291 € ^ 1 0 1 ( 2 )

291 Patents

291 Patents
291IV Applications and Proceedings Thereon

|4) Patents 291 €^>101(8)
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291kl01 Claims
291kl01(2) k. Construction in General.
Most Cited Cases
"Liquid column" of amniotic fluid, called for in
patent claim for intrauterine catheter, required used
of completely enclosed chamber.

for intrauterine catheter, required that amniotic
pressure had means to communicate with air pressure so that pressures were able to be transmitted
from one end of catheter to other end.

[6] Patents 291 €=>235(2)

291 Patents
2911V Applications and Proceedings Thereon
291kl01 Claims
291kl01(2) k. Construction in General.
Most Cited Cases
"Liquid-air interface," called for in patent claim for
intrauterine catheter, required actual, moleculeto-molecule contact between amniotic fluid and air,
and thus was not literally infringed by accused
device which used balloon barrier to separate fluid
and air.

291 Patents
291X11 Infringement
291XII(A) What Constitutes Infringement
291k233 Patents for Machines or Manufactures
291k235 Identity of Principle or Mode
of Operation
291k235(2) k. Particular Patents or
Devices. Most Cited Cases
Accused device, in which amniotic fluid exerted
pressure on balloon, did not make use of "liquid
column," and thus did not infringe claims of patent
for intrauterine device, either literally or under doctrine of equivalents.
[7] Patents 291 €=>237
291 Patents
291X11 Infringement
291XII(A) What Constitutes Infringement
291k233 Patents for Machines or Manufactures
291k237 k. Substitution of Equivalents. Most Cited Cases
Doctrine of equivalents cannot be used to erase
meaningful structural and functional limitations of
patent claim on which public is entitled to rely in
avoiding infringement.
[8] Patents 291 €=>101(2)
291 Patents
291IV Applications and Proceedings Thereon
291kl01 Claims
29Ik 101(2) k. Construction in General.
Most Cited Cases
"Fluid communication," called for in patent claim

|9] Patents 291 €^>101(2)

[10] Patents 291 €^>101(2)
291 Patents
291IV Applications and Proceedings Thereon
291kl01 Claims
29lkl01(2) k. Construction in General.
Most Cited Cases
Fluid-air pressure ratio, called for in patent claim
for intrauterine catheter, required that amount of
pressure exerted by amniotic fluid in first chamber
and air in second chamber had to balance so that liquid column was contained within first chamber.
|111 Patents 291 €^>226
291 Patents
291X11 Infringement
291XII(A) What Constitutes Infringement
291k226 k. Nature and Elements of Injury. Most Cited Cases
One who does not infringe independent patent
claim cannot infringe a claim dependent on, and
thus containing all limitations of, that claim.
[12] Patents 291 € ^ 1 0 1 ( 2 )
291 Patents
2911V Applications and Proceedings Thereon
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291kl01 Claims
291k 101 (2) k. Construction in General.
Most Cited Cases
First lumen "formed along an interior wall," called
for in patent claim for intrauterine catheter, required only that circular tube run within catheter
parallel to interior walls of catheter; lumen was not
required to be physically attached to interior catheter wall.
[13] Patents 291 €^>235(2)
291 Patents
291X11 Infringement
291XII(A) What Constitutes Infringement
291k233 Patents for Machines or Manufactures
291k235 Identity of Principle or Mode
of Operation
291k235(2) k. Particular Patents or
Devices. Most Cited Cases
Claim in patent for intrauterine catheter, calling for
second lumen sealed off from chamber in which
amniotic fluid pressure was being measured, was
not infringed by accused device, which contained
flexible, but not fluid-tight, seal.
[14J Patents 291 €^>235(2)
291 Patents
291X11 Infringement
291XU(A) What Constitutes Infringement
291k233 Patents for Machines or Manufactures
291k235 Identity of Principle or Mode
of Operation
291k235(2) k. Particular Patents or
Devices. Most Cited Cases
Claim calling for independent apertures for amniotic fluid pressure chamber and second lumen, in patent for intrauterine catheter, was not literally infringed by accused device, which had only one set
of apertures that allowed fluid to both enter measurement chamber and to flow through to second lumen.
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1151 Patents 291 €^>237
291 Patents
291X11 Infringement
291XII(A) What Constitutes Infringement
291k233 Patents for Machines or Manufactures
291k237 k. Substitution of Equivalents. Most Cited Cases
Although pneumatic connector in accused device
performed same function as "valve means" called
for in patent claim for intrauterine catheter, it did
not use same or equivalent structure as that found
in patent specification, and thus did not infringe. 35
U.S.C.A. § 112.
[16] Antitrust and Trade Regulation 29T €^>22
29T Antitrust and Trade Regulation
29TII Unfair Competition
29TII(A) In General
29Tk21 Advertising, Marketing, and Promotion
29Tk22 k. In General. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 382k870(l) Trade Regulation)
In order to establish claim under false or deceptive
advertising prong of Lanham Act, plaintiff must
prove: (1) false statement of fact by defendant in
commercial advertisement about its own or another's product; (2) statement actually deceived or has
tendency to deceive substantial segment of its audience; (3) deception is material, in that it is likely to
influence purchasing decision; (4) defendant caused
its false statement to enter interstate commerce; and
(5) plaintiff has been or is likely to be injured as
result of false statement, either by direct diversion
of sales from itself to defendant or by loss of good
will associated with its products. Lanham TradeMark Act, § 43(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(a).
|17| Antitrust and Trade Regulation 29T €^>22
29T Antitrust and Trade Regulation
29TII Unfair Competition
29T11(A) In General
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29TR21 Advertising, Marketing, and Pro-
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Trade-Mark Act, § 43(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(a).

motion
29Tk22 k. In General. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 382k870(l) Trade Regulation)
To prove statement is false, within meaning of Lanham Act false advertising claim, plaintiff must
demonstrate either that challenged advertisement is
literally false, or, although literally true, that it is
still likely to mislead or confuse consumers. Lanham Trade-Mark Act, § 43(a), 15 U.S.C.A. §
1125(a).
[18] Antitrust and Trade Regulation 29T €>^22
29T Antitrust and Trade Regulation
29TII Unfair Competition
29TII(A) In General
29Tk21 Advertising, Marketing, and Promotion
29Tk22 k. In General. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 382k870(l) Trade Regulation)
In order to assess whether advertisement is literally
false, within meaning of Lanham Act, court must
analyze message conveyed within full context of
advertisement, including perspective of relevant
consumer. Lanham Trade-Mark Act, § 43(a), 15
U.S.C.A. § 1125(a).
119) Antitrust and Trade Regulation 29T €=^23
29T Antitrust and Trade Regulation
29TII Unfair Competition
29TII(A) In General
29Tk21 Advertising, Marketing, and Promotion
29Tk23 k. Particular Cases. Most
Cited Cases
(Formerly 382k870(l) Trade Regulation)
Advertisement
of
intrauterine
catheter
as
"sensor-tipped" was not false, within meaning of
Lanham Act, even though device used external
transducer located in reusable cable, absent showing that relevant consuming public, reading statement in context, would have been misled. Lanham

[20] Antitrust and Trade Regulation 29T €=> 414
29T Antitrust and Trade Regulation
29TIV Trade Secrets and Proprietary Information
29TIV(A) In General
29Tk414 k. Elements of Misappropriation. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 382k984 Trade Regulation, 379kl0(5))
To establish claim for misappropriation of trade
secrets under Utah law, plaintiff must show (1) existence of trade secret, (2) communication of trade
secret to defendant under express duty not to disclose or use it, and (3) defendant's use of secret that
injures plaintiff.
[21] Antitrust and Trade Regulation 29T € ^ > 431
29T Antitrust and Trade Regulation
29TIV Trade Secrets and Proprietary Information
29TIV(B) Actions
29Tk429 Evidence
29Tk431 k. Presumptions and Burden
of Proof. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 382kl001 Trade Regulation, 379k27)
Under Utah law, burden is upon the plaintiff to establish the existence of a trade secret, and plaintiff
must substantiate more than vague and unsupported
allegations as to unknown trade secrets in order to
satisfy its burden.
[22J Antitrust and Trade Regulation 29T € ^ > 420
29T Antitrust and Trade Regulation
29TIV Trade Secrets and Proprietary Information
29TIV(A) In General
29Tk420 k. Particular Cases, in General.
Most Cited Cases
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(Cite as: 79 F.Supp.2d 1290)
(Formerly 382k990 Trade Regulation, 379kl0(5))
Under Utah law,former executives of medical
device manufacturer, who left to form competing
company, were not liable for misappropriation of
trade secrets absent showing of what secrets, apart
from their general skill and knowledge, had been
used to manufacturer's detriment.
[23] Limitation of Actions 241 € ^ 1 0 0 ( 1 2 )
241 Limitation of Actions
24 III Computation of Period of Limitation
24111(F) Ignorance, Mistake, Trust, Fraud,
and Concealment or Discovery of Cause of Action
241k98 Fraud as Ground for Relief
241kl00 Discovery of Fraud
241kl00(12) k. What Constitutes
Discover)' of Fraud. Most Cited Cases
Under Utah law, three-year statute of limitations on
employer's breach of fiduciary duty claims against
former employee, based on alleged failure to sign
employment agreement, began to run, at the latest,
when employee filed wrongful termination suit; suit
provided employer with opportunity to fully explore
employee's
terms
of
employment.
U.C.A.1953, §78-12-27.
124] Limitation of Actions 241 €^>100(12)
241 Limitation of Actions
24 III Computation of Period of Limitation
24111(F) Ignorance, Mistake, Trust, Fraud,
and Concealment or Discovery of Cause of Action
241k98 Fraud as Ground for Relief
241kl00 Discovery of Fraud
241kl00(12) k. What Constitutes
Discovery of Fraud. Most Cited Cases
Under Utah law, three-year statute of limitations on
employer's breach of fiduciary duty claims against
former employee, based on alleged misappropriation of employer's documents, began to run, at the
latest, when in connection with employee's wrongful termination suit, employer obtained copies of all
company
documents
employee
possessed.
U.C.A. 1953, §78-12-27.
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[251 Labor and Employment 231H €>^>305
231H Labor and Employment
231HV Intellectual Property Rights and Duties
231Hk304 Trade Secrets or Confidential Information
231Hk305 k. In General. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 255k50 Master and Servant)
Formal employment agreement is not necessary under Utah law to create duty of confidentiality.
[26J Evidence 157 €^>515
157 Evidence
157X11 Opinion Evidence
157XII(B) Subjects of Expert Testimony
157k515 k. Conduct of Business. Most
Cited Cases
Opinion testimony of false advertising plaintiffs
expert would be excluded as irrelevant where based
on improper test. Fed.Rules Evid.Rule 702, 28
U.S.C.A.
[271 Evidence 157 €>^>508
157 Evidence
157X11 Opinion Evidence
157XII(B) Subjects of Expert Testimony
157k508 k. Matters Involving Scientific
or Other Special Knowledge in General. Most Cited
Cases
Claim construction testimony of patent infringement plaintiffs expert would be excluded, upon determination that claims could be construed based
solely on intrinsic evidence, and thus that expert's
testimony was not helpful. Fed.Rules Evid.Rule
702, 28 U.S.C.A.
Patents 291 €^>328(2)
291 Patents
291X111 Decisions on the Validity, Construction,
and Infringement of Particular Patents
291k328 Patents Enumerated
291k328(2) k. Original Utility. Most
Cited Cases
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4,966,161. "Not infringed.
Patents 291 € ^ 3 2 8 ( 2 )
291 Patents
291X111 Decisions on the Validity, Construction,
and Infringement of Particular Patents
291k328 Patents Enumerated
291k328(2) k. Original Utility. Most
Cited Cases
5,573,007. Cited.
*1292 Richard Burbidge, Salt Lake City, UT, for
plaintiff.
Raymond Etcheverry, Salt Lake City, UT, David
Mangum, Salt Lake City, UT, for defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER
BENSON, District Judge.
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these motions in limine contemporaneously with
defendants' motion for summary judgment. Based
upon the motions presently before the Court, the
memoranda and exhibits submitted by both parties
and the arguments presented in oral argument, the
Court issues this Memorandum Opinion and Order.

II. BACKGROUND
Utah Medical is a publicly traded corporation that
designs and manufactures medical products, including intrauterine catheters. In 1983, defendants, Dr.
Wallace and Dr. Cutler, joined Utah Medical where
they worked in a variety of positions, ultimately
serving as Utah Medical's Chief Executive Officer
and Vice President of Research and Development,
respectively. During their time at Utah Medical,
Wallace and Cutler invented and developed several
products. Utah Medical obtained patents on many
of Wallace's and Cutler's inventions, including the
"161" intrauterine catheter at issue in this case.

I. INTRODUCTION
This case is between plaintiff Utah Medical
Products, Inc. ("Utah Medical") and defendants,
Clinical Innovations Associates, Inc. ("Clinical"),
Dr. William Wallace, Dr. Christopher Cutler, and
Steven Smith. Clinical and Utah Medical compete
with one another in the manufacturing and selling
of medical products. The case primarily involves
two competing intrauterine catheters which measure the pressure of amniotic fluid within the uterus
during a pregnant woman's labor and delivery.
Utah Medical's complaint alleges claims against defendants for patent infringement, false advertising
under the Lanham Act, misappropriation of trade
secrets, and breach of fiduciary duty. Defendants
move the Court for summary judgment on all
claims. Defendants also filed two motions* 1293 in
limine: (1) to exclude the expert opinion testimony
of Robert W. Hitchcock regarding plaintiffs Lanham Act claim, and (2) to exclude the expert opinion testimony of Roger W. Blakely, Jr. regarding
his legal opinions on claim construction and other
patent infringement issues. The Court considers

In 1992, Wallace's career with Utah Medical took a
turn for the worse. Wallace was indicted in federal
district court for violations of securities laws and
for tax evasion. Shortly after these charges were
filed, Utah Medical's board of directors placed Wallace on administrative leave and appointed Cutler to
serve as the acting president. Eventually, Utah
Medical named Kevin Cornwall as Wallace's permanent replacement and as president of the company. After Wallace was placed on leave, but before a verdict was reached in the criminal case
against him, Utah Medical's board of directors determined that Wallace's services were no longer
needed and terminated his employment with Utah
Medical. In December 1993, Cornwall instructed
Wallace to clean out his office and asked Cutler to
ensure that Wallace did not remove any trade secret
or proprietary documents. Wallace took with him
three boxes containing 17,000 pages of documents.
Cutler issued a memorandum to the Utah Medical
Board of Directors on January 4, 1993, attesting
that no proprietary or trade secret materials were
contained in the documents Wallace had taken.
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Utah Medical now alleges that Cutler did not actually review the documents and that many of the
documents Wallace took contained proprietary information and trade secrets. Shortly after the appointment of Cornwall, Wallace's trial concluded
and Wallace was acquitted of all charges by the jury.
On April 1, 1993, after Wallace's termination from
Utah Medical, Wallace formed Clinical Innovations
Associates, Inc. On June 1, 1993, Cutler also left
Utah Medical and began work at Clinical. Steven
Smith, who was a senior research and design engineer at Utah Medical from November, 1992 to May,
1993, also left Utah Medical in June 1993 and
thereafter began working for Clinical. Wallace,
Cutler, and Smith have equity ownership in Clinical
and serve on its board of directors. One of Clinical's first products was its "Clearview" uterine manipulator, which is used to position the uterus to facilitate laparoscopic surgical procedures. Utah
Medical alleges that Wallace took proprietary information from Utah Medical that aided Clinical in
the development of this uterine manipulator. In
June, 1996, Clinical began marketing the
"Koala" intrauterine catheter, which Utah Medical
alleges was developed from its trade secret and
confidential information and infringes on one of
Utah Medical's patents. Clinical advertised the Koala as being "sensor tipped." Utah Medical alleges
that such advertising is false and misleading because the Koala does not contain a transducer in the
tip of the catheter.
Ten years before Clinical released its Koala catheter, Utah Medical began work on a series of intrauterine catheters. Utah Medical's first line of intrauterine catheters was the Intran product line. The
*1294 "Intran I" was developed by Wallace and
was introduced to the market in 1987. The Intran I
contained a pressure transducer at the tip of the

catheter and was patented by Utah Medical. In an
effort to improve the Intran I, Utah Medical released the 'intran II" in 1989. The Intran II was
patented under United States Patent No. 4966,161
(the "161 patent"). The 161 patent lists Wallace
and Cutler as inventors and assigns the patent to
Utah Medical. The Intran II removed the transducer
from the tip of the catheter and placed it at the base
of the catheter, outside of the patient's body. By removing the transducer from the catheter tip, Utah
Medical was able to reduce the tip si2:e and catheter
stiffness. The Intran II was sold until 1995 when it
was replaced by the "Intran Plus," which due to
technological advances allowing for smaller pressure transducers, places the transducer in a disposable catheter tip. The Intran Plus remains Utah
Medical's principal intrauterine catheter. Because of
its disposable transducer tip, it is slightly more expensive than other catheters that can reuse the
transducer. While the Intran product line has been
on the market since 1987, and the Koala since
1996, these catheters were not the first to measure
intrauterine pressure. Indeed, simple liquid or airfilled balloon catheters have been in existence for
decades.
Although the Intran II (specifically the 161 patent
claims) and the Koala will be analyzed in detail in
this Opinion, as background to the discussion that
will follow, the Court provides the following additional general description of the involved catheters.
The Intran II, also know as the 161 device, is inserted into a woman's uterine cavity in order to monitor the intrauterine pressure during labor and delivery, as depicted below in Figure 1.
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FIGURE 1 ('161 Patent Figure 10)
The 161 device is comprised of a catheter that is
approximately 30 inches in length. The tip of the
catheter that is inserted into the uterus contains several holes that allow amniotic fluid to enter the
catheter. See Figure 2. Amniotic fluid enters the interior of the catheter into what is called the "first
chamber." At that point the liquid fills the first
chamber, but is prevented from traveling further up
the catheter into the "second chamber" because of
the air that is being sent into the second chamber
through the "first lumen" of the catheter from the
opposite end. The amniotic fluid forms a liquid
column in the first chamber between the holes that
let in the liquid and *1295 the surface of the liquidair interface. The amniotic fluid in the first chamber
and the air coming from the second chamber come
in direct contact with one another. This boundary
between the first and second chamber is variable

because it exists where the liquid column and the
air come in contact and moves depending on the
amount of pressure exerted from each side. The
possible surfaces of this liquid-air interface, or
boundary of the liquid column, can be seen below
in Figure 3. As the uterus exerts pressure, the liquid
column increases in size and as a result air pressure
increases and is transmitted through a pressure
sensitive diaphragm in the pressure transducer. The
transducer converts the pressure reading into an
electrical signal that is transferred to the patient
monitor where the medical staff can monitor the
uterine contractions.
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FIGURE 2 ('161 Patent Figure 1)
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FIGURE 3 ('161 Patent Figure 3)
Beyond measuring intrauterine pressure, the 161
device provides a separate means for the infusion or
withdrawal of liquids into or out of the uterus.
There is another set of holes near the tip of the
catheter that allow amniotic fluid to enter what is
called the "second lumen." The second lumen is
sealed off by a plug from the first and second
chambers of the catheter and is comprised of a separate tube that runs parallel to the first lumen from
one end of the catheter to other end. This *1296

second lumen is completely separate from the first
lumen, as depicted below in the cross section of the
catheter in Figure 4. The second lumen provides access to the amniotic fluid through the catheter.
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FIGURE 4 ('161 Patent Figure 7)
The accused device, the Koala, performs the same
general function as the 161 device, monitoring intrauterine pressure. In developing the Koala catheter, Clinical consulted with Dr. Donald Bobo regarding the application of his patented technology that
was assigned to his company, InnerSpace, Inc. The
Bobo patent discloses the use of a gas-filled pressure flexible membrane at the end of a lumen to
sense intracompartmental body cavity pressure.
Clinical entered into an agreement with InnerSpace
to license its rights under the Bobo patent for use in
an intrauterine catheter. Using the technology license under the Bobo patent, as well as its own alleged innovations, Clinical developed and marketed
the Koala. While in many ways the accused device
is similar to the 161 device, there are several differences between the two catheters.

surrounds an air-pressurized balloon. Rather than
allowing the air and amniotic fluid to come in direct contact with one another, the Koala isolates the
air within the balloon structure. When amniotic fluid enters the plastic housing it surrounds and compresses the air contained within the balloon, thus,
increasing air pressure within the balloon. The air
pressure exerted by the contracting balloon is conducted to a pressure sensing diaphragm that transmits the information into an electrical signal and
sends it to the patient's monitor, as depicted below
in Figures 5 and 6.

*1297 FIGURE 5 (KOALA)

The Koala is comprised of a plastic housing that
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FIGURE 5 (Koala)

Luar connector

Pneumatic connector
(to connect to pressor* transducer)

FIGURE 6 (Koala)
FIGURE 6 (KOALA)
The Koala transmits the air through an internal tube
that is not attached to the interior of the catheter.
Surrounding this internal tube, or first lumen, is a
second lumen that allows amniotic fluid to flow
around the inner tube and be removed from the
catheter, similar to the 161 device, which also allows access to amniotic fluid. Clinical is in the process of registering its own patents on the Koala, and
two patents are currently pending before the United
States Patent and Trademark Office.
The Koala competes directly with Utah Medical's
Intran Plus catheter. Utah Medical claims that Clinical is out to destroy Utah Medical. As a result,
Utah Medical brought this suit against Clinical, alleging that the Koala infringes upon the patented
technology of the Intran II. Additionally, Utah

Medical alleges that Clinical misappropriated trade
secrets in developing Clinical's medical products,
that the advertising claims are false and misleading,
and that Wallace and Cutler breached their fiduciary duties owed to Utah Medical while employed
there. The current dispute illustrates the complexities that are often interwoven amidst competition
and technology.
On July 20, 22, and 26, 1999, the Court heard oral
argument on defendants's motion for summary
judgment. Argument was presented by Raymond
Etcheverry and David Mangum for the Defendants
and by Richard Burbidge for the Plaintiff. After
listening to the arguments advanced by both sides,
the Court took defendants' motions under advisement.

III. DISCUSSION
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c)"mandates the
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entry of summary judgment ... against a party who
fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the
existence of an element essential to that
party's*1298 case, and on which that party will bear
the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 411 U.S. 317, 327, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91
L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Summary judgment is appropriate when no reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party, the facts in the record
show that there is no genuine issue of material fact,
and the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250-51, 106 S.Ct. 2505,
91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). In making such a determination, the Court construes all justifiable factual inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See id.

argues that even if a literal infringement is not
found, the Koala infringes under the doctrine of
equivalents. An accused device infringes under the
doctrine of equivalents if every limitation in the
claim or its equivalent is found in the accused
device. An "equivalent" is something that only differs from the claim limitation insubstantially. See
Valmont Industries, Inc. v. Reinke Manufacturing
Co., Inc., 983 F.2d 1039, 1043 (Fed.Cir.1993). To
find an infringement under the doctrine of equivalents, the Court must determine whether the accused
device performs substantially the same overall
function in substantially the same way to achieve
substantially the same overall result as the element
of the patented device, or whether the substitute
element plays a role substantially different from the
claimed element. See Tronzo v. Biomet, Inc., 156
F3d 1154, 1160(Fed.Cir.l998).

A. Summary Judgment as to Plaintiffs Patent Infringement Claims

Before a determination can be made whether an infringement has taken place, the Court must first interpret the patent claims. See Mar km an v. Westview Instrs., Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 116 S.Ct. 1384,
134 L.Ed.2d 577 (1996). Under Markman, the
"construction of a patent, including the terms of art
within its claims, is exclusively within the province
of the court." Markman, 517 U.S. at 372, 116
S.Ct. 1384. When interpreting patent claims, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has instructed the district courts to "look first
to the intrinsic evidence of record, i.e., the patent itself, including the claims, specification and, if it is
in evidence, the prosecution history." Vitronics
Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582
(Fed.Cir.1996). The "words in a claim are generally
given their ordinary and customary meaning" unless "a special definition of the term is clearly
stated in the patent specification or file history." Id.

Plaintiff alleges that Clinical's Koala catheter (the
accused device) infringes literally, as well as under
the doctrine of equivalents, on Claims 1 through 35
of Utah Medical's 161 patent. Defendants argue that
plaintiff cannot establish that Clinical's Koala catheters infringes on any of the claims of the 161 patent either literally or under the doctrine of equivalents. Defendants contended that a comparison of
the properly interpreted 161 patent claims with the
accused device conclusively demonstrates that the
Koala catheter does not have all of the requisite elements of the 161 patent claims and thus cannot infringe on that patent as a matter of law.
[1][2][3] Patent infringement can arise either literally or under the doctrine of equivalents. "To establish a literal infringement, a plaintiff must demonstrate that every limitation in the claim is literally
met by the accused device." Enercon v. Int'l Trade
Comm'n, 151 F.3d 1376, 1384 (Fed.Cir.1998). Accordingly, the absence of just one claim element
mandates a determination of noninfringement by
the Court. See Litton Sys., Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc.,
140 F.3d 1449, 1454 (Fed.Cir.1998). Utah Medical

[4] The Court recognizes that the patent at issue includes several "means-plus-function" claims. As set
forth in 35 U.S.C. § 112(6), a means-plus function
is not limited to the structure described in the specifications. The Federal Circuit has stated that when
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interpreting means-plus-function limitations such
limitations shall be construed to cover the structure
described *1299 in the specification and equivalents thereof. See D.M.I., Inc. v. Deere & Co., 755
F.2d 1570, 1575 (Fed.Cir.1985). The Federal Circuit defines "equivalent" in the § 112(6) context as
"an insubstantial change which adds nothing of significance to the structure, material, or acts disclosed
in the patent specification." Valmoni Indus, v.
Reinke Man/. Co., 983 F.2d 1039, 1043
(Fed.Cir.1993). Accordingly, in its analysis the
Court must determine whether the accused device
performs the same function as set forth in the claim
with an equivalent structure to that described in the
patent specification. See Cybor Corp. v. FAS Tech
Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1457 (Fed.Cir. 1998).
Once the Court has interpreted the claims of the
patent, the Court next compares the properly interpreted claims to the accused product to determine
whether each element in the claims is present in the
accused product. See Kahn v. GMC, 135 F.3d
1472, 1476 (Fed.Cir. 1998). The second step is typically a factual question for a jury. However, if the
Court finds that "no reasonable jury could find that
every limitation recited in the properly construed
claim is .... found in the accused device" and "where
the evidence is such that no reasonable jury could
determine two elements to be equivalent," summary
judgment of noninfringement should be granted.
Bai v. L & L Wings, Inc., 160 F.3d 1350, 1353-54
(Fed.Cir.1998). As a practical matter, this Court
finds that combining the Markman hearing and the
motion for summary judgment is an efficient and
sensible approach to what could otherwise be an
unnecessarily lengthy and multi-phased process.
As directed by Markman, the Court now proceeds
to interpret Claims 1 through 35 of the 161 patent,
as well as determining whether each element in
these claims reads upon the accused Koala catheter.

L Construction of Claim 1 and Its Application to
the Koala
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Under proper claim construction methodology, the
Court begins its analysis of the 161 patent by examining the actual language of the claims. See
Bell Comm. Research, Inc. v. VHal ink Comm.,
Corp., 55 F.3d 615, 619 (Fed.Cir. 1995). Claim 1
reads:
An apparatus for continuously measuring intracomparmental fluid pressures exerted by a liquid contained within a body cavity comprising:
Pressure-sensing means for insertion into said
body cavity so as to detect said intracompartmental fluid pressures therein, said pressure-sensing means comprising first chamber means for
defining a first volume which is in fluid communication with said liquid such that said liquid will
enter said first chamber means and form a liquid
column therein having a liquid-air interface, and
further comprising second chamber means for defining a second volume which is air-filled and is
in fluid communication with said first chamber
means;
Pressure transducer means attached to said
pressure-sensing means for generating an electrical signal proportional to fluid pressure communicated by said pressure-sensing means to said
pressure transducer means; and
Wherein a ratio is defined by said first and
second volumes such that the ratio of said first
volume to said second volume is such that, at
maximum fluid pressures exerted within said
body cavity, said liquid column in said first
chamber means will tend to be minimized so as
to minimize hydrostatic pressure error resulting
therefrom and such that said liquid-air interface
will be prevented from entering said second
chamber means.
Claim 1 has several distinct requirements that must
read upon the Koala in order to find infringement.
There is no question that the Koala is "an apparatus
for continuously measuring intracompartmental fluid pressures exerted by a liquid contained within a
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body cavity," and it is undisputed that the Koala incorporates "pressure-sensing means for insertion into said body cavity so as to detect said intracompartmental*1300
fluid
pressures
therein."
However, the interpretation of several elements
within Claim l's "pressure sensing means" are disputed. Specifically, the parties dispute the interpretation of the elements requiring: (1) a first and
second chamber means, (2) a liquid column, (3) fluid communication between the chambers, (4) a liquid-air interface, and (5) a ratio defined by first
and second volumes. The Court now proceeds to interpret these disputed elements.
[5] Claim 1 requires that the pressure-sensing
means is comprised of a "first chamber means for
defining a first volume which is in fluid communication with said liquid such that said liquid will enter
said first chamber means and form a liquid column
therein having a liquid-air interface, and further
comprising second chamber means for defining a
second volume which is air-filled and is in fluid
communication with said first chamber means."
The first chamber must holds a volume of amniotic
fluid that comes in contact with the air coming from
the second chamber. The second chamber must
contain air that is pumped into the catheter from an
external source to provide a means of measuring
the amount of pressure asserted against it from the
first chamber when the air therein is compressed.
Clinical contends that Claim 1 requires a first and
second chamber means that are distinctive from the
Koala. Clinical argues that the first chamber means
must be interpreted to require a cavity inside of rigid, physical walls or other such surrounding structure so as to surround the first volume. However,
Utah Medical argues all that is required is an area
that holds amniotic fluid, such that when the amniotic fluid enters the Koala and surrounds the airfilled balloon, it comprises the first chamber and
the air-filled balloon comprises the second chamber. While the Court finds Utah Medical's interpretation very broad, the specification appears to allow
such a broad reading. However, the first chamber in
Claim 1 must have the capacity to enclose within its
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surrounding structure a first volume of amniotic
fluid, forming a liquid column that comes in contact
with the air-filled second volume. In order to form
a liquid column, the first chamber must be completely enclosed without any holes that would prevent a liquid column from functioning properly.
[6][7] Claim 1 requires that the amniotic liquid will
enter the first chamber and "form a liquid column
therein." As established above, the first chamber
must be enclosed by the walls of the catheter. This
is because according to Claim 1 the liquid column
forms below the section of the catheter where the
holes allow the amniotic fluid to enter the catheter
and is enclosed where it comes into contact with the
air from the second chamber. The column must be
formed on the inside of the plastic housing, as the
claim requires it to be "therein." The column is an
uninterrupted volume of liquid between the air from
the second chamber and the free flowing amniotic
fluid that enters the tip of the catheter through the
holes in the tip. A column is defined as "a rigid, relatively slender, upright support, composed of relatively few pieces [or] a decorative pillar, most often
composed of stone and typically having a cylindrical or polygonal shaft ...; any column like object,
mass, or formation a column of smoke." THE
RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 407 (2d ed.1987). Taken from
the plain meaning of the word column, the liquid
column-cylindrical in shape-must fill the interior of
the first chamber and be bound by the cylindrical
sidewalls of the first chamber. While Clinical argues that the accused device does not have a liquid
column as required by Claim 1, Utah Medical argues that the Koala does in fact have a liquid
column. Applying the Court's interpretation of the
required liquid column to the accused device, the
Court finds that a liquid column does not exist in
the Koala, either literally or under the doctrine of
equivalents. The Koala could only be substantially
equivalent by eliminating necessary structural and
functional requirements from Claim 1, which would
be *1301 improper. The "doctrine of equivalents
cannot be used to erase 'meaningful structural and
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functional limitations of the claim on which the
public is entitled to rely in avoiding infringement.'
" Conopco, Inc. v. May Dep't Stores Co., 46 F.3d
1556, 1562 (Fed.Cir.1994). Utah Medical argues
that the Koala has a column that is in fact a hollow
cylinder that surrounds the air balloon within what
Utah Medical argues is a first chamber. However,
the area that Utah Medical argues is the liquid
column is in reality the same as the area in the tip
of the 161 device where the holes allow the amniotic fluid to enter the catheter. The housing around
the Koala is for the purpose of inserting the catheter
into the uterus. If the plastic housing were removed
from the Koala once in the uterus, the device would
still provide an accurate reading based on the amniotic pressure exerted on the balloon. Conversely,
the 161 device is dependent upon the plastic housing wherein a liquid column is formed between the
amniotic fluid and the air. Without such a housing,
the 161 device would not operate.
[8] Clinical next argues that the Koala cannot infringe because it does not have any open passageway between any first chamber means and any
second chamber means, and thus has no "fluid communication" between the first and second chamber
means. Utah Medical counters by arguing that the
term fluid communication is simply describing a
smooth and continuous function of communicating
intrauterine pressures from the first chamber means
through the second chamber means to the pressure
transducer. Thus, Utah Medical argues that this element of the claim reads upon the Koala. Claim 1
uses the term "fluid communication" twice. First, it
requires that the first volume, which is in the first
chamber, be in fluid communication with the amniotic liquid such that the amniotic liquid will enter
the first chamber. Second, it requires that air-filled
second volume be in fluid communication with the
first chamber means. The Court finds that in order
to be in fluid communication with the amniotic fluid, as in the first case or the air as in the second
case, the amniotic fluid or air must be allowed to
enter the first chamber and form, or come in contact
with, the liquid column that has been created so that
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when the pressure changes the liquid column can
move within the first chamber, as indicated by the
possible surfaces of amniotic fluid depicted above
in Figure 3. The term "fluid" is an adjective describing the ability for the liquid and air to move
within the catheter, and, depending on the pressure
exerted by the amniotic fluid, communicate that
pressure to the transducer. Thus, all this element requires is that the amniotic pressure has the means to
communicate with the air pressure so that pressures
are able to be transmitted from one end of the catheter to the other end.
[9] Clinical next argues that Claim l's requirement
for a "liquid-air interface," cannot read upon the accused device because the Koala has an air-filled
balloon that acts as a barrier between the air and liquid. According to Claim 1, the liquid column must
have a "liquid-air interface" with the second airfilled volume. An interface is defined as "a surface
regarded as the common boundary of two bodies,
spaces, or phases." Id. at 993. There is no dispute
that this liquid-air interface occurs in the first
chamber of the 161 device between the amniotic liquid and the air from the second chamber. Clinical
argues that such an interface requires moleculeto-molecule contact between the amniotic liquid
and the air for such an interface to exist. Utah Medical asserts that such an interface is simply an exchange between two different surfaces, arguing that
nothing in Claim 1 requires a direct moleculeto-molecule interface, and that the interface can exist even if a membrane (such as the balloon in the
Koala) acts as a barrier between the air and the liquid. The description of the liquid-air interface in
the claim specifications describe an interface
between the partially filled liquid and air chamber
(161 patent at column 5, line 68 to column 6, line
2), as well as a maintenance of pressure ratios
between the air and the amniotic liquid to prevent
the liquid*1302 from entering the air-filled second
chamber (\6\ patent at column 13, lines 20-28).
Because Claim 1 describes this interface in conjunction with the requisite liquid column, the Court
finds that Claim 1 contemplates direct contact
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between the air and the amniotic liquid. Accordingly, the Court interprets Claim 1 to require an actual interface-molecule-to-molecule-between
the
amniotic liquid and the air. Applying this claim interpretation to the accused device, the Court finds
that the accused device does not involve such an
air-liquid interface and therefore does not literally
infringe on this aspect of the 161 patent. Whether
the accused device infringes under the doctrine of
equivalents is a question of fact.
[10] Claim 1 finally requires that there be a ratio
volumes that will minimize hydrostatic pressure error and prevent the liquid-air interface from entering the second chamber means. Utah Medical argues that the Koala infringes upon this element of
Claim 1 because the balloon must contain the same
ratio to function properly. Clinical, however, argues
that this element should be interpreted to mean that
the ratio must be maintained so the liquid column
will not be allowed to enter the second chamber,
which, Clinical continues, is impossible to read on
the accused device because no liquid can penetrate
the balloon in the Koala. The Court finds that the
ratio referred to in Claim 1 is generally indicating
that the amount of pressure exerted by the amniotic
fluid in the first chamber and the air in the second
chamber must balance so the liquid column is contained within the first chamber. This is stating that
Boyle's law (vl x pi = v2 x p2) must be complied
with in order for the device to provide an accurate
reading. Furthermore, the Court finds that this element of Claim 1 literally requires a device that
would not allow the liquid to enter the second
chamber. Any other interpretation would render the
phrase "and prevent the liquid-air interface from
entering the second chamber means" meaningless.
Additionally, although not briefed, at oral argument
defendants pointed out that another purpose for
maintaining the proper liquid-air ratio, pursuant to
the language of Claim 1, is to minimize hydrostatic
pressure by reducing the length of the liquid
column, which cannot be done in the accused
device because the Koala has no liquid column
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upon which hydrostatic pressure can be exerted
upon it. The Court interprets Claim 1 to require a
physical device that allows for a liquid column that
can be adjusted to a height that will minimize the
effect of any hydrostatic pressure. Because there is
no question that the accused device does not contain such a liquid column, the Court finds as a matter of law that the accused device does not infringe
this claim element either literally or under the doctrine of equivalents. On this point at oral argument,
plaintiff argued that any hydrostatic pressure to
which the column itself would be exposed would be
so minimal as to be insignificant. Even if that is the
cctse, it remains that such is a literal part of Claim 1,
in words chosen by the plaintiff.
In accordance with the foregoing, after comparing
the accused device to Claim 1 of the 161 patent, as
construed by the Court, the Court finds that the elements requiring a liquid column are not present in
the Koala either literally or under the doctrine of
equivalents, and Claim l's requirement of a liquidair interface is not literally present in the Koala, but
may be equivalent to the 161 device. Thus, as interpreted, the Court finds that plaintiff cannot demonstrate that every limitation in Claim 1 is literally or
equivalently met by the accused device. Accordingly, the Court must find that the Koala does not
infringe upon Claim 1 of the 161 patent.™ 1 ^
*1303Litton Sys., Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 140 F.3d
1449, 1454 (Fed.Cir.1998) (holding that the absence of just one claim element mandates a determination of noninfringement by the Court).
FN1. In keeping with the above analysis,
the Court notes that based upon its review,
to interpret Claim l's elements as plaintiff
requests would require the Court to construe the elements of Claims 1 so broadly
as to find that the 161 device essentially
holds a patent on simple fluid mechanics.
Were the Court to interpret the claims of
the 161 patent as broadly as Utah Medical
is requesting, it would appear to be tantamount to an invalidation of the 161 pat-
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ent for prior art and obviousness. Claim 1
cannot be interpreted so broadly as to cover the fiindamental laws of air pressure and
fluid mechanics, including the basic principles used to measure those pressures
within body cavities.
2 Construction of Claims 2 through 17 and Their
Application to the Koala
[11] Claims 2 through 17 are dependent upon Claim
1 and incorporate the requirements of that claim.
a
One who does not infringe an independent claim
cannot infringe a claim dependent on (and thus containing all the limitations of) that claim." Wahpeton Canvas Co., Inc. v. Frontier, Inc., 870 F.2d
1546, 1552 n. 9 (Fed.Cir.1998). Because the Court
has found that Claim 1 is not infringed upon by the
Koala, the Court similarly finds no infringement as
to Claims 2 through 17.

J. Construction of Claims 18 through 32 and
Their Application to the Koala
Plaintiff also alleges that the accused device infringes upon Claim 18 and its dependant claims 19
through 32. Claim 18 is very similar-in fact nearly
identical-to much of Claim 1. Claim 18 reads as
follows:
An apparatus for continuously measuring intrauterine fluid pressures exerted by amniotic fluid within the uterus comprising:
A catheter for insertion into said uterus so as to
detect said pressures, said catheter comprising a
first chamber formed in a distal end of said catheter at the interior thereof for defining a first
volume, said catheter further comprising a plurality of apertures formed at said distal end of the
catheter for providing fluid communication
between said amniotic fluid in the uterus and said
first chamber such that amniotic fluid will enter
said first chamber and form a liquid column
therein having a liquid-air-interface, and said
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catheter further comprising a second chamber
formed with in the interior of said catheter for defining a second volume, said second chamber being airfilled, and wherein a ratio is defined by
said first and second volumes such that the ratio
of said first volume to said second volume is such
that the ratio of said first volume to said second
volume is such that at maximum fluid pressure
exerted during a contraction of the uterus, said liquid column will tend to be minimized so as to
minimize hydrostatic pressure error resulting
therefrom and such that said liquid-air interface
will not enter said second chamber; and
A pressure transducer means for generating an
electrical signal proportional to said fluid pressures communicated to said transducer from said
second chamber of the catheter.
Both parties present the same arguments as to
Claim 18 as they did when arguing for and against
infringement under Claim 1. Because the Court has
found that under Claim 1 no reasonable juror could
find literal infringement for each element of Claim
1, it is unnecessary to undertake the same analysis
regarding Claim 18. Therefore, the Court finds that
Claim 18, as well as its dependent Claims 19
through 32, do not read upon the Koala catheter for
the same reasons articulated for Claims 1 through 17.

4. Construction of Claim 33 and Its Application to
the Koala
Plaintiff further alleges that the accused device infringes on Claim 33 of the 161 patent. Claim 33
presents the Court with another substantial analytical challenge. It reads:
An apparatus for continuously measuring intrauterine fluid pressures exerted by amniotic fluid within a uterus, comprising:
*1304 a catheter for insertion into said uterus
so as to detect said fluid pressures, said catheter
comprising a cylindrical tube formed a long an
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interior wall of said catheter so as to form a first
lumen which extends through a substantial portion of the interior length of said catheter, said
first lumen terminating at a distal end thereof a
selected distance from a distal end of said catheter such that a chamber is formed in at least a portion of the interior space of said catheter defined
by the space between the distal end of said first
lumen and the distal end of said catheter, said
chamber defining a first volume, and said first lumen defining a second volume, said catheter further comprising a second lumen formed in the remaining space between said cylindrical tube and
said interior catheter wall and said second lumen
being coextensive in length with said first lumen
and said second lumen being sealed at a distal
end thereof to prevent fluid communication
between said chamber and said second lumen,
said catheter further comprising a first plurality
of apertures formed at said distal end of said
catheter to provide fluid communication between
said amniotic fluid and said chamber, and further
comprising a second plurality of apertures formed
through said catheter to provide fluid communication between said amniotic fluid and said second
lumen;
a piezoresistive semiconductor pressure transducer comprising a pressure diaphragm for deflection in response to intrauterine fluid pressures
exerted on one side of said diaphragm; and
connector means for housing said pressure
transducer therein and for providing electrical
between said transducer and an electrical cable,
said connector means comprising means for continuously venting and opposite side of said diaphragm to atmospheric pressure, and said connector means further comprising a valve means
for selective positioning between a first and
second position such that when said valve means
is in said first position, said one side of said diaphragm is vented through said connector means
to atmospheric pressure, and when said valve
means is in said second position, said one side of
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said diaphragm is in fluid communication with
intrauterine
fluid
pressures
communicated
through said first lumen, and said connector
means further comprising a fluid port through
which amniotic fluids are infused into and
through which amniotic fluid samples are withdrawn form said second lumen, and wherein fluid
communication from said fluid port to said
second lumen is provided by an aperture formed
through said catheter at a location adjacent said
fluid port.
While Claim 33 is similar in some respects to
Claim 1, there are several additional elements that
the Court must interpret and compare to the accused device. Specifically, Claim 33 has three major components: (1) "a catheter for insertion into
said uterus so as to detect [ ] fluid pressures," comprised of a "first lumen" and a "second lumen," (2)
a "pressure transducer," and (3) a "connector means
for housing said pressure transducer therein and for
providing electrical connection between said transducer and an electrical cable." Each of these major
components has various sub parts. For example, the
"connector means" also contains a "valve means"
for venting the apparatus to atmospheric pressure.
The parties dispute the interpretation of the following elements: (1) a first lumen, (2) a second lumen
that is sealed and contains separate apertures, and
(3) a valve means.
[12] Claim 33 requires a "first lumen" that runs
throughout the interior of the catheter, having an
opening in the chamber of the catheter. The claim
describes the first lumen as "a cylindrical tube
formed along an interior wall" of the catheter. The
first lumen is essentially a passage way that transmits air from the air source into the second chamber
as described in Claim 1. "Lumen" is defined as "the
canal, duct, or cavity of a tubular organ." THE
RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF *1305 THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1144 (2d ed.1987). The
proper construction of the "first lumen" turns on the
meaning of the phrase "formed along an interior
wall." Clinical argues that this restriction requires
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the Court to interpret the claim as requiring the first
lumen to be a cavity within rigid, physical cylindrical walls of a tube that is physically attached to
the interior catheter wall as depicted by the crosssection of the 161 device in Figure 4 (161 Patent
Figure 7). See supra p. 1296.However, Utah Medical contends that all that Claim 33 requires is a
cylindrical tube on the interior of the catheter capable of conveying air pressure from the chamber to
the transducer. Utah Medical further argues that
just because the tube is "formed along an interior
wall" of the catheter does not require that the tube
be attach to part of the catheter. The 161 specifications show that the actual design of the 161 device
attached the first lumen to the wall of the catheter,
stating: "As best illustrated in FIGS. 7 and 8, the
first lumen [ ] is comprised of a cylindrical tube [ ]
which is formed along the interior wall of the catheter...." (161 Specification at Column 10). Figure 7
of the 161 specifications clearly shows that the first
lumen is attached to the interior wall of the catheter. However, Utah Medical argues that according to
the Federal Circuit, such additional limitations appearing in the specification should not be read into
the claim. See Laitram Corp. v. NEC Corp., 163
F.3d 1342, 1347 (Fed.Cir.1998) (noting the
"well-established principle that a court may not import limitations from the written description into
the claims"); Electro Med. Sys. v. Cooper Life Sciences, Inc., 34 F.3d 1048^ 1054 (Fed.Cir.1994)
(stating that "claims are not to be interpreted by
adding limitations appearing only in the specification"). Accordingly, the Court does not look to how
the device was actually constructed according to the
specification, but rather looks to the language of the
claim. The relevant meaning of "form," when used
as a verb, is defined as "to give a particular form or
shape to; fashion in a particular manner." THE
RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 752 (2d ed.1987). "Along" is
defined as "through, on, beside, over, or parallel to
the length or direction of; from one end to the other
of." Id. at 59. Based on the plain meaning of the
claim language the Court finds that "formed along"
only requires that a circular tube run within the
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catheter parallel to the interior walls of the catheter.
The Koala has an interior tube that transmits air
from the air pressure source into the balloon that is
within the chamber of the catheter. Utah Medical
argues that the Koala tube is in fact a first lumen
and this portion of the claim reads literally on the
Koala. There is no doubt that the Koala has a lumen
that runs within the catheter walls. The Koala's air
lumen is an independent tube. Although not attached to the interior wall of the catheter, it does
run parallel to the interior walls of the catheter.
[13] Claim 33 next requires there to be a "second
lumen." The second lumen performs a task separate from that of measuring intrauterine pressure.
That purpose is for the infusion or withdrawal of liquids into or out of the uterus. Claim 33 requires
that the "second lumen [be] formed in the remaining space between said cylindrical tube and said interior catheter wall" and be "coextensive in length
with said first lumen." Simply put, the second lumen is comprised of the interior space of the catheter absent the first lumen and must run along the
first lumen from one end of the catheter to the other
end. Such a requirement initially appears to read
upon the accused device. However, Claim 33 also
requires that the "second lumen [be] sealed at the
distal end thereof to prevent fluid communication
between said chamber and said second lumen."
The plain language of this element specifically requires that there be a seal between the chamber and
the second lumen. Such a seal is created in the 161
device by the use of plug as depicted above in Figure 3. Such a seal or plug is absent from the accused device. Nevertheless,
Utah Medical
argues* 1306 that the Koala has such a seal that restricts the amount of flow between the second lumen and the chamber in such a way that the fluid
infusion and withdrawal does not interfere with the
pressure measurement within the first chamber.
Utah Medical acknowledges that the Koala does not
have a "fluid tight seal," but argues that the Koala's
"flexible seal" nevertheless infringes upon this element of the patent. The Court is not persuaded by
Utah Medical's argument and interprets this ele-
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ment of Claim 33 to require a device that completely seals off the area between the chamber holding the amniotic fluid and the second lumen. The
accused device has no such fluid-tight seal. Nor
could any reasonable fact-finder find the equivalent
of a fluid-tight seal in the accused device. Accordingly, the Court finds that the defendants' device
does not infringe on this element of Claim 33 either
literally or under the doctrine of equivalents.
[14] Finally, in relation to the second lumen, Claim
33 requires a "first plurality of apertures" allowing
amniotic fluid to enter the chamber, as well as a
"second plurality of apertures" allowing amniotic
fluid to enter the second lumen. The Court finds
that Claim 33 requires two separate sets of apertures that function independently of one another.
Indeed, the second set of apertures is required because the seal in the second lumen prevents any fluid from passing from the chamber that is fed by the
first set into the second lumen. According to the
Court's interpretation of Claim 33, these two sets of
apertures must function independently of one another. Although plaintiff does not dispute this element in its brief, the accused device appears to have
only one set of apertures that allow amniotic fluid
to enter the chamber and also pass into the second
lumen. Furthermore, because there is no fluid tight
seal in the Koala, any apertures that may be located
beyond the Koala's alleged "flexible seal" cannot
be said to operate independently of the fist set of
apertures. The Court, therefore, finds as a matter of
law that the Koala does not literally infringe on this
element of Claim 33. There is however, a factual
dispute whether the Koala device infringes on this
element under the doctrine of equivalents.
Claim 33 also requires a "connector means" that
contains a pressure transducer, that mechanically
joins together the transducer and the catheter, and
the electrically connects or joins together the transducer and the patient monitor. Through this connection, intrauterine fluid pressures are communicated
from the catheter through an internal pressure diaphragm to the patient monitor. While the connector
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means is generally undisputed as to its application
to the Koala, the connector means further requires a
"valve means," the application of which is disputed.
The "valve means" language requires a meansplus-function analysis under section 112(6) to interpret this element of Claim 1. See York Prods., Inc.
v. Cenfral Tractor Farm & Family Ctr., 99 F.3d
1568, 1574 (Fed.Cir.1996). As' stated above,
means-plus-function analysis requires the court to
determine whether the accused device performs the
same function set forth in the claim with an equivalent structure-that is one with no substantial
change-to that described in the specification.
[15] The "valve means" in both the 161 patent and
the Koala undoubtably serve the same function.
Claim 33 of the 161 patent states: "valve means for
selective positioning between a first and a second
position such that when said valve means is in said
first position, said one side of said diaphragm is
vented [opened to the outside air] through said connector means to atmospheric pressure, and when
said valve means is in said second position, said
one side of said diaphragm is in fluid communication with intrauterine fluid pressures communicated
through said first lumen...." The pneumatic connector in a housing that mechanically joins the
pressure transducer and the catheter in the Koala
serves the same function. When the *1307 Koala is
unconnected, it is basically in a first position, allowing the diaphragm to have contact with the outside air, and when the Koala is connected, it is in
the second position due to the contact with the fluid
pressure.
Thus, the Court turns to the specification to determine if the corresponding structure is defined by the
language "valve means." The specification states
the "valve means is comprised of a slide valve that
is seated with a channel formed in the housing ...
[and t]he slide valve has a knob at its upper end to
permit movement back and forth of the slide valve
within the channel." Additionally, the slide value is
specified as having "a generally square crosssectional shape as opposed to the circular shape of

© 2009 Thomson ReutersAVest. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.

79 F.Supp.2d 1290
79F.Supp.2dl290
(Cite as: 79 F.Supp.2d 1290)
channel...." The Court construes the "valve means"
element in Claim 33 to cover a structure equivalent
to that described in the specification for the purpose
stated in the claim and rejects Clinical's argument
that the valve means requires a "mechanical switch."
Although the Koala's pneumatic connector serves
the same function as the valve means in Claim 33,
the pneumatic connector is not the same or an equivalent structure as that found in the 161 patent specification. The pneumatic connector is not a slide
valve with a knob at its upper end that permits
movement of the valve back and forth within the
channel. To serve the same function of positioning
between a first and second position, the pneumatic
connector must be disconnected not slid. The Koala
pneumatic connector does not have a knob that permits movement back and forth within the channel.
To be considered an "equivalent" of the specification structure under section 112(6), the pneumatic
connector must only have "insubstantial change[s
that] add[ ] nothing of significance to the structure...."^ Valmont Industries, 983 F.2d at 1043.
The pneumatic connector's structure is substantially
and significantly different from the 161 specified
structure. To perform the same function as the 16Ts
motion along the channel, the pneumatic connector
must be disconnected. Furthermore, the Koala is
designed to switch between the two positions
without some of the specifications of the 161
patent, such as the slide valve and the knob at the
upper end of the slide valve. The two devices are
neither structurally the same nor equivalents, thus,
the court holds that the Koala does not literally infringe the 161 patent with respect to Claim 33's
valve means element.
In sum, while under the Court's interpretation of
Claim 33 the requirements of a first lumen may
read upon the Koala, each and every element of a
claim must read upon the infringing device in order
for the Court to find infringement. See Litton Sys.,
Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 140 F.3d 1449, 1454
(Fed.Cir.1998). Because the Court interprets that
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Claim 33 contains elements requiring the second lumen to be sealed and have a separate first and
second pluralities of apertures for the first chamber
and second lumen, as well as a valve means structure conforming to the patent specification, the
Court holds that under its interpretation no reasonable jury could find that each element of Claim 33
reads literally upon the Koala. The Koala has
neither an fluid-tight seal, nor a first and second
plurality of apertures, and the pneumatic connector
is not structurally identical or equivalent to the 161
specification. Consequently, the Court must find as
a matter of law that the Koala does not literally infringe upon Claim 33 of the 161 patent. Additionally, because the Court cannot eliminate the necessary structural and functional requirements of the
sealed second lumen, the Court finds that the accused device does not have all the necessary equivalent elements. See Conopco, Inc. \\ May Dep't
Stores Co., 46 F.3d 1556, 1562 (Fed.Cir.1994)
(holding that the "doctrine of equivalents cannot be
used to erase 'meaningful structural emd functional
limitations of the claim on which the public is entitled to rely in avoiding infringement' "). Thus, as
to the absence of a fluid-tight seal, the Court finds
that Koala device does not infringe under the doctrine of equivalents. Accordingly, the accused
*1308 device cannot be found to infringe upon
every element of Claim 33.

5. Construction of Claims 34 through 35 and
Their Application to the Koala
Claims 34 and 35 are dependent upon Claim 33 and
incorporate the requirements of that claim. "One
who does not infringe an independent claim cannot
infringe a claim dependent on (and thus containing
all the limitations of) that claim." Wahpeton Canvas Co., Inc. v. Frontier, Inc., 870 F.2d 1546. 1552
n. 9 (Fed.Cir.1998). Because the Court has found
that Claim 33 was not infringed upon by the accused device, the Court must find that Claims 34
and 35 are not infringed upon for the same reasons
that no infringement was found for Claim 33.
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In conclusion, plaintiffs patent infringement claim
as to infringement of the 161 patent cannot stand as
a matter of law. See Bai v. L & L Wings, Inc., 160
F.3d 1350, 1353-54 (Fed.Cir.1998) (finding that
when "no reasonable jury could find that every limitation recited in the properly construed claim is ...
found in the accused device" and "where the evidence is such that no reasonable jury could determine two elements to be equivalent," summary judgment of noninfringement should be granted). Thus,
defendants' motion for summary judgment will be
granted.

B. Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff's False Advertising Claim Under the Lanham Act
Plaintiff alleges that Clinical's Koala promotional
materials, particularly their reference to the Koala
as "sensor tipped," contain a false and misleading
description of facts in violation of the Lanham Act,
and that those descriptions are likely to cause confusion as to what is actually embodied at the tip of
the Koala catheter. Plaintiff maintains that purchasers of the Koala will be mislead into believing
that it has a pressure transducer located at the tip of
the catheter. Ironically, Utah Medical advertised the
Intran II (the 161 device) as sensor-tipped when
that device also had the transducer in proximal end
of the catheter outside of the patients body. Utah
Medical now states that this too was false state- ment.
[16] Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act provides a
cause of action against:
Any person who, on or in connection with any
goods or services, or any container for goods,
uses in commerce any word, term name, symbol,
or device, or any combination thereof, or any
false designation of origin, false or misleading
description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which ... in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature,
characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of
his or her or another person's goods, services, or
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commercial activities.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1994). In order to establish a
claim under the false or deceptive advertising prong
of the Lanham Act, a plaintiff must prove:
(1) a false statement of fact by the defendant in a
commercial advertisement about its own or another's product; (2) the statement actually deceived or has the tendency to deceive a substantial segment of its audience; (3) the deception is
material, in that it is likely to influence the purchasing decision; (4) the defendant caused its
false statement to enter interstate commerce; and
(5) the plaintiff has been or is likely to be injured
as a result of the false statement, either by direct
diversion of sales from itself to defendant or by a
loss of good will associated with its products.
United Industries Corp. v. C lor ox Co., 140 F.3d
1175, 1180 (8th Cir.1998); see also Johnson &
Johnson-Merck Consumer Pharm. Co. v. RhonePoulenc Rorer Pharm,, Inc., 19 F.3d 125, 130 (3d
Cir.1994) (further noting that "the Lanham Act
plaintiff 'bears the burden of proving actual deception by a preponderance of the evidence' ").
[17][18] To satisfy the first element and prove a
statement is false within the *1309 meaning of the
Lanham Act, "the plaintiff must demonstrate either
that the challenged advertisement is literally false,
or, although literally true, that it is still likely to
mislead or confuse consumers." L & F Products v.
Procter & Gamble, 45 F.3d 709, 711 (2d Cir.1995).
Utah Medical pursues its Lanham Act claim only
under the theory that defendants' claim that the Koala is "sensor-tipped" is literally false. Accordingly,
plaintiff argues that by establishing that the commercial claim is literally false, consumer perception
is irrelevant, and the Court should evaluate claims
of literal falsity according to the objective industry
standards without reference to consumer confusion.
See Johnson & Johnson-Merck, 19 F.3d at 129
("If a plaintiff proves a challenged claim is literally
false, a court may grant relief without considering
whether the buying public was misled. A determination of literal falsity rests on an analysis of the
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message in context."); United Industries, 140 F.3d
at 1180 ("If a plaintiff proves that a challenged
claim is literally false, a court may grant relief
without considering whether the buying public was
actually misled; actual consumer confusion need
not be proved.")- Defendants, however, argue that
the law requires evidence of falsity based on the advertisements as a whole as viewed by the relevant
consuming public. While actual consumer confusion is not necessary to assert a claim of literal falsity, the perspective of the relevant consumer population is necessary in determining whether the advertising could be viewed as false. Thus, in order to
assess whether an advertisement is literally false,
the Court must analyze the message conveyed within the full context of the advertisement. Making
such a determination as to the full context requires
the Court to look at the audience. See Sandoz
Pharm. Corp. v. Richards on-Vicks, Inc., 902 F.2d
222, 229 (3d Cir.1990) (noting that " '[c]ontext can
often be important in discerning the message conveyed and this is particularly true where, as here,
the target of the advertising is not the consuming
public but a more well informed and sophisticated
audience' [; h]ence, a target audience's special
knowledge of a class of products is highly relevant
to any claim that it was misled by an advertisement
for such a product" (quoting Plough, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson Baby Prods. Co., 532 F.Supp. 714,
717 (D.Del.1982))). This Court finds such an inquiry relevant in determining if advertising the Koala as sensor-tipped is literally false in light of its
targeted audience. Plaintiff bears the burden to
show that the Koala advertisements were false as
commonly understood by the consuming population
of obstetric and gynecologic clinicians based on
their knowledge and experience.

thus becomes whether Utah Medical has sufficient
evidence that the relevant consuming population interpreted "Sensor-tipped" as meaning the transducer was in the tip of the catheter. On this point,
Utah Medical only offer Mr. Hitchcock's uncorroborated opinion.
Furthermore, Utah Medical's expert focuses only on
the
bald
statement
that the
Koala
is
"sensor-tipped." In fact, it is undisputed that Koala's promotional materials fully describe the device
and detail the respective locations of the pressure
sensing membrane and the pressure transducer. In
those advertisements, Clinical states that the Koala
"senses the pressure at the catheter tip" and communicates amniotic pressure "to a transducer located in the reusable cable"; that the Koala system
has a "pressure sensor in the uterus and external
transducer in the reusable cable"; tteit "when pressure is exerted on the membrane, it is transmitted ...
to the reusable connector which contains a pressure
transducer"; and that "pressure [is] measured at the
tip with internal sensing membrane; [and then] aircoupled to reusable* 1310 transducer located in interconnect cable." Plaintiffs expert admits that he
viewed Clinical's advertisement statement in isolation and that the only thing he found important with
respect to he Koala advertisements was that they
used the term "sensor tip." Accordingly, the Court
finds that plaintiffs argument does not take into account the proper context of the statement. Furthermore, plaintiffs expert offers no insight into how
an educated and skilled labor and delivery clinician
could misled into believing that there is a pressure
transducer in the Koala catheter tip when the
product literature repeatedly states that the external
transducer is located in the reusable cable.

[19] As an initial matter the Court finds that Utah
Medical failed to produce sufficient evidence to
find that the term "sensor-tipped" is literally false.
The tip does in fact "sense" amniotic pressure. The
advertisements do not state that the device is
"transduce-tipped." Such a statement would be literally false as applied to the Koala. The inquiry

Utah Medical offers no support of its claim in context of the entire advertisement or as to the targeted
audience. Utah Medical supports its allegations
solely through the expert testimony of Robert W.
Hitchcock, a biomedical engineer, who opines that
the Koala advertisements are false because the
"balloon at the tip of the Koala catheter is not a
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sensor according to industry defmitions."Hitchcock
claims that in order to be sensor-tipped under engineering parlance, an intrauterine pressure catheter
must contain a silicon chip pressure transducer in
the catheter tip. In his deposition, Hitchcock made
several revealing admissions in connection with
Utah Medical's false advertising claim: (1) that he
had not done any research at all with respect to how
a clinician in labor and delivery would understand
the term sensor tip in conjunction with intrauterine
catheters; (2) that he had not had any discussions
with any intrauterine catheter consumer that expressed any confusion regarding the Koala's advertising; (3) that he had not talked to any purchasers of
intrauterine catheters prior to putting his report together; and (4) that he was speculating with regard
to the purchaser of an intrauterine catheter. As subsequently explained, the Court finds that the expert
opinion of Robert Hitchcock regarding plaintiffs
false advertising claim should be excluded under
Federal Rule of Evidence 702. However, even if the
Court were to allow Hitchcock's expert opinion regarding this issue, and allow it to go to the weight
of the issue, the Court finds that Hitchcock's testimony is not enough to allow plaintiff to present this
claim to a jury.
Plaintiff must also prove that the challenged statement is material. See U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Blue
Cross, 898 F.2d 914, 922 (3d Cir.1990) ( "The
[Lanham Act] plaintiff must ... show that defendant's misrepresentations material in that it is likely
to influence the purchasing decision."). Plaintiff offers no such evidence. Nothing in plaintiffs expert
report rises to the level that a reasonable juror could
use in supporting a finding that the Koala advertisements was material and influenced purchasing decisions of relevant consumers.
Based upon all of the evidence submitted by
plaintiff, the Court finds that no reasonable jury
could find that defendants have falsely advertised
the Koala as sensor-tipped when viewing the Koala
advertisements as a whole in the relative context.
The Koala advertisements clearly disclose that
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while the Koala is sensor-tipped it has a pressure
transducer housed at the other end of the catheter. It
would be another matter if the Koala advertisements read "transducer-tipped," but they do not.
Thus, the Court finds that the sensor-tipped advertisements are not literally false as a matter of law.
Even if plaintiff had claimed that the advertisements were misleading, plaintiffs claim would have
failed because it has no support that consumers
were confused or mislead. If there were some factual basis to support the claim that from the perspective of the relevant consumer the advertisements as
a whole could be viewed as false, the Court would
allow this claim to go to a jury. But, there is not.
Hitchcock's claims are supported by nothing more
than his opinion as an engineer that the term
sensor-tipped does not mean what Clinical claims it
does. Accordingly, the Court finds that no genuine
issues of material fact exist and that summary judgment*1311 is appropriate on plaintiffs false advertising claims under the Lanham Act.

C Summary Judgment as to Plaintiffs Misappropriation of Trade Secrets Claim
[20] Plaintiff alleges that Clinical has misappropriated Utah Medical's trade secrets, specifically alleging that Clinical used its trade secrets and confidential information to develop and market Clinical's Clearview uterine manipulator and Koala catheter. To establish a claim for misappropriation of
trade secrets, plaintiff must show "(1) the existence
of a trade secret, (2) communication of the trade
secret to [the defendant] under an express duty not
to disclose or use it, and (3) [defendants'] use of the
secret that injures [plaintiff]." Water & EnergySystems Tech., Inc., 974 P.2d 821, 822 (Utah 1999)
(citing Microbiological Res. Corp. v. Mima, 625
P.2d 690, 697-98 (Utah 1981)). Clinical argues that
it is entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs
misappropriation of trade secret claim because Utah
Medical has not and cannot establish that its
claimed information is a trade secret or that Clinical
used any claimed trade secret information.
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"The threshold issue in every case is whether, in
fact, there is a trade secret to be misappropriate."
Muna, 625 P.2d at 696. The Utah Supreme Court
further recognized that "[t]he burden is upon the
plaintiff to prove its existence as a secret, and there
is no presumption in his favor." Id. a trade secret is
statutorily defined. The Uniform Trade Secrets Act,
which has been adopted by Utah, reads:
"Trade secret" means information, including a
formula, pattern, compilation, program, device,
method, technique, or process that:
(a) derives independent economic value, actual
or potential, from not being generally known to,
and not being readily ascertainable by proper
means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use; and
(b) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable
under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-24-2(4) (1999).
Plaintiff alleges that much of the 17,000 pages of
documents in the three banker boxes that Wallace
took from Utah Medical contained confidential
trade secret information. According to one ' of
plaintiffs expert reports, the documents that Wallace took from Utah Medical can be separated into
the following five categories: (1) business strategy
documents, including 1989-1993 company goals,
1993-1995 strategic plans, strategy regarding the
Intran catheter, and a joint venture with Malinckrodt Medical regarding a pressure monitoring catheter which uses a "special membrane"; (2) market
analysis documents, including development agreements, Dr. Buschmann agreement, documents relating to fetal oxymetry, Intran marketing and test research, Intran complaints, and Intran II specifications and market research; (3) product developing
and testing documents, including the 1990 Intran
Plus design and development, 1990 Intran II clinical trials, and Intran II design with balloon, analysis
of Intran II clinical trial failures, and intrauterine
catheter design suggestions for proximal sensor,
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air-filled catheter, and distally-mounted flexible
membrane; (4) manufacturing and production documents, including standard operating procedure manufacturing documents, Intran Plus through-put and
procedures, Intran II manufacturing through-put
and vendors; and finally (5) sales and distribution
documents, including Intran sales forecast, 1987
sales numbers, Deltran's sales strategy and marketing plan, Intran sales forecasts, and 1992 VP sales
and marketing work objectives. See Hitchcock
Trade Secret Report at 6-7. Utah Medical argues
that having access to these documents would
provide substantial assistance to Clinical in developing and introducing its Koala catheter by reducing the amount of time necessary to evaluate
product opportunity, develop *1312 and test prototypes, and produce and distribute the product, as
well as provide quicker market penetration, enhanced competitive strategies, and reduced development time and opportunity cost.
[21] Utah Medical further alleges that defendants
had access to other unknown trade secret information that has been withheld by the defendants, as
evidenced by information that appeared in Clinical's business plan regarding its uterine manipulator
but was not in the documents turned over by Wallace to Utah Medical. Such allegations, lacking further support, will not be entertained by the Court.
Without additional evidence, the Court will not infer trade secrets have been misappropriated. The
burden is upon the plaintiff to establish the existence of a trade secret, and plaintiff must substantiate more than vague and unsupported allegations as
to unknown trade secrets in order to satisfy its burden.
In determining whether the documents taken by
Wallace constitute trade secrets, the Court looks to
the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Microbiological Res. Corp. v. Muna, 625 P.2d 690 (Utah
1981), which is remarkably similar to the instant
case. Muna involved a claim of misappropriation
brought by a medical diagnostic kit company
against its former president, a doctor and the de-
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veloper of its diagnostic kits. While employed by
plaintiff, the defendant conceived and developed
diagnostic kits used to detect diseases, and the
plaintiff manufactured these kits and sold them to
hospitals and labs. The plaintiff terminated the defendant, and thereafter the defendant began plans to
manufacture a line of products similar to the
plaintiffs. The plaintiff sued, alleging misappropriation of its claimed trade secrets. See Muna at 692.
Based on these facts, the Utah Supreme Court was
faced with several of the same issues that this Court
is now faced with regarding Utah Medical's claim.
The Muna court offers several valuable insights as
to Utah trade secret law. The court recognized the
balance that must exist in this area, observing that
the law encourages competition and supports an individual's right to exploit his own skill and knowledge, yet should grant established businesses reasonable protection against unfair trade practices.
See id. at 697. Accordingly, the court stated that
"[u]pon termination of his employment, an employee has the prerogative to use his general knowledge,
experience, memory and skill, however gained,
provided he does not use, disclose, or impinge upon
any of the secret process or business secrets of his
former employer." Id. In Muna, the plaintiff failed
to establish any claimed trade secret because the
court found that the information the plaintiff
claimed as its secret was expertise known to those
ih the industry such as Dr. Muna. The court concluded that it would be unfair to preclude Dr.
Mima's use of his expertise, stating that he could
not be enjoined from "using his knowledge, skill
and experiences in an independent business." Id. at
699.
[22] Given Wallace, Cutler, and Smith's collective
knowledge and experience with Utah Medical and
its products, it is difficult to delineate what they
knew and what would be a secret. See id. at 697
("There must be a delineation between the general
knowledge and experience of the employee and the
trade secrets of the employer."). This is why the
plaintiff has the burden to bring forth specific trade
secret information that is not generally known or
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readily ascertainable. This standard cannot be
viewed as whether the information is generally
known and readily ascertainable to the general public, but, based on the defendants' knowledge and
experience, whether the information was known or
ascertainable to them. See id. at 699 (recognizing
that information that was published and commonly
known in the trade should not be considered a trade
secret). Moreover, the "subject matter of the trade
secret must be unknown; it should not be in the
public domain or within the knowledge of the
trade'Vrf. at 696.
*1313 Utah Medical must define its claimed trade
secret with the precision and particularity necessary
to separate it from the general skill and knowledge
possessed by Wallace, Cutler, and Smith. The Court
finds that the plaintiff has not done so. Simply
identifying documents and claiming that they contain trade secret information is not enough. Plaintiff
must establish that the information in the identified
documents is not published or readily ascertainable
information to those in the field. Additionally,
plaintiff has reiterated in deposition and at oral argument that defendant could not help but use trade
secret information in doing what they are doing.
Yet, plaintiff has failed to identify with specificity
exactly what trade secrets were used. Such vague
assertions fall short of what is required by the law.
Even if Utah Medical could establish that defendants had trade secret information, it must be able to
establish that defendants used such information.
See id. at 696. Plaintiff claims Clinical's very
products demonstrate the use of Utah Medical's
trade secret information. Shortly after Clinical's inception in April of 1993, it developed its Clearview
uterine manipulator. By June 11, 1993, Wallace developed a prototype for the Clearview without performing any marketing studies on the uterine manipulator. Clinical also generated a business plan in
July of 1993, describing various potential products,
including its uterine manipulator. Portions of the
business plan, such as the product description and
market analysis sections for a disposable uterine
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manipulator appear to have been copied nearly verbatim from Utah Medical documents. Clinical has
admitted that it was able to avoid formal marketing
evaluations for both the Koala and Clearview uterine manipulator. Clinical has acknowledged that it
did not perform any marketing analysis for the Koala due to its principals' knowledge of Utah Medical's experience with the Intran I and Intran Plus.
Certainly Clinical was able to circumvent some preliminary market research on the Koala and Clearview, allowing them to compete with Utah Medical
sooner than someone who was just entering the
market. However, Wallace, Cutler, and Smith were
not just entering the market, and the law will not
prevent competition just because a former employee has the potential to be an immediate competitor.
Plaintiffs allegation regarding misappropriation of
the uterine manipulator trade secret information
falls short as a matter of law. Plaintiff does not
identify any aspect of Clinical's Clearview product
that it contends was a copy of any trade secret, but
rather only identifies Clinical's business plan,
which discusses general information about the purpose of uterine manipulators and the various competing uterine manipulators available to clinicians.
From the record in this case, the Court finds it is
undisputed that such information is generally
known or readily ascertainable to those in the industry.
Additionally, plaintiff alleges that Clinical's user
specifications for the Koala are virtually identical
to the user specification for the Intran II, which
were among the documents taken by Wallace. Regarding the Intran II user specifications, that information contains general background information
as to what intrauterine catheters are, their clinical
use, and existing devices on the market. The Court
is not satisfied that this information qualifies as a
trade secret as a matter of law.
Finally, plaintiff alleges that the idea of placing a
membrane in the tip of the Intran II was contained
in the documents that Wallace had and that he used
that idea in developing the Koala. However, the
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Court finds that given Wallace's expertise and experience with intrauterine catheters., plaintiff has
not established that this idea to place a membrane
or balloon in a catheter was a trade secret. See id.
at 697 (finding that "the employee is protected by
the rule that the owner may not arbitrarily pronounce anything a trade secret"). It is beyond any
factual dispute that Wallace possessed this knowledge with or without any written reference there to
in documentation he received from Utah Medical.
*1314 Other than plaintiffs two examples of Clinical's copying portions of its business plan discussing the uterine manipulator and the user specifications for the Koala, neither of which contain trade
secret information, Utah Medical offers nothing
more than argument for the proposition that the
trade secret information contained in the Wallace
documents and other trade secret information that
Wallace, Cutler, and Smith left with in their heads
must have been used by Clinical Innovations in its
efforts to compete with Utah Medical. Plaintiff argues that the defendants' use of trade secrets was
inevitable. Statements such as "I don't know how
they couldn't have used trade secrets" are too tenuous to allow the Court to send such a claim to a
jury. This case does not factually rise to the level of
being an inevitable disclosure case. See PepsiCo
v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262 (7th Cir.1995) (finding
the at a former PepsiCo employee could not help
but use time sensitive and highly specific marketing
plans for the upcoming year in his new position
with a competitor). Because plaintiff has failed to
identify any trade secret with the particularly required by law, or adduced any evidence of use of
any such trade secret, the Court finds that defendants are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs
misappropriation of trade secrets claim.

D. Summary Judgment as to Plaintiffs Breach of
Fiduciary Duty Claim
[23] Plaintiffs breach of fiduciary duty claim is
based on Wallace's and Cutler's failure to sign an
employee agreement and Wallace's possession of
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Utah Medical documents. Defendants assert, and
this Court agrees, that plaintiffs breach of fiduciary
duty claim is barred by the statute of limitations.
There is a three-year statute of limitations applicable to plaintiffs claim. SeeUTAU CODE ANN. §
78-12-27 (1999). For the statutory period to begin
to run, "[t]he shareholders or directors must have
knowledge of the wrongdoing or facts that put them
on inquiry and must be sufficiently independent to
be able to assert a claim on behalf of the corporation." United Park City Mines Co. v. Greater Park
City Co., 870 P.2d 880, 885 (Utah 1993). The statute commences when the corporate officers obtain
sufficient information "to put them on notice and to
make further inquiry if they harbor doubts or questions." Id. at 886. In this case, plaintiffs did not
file their claim until January 30, 1997. Accordingly,
the question is whether Utah Medical had knowledge or notice of the wrongdoing before January
30, 1994. Based on the undisputed facts, Utah Medical had knowledge or notice sufficient to spur further inquiry in 1993.
Defendants assert that plaintiff had knowledge of
Wallace and Cutler's alleged failure to sign the employment agreement in 1993. At the latest, Utah
Medical should have known or made further inquiry into this issue at the time Wallace filed his
wrongful termination suit in the Spring of 1993,
which should have provided Utah Medical with the
opportunity to fully explore Wallace's employment
terms. Utah Medical has not disputed that it had notice of Wallace's alleged failure to sign an employment agreement prior to 1994. In addition, Utah
Medical's president admitted that he knew in May
1993 that Cutler had not signed an employee agreement. Plaintiffs memorandum in opposition does
not address this aspect of defendants' argument.
Therefore, it is undisputed that plaintiff had knowledge of these events prior to 1994.
[24] With respect to the second argument in
plaintiffs breach of fiduciary duty claim, Utah
Medical knew that Wallace had Utah Medical documents in his possession long before January of
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1994. Plaintiff attempts to recast its claim as challenging Wallace's use of the documents, not his
mere possession of the documents. However, this
shift does not affect the statute of limitations defect.
Under the standard set forth in United Park City
Mines, the statute begins to run when corporate officers or directors obtain sufficient information "to
put them on notice to make further inquiry if they
*1315 harbor doubts or questions." Id. at 886. In
United Park City Mines, the Utah Supreme Court
makes no reference to any requirement that the officers have knowledge of actual "use" of the information. It is sufficient that Utah Medical had
sufficient information that a reasonable person
would "harbor doubts or questions." In July of
1993, Utah Medical obtained copies of all the documents Dr. Wallace had in his possession. Utah
Medical had ample opportunity to review the documents for any alleged confidential and proprietary
information. At that time they were put on notice of
what the documents contained. As evidenced by
plaintiffs trade secret claim, Utah Medical certainly
claims that the documents contained alleged trade
secrets. Therefore, Utah Medical had sufficient notice well before the January 1994 critical date, and
their claim is barred.
[25] Even if the plaintiffs' claim was not precluded
by the statute of limitations, summary judgment
should be granted because Utah Medical cannot
demonstrate that it suffered any harm as a result of
any alleged breach. To avoid summary judgment on
its breach of fiduciary duty claim, Utah Medical
must demonstrate that it has suffered some harm as
a result of the alleged breach. See Viernow v. Euripides Dev. Corp., 157 F.3d 785, 797-98 (10th
Cir. 1998) (upholding summary judgment where
plaintiff could show no harm as a result of breach
of fiduciary duty). Utah Medical has failed to substantiate that it suffered any harm from the alleged
breach of fiduciary duty. Defendants argue that it is
immaterial whether Wallace and Cutler signed an
employment agreement. A formal employment
agreement is not necessary under Utah law to create
a duty of confidentiality. See Envirotech Corp. v.
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Callahan, 872 P.2d 487, 497 (Utah Ct.App.1994).
Thus, a duty of confidentiality existed between
Wallace and Cutler and Utah Medical under the
Uniform Trade Secrets Act independent of any employment agreement. Therefore, Utah Medical
suffered no harm even if Wallace and Cutler were
obligated to sign the employment agreement, and
failed to do so, as Utah Medical posits. Moreover,
Utah Medical eviscerates its claim by admitting that
the agreement contained no covenant not to compete. Even if Wallace and Cutler had signed the
agreement, they were not forbidden to compete
with Utah Medical. Plaintiff argues that because
this is a bifurcated trial, they do not have to make a
showing of damages. However, the fact of damages
is an essential element of Utah Medical's cause of
action that must be substantiated to overcome summary judgment. See Viernow, 157 F.3d at 797-98.
Because damage is an essential element to a claim
for breach of fiduciary duty, Utah Medical's claim
fails as a matter of law.
Finally, any complaint as to the employment agreements would have been more appropriately brought
under a breach of contract claim. No such cause of
action was filed. The Court also finds that plaintiffs
fiduciary duty argument is coextensive with its misappropriation of trade secrets claim. Plaintiff is
simply attempting to recover under another theory
that is improper. The law will not allow plaintiff to
seek recovery by simply repackaging their claim in
another improper theory.

E. Defendants' Motions in Limine to Exclude Expert Testimony
Defendants move to exclude the expert opinion
testimony of Robert W. Hitchcock regarding
plaintiffs false advertising claim, and to exclude
the expert opinion testimony of Roger W. Blakely,
Jr. regarding his legal opinions on claim construction and other patent infringement issues. Defendants' argue that the proposed expert testimony does
not satisfy, inter alia, the requirements of Federal
Rule of Evidence 702.
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Rule 702 states:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may *1316 testify
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
FED.R.EV1D. 702. (1999). Under the Supreme
Court's decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786,
125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), this Court is required to
assume a "gatekeeping" role to guarantee that under
Rule 702 an expert's testimony is "not only relevant, but reliable." Id. at 589, 113 S.Ct. 2786. Thus,
the Court must determine first whether the expert's
proposed testimony is scientific knowledge, and
second, whether the evidence "fits" the current issue and will assist the jury. See id. at 592, 113
S.Ct. 2786; see also Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 143
L.Ed.2d 238 (1999) (holding that Daubert 's gatekeeping obligation applies not only to scientific
testimony, but also to all expert testimony, and that
Rule 702 does not distinguish between scientific
knowledge and technical or other specialized knowledge).
[26] Robert Hitchcock opines that advertising the
Koala as "sensor-tipped" is literally false. As explained more fully in the false advertising section
above, Hitchcock reaches this conclusion based on
his engineering experience. In accordance with the
Court's holding, plaintiffs Lanham Act claim is
contingent on analyzing the advertisement in full
context as viewed by those to whom the advertisement was directed. Hitchcock never analyzed the
full context of the advertisements or how they were
perceived among the clinicians whom the advertisements targeted. While Hitchcock's expert opinion
may be reliable as to the methodology he used to
opine on the meaning of "sensor-tipped" in the
medical engineering industry, the Court does not
need to address that issue. Even if Hitchcock's
methodology for reaching his opinion is reliable,
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the opinion must be relevant. Hitchcock's testimony
is deficient in this area. The Court finds that Hitchcock's testimony does not satisfy the relevance
prong of admissibility under Dauber and Kumho
Tire and will not be helpful in assisting a trier of
fact as required under Rule 702. Therefore, the
Court finds that Hitchcock's expert report as to
plaintiffs false advertising claim is inadmissible
and should be excluded.
[27] Next the Court turns to Roger Blakely's expert
opinion. Plaintiff has designated Blakely, a patent
attorney, as an expert witness to testify on claim
construction, infringement, and the pioneer status
of plaintiffs patented device. As stated earlier, patent claim construction is a question of law and uis
exclusively within the province of the court."
Markman v. Westview Instrs. Inc., 517 U.S. 370,
372, 116 S.Ct. 1384, 134 L.Ed.2d 577 (1996). Furthermore, patent claims generally will be construed
solely upon intrinsic evidence, which includes the
patent claims, the patent specification, and the prosecution history of the patent, without resort to extrinsic evidence, such as expert testimony. See
Bell & Howell Document Mgt. Prods. Co. v. Altek
Sys., 132 F.3d 701, 706 (Fed.Cir.1997) (holding
that "patents should be interpreted on the basis of
their intrinsic record, not on the testimony of such
after-the-fact 'experts' that played no part in the
creation and prosecution of the patent"); Vitronics
Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1584
(Fed.Cir.1996) (holding that "where the patent documents are unambiguous, expert testimony regarding the meaning of a claim is entitled to no
weight"). In this case, the Court sees no need to resort to any outside legal expert even one with Mr.
Blakely's experience. Accordingly, Blakely's expert
opinion as to claim construction is excluded.
Defendants next argue that Blakely's opinion
should be excluded as to his testimony on whether
the accused device infringes upon the 161 patent
and as to the pioneer status of the 161 patent. The
Court agrees that such legal opinions attempt to
define the legal parameters which in this case
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should be left to the Court and to the jury. See
Specht v. Jensen, 853 F.2d 805, 807-810 (10th
Cir. 1988) (allowing an expert to proclaim a legal
conclusion would "circumvent the jury's decisionmaking function by telling it how to decide the
*1317 case"). While arguing that this testimony
should be admissible, plaintiff acknowledges that
the admissibility of such testimony is within the
discretion of the district court. See Markman v.
Westview Inst, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 980-81
(Fed.Cir.1995). Under its discretion, the Court finds
that Blakely's testimony is unnecessary and not
helpful to the Court or the fact finder pursuant to
Rule 702. Accordingly, Blakely's expert opinion as
to infringement and the pioneer status of the 161
patent is excluded.

IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court finds that in
light of its interpretation of the 161 patent, no reasonable juror could find that the accused device infringes, either literally or under the doctrine of
equivalents, upon Claims 1 through 35 of the 161
patent. Therefore, the Court GRANTS defendants'
motion for summary judgment as to all of plaintiffs
claims for patent infringement.
Additionally, the Court finds that the plaintiff has
not presented sufficient evidence to sustain its false
advertising, trade secrets, and fiduciary duty
claims. Thus, the Court GRANTS defendants' motion for summary judgment as to plaintiffs claims
for false advertising under the Lanham Act, misappropriation of trade secrets, and breach of fiduciary
duty. Finally, the Court GRANTS defendants' motion in limine to exclude the expert testimony of
Robert Hitchcock as to his expert report on the analysis of the term "sensor tip" as applied to the Koala device, as well as defendants' motion in limine
to exclude the expert testimony of Roger W.
Blakely regarding his legal opinions on claim construction, infringement, and the pioneer status of
plaintiffs patented device.

© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.

79F.Supp.2dl290
79F.Supp.2dl290
(Cite as: 79 F.Supp.2d 1290)
It is so ORDERED.
D.Utah,1999.
Utah Medical Products, Inc. v. Clinical Innovations
Associates, Inc.
79 RSupp.2d 1290
END OF DOCUMENT
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Attached please find the revised air cooling / water cooling paper for the May 15 CEC. There are no significant changes
to the paper. It has only been updated to include information on the Spanish Fork water sale and how this has developed
into a controversial issue in the region and that PacifiCorp can expect similar controversy with a purchase of water in the
same area.
The revised version will be distributed prior to the meeting.
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Executive Summary:

While a water-cooled plant is the lowest cost
alternative, it now appears that there will be significant
public opposition to using Utah Lake water for cooling
a power plant. Furthermore, efforts to acquire Utah
Lake Water for the project have not progressed as
rapidly as hoped and are not now expected to be in
place as soon as necessary to meet IRP requirements
for an in-house build alternative. Therefore, it is
recommended that the Company develop the
alternative using an air-cooled condenser and that it
purse acquisition of sufficient water to support the aircooled option.

Key Issue(s) for Discussion:

Evaluation of the preferred option for CCCT
development
Consideration of water acquisition for the air-cooled
option
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0\TERVIEW
CCCT plants can be designed to operate with either air or water-cooled condensers.
Although wet cooling is more widespread both wet and dry cooling are available
technologies for power plants. Conceptually, each has its advantages and disadvantages
- power plants with wet cooling systems are less costly to build and are more efficient in
generating power, but dry cooled plants require minimal amounts of water and less
problems with wastewater disposal.
This paper examines the broad impacts of the selection of water versus air cooling.
While it concentrates on an evaluation of environmental impacts, it also includes a
discussion of economic development, permitting considerations and stakeholder
engagement.
While a water-cooled plant is the lowest cost alternative, it now appears that there will be
significant public opposition to using Utah Lake water for cooling a power plant.
Furthermore, efforts to acquire Utah Lake Water for the project have not progressed as
rapidly as hoped and are not now expected to be in place as soon as necessary to meet
IRP requirements for an in-house build alternative. Therefore, it is recommend that the
Company develop the alternative using an air-cooled condenser and that it purse
acquisition of sufficient water to support the air-cooled option
POLICY CONTEXT
The environmental policy of ScottishPower states that the Company recognize the value
to society of biological diversity, cultural heritage natural resources such as land and
water and will strive, within the scope of our operations, to secure their preservation. The
PacifiCorp policy, which is consistent with the group policy, specifies that the Company
will institute and maintain programs that further the aims of sustainable development,
promote the environmental-stewardship, enhance fish and wildlife, prevent pollution,
conserve energy, reduce consumption and waste, recycle materials and use recycled
products.
Neither ScottishPower nor PacifiCorp have a specific detailed policy concerning water
use. When faced with a decision regarding wet or dry cooling of a plant, the company
must evaluate site specific considerations. Key criteria for such an analysis must include:
•

•

Environmental tradeoffs: It is the company's goal to reduce our overall
environmental footprint where opportunities arise. Choice of cooling technology has
different impacts in the areas of water use, air emissions, noise, and visual impacts.
These differences should be analyzed and balanced based on the environmental
sensitivities at the specific site. In some cases environmental impacts can be
mitigated as part of the project design and this possible mitigation should be
considered as well.
Economic development: Providing low cost power that helps promote economic
development is an important measure of sustainability. Also, prudent utility decision-
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•

•

making requires the company to be guided by the least risk, least cost solution. If one
alternative offers substantially less risk, it may be selected even though it is not the
least cost alternative. In the area of water use, a key matter for economic
development considerations is: would a water-cooled plant be using water that is
critical for another important economic purpose?
Government regulation and permitting: New energy facilities must receive a
number of environmental permits and approvals as part of the siting process. The
ability to get these approvals is one important measure of political preferences in
balancing environmental, economic and social goals.
Stakeholder response: Stakeholders, such as customers, environmental groups, and
water owners may take an interest in the company's choice of technological options.
The strong preferences of stakeholders could impact our ability to move through the
permitting process as well as have an impact on the company's reputation.

ENVIRONMENTAL TRADEOFFS
The environmental tradeoffs appear to rest in favor of an air-cooled plant, although this
decision requires some judgement. The ten fold increase in water use from a watercooled plant is somewhat offset by an efficiency penalty (and a resulting 5% increase in
summertime air emissions) as well as some noise impacts. While air quality impacts are
of great concern along the Wasatch Front, the air impacts will not necessarily be within
this critical airshed, but rather will be experienced within the PacifiCorp system. Lesser
impacts, such as noise from the larger number of fans from a dry-cooled plant, can be
somewhat mitigated through additional capital expense.
The water cooled option might be seen as favored from the perspective of environmental
tradeoffs when considering that the plant is only using 1% of the available industrial
water. This is both a relatively small quantity and it is reasonable to expect this industrial
water to be purchased by another industrial user if not by PacifiCorp. With this
perspective., the efficiency penalty becomes meaningful and could push the balance
towards the water-cooled option.
a) Water Use
With Utah being the second driest state in the nation and in the midst of its fifth year of
drought it is almost certain that there will be growing public concern about how best to
use the state's limited water resources. A dry-cooled plant reduces water consumption to
less than one-tenth of the water used for a corresponding combined-cycle plant using
water cooling.
The plan for a water-cooled gas plant (as described in an April 10, 2003 CEC paper) is to
access water from Utah Lake and pump this water through a new pipe to the plant site.
The water used under this plan is industrial water now being sold by industrial users.

For Water Cooled
1) Water is a precious resource, however, the water PacifiCorp intends to use is
allocated for industrial use and cannot be used for potable water. Utah Lake has fairly
poor water quality and it is not used for potable water but can be used for agricultural
purposes. If drought conditions continue, the clean up and use of this source might be
possible, but it is not currently being considered as a potable source.
2) Utah's Water Resources Planning for the Future (May 2001) shows that the 6,000
acre-feet of industrial water that PacifiCorp is interested in purchasing is less than 1%
of the total municipal & industrial water supply in the Greater Wasatch Area (Table 1
in Appendix). Based on this analysis it is difficult to see a link between wet cooling
at our plant and limits to water dependent industrial development in the region.
For Air Cooled
1) Agricultural water in the Mona area is limited and would not support a water-cooled
option. There is sufficient water for the air-cooled option.
2) Use of agricultural water will result in some local opposition but the extent of this
opposition should be less due to the small quantity (less than 600 acre-ft) of water
involved.
3) The fanners in the Southern Utah Lake area currently pump out 12,000 acre-feet from
the Lake for their use. PacifiCorp will be the single largest user of water from the
Lake with its use of 6,000 acre-ft. It now appears that there would be significant
public opposition to using Utah Lake water to cool a power plant While this
opposition may eventually be overcome, it would take time and effort to do so. The
opposition would most likely occur during public hearings associated with transfer of
the title to ownership of the water.
Conclusion: Water is a precious resource, conserving it in the Utah Coimty area will be
seen as a positive environmental outcome.
b) Air Quality and Plant Efficiency
For Water Cooled
1) Overall the emissions for the specific CCCT with a wet condenser and a CCCT with a
dry condenser will be virtually the same. However, dry cooling is inherently less
efficient than wet cooling, which decreases power output for comparable amounts of
fuel consumed. During peak energy usage (hot summer days when dry cooling is at
its least efficient), additional generation may need to be brought on line to make up
the difference. Dry cooling would reduce the output of a 1,000 MW power plant by
approximately 50 MW during the hottest period when customer demand is greatest.
During peak demand, power would need to be imported or generated to make up this
loss. This simply means that another plant would need to be operated somewhere,
resulting in more air pollution per megawatt generated.
For Air Cooled
There is some reduction in particulate emissions (PM10) associated with an air-cooled
condenser. This is of value because the plant has some impact on neighboring Utah

County which is listed as non-attainment for PM10 emissions. There are no other
significant air quality advantages to an air-cooled system.
Conclusion: Air quality is perhaps the most critical environmental variable given the
location of the plant near an area that is in non-attainment. There are no other significant
air quality differences between technologies. The 5% efficiency "hit" during hot summer
days does result in greater systemwide emissions under the air-cooled scenario.
c) Visual Resources and Noise
The visual view as well as the noise levels needs to be considered when making the
decision between dry and wet cooled condensers.*
For Water Cooled
1) The structures of dry-cooling systems are generally taller (80 feet vs 40 feet) and
larger than those of wet-cooling systems.
2) Dry-cooling systems are somewhat noisier than wet-cooling systems because of the
large fans used to move air through the cooling system and the higher location of the
fans above ground leveL
For Air Cooled
1) Wet-cooling systems emit a visible plume of water from the cooling tower. The
Mona site will utilize a plume-abated cooling tower that reduces the size and
frequency of visible plumes to lower levels, however, the plume with still be visible
to the local community and cars traveling on 1-15.
Conclusion: The impacts in terms of noise favor wet cooling while the visual impacts
favor air cooling.
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
The water-cooled plant is the lowest cost option identified within the least cost plan. The
addition of the least cost option will put less upward pressure on rates and will have an
overall beneficial impact on economic development and growth within the region.
The only exception to this conclusion would be if the water use of the plant were likely to
create another constraint on development (Le., that industrial water that no longer is
available for use by new industry.)
Conclusion: Given that the plant will only use 1% of the currently available industrial
water, it does not appear that the water-cooled plant presents a real limit to growth.
PERMUTING
As water resources become more valuable permitting authorities may begin to deny
permits or condition them on potential impacts to water resources- There currently is no

indication from Utah that the state is leaning towards these restrictions, however, some
other western states have begun initial policy deliberations regarding the use of wetcooling. The New Mexico Legislature, for example, considered enacting new regulations
to review water efficiency in plants exceeding 50MW. The bill would have required an
analysis of water use by all new power plants and consideration of dry cooling. In 2002,
the Arizona Corporation Commission came close to requiring two proposed plants to use
dry cooling technology, but stopped short of actually imposing this condition.
For air cooled
• It now appears that there would be significant public opposition to using Utah Lake
water to cool a power plant. While this opposition may eventually be overcome, it
would take time and effort to do so.
Conclusion: Significant public opposition would delay the permitting process for a wet^
cooled plant.
ENVIRONMENTAL GROUPS
Some Environmentalists will fundamentally be against water-cooled plants.
1) The Land and Water Fund of the Rockies recently published a report "The Last
Straw: Water Use by Power Plants in the Arid West/7 The report concluded: In
follow-up discussions with LWF, they suggest a clear preference towards air cooled
plants but agree there could be other mitigating factors that could make water cooling
acceptable.
2) In March 2003, The Nature Conservancy of Utah and the Utah Mitigation
Commission have completed the acquisition and protection of a key 440-acre wetland
property at the southern end of Utah Lake. The wildlife-rich wetland parcel will be
added to already-protected Mitigation Commission wetlands in the Goshen Bay area
in a growing new wildlife preserve. This lesser-known part of Utah Lake supports
migratory waterfowl, shorebirds, raptors and upland birds in impressive numbers.
Conclusion: Environmentalists have a clear preference towards air-cooled plants.
OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
Right of Way
In order to bring Utah Lake water to the Mona site, a 20-22 mile long pipeline will need
to be built. PacifiCorp is currently looking at both the possibility of putting the pipeline
in an existing transmission right-of-way or following county roads. People who live
along the road and are worried about the construction may speak out against the plant. A
dry cooled plant will most likely get water from a well very near the plant and will not
require a significant pipeline. The location of the well and pipeline for the dry-cooled
plant has not been determined.

Wells
PacifiCorp is intending to use well water approximately 20 miles north of the generation
site in an area that has plenty of recharge coming from Utah Lake. We would sink new
wells a minimum of XA mile from the nearest existing wells. There is the possibility that
this would draw the H20 table of these smaller wells down slightly. Existing well
owners will come out strongly against future water development in the Southern Utah
Lake area. A recent Water Transfer Hearing drew over 280 people to protest the sale of
water to the City of Spanish Fork since the development of this water could impact the
quantity of water from existing wells. This Spanish Fork water sale has developed into a
controversial issue in the region and PacifiCorp can expect similar controversy with a
purchase of water in the same area.
REP Process
The RFP process now underway compares all the external bids against the Next Best
Alternative (NBA). The NBA and the proposals under the RFP will be compared on a
number of metrics including price, resource flexibility, and environmental considerations.
The gas plants that may be submitted as part of the RFP process are not limited to aircooled technology. If the Mona site is restricted to the use of air-cooled condensers, this
may force PacifiCorp's option (considered the NBA) to a different standard than the rest
of the bidders.
CONCLUSION
While a water-cooled plant is the lowest cost alternative, it now appears that there will be
significant public opposition to using Utah Lake water for cooling a power plant.
Furthermore, efforts to acquire Utah Lake Water for the project have not progressed as
rapidly as hoped and are not now expected to be in place as soon as necessary to meet
IRP requirements for an in-house build alternative. Therefore, it is recommend that the
Company develop the alternative using an air-cooled condenser and that it purse
acquisition of sufficient water to support the air-cooled option
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APPENDIX 1
Table 1. Present and Projected Total Municipal and Industrial Water Use by Basin
Utah's Water Resources Planning for the Future, May 2001
(acre-feet/yr)

1

Basin

1 Jordan River
1 Weber River
1 Utah Lake
Bear River
West Desert
Total Greater Wasatch Area
1 West Colorado River
Sevier River
t Kanab Creek/Virgin River
Uintah

Cedar/Beaver
Southeast Colorado River
Total UTAH

|
2020 m
(acre-feet/yr)
332,000
449,000
170,000
267,000
134,000
207,000
50,000
71,000
35,000
24,000
1,029,000
710,000
51,000
55,000
48,000
55,000
86,00
42,000
24,000
27,000
33,000
20,000
9,000
10,000
904,000
1,295,000

Present™

(1) The exact year of the data shown "varies from 1992 to 1998.
(2) Projections represent future demands based on current use rates and future population
projections from the Governor's Office of Plaruiing and Budget Actual demands may be less
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Ability to Use Water Acquired from the Southern End of Utah Lake
There are two issues associated with the risk of not being able to use the water taken from the southern end of Utah
Lake. The first issue is whether the point of water extraction can be transferred to the southern end of Utah Lake.
This issue will be addressed in the Acquisition Agreement (yet to be negotiated) wherein the acquisition will be
subject to State approval for taking the water at the southern end of Utah Lake - a practice consistent with Utah
water law. Initial discussions with the State Engineers Office indicate that it will be acceptable to take the water
from the southern end of the Lake.
The second issue is the cost of transporting the water to the project site. The cost of moving water from its point of
extraction to the project site depends upon how and where the water is taken from the Utah Lake drainage area. To
address this issue we engaged Hansen, Allen and Luce, a highly respected hydrological Utah engineering firm with
significant experience and knowledge with respect to the Utah Lake area. The results of their work and that of a
similar effort conducted by Panda, ensures us that extraction from an appropriate location can be done, that it will
be supported by the State Engineer's Office and that it will be economic to transport the water to the selected
project site.
PacifiCorp Does Not Build a Generation Resource at Mona
The second risk is that of not going forward with a PacifiCorp generation project along the Wasatch Front. If a
response to the RFP produced a new resource with lower evaluated costs than one developed by the Company, this
water could be sold to that entity to ensure that the project would be water-cooled and hence more economic. It is
very unlikely that any project will have water going in to the RFP process. The risk of PacifiCorp not using the
water is mitigated by the opportunity to sell the water to a winning KPF proposal or to others for whatever use.
Water in Utah is in very short supply and there will continue to be a market for this very necessary resource.
Marketability of the Water
The third potential risk is that the market price for the water may be lower than what we paid for it in the event no
generation asset is developed. Because water in Utah is in limited supply and the population continues to increase,
the market price for water has historically increased with time. This critical commodity will only increase in value
with time, although it is unlikely that the total amount of water could be sold in any single transaction. However,
the real value of the asset to PacifiCorp lies in using the water to develop generation resources at the lowest
possible cost in response to the IRP requirements.
FINANCIAL ANALYSIS
The financial benefit of the proposed water acquisition is based on the incremental cost differences between a
CCCT plant equipped with an air-cooled condenser and a CCCT equipped with a water-cooled condenser. Before
describing those differences and providing the results, a few comments concerning the amount of water
recommended for purchase are needed. We recommend the Company acquire 6,000 acre-ft of water. This is
sufficient water for two 500 MW CCCT plants. We recommend that water for 1,000 MW of generation resource be
purchased now while the opportunity is available. The financial analysis presented below is for two cases. In Case
1 the cost of only half the water (3,000 acre-ft) is attributed to the first 500 MW plant. In Case 2 the cost of the
entire 6,000 acre-ft is included in the first 500 MW resource.
Table 1 shows the capital expenditures anticipated for both an air and water-cooled plant. The water cost is
assumed to be $2300 per acre-ft (our expectation of what the final price will be) and only addresses 3,000 acre-ft of
water being attributed to the first 500 MW plant.
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Table 1. Capital Cost Comparison ($l,000s)
Wet Cooling

Capital Cost Components
Water - 3,000 acre-ft
Water Pipeline (sized for 6,000 acre-ft)
Water evaporation pond
Incremental cost for dry condenser above that for wet system

$6,900
$ 15,400
$5,000

Total Capital Requirement

$27,300

Dry Cooling

$30,000
$30,000

Although the capital cost difference is relatively small, there are other major differences A plant with an aircooled condenser is less efficient (has a higher heat rate) and produces less power than does an equivalent plant
equipped with a water-cooled condenser In addition, an air-cooled plant also has higher maintenance costs than a
water-cooled plant
Table 2 presents the mcremental PVRR benefit of wet vs dry cooling for Case 1 wherein only half the water (3,000
acre-ft) is attributed to the first 500 MW project The results indicate that wet cooling has a PVRR advantage of
$23,928,000 over dry coolmg The column showing cash flows without regulatory recovery represents the
economics of a non-regulated project The column with regulated recovery shows the economics of a regulated
project with a one-year regulatory lag Therefore, the purchase of water enables construction of the lowest cost
alternative to ratepayers and is m the best interests of shareholders Representative cash flows are given m
Appendix 1 Appendix 1 also contains a sensitivity analysis around several different variables such as heat
rate Capacity, water pipeline construction costs, air-cooled condenser costs, market price, water costs, etc

Table 2. Case 1 - Mona Wet versus Dry CCCT Cooling
(Only costs for 3,000 acre-ft of water included)

Project Economics ($1,000)
PVRR(d)
Project NPV
Project IRR
Discount Rate Used
Business Umt Cost of Capital
Payback Period (years)

Customer
Revenue
Requirement

Customer
Revenue
Requirement

Cash Flow
With Regulatory
Recovery

$15,250
61 6%
7 5%
7 5%
1 7 Years

$1,265
46 0%
7 5%
7 5%
1 7 Years

($23,928)

Table 3 summarizes the mcremental PVRR benefit of wet vs dry coolmg for Case 2 wherein the total cost for all
6,000 acre-ft of water is incorporated as part of the first 500 MW resource This appears to be a worst case
scenano, in which PacifiCorp purchased the amoimt of water required for a 1,000 MW facility, but ended up only
building 500 MW plant, and was unable to sell off its unused water rights We believe this would be a highly
unlikely scenano Nevertheless, for this case the incremental PVRR benefit of wet vs dry coolmg is $17,288,000
Sensitivity analysis and representative cash flows are also presented in Appendix 1
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Table 3. Case 2 - Mona Wet versus Dry CCCT Cooling
(Only costs for 6,000 acre-ft of water included)

Project Economics ($1,000)
PVKR(d)
Project NPV
Project IRR
Discount Rate Used
Business Unit Cost of Capital
Capital Productivity Ratio
Payback Period (years)

Customer
Revenue
Requirement

Customer
Revenue
Requirement

Cash Flow
With Regulatory
Recovery

$10,414
17.0%
7.5%
7.5%
3.43
6.4 Years

$311
8.2%
7.5%
7.5%
1.07
8.7 Years

($17,288)

The following economic analysis information is included in Appendix 1:
Case 1 - 3000 acre-ft of water
• Economic Results Summary
• Analysis Inputs Detail
• Sensitivity Analysis Graphs
• Scenario Analysis Graphs (utilizing the top four sensitivity variables)
• Capital/(Deferred) Expenditure Authorization - for PacifiCorp Board and above
Case 2 - 6000 acre-ft of water
• Economic Results Summary
• Analysis Inputs Detail
• Sensitivity Analysis Graphs
• Scenario Analysis Graphs (utilizing the top four sensitivity variables)
• Capital/(Deferred) Expenditure Authorization - for PacifiCorp Board and above
Appendix 2 provides economic analysis information for water purchased at $2,700 per acre-ft (the maximum price
for which authorization is being sought). It includes:
• Economic Results Summary, assuming 3,000 acre-ft
• Analysis Inputs Detail, assuming 3,000 acre-ft
• Economic Results Summary, assuming 6,000 acre-ft
• Analysis Inputs Detail, assuming 6,000 acre-ft
We conclude that the economics of acquiring 6,000 acre-ft of water now while it is available are very favorable and
that there is not significant risk in doing so.
RECOMMENDATION
We recommend approval be given to acquire 6,000 acre-ft of industrial water at a price not to exceed $2,700 per
acre-ft for a total expenditure of not more than $16,200,000. We also recommend pursuing two parallel courses of
action to acquire the water.
First, we recommend continuing our discussions with Geneva to determine their creditors' interest in our offer.
Second we recommend continued work with Kennecott for possible acquisition of water from them. We would
then purchase the water from either source depending upon the final negotiated terms and price for the water.
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Economic Results nummary

Case 1 - 3,000 Acie-ft

Project Name: Mona Wet versus Dry CCCT Cooling
——————.

($ 1,000s)
Project Economics
Customer
Revenue
Requirement
PVRR(d)
Project NPV
Project I R R
Discount R a t e Used
Business Unit Cost of Capital
Payback Period (years)

Cash Flows
Without Regulatory
Recovery

Cash Flows
With Regulatory
Recovery

($23,928)
$15,250
61.6%
7.5%
7.5%
1.7 Years

$1,265
46.0%
7.5%
7.5%
1.7 Years

2006
$0
$0

2007
$0
$0

2003
$0
$0

2004
$6,900
$6,900

2005
($9,888)
($9,474)

Net Cash Flow Without Regulatory Recovery
Annual
$0
Cumulative
$0

($6,900)
($6,900)

$9,888
$2,988

$798
$3,786

$655
$4,441

$736
$5,176

$863
$6,039

Net C a s h F l o w W i t h R e g u l a t o r y Recovery
Annual
Cumulative

($6,900)
($6,900)

$9,888
$2,988

$502
$3,490

$65
$3,554

($216)
$3,338

($165)
$3,173

$1,304

$0

$0
$0

$828

$1,285
$333

$1,381
($152)

$1,556
($100)

I n c r e m e n t a l E a r n i n g s @ 55.0% Debt Financing
Without Regulatory Recovery
$0
With Regulatory Recovery
$0

$0
$0

$92
$92

$871
$575

$859
$268

$915
($36)

$1,021
($7)

Annual Revenue Requirement
Calculated
Recovered

$0
$0

$0
$0

($1,672)
($1,534)

($1,835)
($1,656)

Capital Spending W o A F U D C
Capital Spending w A F U D C

$0
$0

Incremental Earnings Before Interest & Taxes
Without Regulatory Recovery
$0
With Regulatory Recovery
$0

$0
$0

$0
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($1,461)
($477)

($1,591)
($952)

2008
$0
$0

2009
$0
$0

Analysis Inputs Detail

Appendix 1

Case 1 - 3,000 Acre-ft

Mona - Wet versus Dry Differential Analysis Inputs
All Costs Stated in FY 2004 Dollars ($ 1,000s)

CCCT

Plant Data
Capacity MWs
Capacity Factor
Generation GWhs

o
Tl

O
m
2!
>

WET
DF

7,235
20,377,183

Heat Rate btu/kWh
mmBtu Required

Variable O&M (costs equivalent to both wet and dry are ignored)
Plant O&M 5/MWh
$
0.04
Water Delivery $/MWh
I
:
Total O&M $/MWh
$
0.04
Total O&M Dollars
$
113
Fixed O&M (costs equivalent to both wet and dry are ignored)
Plant O&M
$
Water Delivery O&M
I
Total O&M Dollars
$
Capital (costs equivalent to both wet and dry are ignored)
Year Spent
Water Purchase
Condenser Construction Cost
Water Pipeline
Evap. Pond

Total Capital

76
0.3
200

434
0.74
2,816

2004
2005
2005
2005

11,998
2,396,337

Total

7,307
20,375,146

12,118
2,396,097

113

$
$
$

_
300

%

..

%

154

$
$
$

300

s
$

WET minus
DRY
Total

Total

75
0,3
198

430
0.74
2,788

22,773,520

$
154 i_
154 $

Inservice
(beg. of year)
2006
2006
2006
2006

CCCT

3,016

$
$_
$
$

DRY
DF

2,986

30

22,771,242

2,277

_
-

-

113

6,900
30,000

15,400
5,000
27,300

>
n
o
o71

•J
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(146)

300

30,000

$
$
$
$
$

6,900
(30,000)
15,400
5,000
(2,700)

Appendix 1

Case 1 - 3,000 Acre-ft

Sensitivity Analysis

Risk Detective Sensitivity Analysis
Created:
Model:
Output:
Base Value:
Description
Heat Rate/Capacity
Water Pipeline Construction
Market Price
Incr Dry Condenser Cost
Plant Fixed O&M
Evap Pond Construction
Water Fixed O&M
Water Residual Value
Variable O&M
Water Cost per Acre Foot

Base
Input
Base
15,400
Base
30,000
300
5,000
154
281%
0 04
2,300

18-Mar-03 10:01:32 AM
Inputs to Generic Model - Water Rights.xlslRisk Det
Mona PVRR (d)
(23,928)

Low
Input
Output
Low (18,285)
10,400
(29,733)
Low (20,179)
29,000
(22,768)
150
(21,553)
3,000
(26,250)
77
(25,148)
100%
(23,079)
0 02
(24,820)
2,100
(24,506)

High
Input
Output
High (33,286)
(18,124)
20,400
High (27,835)
(29,733)
35,000
(26,303)
450
(21,607)
7,000
(22,709)
231
(24,952)
500%
(23,037)
0.06
(22,774)
2,700

Output Explained
Swing
Variation
15,002
43%
11,608
68%
7,656
79%
6,965
89%
4,750
93%
4,643
97%
98%
2,438
1,874
99%
1,784
99%
1,732
100%

Risk Detective Sensitivity Analysis
Created: 18-Mar-03 10:01:32 AM
Model: Inputs to Generic Model - Water Rights.xls!Risk Det
Output: Mona NPV w/o Reg. Recovery
Base Value: 15,250
Description
Heat Rate/Capacity
Water Pipeline Construction
Market Pnce
Incr Dry Condenser Cost
Evap Pond Construction
Plant Fixed O&M
Water Fixed O&M
Water Cost per Acre Foot
Variable O&M
Water Residual Value

Base
Input
Base
15,400
Base
30,000
5,000
300
154
2,300
0 04
281%

Low
Input
Output
Low
11,616
10,400
19,197
Low
12,836
29,000
14,460
3,000
16,829
150
13,721
77
16,034
2,100
15,670
0 02
15,824
100%
14,752

JHigh.
Input
High
20,400
High
35,000
7,000
450
231
2,700
0 06
500%

Output
21,274
11,302
17,765
19,197
13,670
16,779
14,465
14,409
14,675
15,849

Output Explained
Swing
Variation
9,658
41%
7,895
68%
4,929
79%
89%
4,737
3,158
93%
3,058
97%
1,570
98%
1,261
99%
1,148
99%
1,097
100%
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Appendix 1

Case 1 - 3,000 Acre-ft

Sensitivity Analysis

Risk Detective Sensitivity Analysis
Created: 18-Mar-03 10:01:32 AM
Model: Inputs to Generic Model - Water Rights.xls !Risk Det
Output: Mona IRR w/o Reg. Recovery
Base Value: 62%
Description
Water Pipeline Construction
Incr. Dry Condenser Cost
Evap. Pond Construction
Water Cost per Acre Foot
Heat Rate/Capacity
Market Price
Plant Fixed O&M
Water Fixed O&M
Variable O&M
Water Residual Value

Base
Input
15,400
30,000
5,000
2,300
Base
Base
300
154
0.04
281%

Low
Input
Output
126%
10,400
51%
29,000
86%
3,000
73%
2,100
Low
57%
Low
59%
60%
150
63%
77
62%
0.02
62%
100%

High
Input
Output
20,400
25%
35,000
126%
42%
7,000
45%
2,700
68%
High
65%
High
450
63%
61%
231
0.06
61%
62%
500%

Output Explained
Swing
Variation
101%
55%
75%
85%
43%
95%
29%
99%
11%
100%
6%
100%
4%
100%
2%
100%
1%
100%
0%
100%

Explained Variance Summary Table
Created: 18-Mar-03 10:01:32 AM
Model: Inputs to Generic Model - Water Rights.xlslRiskDet
Outputs:

Description
Water Pipeline Construction
Heat Rate/Capacity
Incr. Dry Condenser Cost
Market Price
Evap. Pond Construction
Plant Fixed O&M
Water Cost per Acre Foot
Water Fixed O&M
Water Residual Value
Variable O&M

Mona
PVRR(d)
26%
43%
9%
11%
4%
4%
1%
i%
i%
i%

Mona
NPV w/o Mona IRR
w/o Reg.
Reg.
Recovery Recovery
27%
41%
10%
11%
4%
4%
1%
1%
1%
1%

55%
1%
30%
0%
10%
0%
4%
0%
0%
0%

"CONRDEiMTfAL
Subject to Court Order
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Appendix I

Sensitivity Analysis

• Low

Case 1 - 3,000 Acre-ft

Mona PVRR (d)

• High

Base Value. (23
P5 00O)

PO 000)

(25 000)

>928±

(5 000)

(10 000)

(15 000)

(20 000)
Base
Low

Heat Rate/Capscrty High

Viler Pipeline CooslrucDon

10 400

Market Price

lna Dry Condenser Cost

20 400

Low

H.jh

I 29 000

35 000

Plant Fixed OAM

450

Ev»p pond Coostruaioa

3000

Water Fixed OAM

150

7000

77

23 I

J 00%

Water Residual Value

500V.

Variable OAM

0 02

Water Cost per Acre Foot

• Low
• High

Base

2 100

3 006

2,700

Mona NPV w/o Reg. Recovery
Base Value: 15,250
10 000

Heat Rate/Capacity

15 000

Low

I
i

Water Pipeline Construction

20 000

t

\

10 400

High

1

7000

Plant Fixed OAM

150

Water Cost pet Acre Foot

3000

450

1 31 j

2 700

0 06

Water Res dual Value

35 000

29 000

Ev»p Pond Construction

Water Freed OAM

Base

§

20 400

Ltrw

lncr Dry Condenser Con

High

100%

i

77

2 10O

o trz

I 50cc/,

CONRDENTWL
SubjecttoCourt Order
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Appendix 1

• High

Sensitivity Analysis

Case 1 - 3,000 Acre-ft

Mona IRR w/o Reg. Recovery
Base Value 62%
20%

40%

60V

80%

100*

120%

140%

But
W»le Pipelme ConstractKm

10400

20 400

lncr Dry Condenser C c *

Evap Pond Construe! i on

Wait COST per Acre FOOT

Heat Rate/Cip*city

35 000

29 000

3 0O0

7000

2 100

2 700

Low)

Low!

Hgh

!

H

PUnt Fued OAW

150

•j 450

W»ter Fixed OAM

231

77

006

002

Wwe Res dual V»lue

15400

J DOS

500V

CONFfDBJTfAL
Subject to Court Order
Page 12
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Appendix 1

Case 1 - 3,000 Acre-ft

Scenario Analysis

Risk Detective Scenario Analysis
Created: 18-Mar-03 11:28:06 AM
Model: Inputs to Generic Model - Water Rights.xls!Risk Det
Scenarios:
81
Boxed node represents first node in the tree.
1 Value
Node
Description
1 10 |Heat Rate/Capacity
20 Water Pipeline Construction
30 Market Price
40 Incr. Dry Condenser Cost
1 Node

1 10 |Heat Rate/Capacity
20 Water Pipeline Construction
30 Market Price
40 Incr. Dry Condenser Cost
I Node

Description

10 [Heat Rate/Capacity
20 Water Pipeline Construction
30 Market Price
40 Incr. Dry Condenser Cost

1

Value

j

Multiple-1 Multiple-2 Multiple-3
15,400
20,400
10,400
Base
High
Low
30,000
35,000
29,000
Probability

Description

Value

25.00%
25.00%
25.00%
25.00%
Next
Node
20
30
40
Endpoint

Probability
50.00%
50.00%
50.00%
50.00%
Next
Node
20
30
40
Endpoint

Proba|
bility
1
25.00%
25.00%
25.00%
25.00%
Next
Node
20
30
40
Endpoint

[
j

Output Summary Table
Created: 18-Mar-03 11:28:06 AM
Model: Inputs to Generic Model - Water Rights.xls!Risk Det
Decision Basis; Expected Value,Indepenc ent Output Evaluation
Output

Base

I
Description
MonaPVRR(d)
Mona NPV w/o Reg. Recover)
Mona IRR w/o Reg. Recovery

Value
(23,928)
15,250
62%

Expected
Value
(26,059)
16,663
81 %

Distribution Values
Minimum |
(50,733)
5,187

10%
(37,964)
10,512

15%

25%

j

50%
1 9 0 % [Maximum
(25,983) (16,963)
(8,692)
16,537
24,432
32,928
62%
130%
202%

Distribution Statistics
Created: 18-Mar-03 11:28:06 AM
Model: Inputs to Generic Model - Water Rights.xls!Risk Det
Output
Description
MonaPVRR(d)
Mona NPV w/o Reg. Recover)
Mona IRR w/o Reg. Recovery

Expected Standard
Value Deviation!

Variance

Coef. of
Coef. of
Skew ness Kurtosis

(26,059)

7,875

62,022,542

-036

362

16,663

5,184

26,872,820

0.35

323

0.75

-3

81 %

48%

23%

Distributions
'CONFIDENTIAL
Subject to Court Order
Page 13
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Appendix 1

Case 1 - 3,000 Acre-ft

Scenario Analysis

Mona PVRR (d)
inn%

-

90%

o
© ©

? (

o

nulative Probability

80%

Jf

3

U
30%
20%

f

___r

10%

0%

EV. (26,059)
— . — l — « — • —

i—•—--

(60,000)

(50,000)

(40,000)

(30,000)

(20,000)

»•--'—V

I

(10,000)

1
Mona NPV w/o Reg. Recovery
i ftn°/

90% 80% 70% ]

1

60% J

©

*
a

1

p
U

L

50% 4

40%

[

T1
1

30% 4
20% 4

10% 4
ft0/ -i

,
5,000

10,000

15,000

20,000

25,000

1

1

30,000

35,000

1

CONFIDENTIAL
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Mona IRR w/o Reg. Recovery

100% -

j

i

90% 80% -

Case 1 - 3,000 Acre-ft

Scenario Analysis

[

70% -

j

^

/""

1 60% JO

I

o

t 50% --

i
J

—
31 40% -

y

30% 20% -

10% -J
no/

J

0"/•

7

/

^V
— rv »i%
1

50%

100%

i

200%

150%

>

250%
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Case 1 - 3,000 Acre-ft

CAPITAIV(DEFERRED) EXPENDITURE AUTHORIZATION
Water Rights Acquisition from Geneva Steel

Business:

U.S. Energy - Generation

Department:
Total Amount Requested:

$16,200,000

SAP Ref:

N/A

Transition Initiative No:

Date:

{Description:

Acquire 6,000 acre-ft of water for use in a gas-fired genertion project to

((Section I)

to meet IRP requirements

(Customer Benefit Achieved:

9-Apr-03

N/A

Lower cost generation resources that meet IRP requirements.

((Section 1)

|

[Classification:

Profit Improvement

Profit Maintenance

Explicit Legal & Regulatory

Implicit Legal & Regulatory

1
I

V Efficiency/ Cost Reduction

1

Essential Business Support

Health & Safety

1
| TOTAL
$000

Year end 31st March:

I
j

(Section 4)

(Capital Expenditure Summary
I

V

Transition Ennoblement

(Budgeted Spend

0

(Proposed Spend

(2,574)

flnvestment Appraisal Summary
[
Year end 31 st March:
US GAAP Impact
(Free Cash Flow Profile (Section 2)

102,979

EBIT Impact (Section 8)

81,985

TOTAL
$000

All Nominal $'s

Budget

Plan

Plan

Plan

Plan

2003
$000

2004
$000

2005
$000

2006
$000

2007
$000

Plan

|

0

6,900

(9,474)

0

0

2003
$000

2004
$000

2005
$000

2006
$000

2007
$000

(6,900)

9,888

1,231

1,211

97,549

1

1^04

1,285

79395

|

2008 onwards |
$000

0

j

J
2008 onwards |
$000
I

UK GAAP Impact

|
6,900

(9,888)

[Capital Expenditure

(2,988)

(Gross Margin

78,804

1,213

1,179

76,413

1

607

18

33

79,411

1,231

1,211

556
76,968

1
1

OMAG
IEBIT
[Balance Sheet Impacts
[Assets (provide detail)
[Liabilities (provide detail)
INPV

6,900

(2,988)

(9,888)

0

15,250

i

Discount Rate Used (%)

7.5%

Inflation Rate Used (%)

3.0%

I

Sensitivities - Heat rate and Capacity, Pipeline Construction Cost, Market Prices, Dry Condenser Cost
IRR (%, post-tax, nominal)

|

61.6%

Name

Employee No.

[Submitted by:

Barry Cunningham

P07635

Business Approvals:

GEN1C

Corporate Approvals:

PIC

Date

Signature

1

PPW Board

-

Seplembef 2001

Water Rtghls Appendix 1 »nd 2 x)»
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1. Project Description, Objectives and Relevance to Approved Strategy
Project description:
Acquire 6,000 acre-ft of water for use in a gas-fired generation project to meet IRP requnements

Objective: Statement of customer benefits to be achieved
Resource needs identified in the IRP are met m a lower-cost manner with a water-cooled CCCT,
resulting m overall lower costomer prices than would otherwise be incurred
Base case against which project is evaluated:
The cost differences between a water-cooled CCCT and an air-cooled CCCT are quantified and show
that purchasing water rights are economic
Source and date of market power price assumptions:
Official Forward Pnce Curves issued 10 December 2002

Regulatory assumptions:
Regulated Asset w/ regulatory kg of Approximately 1 year

2. Summary Present Value of Revenue Requirement & Free Cash Flow Profile (excludes interest)
[Present Value of Revenue Requirement (PVRR) Analysis:
P VRR of Project Presented
PVRR of Next Best alternative
PVRR Difference

(23,928) Analysis is a differential analysis of the relevant costs pertammg to

!

I

the decision to install Wet versus Dry cooling CCCT

Year end 31st March

Total
$000

1

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

$000

$000

$000

$000

$000

(6,900)

9,888

2008 onwards 1
$000

[Investment
1

Capital Expenditure (Sect 4)

I

Capital Contribution (Sect 4)

1

Terminal Value (Sect 6)

2,988
0
20,581

20,581

(Impact on
I

Revenue

I

Cash Operating Costs

I

Change in Working Capital
Cash Taxes (See below)

[Free Cash Flow

78,325

1,205

1,170

75,950

1,086

26

42

1,018

1,231

1,211

97,549

0
0
102,979

NPV at 7.5% nominal post-tax

0

(6,900)

9,888

1

15,250

1 ax Calculation
Operating Profit pre Deprec

99,991

1,231

1,211

97,549

Tax Allowances (Sect 12)

2,988

(89)

254

2,823

102,979

1,142

1465

100,372

39,081

433

556

38,091

Taxable Profit
Tax Payable @

37 95 %

CONFIDENTIAL

1

3.a. Risk and Sensitivity Anatys.., t VRR
1

% Movement in

Key assumptions impacting on project PVRR

|

Revised PVRR

Change in PVRR

$000

$000

key assumption

(23,928)

(Base Case
[Wet versus Dry Heat rate and Capacity Derate

-30%

50%

(18,285)

(33,286)

5,643

J Water Pipeline Construction Cost

-32%

32%

(29,733)

(18,124)

(5,805)

5,804

HLH Official Market Prices

Low

High

(20,179)

(27,835)

3,749

(3,907)1

[Avoided Dry Condenser Cost

-3%

17%

(22,768)

(29,733)

1,160

(5,805)1

(9,358)1

3.b. Risk and Sensitivity Analysis NPV
1

Key assumptions impacting on project NPV

% Movement in

Revised NPV

Change in NPV

key assumption

$000

$000

15,250

[Base Case
[Wet versus Dry Heat rate and Capacity Derate

-30%

50%

11,616

21,274

(3,634)

6,024

[Water Pipeline Construction Cost

-32%

32%

19,197

11302

3,947

(3,948)

HLH Official Market Prices

Low

High

12,836

17,765

(2,414)

2,515

[Avoided Dry Condenser Cost

-3%

17%

14,460

19,197

(790)

3,947

2003

2004
$000

2005
$000

2006
$000

4. Investment Summary
1

i Total
$000

year end 31 st March:

SOOO

2007
$000

2008 onwards 1
$000

(Fixed Assets
0

1

Land & Buildings

1

Plant & Machinery

(15,038)
0

1

Fixtures & Fittings

I

Design Expenditure

1

Other Related Expenditure

(Surcharge @

0

0

0

6,900

5,150

0

0

0

0

0

414

0

0

0

0

6,900

(9,474)

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

oj

0

0

0

(Contingency
AFUDC @

(15,038)

0

12,050
0

6%

434

%

0

[Capital Contributions & Grants
[Total Capita) Expenditure

0
(2,574)

[Change in Working Capital
Inventory

0

Receivables

0

Others

0

[Total Working Capital Investment

0

Procurement Strategy Overview
(If applicable, include a Summary of Quotes/Tenders Obtained)
Value of Quote ($000)

Supplier/Contractor

$6,900,000

Geneva Steel

"CUNFIDENTIAL
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6.

Basis for terminal valuation

ISectionfor describing valuation approach (sale liquidation, scrap, perpetuity/remainmg life calculation relating to
\continuing business) and key assumptions
Water nghts are sold at the end of the 35-year project life for a value equal to the purchase price
plus escalation at 3% per annum

7. Information on Discarded Assets
Residual Value
$000

Net Book Value
$000

Description of Asset

20,581

0

Water nghts sold at end of 35 year project

Profit/(Loss)
$000
20,5811

8. Profit Impact
j

Total
$000

year end 31st March.

2005
$000

2004
$000

2003
$000

2006
$000

2007
$000

2008 onwards 1
$000

78,325

1,205

1,170

75,950

[Less Project Direct Costs

479

8

9

462

[Less Project OMAG

607

18

33

556

Less Depreciation

2,574

74

74

O p e r a t i n g Profit

81,985

1304

1,285

99

99

[Project Revenues or Cost Reductions

Interest @

6 99 %

0

0

(265)

1,453

Provisions

414

Profit Before Tax

104,433

Tax
Profit After Tax

1321
20381

414
1,403

0

149

(39,632)

0

0

(56)

(533)

(525)

64,800

0

0

92

871

859

Timing and Milestones

9-Apr-03
\(b) When will contracts/orders be placed ?
One to two months after PPW Board approval (expect Apnl 17, 2003)

\(c) When will the project commence operation (month/year) ?
Upon completion of purchase contract

\(d) When will the project end (month/year)

1384

0

\(a) When is approval required by ?

!

2,427

79395 1

20,581

Profit/(Loss) on Disposals (Sect7)

9

0

7

Indefinite

CONFIDENTIAL

101,497^
(38318)

'

62,979 1

10. Post Investment Review/Audit

Who will review/audit the project and when ?
Appropriate reviews and audits will take place per current guidelines.

11. Free Cash Flow Profile (excludes interest)
(year end 31st March:

2003 l
$000

[ Total
$000

2005
$000

2004
$000

2007
$000

2006
$000

2009
$000

2008
$000

2010 onwards 1
$000

[investment
J

Capital Expend

1

(6,900)

2,988

1

Capital Contrib.

0

I

Term V»k>e (Seel 6)

20,581

9,888

20,581

[Impact on:
[Revenue
ICash Operating Costs

78325

1,205

1,170

1,269

1,446

73,236

1,086

26

42

39

37

942

(433)

(556)

(572)

(620)

(36,899)

798

655

736

863

57,860

1,211

1,308

1,483

94,759

254

200

151

2,472

1,142

1,465

1,508

1,633

97,231

433

556

572

620

0

[Change in Working Capital

(39,081)

[Cash Taxes (See below)
Free Cash Flow

0

63,899

(6,900)

9,888

[NPV at 7.5% nominal post 15,250
tree Cash Flow T u Caknlaijon:
[Operating Profit pre Deprec.

99,991 j

[Tax Allowances (section 12)

2,988

j

(89)

102,979

Taxable Profit
Tax Payable @ J H 5 y .

1,231

i

39,081 j

36,899 ]

12. Tax Allowances
[year end 31st March:

Total
$000

2003
$000

2004
$000

2005
$000

2007
$000

2006
$000

2008
$000

2009
$000

2010 onwards j
$000

20 Year MACRS
[Opening Balance
(Additions
[Allowances
[Closing Balance

5,556

0

371

1,085

1,745

2356

0
9,888

371

714

660

611

7,532

15,444

371

1,085

1,745

2^56

9,888

15 Year MACRS
[Opening Balance

0

[Additions

0

[ Allowances

0

Closing Balance

0

Other
Opening Balance
L^dditions
[Allowances
(Closing Balance

Total Allowances

(4,600)

0

(460)

(920)

(1,380)

(1,840)

0
(6,900)

(460)

(460)

(460)

(460)

(5,060)

(11,500)

(460)

(920)

(1380)

(1,840)

(6,900)

2,988

0

0

0

(89)

254

200

151

2,472

"CONFIDENTIAL
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Appendix 1

Economic Results Summary

Case 2 - 6,000 Acre-ft

Project Name: Mona Wet versus Dry CCCT Cooling
($ 1,000s)
Project Economics
Customer
Revenue
Requirement
PVRR (d)
Project NPV
Project IRR
Discount Rate Used
Business Unit Cost of Capital
Capital Productivity Ratio
Payback Period (years)

Cash Flows
Without Regulatory
Recovery

Cash Flows
With Regulatory
Recovery

($17,288)
$10,414
17,0%
7.5%
7.5%
3.43
6.4 Years

$311
8.2%
7.5%
7.5%
1.07
8.7 Years

($9,060)

2006
$0
$0

2007
$0
$0

2008
$0
$0

2009
$0
$0

($13,800)
($13,800)

$9,888
($3,912)

$946
($2,966)

$779
($2,187)

$861
($1,325)

$991
($334)

$0
$0

($13,800)
($13,800)

$9,888
($3,912)

$788
($3,124)

$541
($2,584)

$485
($2,099)

$620
($1,479)

Incremental Earnings Before Interest & Taxes
Without Regulatory Recovery
$0
With Regulatory Recovery
$0

$0
$0

$0
$0

$1,054
$798

$994
$610

$1,094
$487

$1,273
$675

Incremental Earnings @ 55.0% Debt Financing
Without Regulatory Recovery
$0
With Regulatory Recovery
$0

$0
$0

$185
$185

$541
$382

$511
$273

$578
$201

$693
$322

Annual Revenue Requirement
Calculated
Recovered

$0
$0

$0
$0

($784)
($256)

($465)
($384)

($589)
($607)

($793)
($598)

2003
$0

2004
$13,800

2005
($9,888)

$0

$13,800

Net Cash Flow Without Regulatory Recovery
Annual
$0
Cumulative
$0
Net Cash Flow With Regulatory Recovery
Annual
Cumulative

Capital Spending w/o AFUDC
Capital Spending w AFUDC

$0
$0
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Analysis Inputs Detail

Case 2 - 6,000 Acre-ft

Mona - Wet versus Dry Differential Analysis Inputs
All Costs Stated in FY 2004 Dollars ($l,000s)
WET
DF

CCCT

Plant Data
Capacity MWs
Capacity Factor
Generation GWhs

434
0.74
2,816

76
0.3
200
11,998
2,396,337

7,235
20,377,183

Heat Rate btu/kWh
rnrnBtu Required

DRY
DF

CCCT

Total

3,016

22,773,520

75
0.3
198

430
0.74
2,788

7,307
20,375,146

12,118
2,396,097

WET minus
DRY
Total

Total

2,986

30

22,771,242

2,277

CO ^^/ariable O&M (costs equivalent to both wet and dry are ignored)

i-

Q

CD'

o
O
o
o.
CD

Plant O&M $/MWh

$

0.04 $

_:

Water Delivery $/MWh

L.

Total O&M $/MWh

0.04 S

Total O&M Dollars

113 $

P f f ixed O&M (costs equivalent to both wet and dry are ignored)
"~?
Plant O&M
$
1
Water Delivery O&M
S
ZZ2
Total O&M Dollars
$

$
\JA $_
154 $

113

113

154

300

$

300

$

(M6)

300

>
r*""t:apital (costs equivalent to both wet and dry are ignored)
Year Spent
Water Purchase
Condenser Construction Cost
Water Pipeline
Evap. Pond
Total Capital

2004
2005
2005
2005

Inservice
(beg. of year)
2006
2006
2006
2006

13,800
30,000

15,400
5,000
34,200

>

n
o
o

'J*

Page 22

30,000

$
$
$
$
$

13,800
(30,000)
15,400
5,000
4,200

Appendix 1

Case 2 - 6,000 Acre-ft

Sensitivity Analysis

Risk Detective Sensitivity Analysis
Created:
Model:
Output:
Base Value:
Description
Heat Rate/Capacity
Water Pipeline Construction
Market Price
Incr. Dry Condenser Cost
Plant Fixed O&M
Evap. Pond Construction
Water Residual Value
Water Cost per Acre Foot
Water Fixed O&M
Variable O&M

Base
Input
Base
15,400
Base
30,000
300
5,000
281%
2,300
154
0.04

18-Mar-03 10:50:48 AM
Inputs to Generic Model - Water Rights.xlslBisk Det
Mona PVRR (d)
(17,288)

Low
Input
Output
Low (11,644)
10,400
(23,092)
Low (13,539)
(16,127)
29,000
150
(14,913)
3,000
(19,609)
100%
(15,589)
2,100
(18,443)
(18,507)
77
(18,180)
0.02

High
Input
Output
High (26,646)
(11,484)
20,400
High (21,195)
(23,092)
35,000
(19,663)
450
(14,966)
7,000
(19^36)
500%
(14,978)
2,700
(16,069)
231
(16,396)
0.06

Output
Swing
15,002
11,608
7,656
6,965
4,750
4,643
3,747
3,465
2,438
1,784

Explained
Variation
41%
66%
77%
85%
90%
94%
96%
98%
99%
100%

Risk Detective Sensitivity Analysis
Created: 18^Mar-03 10:50:48 AM
Model: Inputs to Generic Model - Water Rights.xls! Risk Det
Output: Mona NPV w/o Reg. Recovery
Base Value: 10,414
Description
Heat Rate/Capacity
Water Pipeline Construction
Market Price
Incr. Dry Condenser Cost
Evap. Pond Construction
Plant Fixed O&M
Water Cost per Acre Foot
Water Residual Value
Water Fixed O&M
Vanable O&M

Base
Input
Base
15,400
Base
30,000
5,000
300
2,300
281%
154
0.04

Low
Input
Output
Low
6,781
10,400
14,362
Low
8,001
29,000
9,625
3,000
11,993
150
8,885
2,100
11,255
100%
9,420
77
11,199
0.02
10,988

.High.
Input
High
20,400
High
35,000
7,000
450
2,700
500%
231
0.06

Output
16,439
6,467
12,929
14,362
8,835
11,943
8,732
11,613
9,629
9,840

Output Explained
Variation
Swing
9,658
39%
7,895
66%
4,929
76%
4,737
86%
3,158
90%
3,058
94%
2,523
96%
2,194
98%
1,570
99%
1,148
100%
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Sensitivity Analysis

Risk Detective Sensitivity Analysis
Created:
Model:
Output:
Base Value:
Description
Water Pipeline Construction
Incr. Dry Condenser Cost
Heat Rate/Capacity
Evap. Pond Construction
Water Cost per Acre Foot
Market Price
Plant Fixed O&M
Water Fixed O&M
Variable O&M
Water Residual Value

Base
Input
15,400
30,000
Base
5,000
2,300
Base
300
154
0.04
281%

18-Mar-03 10:50:48 AM
|
Inputs to Generic Model - Water Rights.xlslRisk Det
Mona IRR w/o Reg. Recovery
17%

Low
Input
Output
10,400
30%
29,000
16%
14%
Low
3,000
21%
2,100
20%
Low
15%
150
16%
18%
77
0.02
17%
100%
17%

HiRh
Input
Output
11%
20,400
30%
35,000
21%
High
7,000
14%
14%
2,700
19%
High
18%
450
16%
231
17%
0.06
17%
500%

Output Explained
Swing
Variation |
19%
49%
15%
79%
7%
86%
7%
92%
6%
97%
4%
99%
2%
100%
1%
100%
1%
100%
0%
100%

Explained Variance Summary Table
Created: 18-Mar-03 10:50:48 AM
Model: Inputs to Generic Model - Water Rights.xlslRisk Det
Outputs:

[

Description

Water Pipeline Construction
Heat Rate/Capacity
Incr. Dry Condenser Cost
Market Price
Evap. Pond Construction
Water Cost per Acre Foot
Plant Fixed O&M
Water Residual Value
Water Fixed O&M
Variable O&M

Mona
PVRR(d)
25%
41%
9%
11%
4%
2%
4%
3%
1%
1%

Mona
NPV w/o Mona IRR
Reg.
w/o Reg.
Recovery Recovery
26%
39%
9%
10%
4%
3%
4%
2%
1%
1%

49%
7%
30%
2%
6%
5%
1%
0%
0%
0%
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Sensitivity Analysis

l_.ase L - o,uuu /vcrc-n

DLow

Mona PVRR (d)

• High
(25 000)

(30 000)

Base Value: (17,288I)
(20 000)
t

Heat Rate/Capacity

t
Low

High

W»icr Pipeline Construction

1

10 400

j 20 400

Low

Hifh

Market Price

Incr Dry Condenser Cost

29 000

35 000

Plant Fixed OJtM

450

Evap Pond Construction

3000

Water RcuduiJ Value

150

7000

j

500*

1 JOOtt

; 2,700

Water Cost per Acre Foot

2, 100

Waier Fixed OAM

77

23

002

0 06

Variable OAM

DLow
• High

(5 000)

(10 000)

(15 000)

Mona NPV w/o Reg. Recovery
Base Value: 10,414
2000

4000

6000

B 000

10 000

12 000

14 000

16000

)8,000
*£&

He»t Rate/Capacity

Water Pipeline Construction

- »:High

Low

•

20 400

10 400

i • High
:

Low
t

lncr Dry Condenser Coat

Evap Pood Construction

7000

Prant Fixed O&M

150

Water Cost per Acre Foot

Waicr Residua! Value

Water Fixed OAM

35 0OO

29 000

3000

450

2 700

21 DO

>00%

I

">3I

ow

500%

77

0 02
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• Low
DHigh

Sensitivity Analysis

Case i - o,uuu Acre-It

Mona IRR w/o Reg. Recovery
Base Value: 17%
10%

Water Pipeline Construction

13%

20%

t

20 400

10 400

|, -, ,

29 000

lncr Dry Condemn- Cart

-

....

J5 4O0

^ 35 000

It
Heat Rare/Capactty

Low

Evap Pond Construction

7000

jHi*h

t
J

3DCO
»i ' t , n

Water Cost per Acre Foot

2)00

2 700

High

Low
t

Plant Fixed O&M

Water Fixed OAM

|

I 30

I.SO

231 1 j

I^

0 06|: I

Water Roichni Yah*

1CI0%l

002

;

50I0>
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Scenario Analysis

Case 2 - 6,000 Acre-ft

Risk Detective Scenario Analysis
Created: 18-Mar-03 11:30:40 AM
Model: Inputs to Generic Model - Water Rights.xlslRisk Det
Scenarios:
81
Boxed node represents first node in the tree.
Description
[Node
Value

1 10

jHeat Rate/Capacity
20 Water Pipeline Construction
30 Market Price
40 Incr. Dry Condenser Cost

(Node

Description

1 10 JHeat Rate/Capacity
20 Water Pipeline Construction
30 Market Price
40 Incr. Dry Condenser Cost
[Node
1 10
20
30
40

Description

JHeat Rate/Capacity
Water Pipeline Construction
Market Price
Incr. Dry Condenser Cost

Value

Value

Multiple-1 Multiple-2 Multiple-3
20,400
15,400
10,400
High
Low
Base
35,000
29,000
30,000
Proba- Probability
bility
25.00% 50.00%
25.00% 50.00%
25.00% 50.00%
25.00% 50.00%

Probability
25.00%
25.00%
25.00%
25.00%

Next
Next
Node
Node
20
20
30
30
40
40
Endpoint Endpoint

Next
Node 1
20
30
40
Endpoint

Output Summary Table
Created: 18-Mar-03 11:30:40 AM
Model: Inputs to Generic Model - Water Rights.xlslRisk Det
Decision Basts: Expected Value,Independen Output Evaluation
Distribution Values
1
Output
Base Expected
Description
Value
Value
Minimum 1 10% 1 50% 1 90% JMaximumj
(44,093) (31,324) (19,343) (10,323)
(17,288) (19,418)
(2,051)
Mona PVRR (d)
352
5,677
11,701
19,597
10,414
28,093
11,828
Mona NPV w/o Reg. Recovery
11%
19%
8%
35%
62%
22%
17%
Mona IRR w/o Reg Recovery

Distribution Statistics
Created: 18-Mar-03 11:30:41 AM
Model: Inputs to Generic Model - Water Rights.xlslRisk Det
Output
Description
Mona PVRR (d)
Mona NPV w/o Reg. Recovery
Mona IRR w/o Reg Recovery

Coef. of Coef. of
Expected Standard Variance
Skewness Kurtosis
Value Deviation
(19,418)
7,875 62,022,542
-0.36
114
11,828
5,184 26,872,820
0.35
84
22%
12%
1%
149
-I39j

Distributions
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Scenario Analysis

^a^c A - o,uuu /\ure-n

Mona PVRR (d)
inn°/

—

90%
80%

1

*

70%

"5
o
u
^

60%

o j

50%

•-

1 40%
30%

j

20%
10%

r^

_^-i

0% 1—•—•(50,000)

(40,000)

EV (I9 4IS)

~
(30,000)

1

1

1

1

L_

(10,000)

(20,000)

-

Mona NPV w/o Reg. Recovery
ifift*/.

•

90% 80% -]

1

|

*

70% j

»

50% 4

at

j

g

40% 4

E
3

r
30% 4
20% 4
10% 4

EV UB3I

0% 4-*^—•—L—J—h-1—'—'—L-H—'—'—'—'—1—'—'—'—'—1—^~
5,000

10,000

15,000

20,000

1

1

1

J

1

25,000

L

_

30,000
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Case 2 - 6,000 Acre-ft

Scenario Analysis

Mona IRR w/o Reg. Recovery
100%
90%
80% 470%

JO

+

60%

©

ft*

50%

|

40% -f
30%
20%
10%

+

0%
0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%
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Case 2 - 6,000 Acre-ft

CAPITAL/(DEFERRED) EXPENDITUM: AUTHORIZATION
Water Rights Acquisition from Geneva Steel

Business:

U.S. Energy - Generation

Department:
(Total Amount Requested:

$16,200,000

S A P Ref:

1

N/A

T r a n s i t i o n Initiative N o :

Date:

(Description:

Acquire 6,000 acre-ft of w a t e r for use in a gas-fired genertion project to

[(Section 1)

to meet IRP requirements

[Customer Benefit Achieved:

9-Apr-03

N/A
1
1

Lower cost generation resources that meet IRP requirements.

1

(Section 1)
[Classification:

Profit Improvement

Profit Maintenance

1

I

Explicit Legal & Regulatory

Implicit Legal &. Regulatory

1

1

V Efficiency/ Cost Reduction

j

Essential Business Support

Health & Safety

1

1

All Nominal X's

1

|

(Section 4)

Capital Expenditure Summary
Year end 31st March:

V

Transition Ennoblement

1 TOTAL t
SOOO 1

[Budgeted Spend

\

o

(Proposed Spend

'

4,740

(Investment Appraisal S u m m a r y
j
Year end 31st March:
[US GAAP Impact

TOTAL
$000

(Free Cash Flow Profile (Section 2)

115,501

EBIT Impact (Section 8)

73,512

Budget
2003
$000

Plan
2004
$000

Plan
2005
$000

Plan
2006
$000

Plan
2007
$000

Plan
|
2008 onwards |
$000

0

13,800

(9,060)

0

0

2003
$000

2004
$000

2005
$000

2006
$000

2007
$000

(13,800)

9,888

1,189

1,129

117,095

1

1,054

994

71,464

J

0

j

j
2008 onwards |
$000

UK GAAP Impact

|
(9,888)

Capital Expenditure

3,912

Gross Margin

78,804

1,213

(552)

(24)

(49)

(479)

78,252

1,189

1,129

75,934

loMAG
EBIT

13,800

1,179

76,413

1
1

[Balance Sheet Impacts
3,912

[Assets (provide detail)

(9,888)

0

[Liabilities (provide detail)
NPV

13,800

10,414

Discount Rate Used (%)

7.5%

Inflation R a t e Used (%)

3.0%

Sensitivities - Heat rate and Capacity, Pipeline C o n s t r u c t i o n C o s t , M a r k e t Prices, Dry Condenser Cost
I R R (%, post-tax, nominal)

17.0%

Name

Employee No.

[Submitted b y :

Barry Cunningham

P07635

Business A p p r o v a l s :

GEN1C

Corporate Approvals:

PIC

Signature

Date

PPW Board

CONFIDENTIAL
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1. Project Description, Objectives and Relevance to Approved Strategy
Project description:
Acquire 6,000 acre-ft of water for use in a gas-fired generation project to meet IRP requnements

Objective: Statement of customer benefits to be achieved
Resource needs identified in the IRP are met in a lower-cost manner with a water-cooled CCCT,
resulting m overall lower costomer prices than would otherwise be incurred
Base case against which project is evaluated:
The cost differences between a water-cooled CCCT and an air-cooled CCCT are quantified and show
that purchasing water rights are economic
Source and date of market power price assumptions:
Official Forward Price Curves issued 10 December 2002

Regulatory assumptions:
Regulated Asset w/ regulatory lag of Approximately 1 year

2 Summary Present Value of Revenue Requirement & Free Cash Flow Profile (excludes interest)
Present Value of Revenue Requirement (PVRR) Analysis
PVRR of Project Presented
PVRR of Next Best alternative
(17,288) Analysis is a differential analysis of the relevant costs pertaining to

PVRR Difference

the decision to install Wet versus Dry cooling CCCT

|

Year end 31 st March

Total

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

$000

$000

$000

$000

$000

$000

(13,800)

9,888

2008 onwards 1
$000

Investment
Capital Expenditure (Sect 4)

(3,912)

Capital Contribution (Sect 4)

0

Terminal Value (Sect 6)

41,161

41,161

Impact on
Revenue
Cash Operating Costs

78,325

1,205

1,170

75,950

(73)

(16)

(41)

(17)

1,189

1,129

117,095

117,095

Change m Working Capital

0

Cash Taxes (See below)

0

[Free Cash Flow

115,501

NPV at 7.5% nominal post-tax

0

(13,800)

9,888

10,414

Tax Calculation
119,413

1,189

1,129

Tax Allowances (Sect 12)

(3,912)

(549)

(206)

(3,157)

Taxable Profit

115,501

640

923

113,938

43,833

243

350

43,240

Operating Profit pre Deprec

Tax Payable @

37 95 %

'CONFIDENTIAL
September 2001
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I

Key assumptions impacting on project PVRR

% Movement m

Revised PVRR

Change m P V R R

$000

$000

key assumption

(17,288)

[Base Case
[Wet versus Dry Heat rate and Capacity Derate

-30%

(11,644)

50%

(26,646)

5,644

(9,358)1

[Water Pipeline Construction Cost

32%

32°/o

(23,092)

(11,484)

(5,804)

5,804

HLH Official Market Prices

Low

High

(13,539)

(21,195)

3,749

(3,907)1

[Avoided Dry Condenser Cost

-3%

17%

(16,127)

(23,092)

1,161

(5,804)1

3.b. Risk and Sensitivity Analysis NPV

1

% Movement in

Key assumptions impacting on project NPV

Revised NPV

Change in NPV

$000

$000

key assumption

10,414

[Base Case
[Wet versus Dry Heat rate and Capacity Derate

-30%

50%

6,781

16,439

(3,633)

6,025

[Water Pipeline Construction Cost

-32%

32%

14,362

6,467

3,948

(3,947)

HLH Official Market Prices

Low

High

8,001

12,929

(2,413)

2,515

-3%

17%

9,625

14,362

(789)

3,948

2003
$000

2004
$000

2005
$000

2006
$000

[Avoided Dry Condenser Cost

4. Investment Snmmary
[

Year end 31 st March

Total
$000

2007
$000

2008 onwards 1
$000

[Fixed Assets
1

Land & Buildings

1

Plant &. Machinery

1

Fixtures & Fittings

1

Design Expenditure

0
(15,038)

0

13,800

0

0

0

13,800

0

0

0

0

0

5,150

0

0

0

828

0

0

0

(9,060)

0

0

ol

0

0

0 1

0

(15,038)

0

[Contingency

Surcharge @

0

0

Other Related Expenditure

AFUDC @

0

18,950

0
6%

828

%_

0

Capital Contributions & G r a n t s
Total Capital E x p e n d i t u r e

0
4,740

C h a n g e in W o r k i n g Capital
Inventory

0

Receivables

0

Others

0

jTotal W o r k i n g C a p i t a l Investment

5.

0

Procurement Strategy Overview
(If applicable, include a Summary of Quotes/Tenders Obtained)
Value of Q u o t e ($000)

[Supplier/Contractor
[Geneva Steel

S«pitmb« 2001
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$13,800,000

CONFIDENTIAL
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6.

Basis for terminal valuation

{Section for describing valuation approach (sale, liquidation, scrap, perpetuity/remaining
\contmumg business) and key

life calculation relating tc

assumptions

Waterrightsare sold at the end of the 35-year project life for a value equal to the purchase pnce
plus escalation at 3% per annum

7, Information on Discarded Assets
Residual Value
$000

Net Book Value
$000

Description of Asset

0

Water rights sold at end of 35 year project

Profit/(Loss)
$000

41,161

41,161

8. Profit Impact
!

Total

Year end 31 st March:

2003

2004

2005

sooo_ .

SQQQ

2006
,

,

1,205

i 78,325

Project Revenues or Cost Reductions

SOOO

8

2007
SOOO

2008 onwards 1

1

1,170
9

sooo
75,950
462

Less Project Direct Costs

479

Less Project OMAG

(552)

(24)

(49)

(479)

(4,740)

(1351

(135)

(4,469)

994

71,464 1

Less Depreciation
Operating ProOt
Interest @

0

0

73,512

0
(531)

(2,807)

6 99 %

1,054
(182)

(170)

41,161

Profit/(Loss) on Disposals (Sect 7)
Provisions

828

Profit Before Tax

112,694

828

(42,767)

Tax

0

0

0

0

0__

0

69,927

[Profit After Tax

(1,924)
41,161

297

871

("3) .,,.. (331)
541
185

824

110,702

(313)

(42,011)

511

68,691

9. Timing and Milestones

S"

When is approval required by ?
9-Apr-03

U

When will contracts/orders

be placed

7

One to two months after PPW Board approval (expect April 17, 2003)

r
U

When will the project commence

operation (month/year)

?

Upon completion o f purchase contract

When will the project end (month/year) ?
Indefinite

0?NF/DENTML
Septambar 2001
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Westlaw,
974P.2d821
974 P.2d 821, 14 IER Cases 1498, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d 1157, 363 Utah Adv. Rep. 16, 1999 UT 16
(Cite as: 974 P.2d 821)

H
Supreme Court of Utah.
WATER & ENERGY SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGY,
INC., Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Steven L. KEIL, Defendant and Appellant.
No. 980250.
Feb. 19, 1999.
Employer alleged misappropriation of trade secrets
by its former water treatment chemical salesman
and sought preliminary injunction to enjoin disclosure of trade secrets. The District Court, Farmington
Department, Rodney S. Page, J., granted the preliminary injunction. Employee's petition for interlocutory appeal was granted. The Supreme Court,
Durham, Associate C.J., held that employer failed
to establish prima facie case that its former employee misappropriated employer's product formulae or
prices.
Reversed.
West Headnotes
[1] Appeal and Error 30 € ^ 9 5 4 ( 1 )
30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30XV1(H) Discretion of Lower Court
30k950 Provisional Remedies
30k954 Injunction
30k954(l) k. In General. Most
Cited Cases
Appellate court will not disturb a district court's
grant of a preliminary injunction unless the district
court abused its discretion or rendered a decision
against the clear weight of the evidence. Rules
Civ.Proc, Rule 65A(e).
[2] Injunction 212 €^>147

Page 1

212IV Preliminary and Interlocutory Injunctions
212IV(A) Grounds and Proceedings to Procure
2121 V(A)4 Proceedings
212k 147 k. Counter Affidavits and
Other Evidence. Most Cited Cases
To establish substantial likelihood that applicant
will prevail on the merits of the underlying claim,
as element for issuance of preliminary injunction,
applicant must at the very least make a prima facie
showing that the elements of its underlying claim
can be proved. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 65 A(e)(4).
| 3 | Antitrust and Trade Regulation 29T €^>414
29T Antitrust and Trade Regulation
29TIV Trade Secrets and Proprietary Information
29T1V(A) In General
29Tk414 k. Elements of Misappropri*
ation. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 382k984 Trade Regulation, 379kl0(5))
To establish a claim for misappropriation of trade
secrets by employee, employer was required to
show: (1) existence of a trade secret; (2) communication of the trade secret to employee under express or implied agreement limiting disclosure of
the secret; and (3) employee's use of the secret that
injured employer.
|4| Injunction 212 €^>147
212 Injunction
212IV Preliminary and Interlocutory Injunctions
212IV(A) Grounds and Proceedings to Procure
212IV(A)4 Proceedings
212k 147 k. Counter Affidavits and
Other Evidence. Most Cited Cases
Employer failed to establish prima facie case that
its former water treatment chemical salesman misappropriated employer's product formulae or prices,
as required for preliminary injunction to enjoin dis-

212 Injunction

© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.

974P.2d821
974 P.2d 821, 14 IER Cases 1498, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d 1157, 363 Utah Adv. Rep. 16, 1999 UT 16
(Cite as: 974 P.2d 821)
closure of trade secrets; employer did not submit
formulae or price sheets to trial court, and similarities between employer's formulae and the formulae
for new employer's products could be explained by
industry or regulatory demands. Rules Civ.Proa,
Rule 65A(e)(4).
*821 Joseph C. Rust, Salt Lake City, for Appellee.
Thomas R. Blonquist, Salt Lake City, for Appel- lant.
DURHAM, Associate Chief Justice:
f 1 We granted appellant Steven Keil's petition for
an interlocutory appeal from the district court's
grant of a preliminary injunction in favor of
plaintiff Water & Energy Systems Technology, Inc.
("WEST").
f 2 For approximately twelve years prior to March
2, 1998, Keil worked for WEST as a water treatment chemical salesman. Keil voluntarily terminated his employment with WEST on March 2,
1998, and accepted a similar sales position with one
of
WESTs
competitors,
Brody
Chemical
("Brody"). Keil did not have an employment contract with WEST nor did he sign a covenant not to
compete with WEST should he terminate his employment with them. In the month prior to leaving
WEST, Keil made several service calls for Brody
and researched the availability of chemical ingredients for some of Brody's products. Keil also had
meetings with Brody to discuss the viability of
Brody's plans to increase its presence in the water
treatment chemical business. During those meetings, Brody assured Keil that Brody's products
could compete with WESTs.
f 3 While working for WEST, Keil had access to
the formulae and prices for WEST'S water treatment
chemicals. During *822 his employment, Keil derived most of his commissions from sales of water
treatment chemicals to Hill Air Force Base, Alliant
Technologies, Laidlaw, Magnesium Corporation,
Utah State University and E.G. & G. Immediately
after leaving WESTs employ, Keil contacted the
above clients to solicit their business for Brody,

Page 2

claiming that Brody's products were "very similar"
to WESTs.
H 4 On March 9, 1998, WEST filed a complaint
against Keil in district court alleging misappropriation of trade secrets. WEST claimed that Keil had
misappropriated WESTs formulae and prices for its
water treatment chemicals and supplied them to
Brody, thereby giving Brody and Keil an unfair
competitive advantage over WEST. At the time it
filed the complaint, WEST also filed a motion for a
preliminary injunction to enjoin Keil from contacting the six major clients he had while working for
WEST and to prohibit Keil from disclosing to
Brody any confidential information obtained from
WEST. The district court heard and granted
WESTs motion for preliminary injunction. Keil
then filed a motion for relief from the preliminary
injunction and for a new trial. The district court
heard and denied Keil's motion. Keil then filed a
petition seeking permission to file an interlocutory
appeal from the district court's grant of the preliminary injunction. That petition was granted.
Tf 5 In this appeal, Keil asserts that the district court
erred in granting WESTs motion for a preliminary
injunction because WEST failed to meet its burden
of showing that (1) WEST would suffer irreparable
harm unless the injunction issued, (2) the injury to
WEST substantially outweighs the damage the injunction would cause Keil, and (3) WEST is likely
to succeed on the merits of the underlying action.
[I] 11 6 We will not disturb a district court's grant of
a preliminary injunction unless the district court abused its discretion or rendered a decision against
the clear weight of the evidence. See Kasco Services Corp. v. Benson, 831 P.2d 86, 90 (Utah 1992)
(citing System Concepts, Inc. v. Dixon, 669 P.2d
421, 425 (Utah 1983)).
H 7Rule 65A(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure sets forth the elements that must be present before a preliminary injunction may issue:
(1) The applicant will suffer irreparable harm un-
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less the order or injunction issues;
(2) The threshold injury to the applicant outweighs
whatever damage the proposed order or injunction
may cause the party restrained or enjoined.
(3) The order or injunction, if issued, would not be
adverse to the public interest; and
(4) There is a substantial likelihood that the applicant will prevail on the merits of the underlying
claim, or the case presents serious issues on the
merits which should be the subject of further litigation.
Utah R. Civ. P. 65A(e) (1998). Because we are persuaded that WEST failed to meet its burden under
subsection four above, we reverse the district
court's grant of a preliminary injunction.
[2] H 8 To meet the requirements of subsection four,
an applicant must, at the very least, make a prima
facie showing that the elements of its underlying
claim can be proved. See Utah State Road Comm'n
v. Friberg, 687 P.2d 821, 833 (Utah 1984)
(suggesting that prima facie showing of the elements of the underlying claim is required for issuance of preliminary injunction); see also Schwalm
Elecs. Inc. v. Electrical Prods. Corp., 14 Ill.App.3d
348, 302 N.E.2d 394, 397 (1973) (stating prima
facie case of misappropriation of trade secrets is necessary to support issuance of an injunction);
Paramount Office Supply Co. v. DA. hdaclsaac,
Inc. 524 A.2d 1099, 1101 (R.I. 1987) (requiring
prima facie evidence of misappropriation of customer list prior to ordering injunction).
[3] f 9 To establish a claim for misappropriation of
trade secrets, WEST must show (1) the existence of
a trade secret, (2) communication of the trade secret
to Keil under an express or implied agreement limiting disclosure of the secret, and (3) Keil's use of
the secret that injures WEST. See Microbiological
Research Corp. v. Muna, 625 P.2d 690, 697-98
(Utah 1981). "An employer to obtain relief must
establish that his former *823 employee's product is
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a copy of his own product." Id. at 696 (emphasis
added).
\ 10 Arguably, WEST established that its prices
and formulae for its water treatment chemicals were
secret and that it had an implied agreement with
Keil limiting disclosure of the prices and formulae.
In fact, even Keil's expert, Gary Loretitsch, testified
that in the water treatment chemical business ~ormulae and prices are usually proprietary ana held
confidential.
[4] 11 11 However, WEST failed to establish that
Keil copied its prices or its products and supplied
them to Brody. At the hearing, Keil introduced copies of Brody's formulae and Keil's best recollection
of WEST'S chemical formulae. The formulae are
not identical. Furthermore, Keil's expert testified
that although the formulae are somewhat similar,
there are significant differences between Brody's
and WEST'S formulae. Loretitsch explained that
Brody's formulae differ from WEST'S in three
ways. First, the individual ingredients in the formulae are different chemicals. Second, the percentages
of the individual chemicals present in each formula
are different. Finally, the ratios of the individual
components with respect to each other in Brody's
formulae are not the same as in WEST'S. The expert
then opined that Brody's formulae are not copied
from WESTs. He then accounted for the similarities between WEST and Brody formulae by explaining that to some extent all the chemical formulations in this industry are driven by market and regulatory forces.
U 12 In contrast, WEST neither submitted its formulae to the trial court nor did it supply a price sheet.
The court was forced to rely on Keil's best guess as
to WESTs formulae and WEST'S representation
that the prices were the same. WEST did not introduce any expert testimony regarding whether
Brody's formulae had in fact been copied from
WEST. WEST relied on the self-serving statements
of its president, Frank Leaver, who stated that
Brody sold "almost duplicate products" after Keil
began working for them. Notably, however, Leaver
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did not testify that Brody's formulae were copies of
WESTs.
f 13 In addition to his expert's testimony, Keil introduced evidence illustrating that the water treatment chemical industry is relatively easy to break
into. Several industry publications set forth suggested general chemical make-ups for water treatment
chemicals. Both Keil and Brody president John Liddiard described how Brody arrived at the formulations for its products through consultation with
Buckman Laboratories and affirmed that it did not
copy its formulae from WEST.
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Utah, 1999.
Water & Energy Systems Technology, Inc. v. Keil
974 P.2d 821, 14 IER Cases 1498, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d
1157, 363 Utah Adv. Rep. 16, 1999 UT 16
END OF DOCUMENT

f 14 Finally, the district court's own findings support our conclusion that the injunction was improperly granted. The court's findings indicate that it believed WESTs formulae, although not exact duplicates, were "very similar" to Brody's. Similarities
which can be explained by industry or regulatory
demands cannot suffice to meet the requirement
that Brody copied WESTs confidential formulae,
especially in light of the abundant testimony that
the formulae were not copied and the substantial
amount of information in the public domain regarding water treatment chemicals. WEST had the burden of producing evidence that would establish that
its formulae were in fact stolen by Keil for use by
Brody. It is hard to see how this burden could possibly have been met when WEST never submitted
actual formulae to the trial court for comparison
purposes.
K 15 In light of the foregoing, we find that the district court's grant of the preliminary injunction was
against the clear weight of the evidence. WEST did
not meet its burden of establishing a prima facie
case that Keil copied confidential information and
supplied that information to Brody. Consequently,
we reverse the district court's grant of a preliminary
inj unction.
Chief Justice HOWE, Justice STEWART, Justice
ZIMMERMAN, and Justice RUSSON concur in
Associate Chief Justice DURHAM'S opinion.
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Inventor appealed
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Judge, held that:
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mitted by self-interested employees of corporate
competitor when considering whether competitor
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(Formerly 382k 1002 Trade Regulation)
Inventor did not show shared innovative features
between his device and competitor's device, to
show misappropriation of trade secret under Tennessee law through circumstantial evidence, after
competitor's employees denied use or sharing of inventor's information after being given access to it
through proposal, where inventor's experts did not
state which characteristics of inventor's device, if
any, rendered his device innovative or novel and
gave him advantage in market over prior art and
mere facts that inventor had trade secret and
devices were generally similar did not mean that
pertinent similarity had been shown to permit inference of use, West's T.C.A § 47-25-1701 etseq.
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29Tk414 k. Elements of Misappropriation. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 382k984 Trade Regulation)
The four elements under Tennessee law for misappropriation of a trade secret are: (1) the existence of
a trade secret; (2) communication of the trade secret
to the defendant while in a position of trust and
confidence; (3) defendant's use of the communicated information; and (4) resulting detriment to the
plaintiff. West's T.C.A. § 47-25-1701 et seq.
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Evidence. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 3 82k 1002 Trade Regulation)
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features.
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use is permitted in a trade-secret case. West's
T.C.A. §47-25-1701 et seq.
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Under Tennessee law, misappropriation of a trade
secret requires that an idea not be one that is
already used by others. West's T.C.A. § 47-25-1701
et seq.
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?{>I Antitrust and I ade Regulation
29TIV Trade Secrets and Proprietary Information
29 rrV(A) In Genera!
29TM13 k. What Are "Trade Secrets" or
Other Protected Proprietary Information, in General. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 382k984 Trade Regulation)
Under Tennessee law, identification of the trade
secret that provides the owner with an advantage in
the market is necessary for determining whether the
pertinent similarity implies that a competitor used
his secret; the analysis of similarity evaluates only
relevant, innovative features, not all possible congruence. West's T.C.A. § 47-25-1701 et seq.
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29T1V(B) Actions
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for conversion of intangible property, or trade
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seq.
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Chief I hiked States District Ji dge for the
Southern :>isinr- o,,[)hii> sim ie b^ de*tg
nation.

Plaintiff Dr. Alexander S;;MK:nM; -A*.- cleared J
catheter device and shared hi: de^-is <or 'hi
device with Defendant Cordis Corporation, brought
this federal diversity suit against Cordis for mi sap
propriation of a trade secret, wrongful benefit, and
breach of contract. The district court; granted summary judgment to Cordis, and Dr. Stratienko appeals. He challenges (1) the district court's reliance
on self-interested declarations of Cordis employees,
(2) the district court's determination that circumstantial evidence can never create a genuine issue
of material fact in trade-secret cases, and (3) the
district court's determination that the Tennessee tort
of conversion does not extend to conversion of
trade secrets.

Patents 29! €=>328(2)
291 Patents
291XIII Decisions, ou UK- wdidir * oi,;t;,.,i^« ,
and Infringement of Particular Patent
291k328 Patents Enumerated
291k328(2) k. Original Utility. Most
Cited Case;*
5,066,285, • xo- M.^d.

The district court properly relied on declarations of
Cordis employees notwithstanding the employees'
self-interest. Also, although Tennessee law likely
provides that Dr. Stratienko was entitled to an opportunity to demonstrate that Cordis used his catheter design by relying on circumstantial evidence.
Dr. Stratienko failed to proffer sufficient evidence
of similarity between his trade secret and Cordis'
catheter to create a genuine issue of material fact
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concerning use by Cordis of Dr. Stratienko's secret.
Summary judgment was, therefore, appropriate on
his claims for misappropriation, wrongful benefit,
and breach of contract. Dr. Stratienko's other contentions on appeal are without merit, and we accordingly affirm the judgment of the district court.
I.
Dr. Stratienko's device is a modified catheter used
for gaining medical access to blood vessels. Cordis
explained the conventional medical practice associated with catheters in the following manner, which
is consistent with the description of conventional
practice in Dr. Stratienko's patent:
An interventional cardiology procedure generally begins by inserting a hollow needle into the
femoral artery, which is located close to the surface of the skin in the groin area. A wire called a
guidewire is then inserted through the needle into
the artery, and the needle is withdrawn. Another
device called a sheath is then inserted over the
guidewire into the artery. A sheath is a 4-9 inch
hollow tube with a valve at the end which remains outside the body ("proximal end"). The
valve prevents excess blood loss. The sheath remains in place throughout the procedure.
*595 Next, a 35-40 inch hollow tube called a
guiding catheter is inserted through the sheath
and into the artery. The guiding catheter has a
soft, flexible tip at the end that is inserted into the
patient ("distal end"). The distal end positions the
catheter into a specific blood vessel within the
heart ("coronary artery"). The guiding catheter
also remains in place throughout the procedure.
Other medical devices such as angioplasty balloons and stents can be inserted through the guiding catheter and into the patient's coronary artery
to treat the blockage.
Appellee's Br. at 4-5.
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and a catheter with a preformed distal end. While
the record is surprisingly unclear as to the benefits
of the unified sheath-catheter, it appears that it allows a smaller puncture hole while providing necessary support during the invasive procedure. The
preformed distal end is soft and flexible, which allows more precise engagement of targeted segments. His design also has holes at the end of the
catheter, allowing direct delivery of x-ray contrast
fluid to a segment of the targeted vessel; traditional
delivery of contrast fluid must first displace blood
to reach the intended segment.
On May 25, 1999, Dr. Stratienko, a Tennessee resident, sent a letter and Nondisclosure Agreement to
Cordis Corporation. Cordis is a Florida corporation
with its principal place of business in New Jersey,
and is a subsidiary of Johnson & Johnson. In August 1999, Cordis' Associate Manager of Business
Development William Scheessele proposed changes
to the agreement and faxed them to Dr. Stratienko.
Over a period of months, the parties negotiated the
terms of the agreement. Cordis deleted portions regarding remedies for breach and regarding return of
the materials. The agreement specifically provided
that Dr. Stratienko's information was a trade secret.
The parties executed the agreement in November
1999. On December 12, 1999, Dr. Stratienko submitted his patent application and a description of
his "sheath catheter" to Scheessele.
Cordis' internal written policy states that "Reviews
[of submitted proposals] will be conducted by
members of New Business Development, New
Product Strategy, Legal, and to a lesser degree,
senior members of R & D. It is our goal to minimize exposing our innovative engineering talent pool
to external ideas, to safeguard our interests to our
own internal inventions." Scheessele provided Dr.
Stratienko's submitted material to Cordis' in-house
counsel Paul Coletti in mid-December 1999. Both
Scheessele and Coletti declare that they discussed
Dr. Stratienko's proposal, but they deny discussing
the proposal with anyone else at Cordis or Johnson
& Johnson. Scheessele declares that he kept the

Dr. Stratienko submitted a patent application for a
"sheath catheter." His design combines a sheath
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proposal in his locked file cabinet at all times, but
Coletti cannot remember whether he placed the
documents in a locked cabinet or safe. On January
17, 2000, Cordis advised Dr. Stratienko that Cordis
was not interested in his proposal. Coletti returned
the related documents, at the latest, by midFebruary and kept no copies.
On April 7, 2000. , Cordis submitted a combined
sheath and guiding catheter, which it called the
Vista Brite Tip Introducer Guiding Catheter, for
FDA approval. The FDA approved it on A pi il 28,
2000. Cordis sales documents establish that Cordis
manufactured and shipped "seventy-eight Vista
Brite I ip IG Catheters as of May 29, 2000."
Dr.. Stratienko alleges that Cordis has given varying
reasons for its rejection of his proposal. According
to Dr. Stratienko, *596 Scheessele originally told
him that Cordis was not interested because Dr. Stratienko's proposal was not within Cordis' productdevelopment budget, and Scheessele later told him
that the company had no interest in his invention.
Scheessele stated at his deposition that the proposal
did not meet Cordis' needs. Dr. Stratienko further
alleges that Coletti told Dr. Stratienko's patent attorney that a U.S. Patent (No. 5,066,285, the Hillstead Patent) disclosed a combination sheath-catheter method similar to Cordis' Vista Brite Tip IG
Catheter. Dr. Stratienko also stated in his affidavit
that, for the first time in August 2002, Cordis informed him that another U.S. Patent (No.
5,897,497, the Fernandez Patent) disclosed the
combination sheath-catheter. Cordis does not challenge that it gave Dr. Stratienko several reasons for
its disinterest.
Dr.. S'tratienko filed suit in I Iamilton Coun'ty Circuit
Court on November 21, 2001, and Cordis removed
the case to the federal district court for the Eastern
District of Tennessee in January 2002. Dr. Stratienko alleged that Cordis had misappropriated, converted, and wrongfully benefitted from his ideas;
breached the Nondisclosure Agreement; and committed theft of a trade secret under Tennessee's Uniform Trade Secret Act, Tenn.Code Ann. §§

i. Lt
- -"' * vid.^ .'MVWJ IJI **innlary judgment <>; all o! I >? Stratienko's claim.. The primary
pieces of evidence submitted were (1) deposition
testimony and declarations of both Scheessele and
Coletti and (2) Micheline Johnson and David Hill's
expert reports submitted by Dr. Stratienko. David
Hill was Dr. Stratienko's patent attorney. Both experts stated that neither the HiII.stead rioi the
Fernandez patents "teach" the sheath-catheter
design, and both determined that Dr. Stratienko's
proposal shared all the "salient features" of the
Vista Brite Tip IG, except for the holes at the distal
end.
In October 2003, the district court granted Cordis'
motion for summary judgment in full. The district
court reasoned that, because this circuit requires
direct evidence of use in trade-secret cases and because Dr. Stratienko offered only circumstantial
evidence of use, Dr. Stratienko was unabk- to
demonstrate that Cordis used his idea. Witmsu*
evidence that Cordis used his secret, Dr. Strarienku
was unable to rebut the evidence of Cordis' em.Vioy
ees, who denied discussing his ideas with M -UV,
else. Dr. Stratienko's claims for misappropriation,
breach of contract, and wrongful benefit all failed,
therefore, as a matter of law. The coun alsr. -1« -ained that there was no violation ol the b^-- ;r»
Trade Secret Act because Cordis' alleged theft in
April and May 2000 occurred before the July 2000
effective date of the Tennessee statute. Finally, the
district eojrt held that Tennessee does not recognize a civ'- -••• of action for conversion oftra.de secrets.
Earlier, during March 2003, Dr. Stratienko had
moved for leave to amend his complaint so that he
could add a patent-infringement claim involving a
patent that is irrelevant to his trade-secret claims,
and the district court had granted the motion in
April. In February 2004, Dr. Stratienko moveJ =W
voluntary dismissal of this claim, but the -.,* up
denied his request. In March 2004, Cordis mi^ed
for summary judgment, arguing that ->r. Strati en
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ko's patent was not new because Cordis had patented a combined sheath-catheter in 1997, over a year
before Dr. Stratienko filed his first patent application, This was the first time that Cordis had produced any evidence of its patented 1997 Webster
Guiding Sheath. On the eve of the summary judgment hearing, Dr. Stratienko *597 moved for voluntary dismissal with prejudice of his patentinfringement claim. The district court granted the
motion in October 2004.
Dr. Stratienko appeals the district court's October
2003 grant of summary judgment in favor of Cordis. He challenges the rejection of each of his original claims, except for the claim under Tennessee's
Uniform Trade Secrets Act. We affirm because (1)
the district court properly considered the declarations of Cordis employees in determining that
Cordis, as the moving party, satisfied its burden of
demonstrating that no genuine issue of material fact
existed; (2) Dr. Stratienko did not respond with sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Cordis used his catheter
design; and (3) Tennessee's cause of action for conversion does not extend to conversion of trade
secrets.

II.
This court reviews the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo. See United States v.
Miami Univ., 294 F.3d 797, 805 (6th Cir.2002).
Summary judgment is appropriate only when no
genuine issue of material fact exists and when the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). This court must view the
facts contained in the record and draw all inferences from the record in the light most favorable to
the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.
v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct.
1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). This court cannot
weigh the evidence or determine the truth of any
matter in dispute, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
All U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 9*1 L.Ed.2d 202
(1986), because this court determines only whether
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the case contains sufficient evidence from which a
jury could reasonably find for the nonmoving party,
id at 248-49, 106 S.Ct. 2505. If the moving party
fulfills its burden of demonstrating that no genuine
issue of material fact exists, the nonmoving party,
to receive a trial, must present some significant probative evidence creating a factual issue. Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, All U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct.
2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Because Cordis met
its burden and Dr. Stratienko failed to meet his,
summary judgment was proper.

III.
[1] Cordis submitted declarations by Coletti and
Scheessele, in which they deny sharing Dr. Stratienko's information with anyone else at Cordis. Although these declarations came from self-interested
employees, Cordis can rely on those denials to
demonstrate that no genuine issue of material fact
exists because Dr. Stratienko has not impeached the
declarants' credibility. Dr. Stratienko argues that
the following language in Reeves v Sanderson
Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 151, 120 S.Ct.
2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (quoting 9A Charles
Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice
and Procedure at 300 (2d ed.1995)), precludes the
district court from considering Scheessele and
Coletti's declarations in deciding a motion for sum
mary judgment and thus leaves Cordis with no
evidence denying use: "[T]he court should give credence to the evidence favoring the nonmovant as
well as that 'evidence supporting the moving party
that is uncontradicted and unimpeached, at least to
the extent that that evidence comes from disinterested witnesses.' " rNI Dr. Stratienko misinterprets *598 the import of this language to mean that
courts may never consider affidavits of interested
persons when the affidavits are submitted by a
moving party.
FN1. Although Reeves concerned whether,
under Fed.R.Civ.P. 50, sufficient evidence
existed to support a jury verdict in an agediscrimination case, the unanimous Court
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stated that "the standard for granting summary judgment 'mirrors' the standard for
judgment as a matter of law, such that 'the
inquiry under each is the same.' " Reeves,
530 U.S. at 150, 120 S.Ct. 2097 (citations
omitted). rhus, Reeves ' analysis is relevant to our summary judgment analysis.
This court has already considered this issue in Almond v, ABB Indus. Sys., Inc., 56 Fed.Appx. 672,
2003 WL 173640 (6th Cir. Jan.22, 2003) (per curiam), and held that courts can consider the testimony
of a moving party's interested witnesses. The court
held that the interpretation of Reeves advocated by
Dr. Stratienko "leads to absurd consequences" because defendants will often be able to respond only
through the testimony of their employees. Almond,
56 Fed.Appx. 672, 2003 WL 173640, at *2. To support its conclusion, the Almond court cited additional language from Federal Practice and Procedure;
"The testimony of an employee of [the movant]
must be taken as true when it disclosed no lack of
candor, the witness was not impeached, his credibility was not questioned, and the accuracy of his
testimony was not controverted by evidence
...."Wright & Miller at 287 n. 9. Almond 's holding
is consistent with Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v, Martin, 283 U.S. 209, 218, 51 S.Ct. 453, 75'L.Ed. 983
(1931), in which the Supreme Court stated that
courts need not deny the conclusiveness of testimony of the moving party that "is not contradicted
by direct evidence, nor by any legitimate inferences
from the evidence^]" because the rule requiring
that testimony be considered by the jury is not "an
absolute and inflexible one." Almond and Chesapeake establish that the issue, therefore, is not
whether the district court could consider the affidavits of Cordis but instead whether the affidavits
were uncontradicted
Dr. Stratienko unsuccessfully contends that the fol
lowing pieces of evidence so impeach or controvert
the testimony of Scheessele and Coletti that their
testimony is not sufficient for summarv judgment:
(1) Cordis did not follow • ::>.;••••, .^h*-. P )
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(VleUi -.'-n hi> .'lila- unlocked. i3) Coletti :t:\tined
Dr. Stratienko's information for weeks after he declined the proposal, (4) Cordis recommended
changes to the Nondisclosure Agreement, and (5)
Cordis provided several reasons for declining the
proposal. Because none of these facts, however, impeach Scheessele and Coletti's testimony, the district court correctly relied upon Cordis" declara- tions.
Cordis followed its internal policy, and thus the internal policy has no bearing on the declarants' credibility. Dr. Stratienko argues that Cordis' policy,
stating that reviews "will be conducted by members
of New Business Development, New Product
Strategy, Legal, and to a lesser degree, senior mem
bers of R & D[J" impeaches the declarants' testimony that they were the only individuals to see his
proposal. There is no inconsistency here. Cordis established the policy "to minimize exposing our innovative engineering talent pool to external ideas,
to safeguard our interests to our own internal inventions." The policy does not mandate that other individuals read tf ic proposal. Its purpose, as evid
enced by "to a lesser degree," is to limit the individuals who have access to secrets. In this case,
consistent with the policy, Scheessele, a member of
New Business Development, and Coletti, a member
of the legal department, examined the proposal. The
fact that the policy may have permitted others to
view the proposal does *599 not create any evidence that they, in fact, viewed it.
Coletti's uncertainty as to whether he kept Dr. Stratienko's documents in a locked or unlocked office
fails to impeach his testimony that he did not share
Dr. Stratienko's information with others at Cordis.
Dr. Stratienko contends that Coletti said that the
documents were left in an unlocked office. But
Coletti, instead, said that he was unsure whether the
documents were locked away. The small possibility
that the documents were stolen or viewed sub rosa
by being in a potentially unlocked office does not
impeach Coletti's testimony that he did not share
Dr. Stratienko's information with anyone at Cordis,
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Likewise, Coletti's retention of Dr. Stratienko's information for weeks after he declined the proposal
does not contradict the declarations. Although Dr.
Stratienko argues that Coletti's retention of the documents creates a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether Cordis used the documents, the retention
does not demonstrate in any way that Cordis used
the information or that Coletti shared the information with anyone else. Any allowable inference that
the retention of documents for a few weeks increases the probability that Cordis shared them with
Research and Development is too tenuous to create
a genuine issue of material fact as to use.

Moreover, relying on two patents provides good
reason why Cordis was uninterested. Even assuming that the recitation of several reasons creates
credibility issues as to why Cordis declined the proposal, it does not make it any more likely that the
proposal was given to others or used in any way.
Dr. Stratienko's attempts to impeach the declarants'
credibility thus are insufficient to require the conclusion that the district court could not consider the
declarations submitted by Cordis in considering
whether Cordis met its burden of demonstrating the
absence of any genuine issue of material fact.

That Cordis had recommended changes to the
Nondisclosure Agreement in no way impeaches the
testimony of Scheessele and Coletti. Dr. Stratienko
argues that, because Cordis' suggested changes affected the remedies and the return of documents,
the declarants' credibility is impeached. Both Cordis and Dr. Stratienko negotiated the details of the
agreement, and the agreement contains several provisions that protect Dr. Stratienko. Dr. Stratienko
never explains how the revised terms, reached at
arm's length, affect credibility or make it any more
likely that Cordis used the proposal.

IV.

Dr. Stratienko's final argument-that Cordis' several
reasons for declining the proposal impeach the declarants' testimony-also fails because the various
reasons are not contradictory. According to Dr.
Stratienko, Coletti gave only one reason: that the
Hillstead patent disclosed the catheter-sheath combination. Scheessele gave three reasons: (1) that
Cordis was not interested; (2) that the proposal did
not meet Cordis' needs; and (3) that the proposal
was not within Cordis' budget. Dr. Stratienko also
alleges that Cordis later said that the Fernandez patent disclosed the catheter-sheath combination.
None of these reasons is inconsistent with another.
Cordis could have been uninterested because the
proposal was not within its budget and did not meet
its needs. Reliance on two other patents also raises
no inconsistency because Cordis was not limited to
only one patent from which to glean inspiration.

[2] Because Cordis' declarations satisfied Cordis'
burden, the burden of creating a genuine issue of
material fact shifted to Dr. Stratienko, who failed to
produce sufficient*600 evidence of use to create a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether Cordis
used his secret. The district court held that Dr. Stratienko could not demonstrate that Cordis used his
design through circumstantial evidence of (1) Cordis1 access to Dr. Stratienko's secret and (2) the similarity between Dr. Stratienko's secret and Cordis'
catheter. Even assuming that circumstantial evidence in the form of access and similarity may in
some cases be sufficient evidence of use, such evidence is not sufficient here. Dr. Stratienko's evidence
fails to identify which, if any, innovative features
his and Cordis' designs share, and he is, therefore,
unable to show sufficient relevant similarity to permit a circumstantial inference in this case. In light
of the uncontested declarations of Cordis' employees and Dr. Stratienko's failure to produce sufficient evidence of shared innovative features, there
is no genuine issue of material fact that Cordis used
Dr. Stratienko's design.
[3] [4] The district court accurately described the
four elements under Tennessee law for misappropriation of a trade secret: (1) the existence of a
trade secret; (2) communication of the trade secret
to the defendant while in a position of trust and
confidence; (3) defendant's use of the communic-
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ated information; and (4) resulting detriment to the
plaintiff. See Hickory Specialties, Inc. v. B & L
Labs,,
Inc.,
592 ' S.W.2d
583,
586
(Tenn.Ct.App.1979) (citing Smith v. Dravo Corp.,
203 F.2d 369, 373 (7th Cir.1953)). Ihe issue in this
case concerns the third element-whether Cordis
used the confidential information that Dr. Stratienko communicated in his proposal. The parties have
not referred to and we have not discovered any
Tennessee cases considering whether parties may
-*'!• MI Jicumstantial evidence to prove use of a
•:a.i: secret. "Where the state supreme court has not
^pu^n, our task is to discern, from all available
sources, how that court would respond if confronted with the issue." Rector v. Gen Motors Corp.,
963 F.2d "144, 146 (6th Or. 1992).
|5J|()| Contrary to the district court's reasoning, a
strong argument could be made that courts may
properly consider circumstantial evidence concerning similarity of design plus access to the design to
imply use by a defendant of a trade secret. Other
circuit courts have permitted such an inference in
trade-secret and nondisclosure cases. See Sokol
Crystal Prods., Inc. v. DSC Commc'ns Corp., 15
F.3d 1427, 1432 (7th Cir.1994); see also Leggett &
Piatt, Inc. v. Hickory Springs Mfg., 285 F.3d 1353,
1361 (Fed.Cir.2002); Pioneer Hi-Bred Ml v.
Holden Found. Seeds, Inc., 35 F.3d 1226, 1239 (8th
Cir.1994); Eden Hannon & Co. v. Sumitomo Trust
& Banking Co., 914 F.2d 556, 561-62 (4th
Cir. 1990); Electro-Miniatures Corp. v. Wendon
Co., 771 F.2d 23, 26 (2d Cir. 1985); SI Handling
Sys. v.. Heisley, 753 F.2d 1244, 1261 (3d Cir.1985);
Droeger v. Welsh Sporting Goods Corp., 541 F.2d
790, 793 (9th Cir. 1976). Sufficient circumstantial
evidence of use in trade-secret cases must demonstrate that (1) the misappropriating party had access
to the secret and (2) the secret and the defendant's
design share similar features. See, e.g., Leggett &
Piatt, 285 F.3d at 1361; Droeger, 541 F.2d at 793.
These cases support the proposition that, once evidence of access and similarity is proffered, it is
"entirely reasonable for [the jury] to infer that
[defendant] used [plaintiffs] trade secret," Sokol,
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n K3dat 1432.
[7J Permitting an infereiu c ui u- *.
-,•>, ;dence of
access
and
similarity
^
,:• l because
"[misappropriation and misuse can rarely be
proved by convincing direct evidence.'1 Eden Hannon & Co., 914 F.2d at 561 (citing *6QlGreenberg
v. Croydon Plastics Co., 378 F.Supp. 806, 814
(E.D.Pa 1974) ). Presented with "defendants' witnesses who directly deny everything," plaintiffs are
often required to "construct a web of perhaps ambiguous circumstantial evidence from which the trier of fact may draw inferences which convince him
that it is more probable than not that what the
plaintiffs allege happened did in tact take place,"
Id. Thus, requiring direct evidence would foreclose
most trade-secret claims from reaching the jury because corporations rarely keep direct evidence of
their use ready for another party to discover. Caselaw from other circuits thus suggests that Tennessee
law would most likely permit circumstantial evidence of use in trade-secret cases.FN2
F"N2, Our unpublished opinion in American Relocation Network International v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 121 F.3d 707, i '9 '
WL 415313 (6th Cir July 21, 1997), is not.
to the contrary. In American Relocation,
the plaintiff shared with Wal-Mart her ide«i
for an automated real-estate computer s >
tei i i. Wal-Mart declined her proposal hvJ
later allowed another entity, with whirl- ^
had. been dealing during this same period,
to begin an automated real-estate vennu,.
Id. at *l-*2. The district court granuvl
summary judgment in favor of Wal-Man
on all claims, including one for misappropriation of a trade secret, because the district court determined that there was .-n
genuine issue of material fact regarding
unauthorized use of the secret. Id. at *2
On appeal, this court affirmed with respect
to the misappropriation claim, holding thai
the plaintiff "only offers indirect evident
from which a reasonable jury could M.I)
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speculate and could not reasonably conclude that the defendants made unauthorized use of [plaintiffs] secret. Because
[plaintiff] offers no concrete evidence to
overcome the motion for summary judgment, the district court's decision should be
affirmed."/^, at *3.
The case does not hold that circumstantial evidence is never sufficient for a
plaintiff to withstand summary judgment
in a trade-secret case. Instead, we held
only that the plaintiff failed to present
sufficient indirect evidence, such as
evidence
concerning
the
similarity
between her idea and the automated program that Wal-Mart ultimately embraced. We did not hold categorically
that indirect evidence was never permissible or that direct evidence was
mandatory.
In the case at bar, we assume that Dr. Stratienko
produced sufficient evidence of access: Cordis' declarations demonstrate that Cordis, the entity that
developed the Vista Brite IG Catheter, had access
to the information. It would be very burdensome to
require Dr. Stratienko to demonstrate that a particular inventor or designer had access. See Sokol, 15
F.3d at 1432 (stating that any plaintiff "would be
hard pressed to present direct proof of the flow of
information inside the defendant's company").
Dr. Stratienko, however, has not presented sufficient circumstantial evidence of similarity to withstand summary judgment. His evidence does not reveal which novel features Cordis' device shares
with Dr. Stratienko's device. His expert reports essentially state two facts: that (1) the Fernandez and
Hillstead patents do not "teach" the features of
Cordis' Vista Brite Tip IG Catheter and (2) the Stratienko device shares "all of the salient features
found in the Cordis IG."Both of these conclusions
are based on irrelevant comparisons. The experts'
first conclusion that Cordis' catheter is dissimilar
from the Fernandez and Hillstead catheters has no
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bearing on whether Cordis' and Stratienko's catheters are similar. The similarity inquiry is not a comparison of several products to determine which two
products are the most similar. Dr. Stratienko must,
instead, demonstrate similarity by comparing his
secret with the features of Cordis' catheter, not the
features of Cordis' catheter with the features of other catheters.
[8] The experts' conclusions that the catheters share
"all ... salient features" except the holes at the distal
end are also insufficient because their findings do
not reveal which feature was the secret that *602
Dr. Stratienko sought to protect. Misappropriation
of a trade secret requires that an idea not be one
that is already used by others. See Hickory Specialties, Inc., 592 S.W.2d at 586 (stating that the
device must give the creator "an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not use
it"). Dr. Stratienko must demonstrate similarity
between his secret idea (not his product in general)
and Cordis' device. See Leggett & Piatt, Inc., 285
F.3d at 1361. Instead, his experts state only that the
Stratienko device has a catheter-sheath combination, a preformed tip, and holes at the distal end. At
no point do his experts state which, if any, of these
characteristics renders his idea innovative.FN3 It is
entirely possible that the holes at the distal end,
which the Cordis design lacked, distinguished Dr.
Stratienko's device from prior art.FN4 We cannot
find in the record that Dr. Stratienko has presented
evidence of which features were novel to his
design, and thus he has failed to show sufficient
similarity between the innovative aspect of his idea
and Cordis' device to provide enough of a circumstantial inference to create a genuine issue of material fact.
FN3. At oral argument, counsel stated that
the combination of the sheath and catheter
was the novel feature. But the record
demonstrates only that Dr. Stratienko's
device had such a combination, not that the
features had never before been combined.
FN4. Cordis, in its brief, relies on evidence
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of its patented 1997 Webster Guiding
Sheath that it claims was the first combination sheath-catheter device. Because Cordis did not produce any evidence of the
1997 device at the time that the district
court granted the motion for summary
judgment in October 2003, we do not consider it. See White v. Anchor Motor
Freight, Inc., 899 F.2d 555, 559 (6th
Cir. 1990) (stating that on appeal "we review the case presented to the district court
rather than a better case fashioned aftei the
district court's order") (citation omitted).
[9] It is true that the parties have already conceded
that Dr. Stratienko had a trade secret. But this does
not mean that sufficient similarity has been shown
to permit an inference of use. The parties' implicit
concession that a trade secret exists does not identify the secret. Identifying the secret that r-tirM-k-Dr. Stratienko with an advantage in thv m.ir!-.•;
necessary for determining whether the puu,;
similarity implies that Cordis used his secret. I he
analysis of similarity evaluates only relevant, innovative features, not all possible congruence.
Without evidence of the advantage of Dr. Stratienko's device over prior art, there is not a sufficient
basis for a reasonable jury to make the circumstantial inference of use. Dr. Stratienko, therefore, has
not presented sufficient evidence to establish that
there is any genuine issue of material fact as to use,
and summary judgment was proper as to Dr. Stratienko's claims for misappropriation, wrongful benefit, and breach of contract,

[10] The district court also correctly determined
that Tennessee law does not recognize a cause of
action for conversion of trade secrets because no
decision of the Supreme Court of Tennessee calls
into doubt the state court of appeals' express holding rejecting a claim for con vers ion of intangible
property. In B & L Corp. v. Thomas & Thorngren,
Inc., 917 S.W.2d 674, 680 (Tenn.Ct App 1995), the
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Court of Appeals of I ennessee, after considering
the decisions of other courts and determining that
only a niinority of courts recognizes conversion of
intangible property, held that Tennessee does not
recognize an action for conversion of intangible
property. That court; has subsequently relied upon
its holding in B & L See *603Ra!ph v. Pipkin,
2005 WL 1220132, at *3 (Tenn.Ct.App. May 17,
2005); Corporate Catering, Inc. v. Corporate Catering, Etc., LLC, 2001 -;: - . M I ] lf *5
(Tenn.Ct.App. Mar.20, 200
Dr. Stratienko's invocation of language in a state
supreme court opinion, which he claims supports
recognizing conversioii of intangible property, is
unavailing because he misunderstands the import of
the language in that opinion. He points to the following sentence in Barger v. Webb, 216 1 mv 115
391 S.W.2d 664, 665 (1965) (emphasis added): "A
conversion, in the sense of the law of trover, >s Ik,
appropriation of the thing to the party's o^v-» use
and benefit, by the exercise of dominion uvei ^ .. 1;
He argues that, because "trover" appi-.^ \c personal
property, which includes intangible property, the
Supreme Court of Tennessee recognizes conve? >!<;n
of intangible property. The Supreme uun of "or
nessee's recognition that the modern tort of conversion grew out of the old writ for trover,™5
however, in no way implies that the modern tori extends to intangible property. Indeed, if anything, the
opposite conclusion is implied by the historical fact
that trover traditionally did not extend to intangible
property. See W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser &
Keeton on Torts 91 (5th ed. 1984). Because no opinion of the Supreme Court of Tennessee calls uric
doubt the state court of appeals' holding that i^n
nessee does not extend its cause of action to* ,ov
version to intangible property, we are unable to
conclude that Tennessee law recognizes a ion for
conversion of trade secrets.
FN5. At common law, recovery for damage to or loss of personal property e< ".,''< "H?
sought through two actions: trove* ind
trespass.
The
distinguishing
feature
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between these two causes of action was the
remedy and procedure, not the kind of
property subject to each action. Trover,
which evolved into modern conversion, became the preferred action because, unlike
trespass, it did not require the plaintiff to
accept the property in satisfaction of the
claim; instead, the plaintiff could demand
the full value of the property in damages.
See W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser & Keeton on Torts 89 (5th ed.1984). The supreme court recognized this history by referring to conversion "in the sense of
trover," and this is obvious from the context. The next sentence in the opinion discusses damages, not categories of property.
SeeBarger, 391 S.W.2d 664.

VI.
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
C.A.6 (Tenn.),2005.
Stratienko v. Cordis Corp.
429 F.3d 592, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d 1590, 2005 Fed.App.
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